THE

WORKS

OF

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THE PREFACE.

THE following collection of reflections and obſervations, thrown together almoſt without order or connection, was begun to pleaſe a good mother, who is herſelf capable of thinking. I at firſt only deſigned a tract of a few pages: but my ſubject proving involuntarily ſeductive, this treatiſe ſwelled inſenſibly into a kind of large work; too large, without doubt, for what it contains, but too little for the matter of which it treats. I was long in ſuſpenſe about its publication; and, in compoſing it, was frequently made ſenſible, by my labour, of the difference between having written a few pamphlets, and being equal to the compoſition of a book. After many fruitleſs efforts to do better, I judged it my duty to give it to the public as it is, conceiving it of importance to turn their attention to this object; with regard to which, though my notions ſhould be wrong,

yet if I ſhould thereby ſuggeſt right ones to others, I will not wholly loſe my time. A man, who, from the obſcurity of retirement, expoſes his writings to the public, without partiſans to defend, or puffers to recommend them; without even knowing what is either thought or ſaid of them, need be under no fear, that, if he is miſtaken, his errors will be adopted without examination.

I SHALL ſpeak little of the importance of a good education, nor ſhall I take upon me to prove that that method, which now is in uſe, is a bad one: a thouſand others have done ſo before me, and I do not incline to fill my book with things which all the world knows. I ſhall only obſerve, that, time out of mind, there has been a general outcry againſt the eſtabliſhed practice, without any body's thinking it proper to propoſe a better. The learning and ſcience of the preſent age tend rather to deſtroy than build up. To cenſure is magiſterial; but to propoſe one, muſt aſſume another tone, leſs ſuited to philoſophical arrogance. Notwithſtanding the ſhoal of performances that have appeared, all calculated, as it is pretended,

tended, to no other end but public utility, the moſt uſeful of all objects, the art of forming men, is ſtill forgotten. My ſubject was wholly new after Mr Locke's treatiſe; and I am apprehenſive it will be ſo ſtill after mine.

We are not ſufficiently acquainted with a ſtate of infancy; amidſt the many miſtaken ideas we entertain, the farther we proceed, the farther we wander from the point. The greateſt ſages apply themſelves to thoſe things which it concerns man to know, without conſidering what it is children are capable to learn. They are always ſeeking the man in the child, without reflecting what he is before he can be a man. It is to the ſtudy of this I have applied myſelf, to the end that, though my ſcheme ſhould be found chimerical and falſe, yet one might profit by my obſervations. I may have taken a very bad view of what ought to be done; but I conceive I have taken a good one of the ſubject to be wrought upon. Begin then, ye preceptors, to ſtudy your pupils better; for moſt aſſuredly you are not acquainted with them. Now, if you

you read this book with that view, I flatter myſelf it will not be without advantage.

WITH regard to what may be called the ſyſtematical part of this treatiſe, which is nothing elſe but the progreſs of nature, this is what will moſt bewilder the reader: on this, therefore, I ſhall undoubtedly be attacked, and perhaps not without reaſon. He will believe, that in place of reading a treatiſe of education, he is entertained with the reveries of a viſionary on the ſubject. What is to be done? I do not write from the ideas of others, but from my own. I do not ſee things altogether as other people; and have been long reproached on this account. But does it depend on me to give myſelf other eyes, or to be affected by other ideas? No. It is my fault if I am too vain of my own ſentiments, if I believe myſelf alone to be wiſer than all the reſt of the world. It is not poſſible for me to change my ſentiments, but to diſtruſt them: this is all I can do, and this I have done. If I ſometimes aſſume an affirmative tone, it is not with a view to impoſe on the reader, but only to tell him what I think. Why

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ſhould I propoſe any thing in the form of a doubt, of which I have not the leaſt doubt myſelf? I ſay exactly what paſſes in my own mind.

In declaring my ſentiments with freedom, I am ſo far from giving them as an authority, that I always ſubjoin my reaſons, to the end that the reader may weigh them, and judge for himſelf. But, though I do not incline to be obſtinate in the defence of my own notions, I think myſelf, however, not the leſs obliged to propoſe them; becauſe the maxims, concerning which I am of a very different opinion from other people, are not unimportant. They are ſuch whoſe truth or falſehood it is of conſequence to know, and which conſtitute the happineſs or miſery of mankind.

"Propose that which is practicable," is inceſſantly repeated to me. This is juſt the ſame as if one ſhould ſay, Propoſe what is really practiſed; or at leaſt, Propoſe ſomething good, not inconſiſtent with the preſent evil. Such a project, with reſpect to certain things, is much more chimerical than mine; for, by ſuch a combination, the

the good is ſpoiled, and the evil is not removed. I had rather follow the eſtabliſhed practice entirely, than adopt a good one by halves: there would be leſs contradiction in man: it is not in his power to tend two oppoſite ways. Fathers and mothers, what is feaſible only ye are willing to do. But ought I to comply with your inclination?

In every ſort of projects, there are two things to be conſidered; firſt, the abſolute good of the ſcheme itſelf; and ſecondly, the facility of putting it in execution.

With regard to the firſt, it is ſufficient, provided the ſcheme be admiſſible and practicable in itſelf, that its merit conſiſts in the nature of the thing: in the preſent caſe, for inſtance, that the education propoſed to be ſuited to man, and well adapted to the human heart.

The ſecond conſideration depends on relations acquired in certain ſituations; relations accidental to the thing itſelf, of conſequence not abſolutely neceſſary, and capable of infinite diverſity. Thus a ſcheme of education may be practicable in Switzerland,

land, and not in France; another may be practicable among trades people; and a third among perſons of diſtinction. The greater or leſs facility of execution depends on a thouſand circumſtances, which it is impoſſible to determine otherwiſe than by a particular application of the method, to ſuch and ſuch a country or condition. Now, all theſe particular applications not being eſſential to my ſubject, do not enter into my plan. Others may treat them as they pleaſe, each according to the country or rank he may have in view. It is ſufficient for me, that wherever children are born, they may be formed into men, after the manner I propoſe; and having made them ſuch, they are formed as well as poſſibly they can be, both for themſelves and for others. If I do not fulfil my engagement, I am undoubtedly in the wrong; but if I do, it is wrong to require me to do more; for this is all I engage for.

EMILIUS;

OR, A TREATISE OF EDUCATION.

BOOK I.

ALL things are good as they came out of the hands of their Creator, but every thing degenerates in the hands of man. He compels one ſoil to nouriſh the productions of another, and one tree to bear the fruits of another. He blends and confounds elements, climates, and ſeaſons: he mutilates his dogs, his horſes, and his ſlaves: he defaces, he confounds every thing: he delights in deformity and monſters. He is not content with any thing in its natural ſtate, not even with his own ſpecies. His very offſpring muſt be trained up for him, like a horſe in the menage, and be taught to grow after his own fancy, like a tree in his garden.

Without this, matters would be ſtill worſe than they are, and our ſpecies would not be civilized but by halves. Should a man, in a ſtate of ſociety, be given up, from the cradle, to his own notions and conduct, he would certainly turn out the moſt prepoſterous of human beings. The influence of prejudice, authority, neceſſity, example, and of all thoſe ſocial inſtitutions in which we are immerged, would ſtifle in him the emotions of nature, and ſubſtitute nothing in their place. His humanity would reſemble a ſhrub, growing by accident in the high way, which would ſoon be deſtroyed by the caſual injuries it muſt receive from the frequent paſſenger.

It is to thee, the tender and provident mother *, I addreſs myſelf, who art prudent enough

* The early part of education is that which concerns us moſt, and this part is inconteſtably the province of the females. If the Author of nature had deſigned it for the males, he would doubtleſs have furniſhed them with milk for the nouriſhment of their children. In every treatiſe on education, therefore, it is proper more peculiarly to addreſs the women; and that, not only becauſe they are better adapted both by nature and cuſtom for this taſk, but alſo becauſe they are more intereſted in the ſucceſs of it. Widows are left generally, in a great degree, at the mercy of their children, when they ſenſibly feel the good or ill effects of the manner in which they educated them. The laws, calculated leſs for perſons than property, becauſe their object is peace and not virtue, have not given ſufficient authority to mothers. Their relation, however, is more certain than that of fathers; their duties more painful and laborious, and the diſcharge of thoſe duties more eſſential to the peace and good government of a family: nay, it is uſual for them alſo to have a ſtronger attachment to their children. There are occaſions, on which if a ſon ſhould want the reſpect due to his father, he might be, in ſome meaſure, excuſed; but if, on any occaſion whatever, a child ſhould prove ſo unnatural as to forfeit his reſpect to a mother, to her who bore him in her womb, who nouriſh-

nough to leave the beaten road, and ſeekeſt to preſerve this riſing ſhrub from the ſhocks of human prejudice. Cultivate, water the young plant before it die; ſo ſhall its fruit be hereafter delicious to your taſte. Erect an early fence around the diſpoſition of your child: others may delineate its extent, but it remains with you only to raiſe the barrier.

Plants are formed by culture, and men by education. If a man ſhould come into the world in full growth and vigour, his bulk and ſtrength would be uſeleſs, till he ſhould have learned how to exert them: they would be even prejudicial to him, as they would prevent others from thinking it needful to lend him any aſſiſtance *; and thus, left to himſelf, he would periſh before he had diſcovered the objects of his wants. We lament the ſtate of infancy, without reflecting

nouriſhed him with her milk, who, for whole years, gave up her own eaſe to contribute to his, who had no cares but for him; ſhould not juſtice haſten to ſmother the infamous wretch, as a monſter unworthy to breathe a moment longer? It is ſaid, that mothers ſpoil their children. In this, without doubt, they are wrong; but, perhaps, leſs wrong than you who corrupt them. A mother is deſirous that her child ſhould be pleaſed and happy; ſhe deſires he ſhould be ſo at the time; and ſo far ſhe is right: if ſhe be miſtaken in the means of making him ſo, ſhe ſhould be better informed. The ambition, avarice, inſolence, and miſtaken foreſight of fathers, their negligence and cruel inſenſibility, are an hundred times more deſtructive to children, than the blind fondneſs of mothers. It will be neceſſary, however, to explain the ſenſe in which I uſe the term of mother; which is hereafter done.

* For, being in external appearance like themſelves, ignorant of ſpeech as well as deſtitute of thoſe ideas it might expreſs, he would be incapable to make them underſtand the need in which he ſtood of their aſſiſtance; nor would any thing in his appearance ſuggeſt it to the ſpectator.

ting that the human race muſt have been extinct, had not man been firſt a child.

We are born weak, we have need of help; we are born deſtitute of every thing, we ſtand in need of aſſiſtance; we are born ſtupid, we have need of underſtanding. All that we are not poſſeſſed of at our birth, and which we require when grown up, is beſtowed on us by education.

This education we receive from nature, from men, or from circumſtances. The conſtitutional exertion of our organs and faculties is the education of nature: the uſes we are taught to make of that exertion, conſtitute the education given us by men; and in the acquiſitions made by our own experience, on the objects that ſurround us, conſiſts our education from circumſtances.

We are formed, therefore, by three kinds of maſters. The pupil, in whom the effects of their different leſſons are contradictory, is badly educated, and can never be conſiſtent with himſelf. He in whom they are perfectly conſonant, and always tend to the ſame point, hath only attained the end of a complete education. His life and actions demonſtrate this, and that he alone is well brought up.

Of theſe three different kinds of education, that of nature depends not on ourſelves; and but in a certain degree that of circumſtances: the third, which belongs to men, is that only we have in our power: and even of this we are maſters only in imagination; for who can flatter himſelf, he will be able entirely to govern the

the diſcourſe and actions of thoſe who are about a child?

No ſooner, then, doth education become an art, or profeſſion, than it is almoſt impoſſible it ſhould ſucceed, as the concurrent circumſtances neceſſary to its ſucceſs are not to be depended on. All that can be done, with our utmoſt ſolicitude, is to approach as near as poſſible the end we aim at, attributing it to good fortune if it be attained.

If it be aſked, what is this end? it may be anſwered, that of nature, which has been already proved. For, ſince the concurrence of three kinds of education is neceſſary to its perfection, it is by that one, which is entirely independent of us, we muſt regulate the two others. But perhaps this word, *Nature*, may appear vague and equivocal; let us therefore endeavour to give it a preciſe and determinate meaning.

Nature, it has been ſaid, is only habit. But to what purpoſe is this ſaid? Are there not habits, which are contracted only upon compulſion, and which can never ſuppreſs the tendency of nature? Such is, for example, the habitual growth of plants, reſtrained from purſuing their vertical direction. Take off the reſtraint, and it is true, they preſerve the inclination they have been compelled to take: but, you will find, the riſe of the ſap has not on that account changed its primitive direction; if the plant continues to vegetate, its future growth becomes ſtill upwards.

It is the ſame with the inclinations and diſpoſitions of mankind. While we remain in exactly the ſame ſituation in which they were acqui-

red, we may retain even the moſt unnatural habits; but as ſoon as circumſtances change, the force of habit ceaſes, and that of nature exerts itſelf. Education itſelf is certainly nothing but habit: but are there not perſons in whom the impreſſions they received in education are effaced? Are there not others, again, that retain them? Whence ariſes this difference? If it be pretended that by nature is only meant habits conformable to nature, the poſition itſelf is unmeaning and abſurd.

We are born capable of ſenſibility, and from our birth are variouſly affected by the different objects that ſurround us. We no ſooner acquire, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, a conſciouſneſs of our ſenſations, than we are diſpoſed to avoid or purſue the objects producing them, in proportion as they are at firſt ſight agreeable or diſpleaſing: we next learn to approve or diſlike them, according to the convenient or inconvenient relation that ſubſiſts between ourſelves and ſuch objects, and laſtly according to the judgment we form of their conſiſtency with thoſe ideas which reaſon gives us of happineſs or perfection. Theſe diſpoſitions extend and confirm themſelves, in proportion as we become more ſuſceptible and enlightened! But, ſubject to the reſtraint of cuſtom, they are more or leſs diverſified by our opinions. Before they have taken this tincture of habit, they are what I call the diſpoſitions of our nature.

It is to theſe original diſpoſitions, therefore, we ſhould on every occaſion recur. This might alſo be effected, if our three kinds of education were merely different; but what can be done, when

when they are directly oppoſite, and totally contradictory? when, inſtead of educating a man for himſelf, he muſt be educated for others? Their concurrent action is here deſtroyed; reduced to the dilemma of acting in oppoſition to nature, or to the inſtitutions of ſociety, we muſt chuſe either to form the man or the citizen; for to do both at once is impoſſible.

Every particular ſociety, when it is confined, and its members well united, alienates itſelf from the general one of mankind. A true patriot is inhoſpitable to foreigners: they are mere men, and appear to have no relation to him. This inconvenience is inevitable, but it is not great. The moſt eſſential point is a man's being beneficent and uſeful to thoſe among whom he lives. The inhabitants of Sparta, when abroad, were ambitious, covetous, and unjuſt; but diſintereſtedneſs, equity, and concord, reigned within their walls. Be ever miſtruſtful of thoſe coſmopolites, who deduce from books the far-fetched and extenſive obligations of univerſal benevolence, while they neglect to diſcharge their actual duties towards thoſe who are about them. A philoſopher of this ſtamp affects to have a regard for the Tartars, by way of excuſe for his having none for his neighbours. Natural man is every thing with him: he is a numerical unit, an abſolute integer, that bears no relation but to himſelf or his ſpecies. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator of a fraction, that depends on its denominator, and whoſe value conſiſts in its relation to the integral body of ſociety. The beſt political inſtitutions are thoſe which are beſt calculated to di-

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veſt mankind of their natural inclinations, to deprive them of an abſolute, by giving them a relative exiſtence, and incorporating diſtinct individuals in one common whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman; nay, he even loved his country, excluſive of its relation to himſelf. Regulus pretended himſelf a Carthaginian, as being become the property of his maſters. In that character he refuſed to take his ſeat in the Roman ſenate, till a Carthaginian commanded him. He was filled with indignation at the remonſtrances made to ſave his life, and returned triumphant to periſh in the midſt of tortures. This appears to me, indeed, to have but little relation to men with whom we are at preſent acquainted.

The Lacedæmonian, Pædaretes, who, preſenting himſelf for admiſſion into the council of the three hundred, was rejected, returned home, rejoicing that there were to be found in Sparta three hundred better men than himſelf. Suppoſing the demonſtrations of his joy ſincere, as there is room to believe they were, this man was a true citizen.

A woman of Sparta, having five ſons in the army, and being in hourly expectation to hear of a battle, a meſſenger at length arrived, of whom ſhe, trembling, aſked the news. Your five ſons, ſaid he, are killed —— "Vile ſlave, who aſked you of my ſons?" —— But we have gained the victory, continued he. This was enough; the heroic mother ran to the temple, and gave thanks to the gods. This woman was a true citizen.

Thoſe who would have man, in the boſom of ſociety

ſociety, retain the primitive ſentiments of nature, know not what they want. Ever contradicting himſelf, and wavering between his duty and inclination, he would neither be the man nor the citizen; he would be good for nothing either to himſelf or to others. Like men of the preſent times, the Engliſhman, the Frenchman, the citizen, he would be in reality nothing at all.

To be ſomething, to be conſiſtent with one's ſelf, and always the ſame individual, our words and actions ſhould agree; we ſhould be always determined in that part we ought to take; we ſhould take it with an high hand, and perſevere. If ſuch a prodigy could be found, we might then know whether he be a man or a citizen, or how he can ſo manage as to be at once both the one and the other.

From theſe objects, which are neceſſarily oppoſed to each other, ariſe two contrary forms of inſtitution; the one public and general, the other domeſtic and particular.

In order to form an idea of public education, read the republic of Plato. It is not a ſyſtem of politics, as is generally imagined by thoſe who judge of books only by their titles; but the fineſt treatiſe on education that ever was written.

It is cuſtomary, in alluding to any thing extremely chimerical, to mention the inſtitution of Plato. Had Lycurgus laid down his ſyſtem only in writing, I ſhould have thought it a much greater chimera. Plato hath only refined the human heart; Lycurgus diveſted it of its native humanity.

The public inſtitution exiſts not, nor can it exiſt,

exiſt, any longer; for where there is no country, there can be no citizens. Thoſe two words, *country* and *citizen*, ought no longer to find a place in modern languages. I could give my reaſons for it; which, however, I omit, as not immediately relative to my ſubject.

It muſt be obſerved, I do not eſteem, as public inſtitutions, thoſe ridiculous eſtabliſhments that go by the name of Univerſities *. I regard juſt as little the education acquired by an intercourſe with the world, becauſe that experience, aiming at two contrary ends, falls ſhort of both. It is only calculated to make men deceitful, appearing always to intereſt themſelves in the good of others, and being never intereſted in any thing but what relates to their own. As theſe pretenſions are alſo become general, there is no one deceived by them; ſo that it is only ſo much pains thrown away.

From theſe contradictions ariſes that which we conſtantly experience in ourſelves. Impelled by nature and cuſtom contrary ways, and forced to yield in a degree to both impulſes, we take a route in the mean direction of both, that leads us neither to the end of one or the other. Thus held in ſuſpenſe, and wavering, during the whole courſe of our lives, we end our days without being able to render ourſelves conſiſtent, and

* There are, indeed, profeſſors, both in the academy of Geneva and in the univerſity of Paris, for whom I have the greateſt love and eſteem, and think them very capable of inſtructing youth were they not tied down to eſtabliſhed cuſtoms. I would adviſe one of them to publiſh the project he has formed of a reformation therein. Perhaps an attempt may, ſome time or other, be made to remove the evil, when it is ſeen to be not without remedy.

and without ever being good for any thing to ourſelves or others.

There remains then only a private education, or that of nature. But of what uſe to others, it may be ſaid, would a man be, educated only for himſelf? Perhaps, if the twofold object propoſed could be reduced to a ſingle one, in taking from man his contradictory motives of action, we ſhould remove a great obſtacle to his happineſs. To judge of this, we ſhould ſee him quite formed; ſhould have obſerved his inclinations and propenſities, have traced their progreſs, and attended them throughout; in a word, we ſhould be made acquainted with the natural man. I flatter myſelf the reader will have made ſome advance in theſe reſearches, after having peruſed this treatiſe.

In order to form this extraordinary man, let us conſider firſt what we have to do. Much, doubtleſs, depends on preventing any thing from being done. When the wind only is againſt us, we have nothing to do but ſteer cloſe and ſhape our courſe to windward: but in a ſtrong current, if we would not loſe ground, we muſt drop anchor. Take care, young pilot, that your cable does not veer, and your ſhip drive, before you are aware.

According to the order of ſociety, in which the reſpective places of individuals are fixed, every one ought to be educated for that which he is to fill. A man formed for one place, if taken out of it, would be fit for no other, and conſequently good for nothing. In this ſtate, education is uſeful only as fortune ſeconds the intentions of parents; in every other caſe it would

would be hurtful to the pupil, were it only on account of the prejudices it might inſtil. In Egypt, where the ſon was obliged to follow the occupation or profeſſion of his father, education had at leaſt a determinate end; but among us, where rank and profeſſion are only permanent, and perſons continually changing; a father would not know whether, in bringing up his child to his own profeſſion, he might be doing him good or ill.

According to the order of nature, all men being equal, their common vocation is the profeſſion of humanity; and whoever is well educated to diſcharge the duties of a man, cannot be badly prepared to fill up any of thoſe offices that have a relation to him. It matters little to me, whether my pupil be deſigned for the army, the bar, or the pulpit. Nature has deſtined us to the offices of human life, antecedent to the deſtination of our parents concerning the part we are to act in ſociety. To live is the profeſſion I would teach him. When I have done with him, it is true, he will be neither a lawyer, a ſoldier, nor a divine. Let him firſt be a man; he will on occaſion as ſoon become any thing elſe, that a man ought to be, as any other perſon whatever. Fortune may remove him from one rank to another as ſhe pleaſes, he will be always found in his place. *Occupavi te, fortuna, atque cepi: omneſque aditus tuos intercluſi, ut ad me aſpirare non poſſes* *.

Our chief ſtudy is that of human life; the good and evil of which he that is beſt able to ſupport, is, in my opinion, the beſt educated; and

* Tuſcul. V.

and hence it follows that true education conſiſts leſs in precept than action. We begin to inſtruct ourſelves as we begin to live; our education commencing with our being, and our firſt preceptor the nurſe. Thus the word *education* had, among the ancients, a different ſignification to that which is now given it; being uſed to expreſs ſimply nutriment. *Educit obſtetrix*, ſays Varro, *educat nutrix*, *inſtituit pædagogus*, *docet magiſter*. According to this diſtinction, education, inſtitution, and inſtruction, are three things as different, as the nurſe, the preceptor, and the maſter. But theſe diſtinctions not being well underſtood, a child, in order to be well conducted, ſhould follow but one guide.

We muſt therefore generalize our views, and conſider our pupil as man in the abſtract; as expoſed to all the various accidents of human life. If men were born inſeparably attached to the ſoil of one country, if one ſeaſon laſted the whole year, if individuals were incapable of changing their ſituation in life, the cuſtoms already eſtabliſhed would be in ſome reſpects commendable; a child brought up to, and never removed from one certain ſtation, would not be expoſed to the inconveniences of another. But, conſidering the inſtability of human affairs, with that reſtleſs and buſtling ſpirit of the age which turns every thing upſide down in every new generation; can any method of education be more abſurd than that of bringing up a child, as if he were never to ſet his foot out of his nurſery, or was to be perpetually ſurrounded by attendants? If the helpleſs creature makes but one ſlip on the ground, or deſcends one ſtep of the ſtairs,

he is infallibly ruined. It is not enough to teach him to bear pain, he ſhould be inured to the ſenſe of it.

In general, little more is thought of in the education of a child, than to preſerve his being: this is not enough: he ought to learn how to preſerve himſelf when he is grown up to manhood; to ſupport the ſhocks of fortune, to bear riches or poverty; and to live, if occaſion require, either amidſt mountains of ice in Greenland, or on the burning rocks of Malta. You may take what precaution you will to preſerve his life; he muſt inevitably die; and though his death may not be juſtly charged to your ſolicitude, your pains will be in a great meaſure thrown away. It is leſs needful to preſerve your child from death, than to teach him how to live. To live is not merely to breathe; it is to act, to make a proper uſe of our organs, our ſenſes, our faculties, and of all thoſe parts of the human frame which contribute to the conſciouſneſs of our exiſtence. The man who has lived moſt, is not he who hath ſurvived the greateſt number of years, but he who has experienced moſt of life. A man may be buried at an hundred years of age, who died in his cradle. Such a one would have been a gainer by dying young, at leaſt if he had lived, in our ſenſe of the word, till the time of his deceaſe.

All our wiſdom conſiſts in ſervile prejudice; all our cuſtoms are nothing but ſubjection, confinement, and reſtraint. Civilized man is born, lives, and dies in ſlavery: at his birth he is bound up in ſwaddling-cloaths, and at his death nailed down in his coffin. As long as he wears the

the appearance of the human form, he is confined by our inſtitutions. It is ſaid ſome midwives pretend, in moulding the heads of newborn infants, to give them a more proper form; and their pretenſions are admitted. Strange infatuation! Our heads are very ill conſtructed by the Author of our being; we are threfore to have them new-modelled on the outſide by the midwives, and within by the philoſophers. The Caribbeans are a much happier people.

"With us, an infant no ſooner leaves the "womb of its mother, and has hardly enjoyed "the liberty of moving and ſtretching its limbs, "than it is clapped again into confinement. "It is ſwathed, its head fixed, its legs ſtretch-"ed out at full length, and its arms placed "ſtraight down by the ſide of its body. In this "manner it is bound tight with cloaths and "bandages, ſo that it cannot ſtir a limb: in-"deed it is fortunate if the poor thing be not "ſo muffled up as to be unable to breathe, or "if ſo much precaution be taken as to lay it on "its ſide, in order that the fluid excretions "voided at the mouth may deſcend of them-"ſelves; for the helpleſs infant is not at liber-"ty to turn its head to facilitate their diſ-"charge *."

A new-born infant requires to be at liberty to to move and ſtretch its limbs, to ſhake off that numbneſs in which, moulded together in a heap, they have remained ſo long. They are ſtretched out, it is true, but they are prevented from moving: even the head itſelf is rendered im-

* Buffon, hiſt. nat. t. 4. p. 190, 12mo.

moveable by ſtay-bands: ſo that one would imagine the nurſes were afraid the poor creature ſhould have the appearance of being alive.

Hence the impulſive force of thoſe internal parts of the body diſpoſed to increaſe, finds an unſurmountable obſtacle to the movements required to accelerate their growth. The infant is continually making fruitleſs efforts, which waſte its powers or retard their progreſs. More compreſſed, more confined, and leſs at eaſe in its ſwaddling-cloaths than in its mother's womb, I ſee not what it has gained by its birth.

This ſtate of inaction, and conſtraint, in which the limbs of infants are confined, cannot fail to prevent the free circulation of the blood and ſecretion of the humours, to hinder the child's growth and ſtrength, and alter his natural conſtitution. In countries where no ſuch extravagant precautions are taken, the people are tall, robuſt, and well-proportioned: whereas, on the contrary, thoſe where infants are thus treated, ſwarm with hunch-backed, crooked-legged, lame, rickety, and deformed perſons of every kind. Leſt their bodies ſhould not grow diſtorted from their being at liberty to move freely, we are always in haſte to diſtort them effectually by putting them into a preſs. We voluntarily deprive them of the uſe of their limbs, for fear they ſhould by accident hurt or maim themſelves.

May not ſuch a cruel reſtraint have an effect upon their diſpoſition, as well as their temperament? Their firſt ſenſations are thoſe of uneaſineſs and pain; they find an obſtacle oppoſed to every

every motion they are inclined to; more unhappy than a criminal in chains, they are continually making vain efforts, till their patience is exhauſted, and they vent their anxiety in cries.

Do you ſay the firſt language of children is tears? I believe it: you thwart them from their birth: the firſt preſents you beſtow on them are chains; the firſt treatment they receive at your hands, is torture. Their voice being all that is left them free, is it a wonder they ſhould make uſe of it to vent their complaints? They cry becauſe you hurt them; and, I doubt not, if you were bound and bolſtered up in the ſame manner, but you would cry ſtill louder than they.

Whence comes this irrational, this unnatural cuſtom? Ever ſince mothers have taken upon them to deſpiſe their principal obligation, and give up the nurſing of their own children, it has been neceſſary to commit them to the care of women hired for that purpoſe; who, thus become the temporary mothers of children in whoſe favour nature is ſilent, have ſtudied only to ſave themſelves trouble. An infant whoſe arms and legs are at liberty, muſt be continually watched; but when it is faſt bound, it may be thrown into any corner, without troubling yourſelf about its cries. Provided there are no other proofs of the nurſe's negligence, if the child break not a leg or an arm, what ſignifies it to her whether it die, or remain a cripple the reſt of its life? its limbs are preſerved at the expence of its whole body, and, whatever may happen, the nurſe is excuſed.

Do theſe polite mothers, who, diſengaged from the trouble of children, indulge themſelves

in the amuſements of the town, know the treatment their harmleſs infants may, at the ſame time, receive in the country? How often is the little innocent, when its nurſe is in the leaſt hurry, hung up on a peg, like a bundle of clouts, there to remain crucified, till other buſineſs be leiſurely diſpatched! Such children as have been found in this ſituation, have been obſerved to be always black in the face; the ſtomach being violently compreſſed, preventing the circulation of the blood, and forcing it into the head: in the mean while the poor little creatures were ſuppoſed to be very patient, becauſe they had not the power to cry. I know not preciſely how long a child may remain alive in ſuch a ſituation, but I imagine it cannot be a great while. This, however, I think, is one of the greateſt conveniences of ſwaddling-cloaths.

It is pretended that children unſwathed would be ſubject to various accidents from their reſtleſſneſs, deſtructive to the perfect conformation of their limbs. This is one of the futile arguments of our falſe reaſoning, and which has never been confirmed by experience. Of the multitude of children that, among people more rational than we, are nurſed without laying any reſtraint on the motion of their limbs, we ſhall not find one that wounds or maims itſelf: they are incapable of moving with ſufficient force to hurt themſelves; and, if their limbs ever get into a wrong ſituation, the uneaſineſs they feel ſoon induces them to change it.

We have not as yet taken into our heads to ſwathe puppies or kittens; do we ſee any great inconvenience thoſe animals labour under from

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our negligence? Infants, you will ſay, are not ſo alert: I grant it; but if they are more heavy, they are alſo proportionably feeble. They are hardly able to move, much leſs to maim themſelves: nay, if you lay them on their back, they muſt periſh in that poſition, like the tortoiſe, not having the power to turn themſelves.

Not content with having ceaſed to ſuckle their children, the women of theſe times have acquired a reluctance to their production: indeed the one is a natural conſequence of the other. No ſooner does the ſituation of being a mother become burdenſome, than means are preſently found to get rid of it entirely: a fruitleſs beginning only is aimed at, that it may be continually repeated: and thus the attraction which nature deſigned ſhould promote the multiplication of our ſpecies, operates to its deſtruction. This practice, added to the other cauſes of depopulation, forebodes the approaching fate of Europe. The ſciences, arts, philoſophy, and manners it gives birth to, will not fail to reduce it ere long to a deſart. It will be peopled only by wild beaſts; and in this will not have greatly changed its inhabitants.

I have frequently obſerved the little artifices of ſome new married women, who affect to be thought deſirous of nurſing their own children; and perceive they know very well how to get themſelves ſolicited to give up that point. I have obſerved how artfully the huſband, the phyſician, and particularly the mother, has been brought to interfere. A huſband that would dare to conſent that his wife ſhould nurſe her child, would be eſteemed an abandoned wretch;

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an aſſaſſin that wanted to get rid of her. Ye prudent huſbands, ſacrifice, therefore, your paternal affection to domeſtic quiet; thinking yourſelves happy that there are to be found, in in the country, wives more continent than your own. And ſtill more happy may you be deemed, if the time which yours gain by theſe means, is not beſtowed on others as well as on yourſelves.

The duties of women are by no means equivocal: but it is diſputed whether, under their preſent contempt for them, it may not be the ſame thing to a child, if it be nouriſhed by the milk of its mother or of any other perſon? This queſtion ſhould be determined by the phyſicians, who generally reſolve it as the women would have them: and, indeed, I really think it may be better for a child to be nouriſhed by the milk of an healthy nurſe, than of a diſeaſed or an ill conditioned mother, if there be any new evil to fear from her conſtitution.

But is the queſtion anſwered by a phyſical ſolution only? Has a child leſs need of a mother's tenderneſs than of her breaſt? Other women, nay brutes, might afford it the milk which ſhe refuſes; but the ſolicitude, the tenderneſs of a mother cannot be ſupplied. She who ſuckles the child of another inſtead of her own, muſt be a bad mother; how then can it be expected ſhe ſhould make a good nurſe? She may, it is true, become ſo in time, but ſlowly, and as habit takes the place of nature; in the mean while, the neglected child would have time enough to periſh before his nurſe had acquired a maternal affection for him.

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There reſults even from this poſſible advantage an inconvenience, which is of itſelf ſufficient to deter a woman of any ſenſibility from committing her children to the care of others: and this is that of a ſtranger's partaking with, or alienating from her the rights of a mother; of ſeeing her child love another woman as well, or better than herſelf; of perceiving the affection it retains for its natural parent a matter of favour, and that of its adopted one a duty: for where I find the obligations of a mother duly diſcharged, I certainly ought to look for the attachment of the child.

The method uſually taken to remove this inconvenience, is to inſpire children with a contempt for their nurſes, by treating them as real ſervants. When their buſineſs is done, the child is taken away, or the nurſe diſmiſſed, who is afterwards ſo ill received, that ſhe is ſoon diſguſted with coming to ſee her nurſery. At the end of a year or two, the child ſees and knows her no more: But his mother, who imagines herſelf ſubſtituted in her place, and endeavours to repair her negligence by her cruelty, is miſtaken. Inſtead of making an affectionate ſon of an unnatural nurſe-child, ſhe only excites his ingratitude; and teaches him one day to deſpiſe her who gave him life, as he already deſpiſes her who nurſed him with her milk.

How earneſtly might I inſiſt on this point, were it not ſo diſcouraging to expatiate in vain on uſeful ſubjects! More depends on it, by much, than is generally imagined. Would you have mankind return all to their natural duties, begin with mothers of families; you will be a-

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ſtoniſhed at the change this will produce. Almoſt every kind of depravation flows ſucceſſively from this ſource; the moral order of things is broken, and the natural quite ſubverted in our hearts: home is leſs chearful and engaging; the affecting ſight of a riſing family no more attaches the huſband, nor attracts the eyes of the ſtranger; the mother is leſs truly reſpectable, whoſe children are not about her; families are no longer places of reſidence; habit no longer enforces the ties of blood; there are no fathers, nor mothers, children, brethren, nor ſiſters; they hardly know, how ſhould they love, each other? Each cares for no one but himſelf; and when home affords only a melancholy ſolitude, it is natural for us to ſeek diverſion elſewhere.

But ſhould mothers again condeſcend to nurſe their children, manners would form themſelves, the ſentiments of nature would revive in our hearts, the ſtate would be repeopled; this principal point, this alone would reunite every thing. A taſte for the charms of a domeſtic life is the beſt antidote againſt corruption of manners. The noiſe and buſtle of children, which is generally thought troubleſome, becomes hence agreeable; it is theſe that render parents more neceſſary, more dear, to each other, and ſtrengthen the ties of conjugal affection. When a family is all lively and animated, domeſtic concerns afford the moſt delightful occupation to a woman, and the moſt agreeable amuſement to a man. Hence, from the correction of this one abuſe, will preſently reſult a general reformation; nature will ſoon re-aſſume all its rights. Let wives but once again become mothers, and the men will pre-

preſently again become fathers and huſbands.

Superfluous talk! Even their diſguſt at the pleaſures of the world will never bring them back to their duty. Wives have ceaſed to be mothers; they will not, they even have no deſire to be ſuch. Nay, though they ſhould deſire it, they can hardly effect it: as at preſent a contrary cuſtom is eſtabliſhed, every one, deſirous of being ſo, muſt ſtand in oppoſition to all that come near her, united in league againſt an example, which one party hath not ſet, and the other is unwilling to follow.

There are indeed ſome young perſons to be found of a good natural diſpoſition, who, deſpiſing the tyranny of mode and the clamours of their ſex, venture to diſcharge, with a virtuous intrepidity, the moſt delightful obligation nature can impoſe. May their number be augmented by the influence of that happineſs which is deſtined for thoſe who engage in ſo pleaſing a taſk. I will venture, and that on the authority of the moſt obvious reaſonings, and on obſervations that have never deceived me, to promiſe ſuch worthy mothers a real and conſtant attachment on the part of their huſbands, a truly filial affection on that of their children, the eſteem and reſpect of the public, happy delivery, ſpeedy reſtoration to conſtant and vigorous health, and, after all, the pleaſure to ſee their daughters follow their example, and commend it to others.

Where there is no mother, there can be no child. The obligations incumbent on both are reciproca!; and if they are neglected on one ſide, they will hardly be fulfilled on the other. The child ſhould love its mother before it is ſenſible

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of it as a duty. If the voice of nature be not ſtrengthened by habit and cultivation, it will be ſilenced in its infancy, and the heart will periſh, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, before it is born. Thus the very firſt ſteps which are taken with us are foreign to nature.

The obvious paths of nature are alſo forſaken, in a different manner, when, inſtead of neglecting the duties of a mother, a woman carries them to exceſs; when ſhe makes an idol of her child; increaſes its weakneſs, by preventing its ſenſe of it; and, as if ſhe could emancipate him from the laws of narure, prevents every approach of pain or diſtreſs; without thinking, that, for the ſake of preſerving him at preſent from a few trifling inconveniences, ſhe is accumulating on his head a diſtant load of anxieties and misfortunes; without thinking that it is a barbarous precaution to enervate and indulge the child at the expence of the man. Thetis, ſays the fable, in order to render her ſon invulnerable, plunged him into the waters of Styx. This is an expreſſive and beautiful allegory. The cruel mothers I am ſpeaking of act directly contrary: by plunging their children in ſoftneſs and effeminacy, they render them more tender and vulnerable; they lay open, as it were, their nerves, to every ſpecies of afflicting ſenſations, to which they will certainly fall a prey as they grow up.

Obſerve nature, and follow the track ſhe has delineated. She continually exerciſes her children, and fortifies their conſtitution by experiments of every kind; inuring them betimes to grief and pain. In cutting their teeth, they experience the fever; gripping colics throw them into

into convulſions; the hooping-cough ſuffocates, and worms torment them; ſurfeits corrupt their blood, and the various fermentations their humours are ſubject to, cover them with dangerous eruptions. Almoſt the whole period of childhood is ſickneſs and danger, half the children that are born dying before they are eight years old. In paſſing through this courſe of experiments, the child gathers ſtrength and fortitude, and, as ſoon as he is capable of living, the principles of life become leſs precarious.

This is the rule of nature. Why ſhould you act contrary to it? Do not you ſee, that, by endeavouring to correct her work, you ſpoil it, and prevent the execution of her deſigns? Act you from without as ſhe does within: this, according to you, would increaſe the danger; on the contrary, it will create a diverſion, and leſſen it. Experience ſhows, that children delicately educated die in a greater proportion than others. Provided you do not make them exert themſelves beyond their powers, leſs riſk is run by exerciſing, than indulging them in eaſe. Inure them therefore by degrees to thoſe inconveniences they muſt one day ſuffer. Harden their bodies to the intemperance of the ſeaſons, climates, and elements; to hunger, thirſt, and fatigue; in a word, dip them in the waters of Styx. Before the body hath acquired a ſettled habit, we may give it any we pleaſe, without danger; but when it is once arrived to its full growth and conſiſtence, every alteration is hazardous. A child will bear thoſe viciſſitudes which to a man would be inſupportable: the ſoft and pliant fibres of the former readily yield

to impreſſion; thoſe of the latter are more rigid, and are reduced only by violence to recede from the forms they have aſſumed. We may therefore bring up a child robuſt and hearty, without endangering either its life or health; and though even ſome riſk were run in this reſpect, it would not afford ſufficient cauſe of heſitation. Since they are riſks inſeparable from human life, can we do better than to run them during that period of it wherein we take them at the leaſt diſadvantage?

The life of a child becomes the more valuable as he advances in years. To the value of his perſon, muſt be added the coſt and pains attending his education; to the loſs of life, alſo, may be annexed his own ſenſe and apprehenſions of death. We ſhould, therefore, particularly direct our views to the future in his preſent preſervation; we ought to arm him againſt the evils of youth, before he arrives at that period: for if the value of his life increaſes till he attain the age in which it is uſeful, what a folly is it to protect him from a few evils in his infancy, to multiply his ſufferings when he comes to years of diſcretion? Can ſuch be the inſtructions of a maſter of his profeſſion?

Man is born to ſuffer in every ſtage of his exiſtence. Even ſelf-preſervation is attended with ſome degree of pain. Happy are we that in our infancy we are ſuſceptible only of phyſical evils! Evils much leſs cruel, much leſs terrible than others, and more ſeldom capable of reconciling us to death. Men never deſtroy themſelves to get rid of the gout; the anguiſh of the mind only is productive of deſpair. We lament the

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ſtate of infants, whereas it is our own that is moſt to be lamented. Our greateſt evils are derived from ourſelves.

A child as ſoon as it is born begins to cry; great part of its earlieſt infancy being ſpent in tears. Sometimes we dance it about and ſoothe it; at others threaten and beat it, in order to make it ſilent. We always either do that which is pleaſing to the child, or exact of it what pleaſes ourſelves; either ſubmitting to its humours, or obliging it to ſubmit to ours. There is no medium, it muſt either command or obey. Hence the firſt ideas it acquires, are thoſe of tyranny and ſervitude. Before it can ſpeak it learns to command, and before it can act it is taught obedience; nay, ſometimes it is puniſhed before it be conſcious of a fault, at leaſt before it can commit one. Thus it is we early inſtil into their tender minds thoſe paſſions which we afterwards impute to nature, and after having taken the pains to make them vitious, complain that we found them ſo.

In this manner a child paſſes ſix or ſeven years under the care of the women, the conſtant victim of their caprices and his own. After he has learned of them what they uſually teach, that is, after they have burdened his memory with words without meaning, and things of no conſequence; after they have corrupted his natural diſpoſition by the paſſions they have implanted, this factitious being is turned over to the care of a preceptor, who proceeds in the developement of thoſe artificial buds already formed, teaching him every thing except the knowledge of himſelf, the buſineſs of human life, and the attain-

ment of happineſs. So that when this ſlaviſh and tyrannical infant, replete with ſcience and deprived of ſenſe, equally debilitated both in body and mind, comes at length to enter on the world, it is no wonder that the diſplay he makes of his folly, vanity, and vice, ſhould cauſe us to lament the miſery and perverſeneſs of human nature. We are, however, miſtaken: ſuch is the man of our caprices; that of nature is differently conſtituted. Are you deſirous of preſerving his original form? begin with him as ſoon as he comes into the world: make yourſelf maſter of him as ſoon as he is born, nor quit him afterwards till he is grown up to manhood: without this you will never perfectly ſucceed. As his mother is his only true nurſe, ſo is his father his only true preceptor. Let them mutually agree in the practice of their duty as well as in the theory: let their child paſs from the hands of one to the other. He will be better educated by a judicious father, though of confined talents, than by the moſt able maſter in the world; for zeal will better ſupply the place of abilities, than abilities make up for the want of zeal.

But it will be ſaid, other buſineſs, employments, duties———Duties! Surely thoſe of a father are of the higheſt importance! * We need not

* When we read in Plutarch, that Cato himſelf, the cenſor, who governed in Rome with ſo much glory, brought up his ſon from the cradle, and that with ſo much aſſiduity, that he would quit every buſineſs to be preſent when the nurſe, that is to ſay the mother, waſhed and rubbed him; when we read in Suetonious, that Auguſtus, maſter of the world he had conquered and over which he reigned, taught his grandchildren to write, to ſwim, to comprehend the elements of ſcience, and had them conſtantly about him; we, that are grown ſo much wiſer,

not be ſurpriſed however, if the man, whoſe wife diſdains to nouriſh the fruit of their union, ſhould in like manner diſdain to cultivate and improve it. There is no picture in the world more delightful than that of a family; a ſingle feature wanting, nevertheleſs, ſpoils the whole. If the mother be of too puny a conſtitution for a nurſe, the father has too much buſineſs on his hands for a preceptor. Their children ſent from home, and diſperſed in boarding-ſchools, convents, and colleges, carry elſewhere there family-regards; or rather contract the habit of being attached to nothing. Brothers and ſiſters hardly know each other; but, when on any occaſion aſſembled, behave to each other as politely, and with as much diſtant ceremony, as ſtrangers: when intimacy between relations no longer ſubſiſts, the pleaſures of life no longer depend on family-ſociety, but are ſought for in the corruption of manners. Where is there a man ſo blind, as not to ſee clearly the connection of theſe things?

A father, in begetting and providing for his children, hath in that diſcharged but a third part of his obligations. He owes a being to his ſpecies, ſocial beings to ſociety, and citizens to the ſtate. Every man who is capable of paying this triple debt, and refuſes, is in that reſpect criminal; and perhaps is more ſo when he pays it by halves. He who is incapable of performing the

wiſer, cannot help laughing at the inſignificant good people of thoſe days, who amuſed themſelves with ſuch trifles; too confined, doubtleſs, in their abilities to be equal to the important affairs of the great men of the preſent times.

duties of a father, has no right to be one. Neither poverty, nor buſineſs, nor perſonal importance, can diſpenſe with parents nurſing and educating their children. Readers, you may believe me, when I take upon me to aſſure every parent, who is endued with ſenſibility, and neglects theſe ſacred obligations, that he will long live to repent it in the bitterneſs of his ſorrow, and never be comforted.

But what ſtep doth a wealthy parent take? this maſter of a family, ſo very much engaged as to be obliged to give up the education of his children? He pays another perſon, to diſcharge thoſe obligations which are laid on himſelf. Venal ſoul! doſt thou think thou canſt purchaſe thy ſon another father with money? Deceive not thyſelf; it is not a maſter thou giveſt him, but a ſervant, who will ſoon make him as ſervile as himſelf.

Much has been ſaid and written on the qualifications of a good governor. The firſt that I ſhould require of him, and which would include a great many others, is, that he ſhould not be venal. There are ſome profeſſions ſo noble that they cannot be practiſed for hire, without ſhewing the profeſſor unworthy of them: ſuch is the profeſſion of arms, and ſuch that of moral inſtitutions. To whom, then, ſhall I intruſt the education of my child?—I have already told you; to yourſelf. But I am incapable. ——Are you indeed incapable? Make then a friend. I ſee no other reſource.

What a ſublime idea do I entertain of a complete tutor! In fact, to be able to form the man, one ought either to be his father, or ſomething more

more than man one's ſelf. Yet ſuch is the office you careleſsly confer on the mereſt mercenaries.

The more I reflect on this ſubject, the more I perceive new difficulties ariſe. It is neceſſary the governor ſhould have been educated for his pupil, that his domeſtics ſhould have been educated for their maſter, that every one who comes near him ſhould have received the ſame impreſſions which they are to communicate to him; and thus education on education becomes neceſſary nobody knows how far. How can a child be properly educated by one who has not been properly educated himſelf? But where is ſuch an extraordinary mortal to be found? I confeſs I am ignorant. In theſe abject times, who knows what degree of virtue the human mind may attain? Yet ſuppoſe this prodigy found. It is in examining what he ought to do, that we ſhall ſee what he ought to be. I can venture to pronounce beforehand, however, that the father who is the moſt ſenſible of the value of a good governor, will be the firſt to do without one; as he will find it more difficult to procure one, than to become ſuch himſelf. Or is he deſirous, in ſuch a caſe, to make a friend? let him educate his child to that end; he then will have no need to ſeek one elſewhere, and nature will have already done half his work.

A certain perſonage, of whom I know nothing more than his elevated ſtation, once made me a propoſal to educate his ſon. In this he doubtleſs did me great honour: ſo far, however, from being offended at my refuſal, he ought to commend my diſcretion. Had I accepted his offer, and my method proved wrong, his ſon's

education would have been ſpoiled; and if it proved right, it had been ſtill ſo much the worſe. The ſon would have renounced the titles of his father, he would have had no inclination to be a prince.

I am too ſenſible of the importance of a preceptor's duty, I feel too much my own incapacity, ever to accept of ſuch an employ from any perſon whatever; even the motives of friendſhip itſelf affording to me additional reaſons to refuſe it. I imagine, indeed, that, after having read this book, few will be diſpoſed to make me ſuch an offer; and I muſt beg of thoſe who are, not to take the trouble of a fruitleſs application. I made formerly a ſufficient eſſay in this buſineſs to convince me I am not fit for it, and even my ſituation would excuſe me were my talents equal to it. I thought it incumbent on me to make this public declaration, to ſatisfy thoſe who do not appear to think ſo reſpectfully of me as to believe my reſolutions on this head ſincere.

But, though I hold myſelf incapacitated to undertake the moſt uſeful part of this arduous taſk, I ſhall venture to attempt that which is the moſt eaſy. To follow the example of many others, I ſhall not ſet my hand to the work, but to the pen; and inſtead of doing it myſelf, endeavour to adviſe others what ought to be done.

In attempts of this kind, their authors, generally very eaſy about the conſiſtency of a theory they are not concerned to put in practice, lay down, without ſcruple, a number of fine precepts impoſſible to be followed; and for want of being ſufficiently circumſtantial and exempla-

ry in their application, render even thoſe which are practicable uſeleſs.

I have, therefore, in this work, made choice of an imaginary pupil, and have taken the liberty to ſuppoſe myſelf of a proper age, in health, and poſſeſſed of the requiſite abilities to undertake his education, to conduct him from the time of his birth, till, grown up to maturity, he may ſtand in need of no other guide than himſelf. This method appears to me uſeful, in preventing an author, diffident of himſelf, from running into chimeras: for, when he deviates from the ordinary practice, he has only to try his method on his pupil; and he will ſoon ſee, or the reader will ſee for him, whether he follows the natural progreſs of infancy and the ſenſations of the human heart.

This is what I have endeavoured to do, amidſt the various difficulties that preſented themſelves. That I might not needleſsly ſwell the ſize of my book, I have contented myſelf, however, with ſimply laying down thoſe principles, of which every one, at firſt ſight, muſt acknowledge the truth. As to thoſe which require proof, I have applied them all either to Emilius, or other examples; and have ſhewn, by the moſt circumſtantial applications, in what manner my theory may be reduced to practice: ſuch, at leaſt, is the plan I have laid down: it remains with the reader to decide how far I have executed my deſign.

Agreeable to this ſketch of my plan, I ſpeak but little, at firſt ſetting out, of Emilius; becauſe my firſt maxims of education, although contrary to thoſe generally eſtabliſhed, are ſo

ſelf-

ſelf-evident, that it is not eaſy for perſons of common ſenſe to refuſe their aſſent to them. But, in proportion as I advance, my pupil, brought up very different from yours, is no longer an ordinary youth, but requires a regimen peculiar to himſelf. He appears then more frequently in the ſcene; and, toward the latter end of my tuition, I loſe view of him not a moment, till he has no longer occaſion for my aſſiſtance.

I ſhall not here expatiate on the qualifications of a complete tutor; I ſuppoſe them, and, at the ſame time, ſuppoſe myſelf poſſeſſed of them all. In the peruſal of the work, the reader will ſee how liberal I have been to myſelf.

I ſhall here obſerve only, in contradiction to the common opinion, that the governor of a child ſhould be young, even as young as poſſible, conſiſtent with his having attained neceſſary diſcretion and ſagacity. I would have him be himſelf a child, that he might become the companion of his pupil, and gain his confidence by partaking of his amuſements. There are not things in common enough between infancy and manhood, to form a ſolid attachment at ſo great a diſtance. Children ſometimes careſs old men, but they never love them.

It is generally required that a governor ſhould have already gone through a courſe of education in that character. This is too much: the ſame man can go through but one: if a firſt be neceſſary to qualify him for the ſecond, what right had he to engage in that firſt?

From longer experience he may know better how to act, but he will be no longer capable of action.

action. Whoever has filled that ſtation well enough to be ſenſible of its difficulties, will not be diſpoſed to enter on it a ſecond time; and if he has but ill acquitted himſelf the firſt time, it is a bad recommendation for the ſecond. It is a very different thing, I own, to follow a young man up and down for four years, and to conduct him for five and twenty. You give your ſon a tutor, when he is already formed; I would have him have had a governor before he was born. Your preceptor may change his pupil every four years: mine can have but one. You make a diſtinction between a preceptor and a governor: another folly! Do you diſtinguiſh between the pupil and the ſcholar? There is but one ſcience to be taught children; and that is moral behaviour. This is, beſides, a ſcience of itſelf, and whatever Xenophon has ſaid of the education of the Perſians, is not to be divided. I ſhould rather alſo denominate a maſter in it a governor, than a preceptor; becauſe it is leſs his province to inſtruct than conduct; it is not his buſineſs to lay down precepts, but to teach his pupil to diſcover them.

If ſo much care is to be taken in the choice of a governor, it ſhould be ſurely permitted him on the other hand to chuſe his pupil, particularly in a caſe where a model for imitation is propoſed. This choice cannot be directed either by the genius or character of the child, which can only be known in the iſſue, and which I adopt before it is born. Nay, were I capable in this reſpect to make a choice, I ſhould fix on an ordinary capacity; ſuch therefore I ſuppoſe that of my pupil. Common men alone are the objects

jects of education; and theirs only ſhould ſerve as an example to the reſt of their ſpecies. A genius will educate himſelf, in ſpight of all obſtacles. The ſoil is not a matter of indifference in the cultivation of mankind: they are not all ſuch as they might have been if born in temperate climates. The diſadvantage is viſible in either extreme. A man is not planted like a tree, in any country, to grow there continually, but is frequently changing his place; and he who removes from one extreme to the other, is obliged to go twice as far to arrive at the ſame point, as he who ſets out from a line drawn between both. If the inhabitant of a temperate clime viſits ſucceſſively both extremes, his advantages are further evident; for, although he ſhould undergo the ſame modification as one that ſhould paſs from one extreme to the other, yet he would depart each way, the leſs by half, from his natural conſtitution. Thus a Frenchman may live in Guinea or in Lapland; but a Negro would not live ſo well at Torneo, nor a Samoyad at Benin. It appears, alſo, that the organization of the brain is leſs perfect in the two extremes. Neither the Negroes nor the Laplanders have the natural underſtandings of the natives of milder climates. If, therefore, my pupil muſt be an inhabitant of the earth, I would ſelect him from thoſe of a temperate zone; from the French, for inſtance, in preference to all others.

As we go northwards, we find men conſume a great deal upon an ungrateful ſoil; towards the ſouth they conſume little on a fertile one. Hence ariſes a new diſtinction; the one being thereby

thereby rendered laborious, and the other contemplative. Society preſents us, on one ſpot, with a picture of this diſtinction, in that between the poor and the rich. The former reſide on the ungrateful ſoil, and the latter on the plentiful one.

The poor ſtand in no need of education; that of their ſtation is confined, and they cannot attain any other. On the contrary, the education of thoſe who are in a wealthy ſtation, is that which is the leaſt adapted to their own good, or to the good of ſociety. Add to this, that an education adapted to the nature of things, ought to qualify a man for all conditions of life: now it is certainly leſs reaſonable to educate the poor for a high ſtation, than the rich for a low one; for, in proportion to the number of both, there are much fewer perſons who become rich, than there are who become poor; as it is much eaſier to ſpend a fortune than to acquire one. Our pupil therefore ſhall be rich: thus we are ſure at leaſt of forming one man the more; a poor one may become a man of himſelf.

It is for the ſame reaſon, I ſhall not be ſorry that Emilius ſhould be alſo of noble birth; as we are ſure of ſnatching one victim from the abſurdities of prejudice.

Emilius is an orphan. It is to no purpoſe he ſhould have a father or mother. As I charge myſelf with their obligations, I ſucceed to their rights and authority. He ought indeed to honour his parents, but complacence is all that is due to me. This is the firſt, or rather the only condition I make with him.

To this I ſhould add, what is only a conſe-

quence of it, that we are never to part but by mutual conſent. This is an eſſential article, and I would even have both the governor and pupil look upon each other as inſeparable, and the fortunes of each as common to both. For as ſoon as they regard, though at a great diſtance, their future ſeparation, as ſoon as they foreſee the moment when they are to become ſtrangers to each other, they begin to be ſo already; each forms his ſeparate views, and both taken up with the proſpect of what may happen after their parting, continue together againſt their inclination. The pupil looks upon the tutor only as the badge and ſcourge of childhood; while the latter regards the former as an inconvenient burden, of which he ſhould be glad to be lightned: thus they ſigh in concert for the moment in which they ſhall ſee themſelves rid of each other; and as there can be no real attachment between them, the one is as careleſs as the other is intractable.

But when they regard themſelves as formed to ſpend their days together, it is of the utmoſt conſequence to both to endear themſelves to each other; and this of itſelf is ſufficient to create a reciprocal eſteem. The pupil will not be aſhamed to be conducted in his infancy by the friend he is to accompany when grown up: on the other hand, the governor cannot but intereſt himſelf in the cultivation of the plant of which he is to reap the fruit; while in adding to the merit of his pupil he is laying up a fund by which he is to profit in his old age.

This preliminary adjuſted, I ſuppoſe, from an happy delivery, to receive a well ſhaped, vigorous

gorous, and healthy child. A father has no choice, and therefore ought to give no preference to any of the children God has given him; they are equally his children, and are intitled to the ſame care and tenderneſs. Whether they are maimed or perfect, ſickly or robuſt, each of them is a ſacred depoſit, of which he is to give an account to him of whom he received it, marriage being a contract made with nature as well as between the parties.

But whoever lays himſelf under an obligation which nature has not impoſed, ought to be well aſſured of the means to diſcharge it, otherwiſe he will thereby render himſelf accountable for what is out of his power to perform. Whoever undertakes the tuition of an infirm and valetudinary infant, converts his office of governor into that of an attendant on the ſick; he will loſe that time in preſerving an uſeleſs life, which was intended to increaſe its value; he will be expoſed himſelf to the mortification of ſeeing himſelf, one day, reproached by a weeping mother for the death of her ſon, whom ſhe hath long and aſſiduouſly kept alive.

I would not take charge of a ſickly child tho' I were ſure it would live to be fourſcore. I would not be troubled with a pupil always uſeleſs to himſelf and to others, whoſe only concern would be ſelf-preſervation, and the weakneſs of whoſe body would prevent the cultivation of his mind. What ſhould I be doing, in vainly beſtowing all my time and pains on ſuch an object, but adding to the loſs of ſociety, by depriving it of the ſervices of two men inſtead of one? Let any one elſe take charge of his in-

firmities, I conſent and approve his charity; but my talent, if I know myſelf, lies not that way: I could never teach a child to live, who ſhould be in continual apprehenſions of dying.

The body ſhould be vigorous, to act in obedience to the mind; a good ſervant ſhould be robuſt and ſtrong. I know intemperance will inflame the paſſions; that in time it will wear it abſolutely away; mortification and abſtinence too produce the ſame effect from a different cauſe. The more feeble a body is, the greater influence it has over the mind; the ſtronger it is, the more obedient is it to its commands. The ſenſual paſſions all lodge in effeminate bodies; they are excited by ſo much the more as they are incapable of gratification.

A debilitated body enervates the mind. Hence the influence of phyſic, an art more deſtructive to mankind than all the evils it pretends to cure. I know not, for my part, of what malady we are cured by the phyſicians, but I know many fatal ones which they inflict on us; ſuch are cowardice, puſillanimity, credulity, and the fear of death: if they cure the body of pain, they deprive the ſoul of fortitude. What end doth it anſwer to ſociety, that they keep a parcel of rotten carcaſes on their legs? It is *men* the community wants, and thoſe we never ſee come out of their hands.

It is however the preſent mode to take phyſic; and it ſhould be ſo. It is a pretty amuſement for idle people that have nothing to do, and not knowing how to beſtow their time otherwiſe, throw it away on ſelf-preſervation. Had they been ſo unfortunate as to have been born immortal,

mortal, they would have been the moſt miſerable of beings. A life which they would not be under the continual apprehenſions of loſing, would be to them of no value. Phyſicians pay their court to ſuch perſons, by frightening them, and affording them daily the only pleaſure they are ſuſceptible of; that of hearing they are in danger and yet not quite dead.

I have no deſign to enlarge here on the futility of phyſic, my preſent purpoſe being only to conſider it in a moral light. I cannot however forbear obſerving, that mankind uſe the ſame ſophiſtry in regard to the uſe of medicine, as they do with reſpect to their ſearch after truth. They ſuppoſe always, that when a phyſician treats a patient who recovers, he has cured him; and that when they have gone through a diſquiſition concerning the truth, they have found it. They do not ſee that we ought to put in the balance, againſt one cure effected by phyſic, the deaths of an hundred patients it has killed; or that we ſhould oppoſe to the utility of one boaſted truth, the miſchief of a thouſand errors fallen into by making the diſcovery. The ſcience which enlightens, and the phyſic that cures, are, doubtleſs, very uſeful: but the pretended ſcience that miſleads, and the phyſic that kills, are as certainly deſtructive. Teach us therefore to diſtinguiſh between them. This is preciſely the point in queſtion. Could we teach our vain curioſity not to thirſt after information, we ſhould never be the dupes of falſehood; could we be ſatisfied to bear the maladies to which nature denies a cure, we ſhould never die by the hands of the phyſician. Self-denial in theſe two

inſtances is prudent; men would be evidently gainers by ſuch abſtinence and ſubmiſſion. I do not pretend to deny that phyſic may be uſeful to ſome few particular perſons, but I affirm it to be deſtructive to the human race in general.

It may be replied, as it conſtantly is, the fault lies in the phyſician, and not in the ſcience of medicine, which is otherwiſe infallible. Well, well, be it ſo: take care, however, the phyſic be never accompanied by the doctor; for as ſure as ever they come together, there will be an hundred times more to fear from the blunders of the artiſt, than to hope for from the efficacy of the art.

This deceitful ſcience, calculated more to affect the mind than the body, is not more uſeful to one than the other: it cures us leſs of ſickneſs than it kills us with terror. It does not ſo much keep death at a diſtance, as it anticipates his horrors. It wears us out, inſtead of prolonging our lives; and though it could be ſaid to prolong the life of individuals, it would be ſtill to the prejudice of our ſpecies; ſince it renders us leſs ſerviceable to ſociety, by the regimen it impoſes, and the conſtant ſolicitude it lays us under. It is to our knowledge of danger that we are indebted for our fears: the man who ſhould think himſelf invulnerable, would be afraid of nothing. By arming Achilles againſt danger, the poet has deprived his character of all the merit of his valour: any one in ſuch circumſtances might have been an Achilles too.

Do you ſeek men of true courage? Look for them

them where there are no phyſicians, where men are ignorant of the conſequence of diſeaſes, and where they are never apprehenſive of death. Man, by nature, is formed to ſuffer with patience, and die in peace. It is the phyſicians with their preſcriptions, the philoſophers with their precepts, and the prieſts with their prayers and exhortations, that have debaſed the heart of man, and made him ignorant how to die.

Let me have a pupil, therefore, who will have no occaſion for any of theſe gentry, or I ſhall reject him. I am unwilling that other people ſhould ſpoil my work: I will have the education of him entirely myſelf, or not take any farther trouble about him. The ſagacious Mr Locke, who had ſpent part of his life in the ſtudy of medicine, earneſtly adviſes us, never to give children phyſic by way of precaution or for ſlight indiſpoſitions. I will go farther, and declare, as I never call in the phyſician for myſelf, ſo I will never trouble him on the account of Emilius; unleſs, indeed, his life be in evident danger; and then the doctor cannot do more than kill him.

I know very well the phyſician will not fail to take advantage of that delay. If the child dies, he was called in too late; had he been ſent for ſooner———if he recovers, it is then the phyſician who ſaved him. Be it ſo. I am content the doctor ſhould triumph, on condition he is never ſent for till the patient be at the laſt extremity.

For want of knowing the way to get cured, a child ſhould learn to know how to be ſick; this art will ſupply the want of the other, and often

often ſucceed a great deal better: this is one of the arts of nature. When a brute animal is ſick, it ſuffers in ſilence and keeps itſelf ſtill: and yet we do not ſee that brutes are more ſickly than men. How many perſons have impatience, diſquietude, apprehenſion, and particularly medicines, deſtroyed, whom their diſeaſes would have ſpared, and whom time alone would have cured? Will it be objected, that brute-animals, living in a manner conformable to nature, ought to be leſs ſubject to diſeaſes? This is the very point I aim at. I would bring up my pupil preciſely in the ſame manner; from which he would doubtleſs deduce the ſame advantages.

The only uſeful part of medicine is the Hygeine. This however is rather a virtue than a ſcience. Temperance and exerciſe are the two beſt phyſicians in the world. Exerciſe whets the appetite, and temperance prevents the abuſe of it.

To know what kind of regimen is the moſt ſalutary, we need only inquire what is that of thoſe people who enjoy the greateſt ſhare of health, are the moſt robuſt, and live the longeſt? If the arts of medicine are found, from general obſervation, not to confer better health or longer life; the very proof of their being uſeleſs ſhows them to be hurtful, as ſo much time, ſo many perſons and things are taken up thereby to no purpoſe. Not only the time miſpent in the preſervation of life, is loſt from its enjoyment; it ſhould be deducted alſo from its duration: but when that time is employed in tormenting us, it is ſtill worſe than the mere annihila-

nihilation of it; it gives a negative quantity, and, if we calculate juſtly, ſhould be taken from the future duration of our lives. A man who lives ſix years without phyſicians, lives more for himſelf and others, than he who ſurvives, as their patient, for thirty. Having experienced both, I conceive myſelf peculiarly authoriſed to determine this point.

Such are my reaſons for making choice only of a robuſt and healthy pupil, and the principles on which I would preſerve him ſo. I ſhall not go about to prove the utility of manual labour, and thoſe bodily exerciſes which ſerve to ſtrengthen the conſtitution and preſerve health: this is a point which nobody diſputes: inſtances of longevity are almoſt all of them found among perſons accuſtomed to exerciſe, and who have undergone the greateſt labour and fatigue *. I ſhall be as far from entering into a tedious detail of the methods I ſhall take to effect this end. It will be ſeen that they neceſſarily enter into the practical

* I cannot help citing the following inſtance, on the authority of the Engliſh news-papers, as it affords ſo much room for reflection on this ſubject. 'One Patrick O'Neale, born 'in the year 1647. married his ſeventh wife in 1760. He 'ſerved in the dragoons in the 17th year of the reign of 'Charles II. and in different corps till 1740, when he ob-'tained his diſcharge. He had made all the campaigns of 'King William and the Duke of Marlborough. This extra-'ordinary perſon never drank any thing ſtronger than ſmall 'beer, and lived upon vegetables. His cuſtom was to riſe 'with the ſun, and to go to bed when it ſet, except on ſuch 'urgent occaſions as prevented. Notwithſtanding his great 'age, he is well in health, walks without a crutch, is hardly 'ever unemployed, and every Sunday goes to his pariſh-church 'accompanied by his children, grandchildren, and great grand-'children.'

practical part of my plan; ſo that this intimation will be ſufficient, without farther explanation.

Our wants commence with our lives. The new-born infant muſt be provided with a nurſe. If its mother conſent to take upon herſelf that office, it is well. Directions for her behaviour will be given her in writing: for this advantage has its inconvenience, and keeps the governor at a little more diſtance from his pupil. But it is to be preſumed, the good of the child, and the eſteem ſhe muſt have for him to whom ſhe would commit ſo important a charge, will render the mother attentive to the directions and advice of its maſter: this preſumed, we are certain that every thing ſhe does will be better done by her than by any one elſe. If it muſt have an hired nurſe, we muſt begin with making a good choice.

One of the misfortunes attending the rich, is their being univerſally impoſed on. Is it to be wondered at, then, they ſhould know ſo little how to judge of mankind? Their own wealth ſerves to corrupt them; and, by a juſt retaliation, they are the firſt who feel the defects of the only advantage they are acquainted with. Every thing about them is done wrong, but what they do themſelves, and this is hardly any thing at all.

Is the choice of a nurſe the point in queſtion? They apply to the *accoucheur*. The conſequence of this is, that ſhe is the beſt nurſe who has made him the greateſt acknowledgment. I ſhall not conſult a man-widwife, therefore, in the choice of a nurſe for Emilius; but ſhall take care

care to chuſe one myſelf. I may not reaſon on this head, perhaps, ſo ſcientifically and eloquently as a profeſſed chirurgeon; but this I am certain of, I ſhall be more ſincere, and my zeal will be leſs apt to miſlead me than his avarice.

There is no great myſtery in this choice; the rules for it are well known; but I conceive a little more regard ſhould be had to the age of the nurſe's milk, as well as to its quality. New milk is altogether thin and wateriſh; it is required, indeed, to be in a manner purgative, in order to carry off the remains of the *meconium* thickened in the inteſtines of the new-born infant. By degrees the milk acquires conſiſtence, and furniſhes a more ſolid aliment to the child, as it becomes more capable of digeſtion. It is not without deſign, ſurely, that, among the females of every ſpecies of animals, nature thus varies the conſiſtence of their milk according to the age of the infant.

A child newly born, therefore, requires a nurſe newly delivered. This, I know, has its inconvenience; but as ſoon as ever we depart from the natural order of things, we find inconveniences in every attempt to do right. The only commodious expedient is to do wrong, and that is generally preferred.

A nurſe ſhould have a good heart as well as good health: the intemperature of the paſſions will alter her milk, as well as that of the humours: add to this, that to regard the matter only in a phyſical light, is to take a view but of half the object. A nurſe may be a very bad one, and yet her milk may be good: a good dif-

diſpoſition is as eſſential as a good conſtitution. If we take a vitious woman, I do not ſay the child will contract her vices, but I ſay it will ſuffer by them. Is it not incumbent on her to be careful, obliging, and cleanly, as well as to ſuckle it? If ſhe be gormandizing and intemperate, ſhe will ſoon ſpoil her milk; if ſhe be negligent or paſſionate, what will become of the poor little wretch that lies at her mercy, and can neither defend itſelf nor complain? Perſons of vitious diſpoſitions are not at all adapted for any laudable employment whatever.

The choice of a nurſe is of ſo much the greater conſequence, as a child ought to have no other governeſs, in the ſame manner as he ought to have no other preceptor than his governor. Such was the cuſtom of the ancients, who, though leſs pretenders to reaſon, were more rational than we. With them, the nurſes who once undertook the education of children of their own ſex, never left them afterwards: and hence we ſee the reaſon why, in their theatrical pieces, the confident is generally a nurſe. It is impoſſible, that a child who paſſes ſucceſſively thro' ſo many hands, ſhould ever be well brought up. At every change, he will naturally make ſecret compariſons, which tend to diminiſh his reſpect for thoſe who ſuperintend his education, and conſequently their authority over him. If he ſhould once come to think there are grown perſons who have no more ſenſe than children, all the authority of age is loſt, and his education ſpoiled. A child ſhould know no other ſuperiors than its father and mother, or, in default of them, its nurſe and governor: even theſe

are

are too many by one; but this participation is inevitable, and the only way to remedy its defects, is, that they ſhould ſo act in concert as to be only one, reſpecting him.

It is requiſite that a nurſe ſhould live a little better than ordinary, and take more ſubſtantial aliment; but not that ſhe ſhould entirely vary her regimen. A ſudden and total change, even tho' from bad to good, is always dangerous: and if her ordinary manner of living preſerve her health and conſtitution, why ſhould ſhe be made to change it?

The peaſants eat leſs animal food and more vegetables than our women in town; a regimen which is rather favourable than otherwiſe to them and their children. When they are engaged to ſuckle thoſe of citizens, they are, however, obliged to vary their aliment, from the notion that meat-ſoups and broths afford a better chyle and greater plenty of milk. I am not at all of this opinion; and have experience on my ſide, which informs us, that children thus nouriſhed are more ſubject to the gripes and worms than others.

Nor is this to be wondered at, ſince animal ſubſtances, when putrefied, are covered with worms, in a manner never experienced in the ſubſtance of vegetables. Now, the milk, as it is prepared in the animal body, becomes a vegetable ſubſtance *; as may be demonſtrated

* Women eat bread, vegetables, and milk-diets: the females of the canine and feline ſpecies, even ſhe-wolves, feed on the ſame. Hence they derive vegetable juices for their milk. It remains to be examined, what is the milk of thoſe animals which

by analyſation; it turns readily by acids, and ſo far from affording the leaſt appearance of a volatile alcali, as animal ſubſtances do, it yields, like plants, an eſſential neutral ſalt.

The milk of thoſe women who live chiefly on vegetables, is more ſweet and ſalutary than that of carnivorous females. Formed out of ſubſtances of a ſimilar nature, it keeps longer, as it is leſs ſubject to putrefaction. And with reſpect to its quantity, every one knows that pulſe and vegetables increaſe the quantity of blood more than meat; and why not therefore that of the milk? I cannot believe that a child, who is not weaned too ſoon, or ſhould be weaned only with vegetable nutriment, and whoſe nurſe alſo ſhould live entirely on vegetables, would ever be ſubject to worms.

Vegetable aliment may poſſibly make the milk more apt to turn ſour; but I am very far from regarding ſour milk as unwholeſome nutriment. There are people in ſome countries who have no other, and yet are in good health: the whole apparatus of abſorbent alcali is to me indeed a piece of quackery.

There are ſome conſtitutions with which milk does not at all agree; nor will any abſorbent reconcile it to the ſtomach, while others digeſt it very well without abſorbents. Much inconvenience has been apprehended from the milk's turning to curds; this is an idle apprehenſion, becauſe it is well known the milk always curdles in the ſtomach.

Hence

which abſolutely cannot receive nouriſhment from any thing but meat; if there are any ſuch, which I much doubt.

Hence it is that it becomes an aliment ſolid enough to nouriſh infants and other animals; whereas, if it remained fluid, it would paſs off, and afford them no nouriſhment at all *.

We may cook up milk in what form ſoever we pleaſe, mix it with a thouſand abſorbents, it will be all to no purpoſe; whoever takes milk into the ſtomach, will infallibly digeſt cheeſe. The ſtomach, indeed, is particularly calculated to curdle milk; it is in the ſtomach of a calf we find the rennet.

I am of opinion, therefore, that, inſtead of changing the ordinary diet of nurſes, it is ſufficient only to increaſe its quantity, and take care it be the beſt of its kind. It is not from the nature of the aliment that vegetable foods are over heating. It is their high ſeaſoning only that makes them unwholeſome. Reform your kitchen; throw aſide your baking and frying-pans; let not your butter, ſalt, or milk meats, come near the fire; let not your vegetables, boiled or ſtewed, have any ſeaſoning, till they come hot to table: this kind of diet will then, inſtead of heating the nurſe, furniſh her with milk in abundance, and of the beſt quality †.

Can it be ſuppoſed that a vegetable diet ſhould

* Although the juices contributing to our nouriſhment are all liquid, it is yet neceſſary they ſhould be compreſſed from ſolid aliments. A working man, who ſhould live only upon broths, would ſoon be emaciated. He would be ſupported much better on milk, becauſe it curdles, and aſſumes ſolidity in the ſtomach.

† Thoſe who are deſirous of ſeeing the advantages and inconveniencies of the Pythagorean regimen conſidered at length, may conſult the tracts of the Drs Cocchi and Branchi on this important ſubject.

be the beſt adapted for a child, and animal food for its nurſe? There is an evident contradiction in the notion.

It is particularly in their earlieſt years, that the conſtitutions of children are affected by the ambient air. It penetrates through the pores of their ſoft and delicate ſkin, acts powerfully on their growing bodies, and makes ſuch impreſſions as are never after effaced. I ſhould not adviſe, therefore, the taking a woman from the country, to ſhut her up in a cloſe nurſery in town, there to bring up my child. I ſhould rather it ſhould go to breathe the freſh air of ſome open village, than the ſtinking atmoſphere of a city. It ſhould adopt the ſituation of its new mother, dwell beneath her ruſtic cottage, and its governor ſhould follow it. The reader will pleaſe to remember that its governor is not a hireling, but the friend of its father. "Well, "but," it may be ſaid, "what if no ſuch friend "can be met with? What if ſuch a removal be "inconvenient? What if all this you are adviſing be impracticable? What is to be done "then?"——I have already told you; act as you do: you will need no counſel to adviſe you to do that.

Mankind were not formed to be heaped together in ſhoals, but to ſpread over the face of the earth to cultivate it. The more they aſſemble together, the more they corrupt one another. The infirmity of the body, and the depravity of the mind, are both the inevitable effect of their too numerous concourſe. Man is, of all animals, the leaſt adapted to live in herds. Flocks of men, like flocks of ſheep, would all periſh

periſh in a ſhort time. Their breath is deſtructive to their fellow-creatures; nor is it leſs ſo in a literal than a figurative ſenſe.

Cities are the graves that ſwallow up the human ſpecies. At the end of a few generations, they periſh or degenerate; ſo that they require to be conſtantly recruited and regenerated from the country. Send then your children to regenerate themſelves, if I my ſo expreſs myſelf, in the country; and to recover, in the open fields, that vigour which is loſt in the unwholeſome air of populous cities. It is cuſtomary for pregnant women, who are in the country, to haſten their return to town, in order to lie in: they ought to take the contrary method; particularly thoſe who intend to nurſe their own children. They would have leſs to regret than they imagine; and, in a ſituation better adapted to their ſpecies, the pleaſures inſeparably attached to the diſcharge of their natural duties would ſoon make them loſe all taſte for ſuch as have no relation to nature.

As ſoon as the child is born, it is waſhed with warm water, uſually mixed with wine. This addition of wine appears to me little neceſſary. As no fluid is in its natural ſtate in fermentation, it is hardly to be thought the uſe of an artificial liquor needful to our preſervation.

For the ſame reaſon, the precaution of warming the water may be as well diſpenſed with; and, in fact, among many different people, their children are taken, immediately after their birth, and bathed in the river or the ſea, without farther ceremony. But ours, enervated be-

fore they are born by the effeminate habits of their parents, bring into the world with them conſtitutions already ſpoiled, and which will not bear to be ſubmitted immediately to thoſe experiments which are neceſſary to re-eſtabliſh them. It is by degrees only they are to be reſtored to their native vigour. Follow, then, at firſt, the eſtabliſhed cuſtom, and depart from it by degrees. Children ſhould be frequently waſhed; their unavoidable uncleanlineſs ſufficiently indicates the neceſſity of it. But, as they gain ſtrength, diminiſh by degrees the warmth of the water, till you come at length to waſh them, winter and ſummer, with it quite cold, or even freezing. As, in order not to expoſe them to danger, this diminution muſt be ſlow, gradual, and inſenſible, a thermometer may be made uſe of to meaſure the degree of heat or cold exactly.

This cuſtom of bathing, once begun, ought never to be left off, but to be continued during life. I conſider it, not only in reſpect to cleanlineſs and preſent health, but alſo as a ſalutary precaution; rendering the texture of the fibres more pliant and apt to yield, without effort or danger, to the impreſſions of the various degrees of heat and cold. For this reaſon, I would have my pupil, as he grows up, accuſtom himſelf to bathe in water, of all the different degrees of cold and heat, from the utmoſt tolerable degree of heat to the ſame of cold, making uſe of both alternately. Thus by habituating himſelf to ſupport the different temperatures of water, which, being a denſer fluid, touches the body in more points, and affects us more powerfully, he would be-

become almoſt inſenſible to the changes in the temperature of the air.

I would not have a child, alſo, the moment he is at liberty to breathe, by being freed from one incumbrance, be laid under others ſtill more deſtructive. No ſtay-bands, no rollers, no ſwaddling-cloaths; but blankets, looſe, and large enough to leave all its limbs at liberty; neither ſo heavy as to lay a reſtraint on its motion, nor ſo warm as to prevent its feeling the impreſſions of the air *. Place it in a roomy cradle †, well lined, where it may roll and tumble about at eaſe, and without danger. When it has gathered ſufficient ſtrength, let it crawl on its hands and knees about the nurſery; let it uſe and ſtretch its little limbs, and you will ſee it daily grow ſtronger. Compare it with a child of the ſame age, wrapt up in ſwaddling cloaths, and you will be aſtoniſhed at the difference of their progreſs ‡.

Great

* Children are ſtifled in great cities, in conſequence of their bandages and thick cloathing: thoſe who have the care of them being ignoraut, that the cold air, ſo far from hurting them, braces up their fibres, and ſtrengthens them; and that hot air relaxes, gives them a fever, and kills them.

† I ſay, a *cradle*, to make uſe of a common word for want of a better: otherwiſe I am well perſuaded children have no occaſion for rocking, and that this cuſtom is often hurtful.

‡ The ancient Peruvians, in looſely ſwathing their children, left their arms at full liberty. When they threw aſide this dreſs, they placed them at freedom in a little hollow, dug in the earth, and lined with cloaths. Here their children, unable to get out and crawl into danger, had their arms quite looſe, and could move their heads and bend their bodies, without running the riſk of falling or hurting themſelves. As ſoon as they were able to ſtand, the nipple was ſhown them at a diſtance, and thus they were enticed to learn to walk. The young negroes are often in a ſituation in which it is with much more difficulty

Great oppoſition is doubtleſs to be expected on the parts of the nurſes, to whom a child, well bolſtered up in ſwaddling cloaths, will certainly give leſs trouble, than one whoſe legs and arms, being at liberty, muſt be conſtantly watched. Add to this, that its uncleanlineſs being more apparent in an open dreſs, its cloaths would oftener want ſhifting; and, after all, cuſtom is an argument which in ſome countries is impoſſible to be refuted, to the ſatisfaction of the vulgar of every rank.

Never go about, therefore, to convince nurſes. Lay on them your commands; ſee them executed, and ſpare no pains to make them as eaſy as poſſible in the execution. Why ſhould you not partake of the trouble? In common nurſeries, the phyſical part of education only is regarded: Provided the child lives, and does but thrive, as it is called, all is well; nothing more is regarded. But according to my ſyſtem, wherein

ty they come at the breaſt: they cling round the hip of the mother with their knees and feet, and by that means ſtick ſo cloſe, that they ſtand in no need of being ſupported, while they reach the breaſt with their hands, and thus continue to ſuck, without letting go their hold, or being in danger of falling, notwithſtanding the various motions of the mother, who all the while is employed in her uſual labour. Theſe children begin to walk at the end of the ſecond month, or rather to ſhuffle along on their hands and knees; an exerciſe that gives them ever afterwards a facility of running almoſt as ſwift in that manner as on their feet. *Buffon, tome* iv. *p.* 192. 12mo.

To theſe examples M. Buffon might have added that of the Engliſh, among whom the extravagant and barbarous cuſtom above mentioned is daily loſing ground. See alſo *Loubiere, Voyage de Siam, Le Sieur le Beau, Voyage du Canada*, &c. I could, indeed, fill twenty pages with quotations, if it were neceſſary to ſupport what I have advanced by the evidence of facts.

wherein the care of a child's education commences with its being, the infant becomes at his birth the diſciple, not indeed directly of his governor, but of nature. The governor does nothing more than ſtudy her ſuperior precepts, and endeavour to prevent them from being thrown away. It is his province to have an eye over, to obſerve and attend his pupil; to watch as diligently the firſt dawning of his feeble underſtanding, as the Mahometans look for the riſing of the new moon.

We are born with a capacity for acquiring knowledge; but without knowing any thing. The ſoul, confined in half-formed and imperfect organs, poſſeſſes not even the ſenſe of its own exiſtence. The emotions and cries of a new-born infant, are effects purely mechanical, void of ſenſe or will.

Let us ſuppoſe a child, at its birth, poſſeſſed of the ſtrength and ſtature of a man; taken from his mother's womb, as one may ſay, armed at all like points, like Pallas iſſuing from the brain of Jove: this adult infant would be a perfect ideot, an automaton, an immoveable and almoſt inſenſible ſtatue. He would ſee nothing, underſtand nothing, know nothing; nay, he would not be able to turn his eyes toward the object he might have occaſion to ſee. He would not only be incapable of perceiving external objects, he would not be able to perceive them in the reſpective organs of perception: Colours would not appear to be painted on the retina, ſounds would ſeem not to ſtrike on the ear, the bodies in contact with him would not appear to touch his own; nay, he would

would not be ſenſible of his having any body at all. The feeling of his hands would ſeem to exiſt in the brain; all his ſenſations would be generalized into one; he would ſeem to exiſt only in the common *ſenſorium*; he would have but one idea, *i. e.* that of a *ſelf*, in which all his feelings would be abſorbed; and this idea, or rather ſenſation, would conſtitute the only difference between ſuch a ſuppoſed being and a common child. This being, alſo, thus formed on a ſudden, would be as little capable of ſtanding on his legs: it would require a long time for him to learn how to keep his body in equilibrio; perhaps he would not even attempt it, and you would ſee this tall robuſt animal fixed in one place like a ſtock or a ſtone, or crawling and tumbling about like a puppy.

He would perceive uneaſineſs occaſioned by his wants, without knowing what he wanted, or dreaming of any means to gratify them. There is no immediate communication between the muſcles of the ſtomach and thoſe of the legs and arms, that, ſuppoſing him ravenous with hunger and ſurrounded with victuals, would make him take one ſtep to approach, or reach out his hand to lay hold of them; ſo that, his body having none of the natural propenſities to growth, nor any of thoſe conſtant emotions which actuate children on that account, he would die of hunger before he would move to ſeek any thing for his ſubſiſtence. If we reflect ever ſo little on the order and progreſs of our acquirements, we ſhall not be able to deny, that a man muſt be nearly in ſuch a ſituation of primitive ignorance and ſtupidity, before he has ac-

acquired any thing of the experience of his fellow-creatures.

The point, therefore, is known, or may be known, from which we all ſet out to arrive at common underſtanding: but who is there can tell how diſtant is the other extremity of the line? Every one advances more or leſs according to his genius, taſte, neceſſities, talents, zeal, and the opportunities afforded him. I know of no philoſopher who hath been raſh enough to preſcribe the limits of our knowledge, and to ſay, Thus far, O man, ſhalt thou go, and no farther. We are ignorant of the extent of the human capacity, nor hath any one as yet meaſured the utmoſt poſſible diſtance between that of one man and another. Where is the mind ſo baſe as never to have been elevated by this reflection? Where is the man does not ſometimes ſay in the pride of his heart, "How many men "have I already ſurpaſſed! how many may not "I yet overtake! why ſhould my equal go far-"ther than myſelf?"

I ſay it again, the education of a man commences at his birth: before he can ſpeak, before he can underſtand, he is already inſtructed. Experience is the forerunner of precept; the moment he knows the features of his nurſe, he may be ſaid to have acquired conſiderable knowledge. Trace the progreſs of the moſt ignorant of mortals, from his birth to the preſent hour, and you will be aſtoniſhed at the knowledge he has acquired. If we divide all human ſcience into two parts, the one conſiſting of that which is common to all men, and the other of what is peculiar to the learned, the latter will appear

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inſignificant and trifling in compariſon with the other. But we think nothing of general acquiſitions, becauſe they are made inſenſibly, and even before we arrive at the age of reaſon; knowledge becomes conſpicuous only in its difference on compariſon; juſt as in working algebraic equations, common quantities are ſtruck out and ſtand for nothing.

Even brutes themſelves have their acquirements. They have organs of ſenſe, and muſt learn how to make uſe of them; they have wants which they muſt learn to provide for; they muſt learn to ſwim, to walk, and to fly. Quadrupeds are not capacitated to walk merely becauſe their legs are able to ſupport them: as ſoon as they are brought forth, the firſt eſſays they make are very hobbling and uncertain. A ſinging-bird, eſcaped from the cage in which it was bred, will not know how to fly, becauſe it has never flown. Senſible and animated beings owe every thing to inſtruction. If trees and plants had a progreſſive loco-motion, they muſt have been endued with ſenſes, and have acquired knowledge, otherwiſe their ſpecies would have been extinct.

The firſt ſenſations of children are thoſe which are merely affecting; they perceive nothing for ſome time but pleaſure and pain. Being unable to walk about, or lay hold of any thing, they require a good deal of time to form to themſelves by degrees thoſe repreſentative ſenſations which make objects appear to have an external exiſtence. In the mean time, and while ſuch objects are extending themſelves, retreating as it were from the eye, and aſſuming forms

forms and dimenſions, the return of the affecting ſenſations begins to ſubmit to the influence of habit; the eyes of children are turned conſtantly toward the light, and, if it come from one ſide, they imperceptibly take that direction; ſo that care ſhould always be taken to ſet them facing the light, leſt they ſhould become ſquint-eyed, or accuſtom themſelves to look croſſwiſe. They ſhould alſo be early accuſtomed to the abſence of light, otherwiſe they will be apt to cry when they find themſelves in the dark.

Sleep and nutriment, when too exactly proportioned, become neceſſary to them at the end of ſtated intervals; and, after a time, their propenſities thereto ariſe, not from phyſical neceſſity, but habit; or rather, habit produces an additional neceſſity to thoſe of nature: this muſt, by all means, be prevented.

The only habit in which a child ſhould be indulged, is that of contracting none; he ſhould not be permitted to exerciſe one arm more than the other; we ſhould not accuſtom him to preſent his right hand oftener than his left, or to make uſe of one more than the other; he ſhould not be uſed to eat, ſleep, or do any thing, at ſtated hours, or not to be left alone, whether in the day or night. Prepare early for his enjoyment of liberty, and the exerciſe of his natural abilities, by leaving him in full poſſeſſion of them unreſtrained by artificial habits, and by putting him in a ſituation to be always maſter of himſelf, and to do whatever his reſolution prompts him, as ſoon as he is able to form one.

As ſoon as a child begins to diſtinguiſh objects, a proper choice ſhould be made in thoſe

which are preſented to it. Every new object is naturally intereſting to a child: it finds itſelf ſo weak and feeble that it is fearful of every thing it is not acquainted with; but familiarity, which renders objects unaffecting, deſtroys this timidity. We ſee children educated in neat houſes, where cobwebs are carefully ſwept away, are always afraid of ſpiders, and retain the ſame diſguſt for them as they grow up: whereas I never knew a peaſant, either man or woman, afraid of a ſpider.

Why ſhould not the education of a child, therefore, begin before it can ſpeak or underſtand, ſince even the choice of objects preſented to its view is ſufficient to render it either timid or courageous? I would have them habituated to new objects, to ugly, diſguſtful, and uncommon animals; beginning with them, however, at a diſtance, and letting them approach by degrees; or till, being uſed to ſee others handle them, they will venture to handle them themſelves. If a child, during his infancy, hath been uſed to regard toads, ſerpents, or cray-fiſh, with indifference, he will look without horror, as he grows up, on any animal whatever. No object is frightful to ſuch as are daily accuſtomed to frightful objects.

All children are terrified at a maſk. I would begin to reconcile Emilius to maſks, by ſhowing him firſt an agreeable one. Somebody ſhould afterwards put it on, at the ſight of which I would laugh, the company ſhould laugh, and the child would then laugh with the reſt. By degrees, I would uſe him to others leſs agreeable; and laſtly to the moſt hideous and frightful.

ful. By artful management he will thus be brought to laugh and be as much pleaſed with the laſt as the firſt; I ſhould not be afraid he would ever be terrified at a maſk.

When Hector was going to take leave of Andromache, his child Aſtyanax, frightened at the nodding plume of his father's helmet, did not know him, but ſhrunk, crying, into the boſom of his nurſe, and drew a ſmile from his weeping mother. What ſhould have been done to cure the infant of his fears? Certainly the very thing which Hector did, in taking off his helmet and embracing the child without it. Nor ſhould this have been all: at ſome other opportunity he ſhould have been brought to handle and play with the feathers; after which his nurſe ſhould have taken the helmet, and put it, laughing, on her head; if it may be preſumed a woman might dare to make ſo free with the arms of Hector.

To accuſtom Emilius to the report of fire-arms, I would firſt make a flaſh in the pan of a piſtol; the ſudden light of which would give him pleaſure. I would then repeat it, with a larger prime: after being ſome time uſed to this, I would put a ſmall charge into the barrel, without ramming it; and after that a greater; and ſo on, till I had brought him by degrees to hear with indifference the report of muſquetry, bombs, cannon, and even the moſt terrible exploſions. I have remarked that children are ſeldom afraid of thunder, unleſs the claps are exceſſively loud, and really hurt the drum of the ear. They have otherwiſe no ſuch fear, till they have learned that it is ſometimes hurtful,

and even mortal. The fears thus inſtilled by reaſon, ſhould be eradicated by habit; while, by ſlow and artful means, both children and men would acquire intrepidity, and be afraid of nothing.

In a ſtate of infancy, wherein the memory and imagination are as yet inactive, a child is attentive to nothing but what actually affects his ſenſes with pain or pleaſure. His ſenſations being thus the original materials of his ideas, to regulate the formation of thoſe ideas agreeable to the order of things, is to prepare his memory to preſent them hereafter in the ſame order to his underſtanding: but as, while ſo young, he is only capable of attending to his ſenſations, it is ſufficient at firſt to make him ſenſible of the connection between theſe ſenſations and the objects that excite them. He is curious to touch and handle every thing he ſees; he ſhould be indulged in the gratification of this curioſity; it ſuggeſts to him a very neceſſary courſe of experiments. Hence it is he muſt learn to feel heat and cold, the hardneſs, ſoftneſs, and weight of bodies; to judge of their magnitude, figure, and other ſenſible qualities, by looking, touching *, hearing, and particularly by comparing the ſight with the touch, and judging, by means of the eye, of the ſenſation acquired by the fingers.

It is by motion only that we diſcover any thing

* The ſenſe of ſmelling is that which comes the lateſt to perfection in children. They appear not to be ſenſible of either good or ill ſcents, till they are two or three years old. They ſeem to have in this reſpect the ſame indifference, or rather inſenſibility, which is remarked in many other animals.

thing to exiſt out of ourſelves; and it is by our own motion that we acquire the idea of extenſion. It is becauſe a child has no ſuch idea, that it will ſtretch out its hand, in the ſame manner, to lay hold of an object within its reach, or at an hundred yards diſtance. This effort appears to you only a token of command, an order to the object to come to him, or to you to fetch it; but it is in fact no ſuch thing. It is made, becauſe the objects which a child firſt perceives to exiſt in the brain, and afterwards in the eye, appear now to exiſt at arm's length; and he has no conception of any extenſion beyond his reach. Care ſhould be taken, therefore, to walk him about often, to have him carried about from one place to another where he chuſes to go, in order to give him juſt ideas of local relations, and teach him to judge of diſtances. When he begins, however, once to know theſe, your method muſt be changed, and you muſt let him go, or carry him, only where you pleaſe, not where he pleaſes: for when his ſenſes no longer deceive him in this reſpect, the efforts I have been ſpeaking of change their cauſe. This change is ſo remarkable, that it may require ſome explanation.

The uneaſineſs occaſioned by our wants, is expreſſed by ſigns, when the aſſiſtance of others is required to relieve them. Hence the cries of infants. They are almoſt perpetually in tears: and indeed ſo they muſt be. As all their ſenſations are of the affecting kind; when theſe are agreeable, they enjoy them in ſilence; but, when painful, they naturally expreſs themſelves in their own language, and demand relief.

Now, while they are awake, they ſeldom are in a ſtate of indifference: they are generally aſleep, or ſome how or other affected with uneaſy ſenſations.

All modes of ſpeech are the factitious productions of art. It has been long a ſubject of inquiry, whether there exiſted in nature an univerſal language. Without doubt there does, and this is what children ſpeak before they can talk any other. This language, indeed, does not conſiſt of articulate words; but is emphatic, ſonorous, and intelligible. The uſe of the invented modes of ſpeech, hath made us neglect this ſo much as even quite to forget it. Let us ſtudy the wants and efforts of children, and we ſhall ſoon learn it again. Nurſes are our maſters in this language; they underſtand every thing ſaid by their reſpective children; they make replies and hold connected dialogues with them; and, though they themſelves make uſe of words, thoſe words are perfectly needleſs: the child comprehends not the ſenſe of the word, but the accent with which it is pronounced.

To the language of the tongue, we may alſo add that of geſture, equally expreſſive. By geſture I do not mean any motion of the feeble hands of ſuch young children; the geſture of infants lies in the muſcles of their face. It is aſtoniſhing to ſee ſuch ſtrength of expreſſion in their half-formed phyſiognomies: their features are continually varying, with inconceivable rapidity of tranſition. You will ſee ſmiles, fears, deſires, take place on their countenances, and vaniſh like lightning; at every change a new face appearing in an inſtant. The muſcles of their faces

faces are certainly more changeable than ours. On the other hand, their dull and languid eyes hardly ſpeak at all. Such a ſpecies of expreſſion indeed is adapted to an age whoſe wants are merely corporeal; the expreſſion of our feelings conſiſts in grimace, and the diſtortion of our features; that of our ſentiments lies in our eyes.

As man, in his firſt ſtage of life, is a wretched and helpleſs being, ſo his firſt mode of expreſſion is that of tears and complaint. An infant is ſenſible of his wants, and incapable of ſatisfying them; he therefore implores the aſſiſtance of thoſe about him, by his cries. If he be hungry or have thirſt, he cries; if too cold or too hot, if he want to move, or to be held ſtill, he cries: if he want to ſleep or to be danced about, he has no other method to expreſs himſelf but by crying.

The leſs he is in a ſituation to help himſelf, the more frequently he requires aſſiſtance, to vary his circumſtances or poſition. He has but one kind of language, becauſe he knows in fact but one kind of inconvenience: in the preſent imperfection of his organs, he is incapable of diſtinguiſhing their different impreſſions; all the different cauſes of his uneaſineſs form but one ſenſation of pain.

Thus from the tears of children, which one is apt to think ſo little worthy of attention, ariſes the firſt ſenſe of the relation which man bears to the objects that ſurround him: here is forged the firſt link of that extenſive chain which forms the bond of ſociety.

When a child cries, it is evidently uneaſy; it hath

hath ſome want that requires to be ſatisfied: we look, we examine what it is, find it out, and relieve it. If this be not the caſe, and the cauſe of uneaſineſs cannot be found, its tears continue to flow, and it begins to grow outrageous: we ſoothe it, to make it quiet; rock it, or endeavour to ſing it aſleep: if this does not ſucceed, we grow impatient and threaten it; nay ſometimes a brutual nurſe will beat the poor innocent in theſe circumſtances. Strange leſſons theſe, ſurely, at our firſt entrance into life!

I ſhall never forget that I once ſaw a crying child thus beaten by its nurſe; on which it became immediately ſilent, and, as I thought, intimidated. I reflected upon this occaſion, what a ſervile mind that muſt be, on which nothing would operate but rigour. I was, however, deceived; the little wretch was almoſt ſuffocated with choler; it loſt its breath, and I ſaw it growing black in the face. In a moment after, it ſet up the moſt piercing cries; expreſſing all the ſigns of reſentment, fury, and deſpair, adapted to its age. I was even apprehenſive that it would expire under the violence of its agitation. This example alone would have convinced me, if I could ever have doubted it, of an innate ſenſe of right and wrong being implanted in the human heart. I am very certain, had a burning coal fallen by accident on the hand of the child, it would have been leſs agitated than by this ſlight blow, given with a manifeſt intention to hurt it.

This diſpoſition in children to paſſion and exceſſive anger, requires very nice management. Boerhaave thinks the diſeaſes of children ſhould be

be ranked, for the moſt part, in the claſs of convulſions; becauſe their heads being proportionably larger, and the nervous ſyſtem more extended than in adults, their nerves are more ſuſceptible of irritation. Be careful, therefore, to keep them from ſervants, who are continually teazing and provoking them; ſuch ſervants are infinitely more fatal to children than the intemperature of the air or the ſeaſons. While infants are croſſed only by the reſiſtance of things, and not by perſons, they will never grow fractious nor paſſionate. This is one reaſon why the children of common people, being more free and independent, are for the moſt part leſs infirm and delicate in their conſtitutions, and more robuſt than thoſe of others, who, by pretending to educate them better, are perpetually contradictiong them. It muſt, however, be remembered that there is a very wide difference between acting always in obedience to, or humouring a child, and not contradicting it.

Tears are the petitions of young children; if they be not looked on as ſuch, they will ſoon become commands: infants would begin by praying our aſſiſtance, and go on to command our ſervice. Thus from their own weakneſs, whence at firſt ariſes the ſenſe of their dependence, follows the notion of domineering and command. This idea, however, is leſs excited by their wants than by our aſſiduities; and here we begin to perceive thoſe moral effects, whoſe immediate cauſe doth not exiſt in nature. At the ſame time, we ſee how neceſſary it is, to diſcover the ſecret motives of the cries of children even in their earlieſt infancy.

When

When a child ſometimes holds out its hand, without any other emotion, it thinks to reach the object, becauſe it cannot eſtimate the diſtance of it: it is here only miſtaken: but when, in reaching out its hand, it cries, or manifeſts other ſigns of impatience, it is not deceived in the diſtance of the object, but is either commanding it to approach, or you to fetch it. In the firſt caſe, therefore, it is proper to undeceive the child, by carrying it gently toward the object; and in the laſt, not to appear to mind it, but, the louder it cries, the leſs notice to take of it. It is of conſequence to check children betimes, in uſurping the command over perſons who are not in their power, or over things which they are not ſufficiently acquainted with.

For the latter reaſon, it is better, when a child deſires any thing that may be proper to give him, to carry him to the object, than to bring the object to the child; as, by this means, he deduces a concluſion adapted to his tender years, and which there is no other way of ſuggeſting to him.

The Abbe de St Pierre calls men great children; we may with equal propriety give a turn to the expreſſion, and call children little men. Theſe propoſitions are true as maxims, though as principles they require explanation; but when Hobbes calls a vicious man a robuſt child, he is guilty of an abſolute contradiction. All vice takes its riſe from weakneſs: an infant is vicious only becauſe he is weak; give him power, and you make him good. An all-powerful being could never do any ill. Of all the attributes aſcribed to an omnipotent Deity, that of goodneſs

neſs appears to be the moſt eſſential to his exiſtence. We cannot conceive him to exiſt without it. Among all the people who entertained the Manichean notions of two principles, the evil one was conſtantly ſuppoſed inferior to the good; without which their whole ſyſtem had been to the laſt degree abſurd.

Reaſon only teaches us to know good from evil. Conſcience, which excites us to love the one and hate the other, although independent on reaſon, cannot diſcover one from the other without it. Before we come to be capable of reaſoning, we do good and ill without knowing it; and there is no morality in our actions, tho' there may, and frequently is, in our ſentiments concerning the actions of others relative to us. A child will often put things into diſorder, will break every thing it comes near, will graſp a ſparrow as it would a ſtone, and kill it, without knowing what it is doing. And why? A philoſopher will preſently account for it, from the vices inherent in our nature; the pride, the thirſt of power, the ſelf-love, and the wickedneſs of man: a ſenſe of its weakneſs, he will add, makes the child eager to perform actions of ſtrength, and to experience its own power. But in anſwer to this, look upon that infirm and decayed old man, brought back by the revolutions of human life to the weakneſs of infancy: he not only remains peaceable and quiet in himſelf, but is deſirous every thing about him ſhould be ſo too. The leaſt change of ſituation is troubleſome to him, and he is pleaſed with an univerſal calm. How ſhould the ſame imbecility, joined with the ſame paſſions, produce ſuch different

ferent effects in the two ages, if the original cauſe were not changed? and where are we to ſeek this diverſity of cauſes, unleſs in the phyſical conſtitution of the two individuals? The active principle, common to both, expands and unfolds itſelf in one, and contracts and cloſes itſelf in the other; in the one it tends to form, in the other to deſtroy, the man; in the one it tends to life, and in the other to death. The drooping activity of the vital principle is concentrated in the heart of age; in that of infancy, it overflows and diffuſes itſelf; in the exceſs of its vivacity, a child ſeems to have life enough to animate every thing around it. Whether it makes or mars, it is all one to a child, provided the ſituation of things be changed; as every change neceſſarily implies action. If it ſeem to have a propenſity to deſtroy things, it is not from a vicious principle; but becauſe the action, neceſſary to make or compoſe any thing, is tedious and ſlow; whereas that of ſpoiling and breaking things to pieces, being quicker, agrees better with its natural alertneſs and vivacity.

At the ſame time, however, that the Author of nature hath given to children this active principle, he hath taken care to prevent its being hurtful, by giving them as little ſtrength in proportion to indulge it. But no ſooner are they miſled to conceive the perſons about them as inſtruments which they themſelves are to put in action, than they make uſe of them to aſſiſt their weakneſs in purſuing their inclinations. Hence it is they become importunate, tyrannical, imperious, miſchievous, and intractable;

a progreſs that doth not ariſe from a natural ſpirit of domineering, but is the effect of wrong education: for it requires no great experience to perceive how agreeable it is to act by means of others, and to have occaſion only to ſpeak in order to put the world in motion.

As it grows up, a child acquires ſtrength, and becomes leſs active and reſtleſs; it contracts its powers more within itſelf. The body and ſoul, if I may ſo ſay, keep each other in æquilibrio; and nature requires no greater quantity of motion than is neceſſary to our preſervation. But the deſire of command doth not ceaſe with the motives that gave riſe to it; the notion of ſuperiority is flattering to ſelf-love, and is increaſed by habit: thus caprice ſucceeds to neceſſity, and the force of prejudice and opinion takes root in the mind.

The principle once known, we ſee clearly the track wherein we began to deviate from nature: let us inquire then, what muſt be done, in order to prevent our going aſtray. So far from being endued with ſuperfluous abilities, children have at firſt hardly ſufficient for the purpoſes nature requires; it is requiſite therefore to leave them at full liberty to employ thoſe ſhe hath given them, and which they cannot abuſe: this is my firſt maxim.

It is our duty to aſſiſt them, and ſupply their deficiencies, whether of body or mind, in every circumſtance of phyſical neceſſity. Second maxim.

Every aſſiſtance afforded them ſhould be confined to real utility, without adminiſtering any thing to the indulgence of their caprice or unreaſonable humours; for they will never be ca-

pricious unleſs through neglect, or in ſome particular circumſtance depending on their conſtitution. Third maxim.

The meaning of their language and ſigns ought to be carefully ſtudied, in order to be able to diſtinguiſh, in an age when they know not how to diſſemble, between thoſe inclinations that ariſe immediately from nature, and what are only fantaſtical. Fourth maxim.

The deſign and tendency of theſe rules are, to give children more real liberty and leſs command; to leave them more to do of themſelves than to require of others. Thus, by being early accuſtomed to confine their deſires to their abilities, they will be little affected with the want of what is out of their power.

Here we have a new, and very important reaſon for leaving their body and limbs at full liberty; with this precaution, however, that we remove them from the danger of falling down, and put every thing out of their reach whereby they may wound or hurt themſelves.

It cannot be doubted that an infant, whoſe body and arms are at liberty, will cry leſs than another bolſtered up in ſwaddling cloaths. The child, who is liable to ſuffer none but natural inconveniencies, will cry only when it feels pain; which is a great advantage in its education; for then we are certain to know when it ſtands in real want of aſſiſtance; and this ſhould be afforded it, if poſſible, immediately. But if it be out of our power to relieve it, we ſhould take no notice, nor make any fruitleſs attempts to quiet it: kiſſes and careſſes will not cure its colic; yet it will remember the methods taken

to

to ſoothe it; and when it once knows how to employ you at its pleaſure, it is become your maſter, and all is over. Being leſs reſtrained in their efforts to move, children would cry leſs; if we were leſs importuned with their tears, it would require leſs trouble to quiet them; threatened and ſoothed more ſeldom, they would become leſs timid and obſtinate, and would retain more of their natural temper and diſpoſition. It is leſs from letting children cry unnoticed, than from ſtriving to appeaſe them, that they get falls: my proof of this is, that thoſe which are moſt neglected are the leaſt ſubject to thoſe accidents. I am far, however, from recommending that children ſhould, for this reaſon, be neglected: on the contrary, I would have ſo much care taken of them as to prevent accidents of this kind, and not that their cries ſhould give the firſt notice of them. Neither would I, at the ſame time, have a nurſe be over-ſolicitous about triſles. Why ſhould ſhe think it ſo great a hardſhip on the child, to let it cry a little, when ſhe ſees on how many occaſions its tears are uſeful and ſalutary? When children come to be ſenſible of the great value you ſet on their ſilence, they will take care you ſhall not have too much of it. They will, at length, ſet ſo great a value on it themſelves, as to prevent your being able to obtain any; when, by dint of continual crying without ſucceſs, they ſtrain, exhauſt, and ſometimes deſtroy themſelves.

The long fits of crying in a child, who is neither confined, ſick, nor in real want of any thing, are only fits of habit and obſtinacy. They are not to be attributed to nature, but to the

nurſe, who, from not knowing how to bear ſuch importunity, only increaſes it, without reflecting that, in making the child quiet to-day, ſhe is only encouraging it to cry the more to-morrow.

The only way to cure, or prevent, this habit, is, to take no notice of a child in ſuch circumſtances. Nobody cares, not even children, to take fruitleſs pains. They may for a while perſevere in their trials; but, if you have more patience than they have obſtinacy, they will be diſguſted at the experiment, and repeat it no more. This is the method to prevent their tears, and to uſe them to cry only when they are really in pain.

When they are poſſeſſed of theſe fits of caprice and obſtinacy, a certain way to quiet them is, to divert their attention by ſome agreeable and ſtriking object, that may make them forget their motive for crying. Moſt nurſes excel in practiſing this expedient; and, if artfully managed, it is very uſeful: but it is of the utmoſt conſequence that the child ſhould not perceive this intention of diverting him, but that he ſhould imagine we are amuſing ourſelves without thinking of him: in this reſpect, however, all nurſes are very inexpert, and perverſely do a right thing the wrong way.

Children are in general weaned too early. The proper ſeaſon is indicated by the cutting of their teeth, an operation which is uſually very ſharp and painful. At this time, by a mechanical inſtinct, they carry every thing, which is put into their hands, up to their mouths. In order to facilitate this taſk, therefore, the child is

is uſually provided with a coral, or other hard body, to rub againſt its gums. I am of opinion, however, this doth not anſwer the end propoſed. The rubbing of hard bodies in this caſe againſt the gums, ſo far from ſoftening, muſt make them hard and callous; rendering the teeth ſtill more difficult to cut, and the pain more acute and laſting. Let us follow the traces of inſtinct. We do not ſee the young of the canine ſpecies, in cutting their teeth, ever gnaw flints, iron, or bones; but always wood, leather, rags, or other ſoft ſubſtances, which tear to pieces, or yield to the impreſſion of their teeth.

But ſimplicity is baniſhed from every thing, even from our treatment of the moſt ſimple of animals, an helpleſs infant. It muſt have bells of ſilver and gold, and corals of all ſorts and prices. What an uſeleſs and deſtructive apparatus! I would have nothing of all this. No bells, no corals, for my child; but little natural twigs taken from the tree, with their leaves and fruit, the dried heads of poppies, in which it might hear the ſeeds rattle, a ſtick of liquorice which it might ſuck and chew: theſe would amuſe it as well as any ſuch magnificent toys, and would not uſe it to the luxurious parade of wealth or diſtinction.

It is generally acknowledged, that milk-meats, or puddings made of raw flour, are not a very wholeſome nutriment, boiled milk and crude meal never agreeing well with the ſtomach. In puddings the flour is leſs baked than in bread, beſides that it has not been fermented: panada, or bread-puddings, as alſo thoſe made of the beſt rice, I ſhould think much preferable. But

if children muſt abſolutely have flour-puddings, it is proper the flour ſhould be baked a little beforehand. We make, in my country, a very agreeable and wholeſome ſoup, with a meal thus prepared. Meat-broths, and other ſpoon-meats of that kind, are alſo an indifferent aliment; which ſhould be uſed but ſparingly. It is neceſſary that children ſhould accuſtom themſelves early to chew; this is the true way to facilitate the cutting their teeth: and hence, when they begin to ſwallow, the ſaliva, mixed with their aliment, promotes digeſtion.

I would therefore uſe them, betimes, to chew dried fruits and cruſts of bread. I would give them hard cakes and biſcuits to play with; by ſoftening which in their mouths they would ſometimes ſwallow part of them: thus they would cut their teeth eaſily, and wean themſelves almoſt imperceptibly. Infants born and brought up in the country have generally a very good appetite, and require no other trouble in weaning.

Children are accuſtomed to liſten to ſounds from their birth: we not only talk to them before they can underſtand the meaning of what is ſaid, but before they can mimic the ſounds repeated in their hearing. Their organs of ſpeech, as yet in a ſtate of incapacity, are brought by ſlow degrees to the imitation of ſounds; and indeed we are not well aſſured that theſe make as diſtinct impreſſions on their organs of hearing as on ours. I do not diſapprove of the nurſe's amuſing her child with ſinging, and other very ſprightly and chearful notes; but I am abſolutely againſt her ſtunning it perpetually with a confuſed

fuſed heap of uſeleſs words, of which the child comprehends nothing but the tone in which they are ſpoken. The firſt words repeated in the hearing of an infant, ſhould be few, eaſy, and diſtinct: they ſhould alſo be repeated often, and be only ſuch as ſerve to expreſs ſenſible objects, which may, at the ſame time, be pointed out to its view. Our unhappy readineſs to content ourſelves with words we do not underſtand, takes place earlier than may be imagined. The ſchool-boy liſtens to the gabbling uſher of his claſs, with the ſame ſtupid attention as he did to the prattle of his nurſe. Hence it appears to be a very uſeful mode of inſtruction, to bring up children to hear nothing of it.

A thouſand conſiderations preſent themſelves, when we come to reflect on the formation of the language, and the firſt attempts of children. Whatever pains or method we take, they will all learn to ſpeak in the ſame manner, ſo that philoſophical ſpeculations are entirely uſeleſs.

They have, as it were, a grammar adapted to their age, the rules of whoſe ſyntax are more general than thoſe of ours; and if we conſider it attentively, we ſhall be ſurpriſed to ſee the exactneſs with which they purſue certain analogies; very miſtaken ones, if you will; but very regular, and exceptionable only from their uncouth turn, or contrariety to common practice. Methinks I hear a poor boy ſeverely reprimanded by his father, for ſaying, *Mon pere, irai-je-t-y?* Now, it is clear the child purſues analogy better than our grammarians; for as we ſhould ſay to him, *Vas-y*, why ſhould he not have ſaid, *Irai-je-t-y?* It is to be obſerved alſo with what addreſs

addreſs he thus avoided the diſagreeable *hiatus* in ſaying *irai-je-y*, or *y irai-je?* Is it the fault of the poor child that we have improperly deprived this phraſe of the determinate adverb *y*, becauſe we know not what to do with it *? It is an intolerable and very ſuperfluous piece of pedantry to think of correcting in children ſuch little treſpaſſes againſt the cuſtoms of ſpeech as theſe, of which they infallibly correct themſelves in time. Speak always correctly yourſelf, in their preſence; behave ſo that they ſhall be better pleaſed with your company than that of others; and be aſſured their language will grow inſenſibly correct and pure as your own.

An abuſe of another kind, though of equal importance, and not leſs eaſy to prevent, is our being too earneſt to teach them to ſpeak; as if we were afraid they would never learn it of themſelves. This imprudent forwardneſs is productive of an effect directly contrary to the end deſigned, and occaſions them to talk leſs early and more indiſtinct: the extreme attention which is paid to every thing they attempt to ſay, makes it needleſs for them to pronounce their words diſtinctly; hence, taking the trouble only juſt to open their mouths, many of them retain during life a vicious mode of pronunciation, and a confuſed manner of ſpeech, that renders them almoſt unintelligible.

I have lived much among the country people, and never heard any of them liſp, whether men or

* Any reader, poſſeſſed of the leaſt ſmattering of French, will readily underſtand this example, and at the ſame time ſee the impoſſibility of the tranſlator's rendering it in Engliſh.

or women, old or young. May we not aſk, whence this could happen? Are the organs in peaſants conſtructed different from ours? No; they are only differently exerciſed. Oppoſite my window is a little mount, whereon the little children of the place aſſemble to play; and, although they are at a good diſtance, I can perfectly diſtinguiſh what they ſay, and often take down minutes of their diſcourſe, as proper hints for this work. At the ſame time I am every day deceived by mine ear, as to their ſeveral ages; by their voices I ſhould take them ſometimes to be nine or ten years old, and by their looks and ſtature to be but three or four. Nor have I confined this obſervation to myſelf, but tried the ſame experiment on ſeveral of my city-friends, who come occaſionally to viſit me; all of whom have, without exception, fallen into the ſame miſtake.

The reaſon of this is, that children educated in town, being chiefly confined to the nurſery, and for ever under the wing of their governeſs, have occaſion only to mumble out their words to be underſtood: they no ſooner move their lips, than every one is attentive to what they have to ſay; the words they cannot pronounce, or pronounce ill, are ſaid for them; and thus, by dint of attention, and by having the ſame people always about them, the meaning of what they would ſay is rather gueſſed at, than of what they actually do ſay underſtood.

In the country it is quite different. The nurſe is not perpetually at hand, and the child is obliged to learn to ſpeak diſtinctly and loud what he wants to have underſtood. There the children

dren rambling about the fields at a diſtance from their father, mother, or playfellows, are habituated to make themſelves heard a great way off, and to adapt the efforts of their voice to their diſtance from thoſe they would make to hear them. This is the true method of learning pronunciation, and not that of ſtammering out a few inarticulate words to an attentive governeſs. Thus when you ſpeak to the child of a peaſant, its baſhfulneſs may prevent its giving you an anſwer; but whatever it ſays, it ſpeaks plain and properly: whereas, on the contrary, in town, the nurſe muſt always act as an interpreter, without which you would never be able to underſtand what is muttered between the teeth of their children *.

As they grow up, indeed, the boys ought to correct themſelves of this fault, by what they learn at college, and the girls at the convent or boarding-ſchool: in fact, thoſe who are thus educated, ſpeak in general more diſtinctly than ſuch as are brought up conſtantly at home. But what prevents them from ever acquiring ſo clear and articulate a pronunciation as that of the peaſants, is the neceſſity impoſed on them of learning many things by heart, and of repeating them

* This is not without exception: thoſe children who are at firſt the moſt difficult to underſtand, become often the moſt loud and noiſy when they begin to acquire ſtrength of voice. But there would be no end of replying particulary to ſuch *minutiæ*; the ſenſible reader will eaſily perceive, that both deficiencies and exceſs in the ſame ſpecies of abuſe may be equally remedied by the ſame method. I look upon theſe two maxims as inſeparable; *always enough*, and *never too much*. The latter is the neceſſary conſequence of the firm eſtabliſhment of the former.

them afterwards aloud; for, in ſtudying, they habituate themſelves to ſcribble, and jabber over their leſſons. Again, in reciting them, it is ſtill worſe; as, being frequently at a loſs for words, they drawl out their ſentences and ſyllables in the moſt diſagreeable tones: it is impoſſible it ſhould, in ſuch caſe, be otherwiſe; when the memory fails, the tongue muſt gabble of courſe. Thus it is we contract and retain the habits of a vicious pronunciation. Emilius, as will be ſeen hereafter, ſhall contract no ſuch habits, or at leaſt not in the ſame manner.

I acknowledge that the common people and peaſants run into the other extreme: that they almoſt always ſpeak louder than is needful; that, in pronouncing their words too articulately, their ſpeech is harſh and diſguſting; and that they make an ill choice of words and phraſes.

But, in the firſt place, this extreme doth not appear to me ſo vicious as the other; for, as the chief end of ſpeech is to make ourſelves underſtood, certainly the greateſt fault we can be guilty of in ſpeaking is to be unintelligible. To affect to ſpeak without accent or emphaſis, is to deprive our diſcourſe of all gracefulneſs and energy. Accent is the ſoul of converſation, and gives it expreſſion and ſincerity. It is leſs deceitful than words: and perhaps this is the reaſon it is rejected by perſons of polite education. It is the cuſtom of ſaying every thing in the ſame tone of voice and manner, that qualifies us for the mean art of abuſing people without their perceiving it. To the diſuſe and preſcription of accent ſucceed the various affected, ridiculous, and abſurd modes of polite converſation,

tion, in uſe particularly with thoſe who frequent the court. This affectation of ſpeech and look is what generally renders the French, at the firſt interview, diſagreeable to people of other nations. Inſtead of giving their ſpeech its natural accent, they give it an affected one; which is not a method to prepoſſeſs others in their favour.

All thoſe little errors in ſpeech, which we are uſually ſo much afraid children ſhould fall into, are not worth notice; they are with the greateſt eaſe either to be prevented or amended: but thoſe habits which they contract, by our rendering their diſcourſe low, confuſed, and timid, by inceſſantly criticiſing their tone of voice, and taking exception at their words, can never be corrected. A man who hath learned to talk only in the nurſery, and in aſſemblies, would make himſelf little underſtood at the head of a battalion, and would never be able to ſilence a popular tumult by his elocution. Let children firſt learn to ſpeak to men; they will be able to prattle to women whenever they pleaſe.

Nurſe them in the country amidſt ruſtic ſports and employments: they will there acquire a voice clear and ſonorous, nor be in a ſituation to contract the confuſed liſping and ſtammering of children educated in town. Nor will they be any more liable to contract the provincial phraſes and accent of the country; or at leaſt will ſoon ſhake them off, if their maſter living with them from their birth, and converſing with them daily, take care to prevent, or efface, by the purity of his own language, the impreſſions made by the dialect of the peaſants. Emilius muſt be taught to ſpeak as good French as I am

maſter

maſter of, and at the ſame time to pronounce it much better and more diſtinctly than I can.

A child, who would learn to ſpeak, ſhould be accuſtomed only to hear words whoſe meaning he might be eaſily made to comprehend, and to ſpeak thoſe only which he is in a capacity to pronounce articulately. The efforts he makes to do this, will induce him frequently to repeat the ſame ſyllable, as it were to exerciſe himſelf in the diſtinct pronunciation of it. When he begins to ſtutter, however, never give yourſelf the trouble to gueſs what he would ſay. To preſume even to be always attended to, is exerciſing a ſort of command; and in this, be it of what kind ſoever, a child ſhould never be indulged. Let it be thought ſufficient with you, to provide him, very carefully, with what is neceſſary; it is his province to endeavour to make you underſtand what is not ſo. Much leſs ſhould you be ſo precipitate, to oblige him to ſpeak; he will learn to talk well enough of himſelf as he comes to perceive the utility of it.

It has been remarked, indeed, that ſuch children as are backward in learning to talk, never ſpeak ſo diſtinctly as others. It is not, however, from their being backward to ſpeak that their organs contract any impediment; but, on the contrary, it is ſome natural impediment which makes them ſo late before they ſpeak. Were not this the caſe, why ſhould they be the leſs forward in this reſpect than others? Have they leſs need of ſpeech, or are they leſs excited to it? This is not the caſe, but the direct contrary; for the great concern ariſing from this delay, when it comes to be known, occaſions the poor

child to be much more eagerly ſolicited and tormented to ſpeak than are thoſe who begin earlier: now thoſe ſolicitations to repeated efforts greatly contribute to render its ſpeech confuſed and ſtammering; whereas, if treated leſs precipitately, it would have had more time and leiſure to have acquired a better pronunciation.

Children who are preſſed too much to ſpeak, have neither time allowed them to learn to pronounce diſtinctly what they ſay, nor to comprehend perfectly what they hear: whereas, if left to themſelves, they would begin to practiſe upon words of the moſt eaſy pronunciation, annexing to them ſome ſignification, which they would make underſtood by their geſtures; they would give you their own words before they received yours, and make uſe of the latter only as they ſhould underſtand them: for not being preſſed to it, they would firſt obſerve the ſenſe you yourſelf ſhould give them; which when they were certain of, they would adopt them accordingly.

But the greateſt evil attending this precipitation, is, not that our firſt diſcourſe to children, and the firſt language they ſpeak, are to them void of meaning; but that, with reſpect to them, they convey a meaning different from ours, without our knowing it, or being able to find it out; ſo that, in ſometimes appearing to anſwer us very pertinently, they ſpeak without having underſtood us, and without our underſtanding them. It is at ſuch equivocal expreſſions we are ſometimes ſo much ſurpriſed, when we annex ideas to their words to which they themſelves are ſtrangers.

ſtrangers. This inattention, on our part, to the true ſenſe that words convey to children, appears to be the grand cauſe of the firſt errors they fall into, and which, even after they are undeceived, continue to influence their turn of mind during the reſt of their lives. I ſhall have more than one occaſion, in the following ſheets, to illuſtrate this by examples.

The vocabulary of a child, therefore, ſhould be as confined as poſſible. It is a very great inconvenience for him to have more words than ideas, to know how to talk about things of which he is yet incapable of thinking. I imagine one reaſon, why perſons who live in the country have generally more clear underſtandings than thoſe who reſide in town, is, that their dictionary is leſs extenſive. They have few ideas; but they compare, and reaſon on them very juſtly.

In the firſt developement of the ſeveral organs and faculties of a child, they nearly accompany each other. He begins to talk, to eat, to walk, almoſt at the ſame time. This may be properly called the firſt epoch of human life. Before this period, he is little better than he was in the womb of his mother; he has no ſentiments, no ideas, nay hardly any ſenſations; he is even inſenſible of his own exiſtence:

Vivit, et eſt vitæ neſcius ipſe ſuæ.
Ovid. Triſt. i. 3.

BOOK II.

WE are come now to the ſecond period of life, at which the ſtate of infancy, properly ſpeaking, ends, and that of puerility begins: for the words *infans* and *puer* are by no means ſynonymous. The firſt is comprehended in the other, and ſignifies a child *who cannot ſpeak;* hence we find, in Valerius Maximus, the expreſſion *puerum infantem.* I ſhall continue, notwithſtanding, to make uſe of the word *children* agreeable to its modern acceptation.

When a child begins to talk, it weeps leſs. This progreſſion is natural; one language being only ſubſtituted for another. As ſoon as he can complain in expreſs terms, why ſhould he do it by tears, unleſs indeed he ſuffer too violently to be able to vent his complaint in words? If he continue, otherwiſe, in the practice of crying, it is the fault of thoſe who are about him. When once Emilius comes to be able to ſay, *I am not well,* he muſt be in very great pain indeed if he afterwards ſheds a tear.

If a child be of a delicate conſtitution, extremely ſuſceptible, and naturally apt to cry for nothing, I would ſoon dry up the ſource of his tears by rendering them fruitleſs. So long as he ſhould continue crying, I would not go near him; but run to him immediately on his becoming ſilent. By this means, his manner of calling me to his aſſiſtance would be by his ſilence, or, at moſt, by giving only one cry. It is from the perceptible effect of ſigns, that children judge

judge of their meaning; they ſee no other relation between them. Whatever miſchief a child may have done itſelf, it is very rare for it to cry when alone, at leaſt if it hath no hopes of being heard.

If Emilius ſhould get a fall, a bump on his forehead, make his noſe bleed, or cut his fingers; inſtead of running to him with an air of apprehenſion and danger, I would remain quite ſtill, at leaſt for ſome time. The miſchief is done, and there is a neceſſity for his bearing the pain of it; my over-ſolicitude would only ſerve to frighten him the more, and increaſe his ſenſibility. In fact, it is leſs the pain than the fright which affects children on theſe occaſions. I would ſpare him, at leaſt, the anxiety of the latter; for he will certainly judge of his misfortune in a great degree as I do. If he ſees me alarmed, run eagerly to his relief, conſole and pity him, he will think himſelf undone: but if he ſees me apparently indifferent, and make light of it, he will ſoon make as light of it himſelf, and think himſelf cured as ſoon as the ſmart is over. It is at this age children acquire their firſt principles of courage; and, by being inured to ſlight inconveniences, learn by degrees to ſupport greater.

So far alſo from being anxious to prevent Emilius from cutting or hurting himſelf, I ſhould be very ſorry if this did not ſometimes happen; and that he ſhould grow up without feeling pain. The firſt thing we ought to learn, and that which is of the greateſt conſequence for us to know, is to ſuffer. It ſeems as if children were formed little and feeble only to learn this important leſſon without danger. If they fall down,

or run againſt any thing, they neither break a leg nor an arm: if they wound themſelves with any ſharp inſtrument, the wound is hardly ever fatal or very deep. I know not, in ſhort, any inſtance of a child, when left at liberty, having killed, maimed, or done itſelf any conſiderable damage; unleſs, indeed, in caſes where it has been imprudently expoſed to tumble down from ſome high place, to fall into the fire, or within the reach of ſome deadly weapon. How uſeleſs and pernicious, therefore, is that magazine of implements with which a child is armed at all points againſt pain; and is hence expoſed to it, when he grows up without experience and without courage; ſo that he is apt to think himſelf mortally wounded by the prick of a pin, and to faint away at the ſight of his own blood!

Our pedantic method of inſtruction is, always to teach children what they would learn better of themſelves, and to neglect what we only are capable of teaching them. Is there any thing more ridiculous than the pains we take to teach them to walk, as if we had ever ſeen a child, through the negligence of its nurſe, ignorant of it when he is grown up! On the contrary, how many perſons do we ſee walk badly all their lives, becauſe they were badly taught at firſt?

Emilius ſhall have no pudding-caps, no go-carts, no ſwings, no leading-ſtrings, or at moſt only a back-ſtring, for the ſake of holding him up on the pavement when he juſt begins to walk, or to aſſiſt him in running *. Inſtead of keeping

* No perſons are ſo ridiculous in their gait, nor leſs ſure-footed, than ſuch as have been too much uſed to leading-ſtrings when

ing him ſtifling in the cloſe air of his nurſery, he ſhould be taken out every day into the open fields. There he might run and play about; and if he tumbles a hundred times a-day, ſo much the better; he will the ſooner learn, when down, to get up again. The pleaſure of being at liberty will be a ſufficient recompenſe for his falls. I would have my pupil frequently hurt himſelf; in return, however, he would be always gay and ſprightly; whereas, though yours ſhould hurt themſelves leſs, they would be, on the other hand, more fractious, peeviſh, and dull. I doubt much if the advantage would be on their ſide.

Another ſtep in the progreſs of children, renders complaints leſs needful; this depends on the developement of their corporeal powers. When they are capable of doing more themſelves, they have leſs need of recurring frequently to others. With the increaſe of their ſtrength, increaſes alſo their knowledge in the means of exerting it. It is at this period the life of the individual may be properly ſaid to commence; it is at this time he begins to be conſcious of himſelf. His memory extends the ſenſe of his identity to every moment of his exiſtence; he becomes always one and the ſame perſon, and of courſe already ſuſceptible of happineſs or miſery. From this time, therefore, he muſt be conſidered as a moral being.

Although the longeſt term of human life is deter-

when little. This is another of thoſe obſervations which are eſteemed trivial, becauſe notoriouſly true, and which are true alſo in more ſenſes than one.

determinate, and it be eaſy to calculate the probability of our reaching that term at any intermediate age, yet nothing is more uncertain than the duration of life in the perſons of individuals; very few of whom arrive at its longeſt period. Life is the moſt precarious at its commencement; the leſs time we have exiſted, the leſs hope have we of future exiſtence. Of all the children that are born, the half only, at moſt, arrive at the age of fourteen, and it is very probable yours may not reach the age of manhood.

What can we think, then, of that barbarous method of education, by which the preſent is ſacrificed to an uncertain future; by which a child is laid under every kind of reſtraint, and is made miſerable, by way of preparing him for we know not what pretended happineſs, which there is reaſon to believe he may never live to enjoy? Suppoſing it not unreaſonable in its deſign, how can we ſee, without indignation, the unhappy innocents ſubjected to a yoke of inſupportable rigour, and condemned like galley-ſlaves to continual labour, without being aſſured that ſuch mortifications and reſtrictions will ever be of any ſervice to them? The age of cheerfulneſs and gaiety is ſpent in the midſt of tears, puniſhments, threats, and ſlavery. We torment the poor creatures, for their future good; and perceive not that death is at hand, and ready to ſeize them amidſt all this ſorrowful preparation for life. Who can tell how many children have fallen victims to the extravagant ſagacity of their parents and guardians? Happy to eſcape ſuch cruelty, the only advantage

tage the poor ſufferers reaped from the evils they endured, being to die without regretting a life of miſery.

Man, be humane! It is the firſt, the chief of moral duties, to exerciſe humanity to every thing, of what age or condition ſoever, that is relative to man. What! is wiſdom void of humanity? Have a tender regard for children; indulge them in their diverſions, their pleaſures, and in every thing dictated by their harmleſs natures.

Who is there among us that has not, at times, looked back with regret on that period of our lives, wherein the countenance was always ſmiling, and the heart as conſtantly at eaſe. Why will you deprive the little innocents of the enjoyment of a ſeaſon ſo ſhort and tranſient? of a bleſſing ſo precious, which they cannot abuſe? Why will you clog, with bitterneſs and ſorrow, thoſe rapid moments which will return no more for them than for you? Ye fathers, do you know when the ſtroke of death ſhall fall on your offſpring? Lay not up in ſtore, then, for your own ſorrow, by depriving them of the enjoyment of the few moments nature has allotted them: as ſoon as they become ſenſible of the pleaſures of exiſtence, let them enjoy it, ſo that whenever it may pleaſe God to call them home, they may not die without having taſted of life.

What exclamations are here raiſed againſt me! How loud I hear the clamours of that miſtaken wiſdom, which leads us perpetually out of ourſelves; which regards the preſent always as nothing, and, inceſſantly purſuing a future that recedes as we advance, by taking us from the ſpot we are in, tranſports us where we ſhall never be!

This

This is the time, you will perhaps reply, to correct the propenſities of human nature: it is in infancy, you will ſay, when our pains are leaſt violent, that they ſhould be multiplied, in order to diminiſh their number when we arrive at the years of diſcretion. But who hath told you that ſuch will be the conſequence? or that ſuch an arrangement of cauſe and effect is in your power? or that all that fine diſcipline, in which you train the weak mind of an infant, will not be one day more pernicious than uſeful? Who hath aſſured you that you ſhall ſave him any pain or trouble hereafter, by what you inflict on him now? and how will you prove to me, that thoſe evil propenſities which you pretend to eradicate, are not owing to your own miſtaken behaviour, much more than to nature? That is an unlucky foreſight which makes us for the preſent miſerable, under the notion, whether well or ill founded, of rendering us one day or other happy. Hence let thoſe who uſually confound liberty and licentiouſneſs, and make no difference between a child that is ſpoiled, and one that is made happy, learn to make a diſtinction.

To prevent our running into chimeras, let us never loſe ſight of what is befitting our ſituation. Humanity has its place in the order and conſtitution of things; the ſtate of infancy in thoſe of human life; men ſhould be conſidered as men, and children as children. To aſſign both their ſeparate places, and regulate the human paſſions, agreeable to the conſtitution of man, are all that can be done for his happineſs. The reſt depends

pends on circumſtances which are not in our power.

We know nothing of abſolute happineſs or miſery. All is in this life a mixture of both; we never enjoy a pure ſenſe of either; indeed, we remain not two moments together in the ſame circumſtances. The affections of the mind, as well as the modifications of the body, are in a perpetnal change. Good and evil are common to every thing, and affect us only in different proportions. The moſt happy are thoſe who feel the leaſt of pain; the moſt miſerable, thoſe who experience the moſt of pleaſure. Every one ſuffers more from the former than he enjoys of the latter, and this diſproportion is common to all mankind. The happineſs of man, in his preſent ſtate, is merely negative, and muſt be eſtimated by the leaſt quantity of his ſufferings.

Every ſenſe of pain is inſeparable from the deſire of being freed from it: every idea of pleaſure is alike inſeparable from the deſire of enjoying it; now, every deſire ſuppoſes the privation or abſence of the object deſired, and this circumſtance is always in ſome degree painful; in the diſproportion, therefore, between our deſires and our abilities, conſiſts our miſery. A ſuſceptible being whoſe abilities ſhould be equal to its deſires, would be poſitively happy.

In what then conſiſts human wiſdom, or the means of acquiring happineſs? To diminiſh our deſires is certainly not the method; for if theſe were leſs than our abilities, part of our faculties would remain uſeleſs and inactive, and we ſhould enjoy but half our being. Nor is it, on the other hand, to extend our natural capacity

city for enjoyment; for if our desires, at the same time, be extended in a greater proportion, we should only become thereby the more miserable.

It must consist, therefore, in lessening the disproportion between our abilities and our desires; and in reducing our inclinations and our powers to a perfect equilibrium. It is in such a situation, and in that only, that all our faculties may be employed; and yet the mind preserve its tranquillity, and the body its due regularity and ease.

It is thus nature, which formed every thing in the best manner, originally constituted us. Man, in his infancy, is possessed only of such desires as tend to his preservation, and of the faculties necessary to their gratification. Nature keeps all the rest concealed, as it were, in the bottom of his mind, to be produced as he shall have occasion for them. It is in this primitive state only that our desires and faculties are counterpoised by each other, and that man is not unhappy. As soon as his potential faculties proceed to action, imagination, the most active of all, takes its flight and goes before them. It is our imagination which forms an estimate of possibilities, good or evil; and which, of course, excites and inflames our desires with the hopes of gratifying them. But the object, which at first appears to be even in our possession, flies and outstrips our pursuit; or, when we think we have reached it, is transformed into a different shape, while that which attracted us appears still at a distance. When we no longer behold the distance we have run, we esteem it as nothing; while the remainder of our course seems the more

more to extend itſelf: thus we exhauſt ourſelves before we arrive at the goal; and the more we gain upon enjoyment, the farther diſtant doth happineſs appear.

On the contrary, the leſs mankind depart from their natural ſituation, the leſs is the difference between their deſires and abilities, and of conſequence the nearer they are to happineſs. Man is never more miſerable than when he appears to be totally unprovided with any thing: for miſery doth not conſiſt in the mere privation of things, but in our ſenſe of the want of them.

The material univerſe has its limits, the imaginary world is infinite: as we cannot enlarge the one, therefore, let us contract the other; for it is their difference only that gives birth to all thoſe inconveniences that make us really unhappy. If we except the bleſſings of ſtrength, health, and the teſtimony of a good conſcience, all the other conveniences and pleaſures of life depend on opinion: except pain of body and remorſe of conſcience, all our evils are imaginary. This principle, it may be ſaid, is trite and common. I confeſs it: but the practical application of it is not common; and it is of the practice only I am now ſpeaking.

When we ſay man is weak and feeble, what do we mean by it? The word *feebleneſs* indicates ſome relation, a relation to the being to which it is applied. A being whoſe powers ſhould exceed its wants, were it even an inſect, a worm, could not be with propriety called feeble; although another, whoſe wants ſhould exceed its abilities, were it an elephant, or a lion, were he a conqueror, a hero, or a god, would be juſtly

denominated weak and feeble. When the apoſtate angel miſtook his nature, and rebelled, he was much more weak than the happy mortal who is contented with his ſtate of humanity. Man is very powerful when he is ſatisfied with being only what he is; but he is very weak when he would raiſe himſelf above his ſpecies: do not imagine, therefore, that in extending your faculties, you extend your powers of gratification; on the contrary, you diminiſh them, if your pride ſoars above them. Let us meaſure the radius of our ſphere, and, like the inſect in the middle of its web, remain in its centre: let us be ſatisfied with ourſelves, and we ſhall have no occaſion to complain of our weakneſs; for we ſhall never perceive it.

All animals are endued with the faculties neceſſary to their preſervation, and no other. Man only is poſſeſſed of thoſe which are ſuperfluous. Is it not very ſtrange that this ſuperfluity ſhould conduce to his unhappineſs? In every country, the labour of a man's hands is ſufficient for his ſubſiſtence. Were he wiſe enough to ſet the reſt at nought, he would always be provided with what is neceſſary, becauſe he would never have too much. Great wants often ariſe from great poſſeſſions, and the beſt means to acquire thoſe things we want, is to deprive ourſelves of what we already have. It is by our ſolicitous endeavours to increaſe our happineſs that we change it into miſery. Every man who is deſirous only to live, will live happy; and of conſequence will live honeſt, for of what advantage would diſhoneſty be to him?

If we were immortal, we ſhould be, of all beings

ings, the moſt miſerable. It is, doubtleſs, hard to die; but it is agreeable to hope we ſhall not live here for ever, and that a better life will put an end to the troubles of this. If we were offered immortality on earth, who is there would accept ſo melancholy a gift? What reſource, what hope, what conſolation, would be left us againſt the rigour of fortune and the injuſtice of mankind: the ignorant, who foreſee nothing, are little ſenſible of the value of life, and are little afraid to loſe it: the enlightened and truly wiſe have in proſpect the poſſeſſions of a future life of greater value, which they prefer to all thoſe of the preſent. It is only the vain and ſuperficial pretenders to wiſdom, that, in prolonging our views to the end of this life, and no farther, have done the moſt eſſential injury to mankind. The neceſſity of dying is, to a wiſe man, a reaſon for ſupporting the painful incidents of life. If we were not certain ſome time or other to loſe it, it would coſt us too much in its preſervation.

As to moral evils, they all depend on opinion, except one, which is guilt, and that depends on ourſelves: our phyſical evils either deſtroy themſelves or us. Time or death are infallible remedies: but we ſuffer ſo much the more by them in proportion as we are ignorant how to bear them; and torment ourſelves juſt as much more, by endeavouring to cure our maladies, as we ſuffer in ſupporting them. Live according to nature, be patient, and baniſh the phyſicians: by this means you will not, indeed, eſcape death, but you will feel its pangs but once; whereas, otherwiſe, it will be every day repreſented to your troubled imagination in all its horrors; while

the deluding art of medicine, inſtead of prolonging your days, will only rob you of their enjoyment. I would be glad to know of what real utility this art hath been to mankind. Some of thoſe it cures, it is true, might otherwiſe die; but millions it has killed, might otherwiſe have ſurvived their diſeaſes. Will a man of ſenſe ever put into ſuch a lottery, where there are ſo many blanks to a prize? Surely no. Let him bear what he muſt; but whether it be his fate to die or recover, let him live at leaſt as long as he can.

All is folly and contradiction in human affairs. We are more anxious about the preſervation of life, in proportion as it becomes leſs worthy our conſideration. Thus old men regret its loſs more than young; they are unwilling to throw away the preparations they have been ſo long making to enjoy it. It is very cruel, at ſixty years of age, to be ſnatched away by death before we have begun to live. It is conceived, that man hath a ſtrong propenſity to ſelf-preſervation, and this is true; but it is not generally perceived that this propenſity, ſuch as we experience it, is the effect of education. Man, by nature, is ſolicitous about his preſervation only as the means of it are in his power: when theſe are out of his reach, he lies down contented, and dies, without tormenting himſelf to no purpoſe. Thus the firſt principle of reſignation is inſtilled into us by nature. Savages and brutes ſtruggle but little with death, but expire without complaining. This natural principle being deſtroyed, others are to be deduced from reaſon; but few know how to draw practical concluſions

of

of this kind; their factitious reſignation being never ſo entire and complete as the firſt.

That foreſight, which carries us beyond ourſelves, and often tranſports us in imagination to ſcenes we ſhall never arrive at, this it is which is the true ſource of all our miſeries. What frenzy is it, in a being ſo tranſitory as man, to keep always looking forward to a futurity that ſeldom arrives, and to neglect the preſent of which he is ſo certain! A frenzy by ſo much the more fatal, as it increaſes with age, and as old men, always diſtruſtful, provident, and covetous, had rather deny themſelves neceſſaries to-day, than run the chance of wanting them an hundred years hence. Thus we lay hold and are tenacious of every thing; time, place, perſons, and circumſtances, all that is, or may be, becomes of conſequence to our welfare: our own perſons are thus the leaſt part of ourſelves. Every one expands himſelf, if I may ſo ſay, over the face of the earth, and becomes ſuſceptible on every part of its extenſive ſurface. Is it to be wondered at that our evils ſhould multiply, and that we ſhould feel in all thoſe parts wherein we are capable of being wounded? How many ſovereigns have been made unhappy by the loſs of countries they have never ſeen? How many merchants are required to trade to the Indies, to furniſh out the cries of Paris?

Is this nature, which thus tranſports men ſo far from themſelves? Doth nature lay us under this dependence, to learn our deſtiny from others, and even ſometimes be the laſt to hear of it; ſo that a man may die happy or miſerable, without knowing any thing at all of the matter?

I ſee a perſon ſprightly, gay, vigorous, and in health; his countenance inſpiring joy, his looks denoting eaſe and contentment; in a word, the picture of happineſs: the poſt arrives, a letter is brought him, he looks on the addreſs, opens and reads it: his countenance changes, he grows pale, and falls motionleſs to the ground: when he comes to himſelf, he falls to weeping, ſobbing, and tearing his hair; he makes the air reſound with his exclamations, and ſeems agitated by the moſt terrible convulſions. Senſeleſs man! what harm can that piece of paper have done you? what member hath it diſlocated or broken? what crime hath it made you commit? in ſhort, what change hath it worked in yourſelf, to throw you into ſuch agitations?

What if this letter had miſcarried, or had been thrown, by ſome charitable hand, into the fire? Would not the loſs of this happy, and at the ſame time unhappy mortal, have been very problematical? His misfortune, though he had not heard of it, you will ſay, had been nevertheleſs real. Very well; but if he did not feel it, where was he in the mean time? His happineſs, you will ſay, was only imaginary: I underſtand you: that is, health, eaſe, chearfulneſs, and content of mind, are only chimeras. We no longer exiſt where we are, but exiſt only where we are not. Is it worth while to be under ſuch fear of death, while that in which we live remains behind us?

Confine, O man, thy exiſtence within thyſelf, and thou wilt be no longer miſerable. Remain in the place nature hath aſſigned you in the ſcale of beings: ſpurn not againſt the hard law of neceſſity, nor waſte, by your oppoſition, that ſtrength which

which heaven hath beſtowed on you, not to extend and prolong your exiſtence, but only to preſerve it during its own time and in its own manner. Your liberty, your power, extend as far as your natural faculties, and no farther; all the reſt is only ſlavery, illuſion, and deceit. Authority itſelf is ſervile, when it is founded on opinion; for you depend on the prejudices of thoſe whom you govern by the force of prejudice. To govern them according to your own pleaſure, you muſt govern them agreeable to theirs. They have only to change their mode of thinking, and you will be obliged to change yours of acting. Thoſe who approach you, need only know how to influence the opinions of the people over whom you bear imaginary ſway, thoſe of the favourites by whom you are ſwayed, thoſe of your family, or even of yourſelf; and your vizirs, courtiers, prieſts, ſoldiers, valets, and even children, if you ſhould reſemble Themiſtocles *, will lead you like a child yourſelf in the midſt of your legions. Do what you will, your actual authority will reach no farther than your perſonal abilities. As ſoon as it becomes neceſſary for you to ſee through the eyes of others, your will alſo muſt be directed by theirs. My people are my ſubjects, you will ſay, haughtily. Be it ſo. But who are you? the ſubject of your miniſters:

* That little boy you ſee there, ſays Themiſtocles, is the arbiter of all Greece; for he governs my mother, my mother rules me, I the Athenians, and the Athenians all the other Greeks. What petty perſonages ſhould we often find governors of the greateſt empires, if from that of the ſovereign we gradually deſcended to the firſt hand that puts the ſecret ſprings of this government in motion.

ſters: And your miniſters, in turn, what are they? the ſubjects of their ſecretaries, clerks, and miſtreſſes, the ſervants of their very ſervants. Seize, uſurp every thing, and then diſtribute gold by handfuls, erect batteries and gibbets, make laws, proclaim edicts, increaſe the number of your ſpies, ſoldiers, priſons, and executioners; impotent, petty ſovereigns! what end will all this anſwer? You will be no better ſerved, no leſs plundered and deceived, and not a jot more abſolute. You will be ever ſaying, "Such is our ſovereign will and pleaſure," and always doing the will and pleaſure of others.

He only performs the actions of his own will, who ſtands in no need of the aſſiſtance of others to put his deſigns in execution: and hence it follows, that the greateſt of all bleſſings is not authority, but liberty. A man truly free, wills only what he is able to perform, and performs what he pleaſes. This is my fundamental maxim. It need only be applied to a ſtate of infancy, and all the rules of education will naturally flow from it.

Society has enervated man, not only by depriving him of the privilege of exerting his natural faculties, but particularly in rendering them inſufficient for his purpoſes. Hence it is that his deſires are increaſed with his weakneſs; and hence alſo we may ſee what is the weakneſs of a child compared with that of a man. If man is a powerful, and a child a feeble being, it is not becauſe the former has more abſolute ſtrength than the latter, but becauſe he is naturally capable of ſupplying his own wants, and the other is not. Men therefore ſhould be more

reſo-

reſolute, and children more capricious; by which I mean, the latter ſhould have a greater number of deſires that do not ariſe from real wants, and cannot be gratified without the aſſiſtance of others.

I have given a reaſon for the weakneſs of a ſtate of infancy. Nature hath provided for it, in the attachment of parents to their offspring. This attachment, however, may be carried to exceſs, and is ſubject to great abuſe. Parents, who live themſelves in a civilized ſtate, introduce their children into the world too young. By increaſing the number of their wants, inſtead of relieving, they augment the natural weakneſs of infancy. They augment it farther, in requiring more of a child than is required by nature, in ſubjecting to the will of the parent the little ſtrength a child has to execute its own, and in converting into ſervility on both ſides the reciprocal dependence adapted to the weakneſs of the one and the attachment of the other.

A wiſe man knows and will keep his place; but a child is ignorant of his, and therefore cannot confine himſelf to it. There are a thouſand avenues through which he will be apt to eſcape: it belongs to thoſe who have the care of his education, therefore, to prevent him; a taſk, by the way, which is not very eaſy. He ſhould be neither treated as an irrational animal, nor as a man; but ſimply as a child: he ſhould be made ſenſible of his weakneſs, but not abandoned to ſuffer by it; he ſhould be taught dependence, and not merely obedience; he ſhould be inſtructed to aſk, and not to command. He is in a ſtate of ſubmiſſion to others, only becauſe of his wants,

wants, and becauſe they know better than himſelf what is good or hurtful for him. No one hath a right, not even the father of a child, to command it to do any thing that is uſeleſs.

Before prejudice and cuſtom have altered our natural diſpoſitions, the happineſs of children, as well as of men, conſiſts in the exerciſe of their liberty; but this liberty in the firſt is limited by their weakneſs. Whoſoever does what he will is happy, provided he is capable of doing it himſelf: this is the caſe with man in a ſtate of nature. But though a man act as he pleaſes, yet if his deſires ſurpaſs his perſonal abilities, he is not happy: this is the caſe with children in the ſame ſtate. They enjoy, even in that of nature, but an imperfect liberty, reſembling that which men enjoy in a ſtate of civil ſociety. As we all ſtand in need of each other, we become by that means weak and miſerable. Nature intended us to be men; the laws and cuſtoms of ſociety have reduced us to the condition of children. The rich, the great, the powerful, are all mere infants, who, ſeeing every one ſolicitous to relieve their miſery, deduce from thence the moſt puerile vanity, and are proud of that ſervice and attendance which would not be paid them if they were completely men.

Theſe conſiderations are of great importance, and may ſerve to account for all the contradictions we meet with in the ſocial ſyſtem. Man is ſubjected by two kinds of dependence: the firſt on circumſtances and things, which is that of nature; and the ſecond on men, which is the effect of ſociety. The former being merely phy-

phyſical, is in no degree deſtructive of liberty, nor productive of guilt: the latter, being unnatural and diſorderly *, is productive of all manner of vice; and it is by means of this the maſter and the ſlave mutually corrupt each other. If there be any way to remedy this evil in ſociety, it is by ſubſtituting laws in the place of perſons, and to inveſt the general will with a real power ſuperior to that of individuals. If the laws of nations, like thoſe of nature, were ſo fixed and invariable, as that no human force or art could alter them, our dependence on men would then become the ſame as that on circumſtances; we might unite, in a republican government, all the advantages of a ſtate of nature with thoſe of ſociety; to that liberty which preſerves man from falling into vice, we might add that morality which raiſes him up to virtue. But this is not the caſe.

Subject your child, therefore, only to a dependence on circumſtances; you will then follow the order of nature in the progreſs of his education. Oppoſe to his indiſcreet deſires only phyſical obſtacles, or the inconveniencies naturally ariſing from the actions themſelves; theſe he will remember on a future occaſion: without forbidding him to do ill, it is ſufficient to prevent him. Experience and impotence only ſhould lay on him their poſitive commands. Give him nothing becauſe he deſires it, but becauſe it is needful for him. Let him not know, that

* In my treatiſe on the principles of politic law, it is demonſtrated, that the wills of individuals cannot be preſcribed or ſubjected by any ſyſtem of laws.

that in doing your will he is obedient to you, nor that in doing his you are ſubſervient to him. Inſtil no ideas of command or obedience, but let him conceive both your actions and his own to be equally independent. Aſſiſt him when he ſtands in need of it, juſt ſo much as is neceſſary to make him free, but not imperious; thus in receiving that aſſiſtance with a kind of humiliation, he will aſpire after that moment when he ſhall be able to do without it, and have the honour to ſerve himſelf.

In order to ſtrengthen and forward the body in its growth, nature employs various means, which ſhould never be thwarted. We ſhould never, for inſtance, oblige a child to ſtand ſtill, when it is deſirous of running about; nor to walk about, when it is propenſe to ſtand. If the diſpoſition of children is not ſpoiled by our own fault, they will never require any thing that is uſeleſs. Let them leap, run about, and make what noiſe they pleaſe. This is all the natural effect of the activity of their conſtitution, exerting itſelf to gather ſtrength; but we ought to diſtruſt every deſire which they are incapable of themſelves to gratify, and for which they are obliged to requeſt our aſſiſtance. We ſhould be very careful here to diſtinguiſh between the true, the phyſical want, and that of caprice, which now begins to ſhew itſelf, or that which ariſes only from the ſuperfluity before mentioned.

I have already adviſed what is to be done when a child cries for this thing or the other. To this I will only add, that, when it is capable of expreſſing itſelf in words, if it endeavours to enforce its demands by crying, in order to obtain

tain its wants more ſpeedily, or to come over a refuſal, it ought to be abſolutely and irrevocably denied. When it deſires what is neceſſary, you ought to know and immediately comply with its requeſt: but to be induced to do any thing by its tears, is to encourage it to cry; it is to teach it to doubt your good-will, and to think you are influenced more by importunity than benevolence. Beware of this: for if your child once comes to imagine you are not of a good diſpoſition, he will ſoon be of a bad one; if he once thinks you compliant, he will ſoon grow obſtinate. You ſhould comply with his requeſt immediately, if you do not intend to refuſe it. Mortify him not with frequent denials, but never revoke a refuſal once made him.

But above all things, beware of teaching your child the ceremonious jargon of politeneſs, a ſet of phraſes which he employs, like magic ſyllables, to ſubject to his pleaſure every one that comes near him, and to obtain upon demand whatever he deſires. In the mode of education adopted by the rich, their children never fail of being rendered politely imperious, by being inſtructed to make uſe of ſuch expreſſions as no body chuſes to reſiſt. Neither in voice nor manner have they any thing ſuppliant about them: on the contrary, they are as arrogant, if not more ſo, in their requeſts, than in their commands, inaſmuch as they are always more certain of being obeyed. One ſees immediately, that their *If you pleaſe*, means, *It is I pleaſe*, and that their *Pray* ſtands for *Do*. Admirable politeneſs this, which teaches them only to pervert the meaning of words, and not to be able

to ſpeak otherwiſe than with the air of command!

For my part, who am leſs afraid Emilius ſhould prove clowniſh than inſolent, I had much rather hear him ſay in a ſuppliant tone, *Do* ſo or ſo, than make uſe of a dictatorial *Pray, if you pleaſe*. It is not the words he makes uſe of that is of ſo much conſequence, but the acceptance he annexes to them.

Exceſſive ſeverity, as well as exceſſive indulgence, ſhould be equally avoided. If you leave children to ſuffer, you expoſe their health, endanger their lives, and make them actually miſerable; on the other hand, if you are too anxious to prevent their being ſenſible of any kind of pain and inconvenience, you only pave their way to feel much greater; you enervate their conſtitutions, make them tender and effeminate; in a word, you remove them out of their ſituation as men, into which they muſt hereafter return in ſpite of all your ſolicitude. In order not to expoſe them to the few evils nature would inflict on them, you provide for them many which they would otherwiſe never have ſuffered.

It may here perhaps be objected, that I fall into the ſame error, for which I have reproached thoſe miſtaken parents, who ſacrifice the preſent happineſs of their children to the conſideration of an uncertain or imaginary futurity. Not ſo; for my pupil will be ſufficiently indemnified for the ſlight inconveniencies he ſuffers, by the liberty in which he is indulged. I ſee the neglected little rogues ſometimes playing amidſt the ſnow, with their hands black and blue, and ſo benummed as hardly to be able to move their fingers.

fingers. They may go, if they will, to the fire and warm themſelves; yet this they refuſe to do; and, if you ſhould compel them to it, they would ſuffer an hundred times more from your ſeverity than from that of the cold. Of what then do you complain? Do I make the child unhappy by expoſing him only to thoſe inconveniencies he chuſes to ſuffer? No. I make him happy for the preſent, by leaving him to enjoy his liberty; and prepare him for being ſo hereafter, by arming him againſt thoſe evils he muſt neceſſarily encounter. If it depended on his choice to be my pupil or yours, do you think he would heſitate a moment which to prefer?

Can you conceive any being can be truly happy in circumſtances inconſiſtent with its conſtitution? And is it not inconſiſtent with the conſtitution of man, to endeavour to exempt him from all the evils incident to his ſpecies? Yes, I will maintain it, that we are capacitated to experience great pleaſure only, by being inured to ſlight pain: ſuch is the nature of man. If his phyſical conſtitution be too vigorous, his moral conſtitution tends to depravity. The man who ſhould be ignorant of pain, would be a ſtranger alſo to the ſenſations of humanity, and the tender feelings of compaſſion for his ſpecies; his heart would be unſuſceptible of ſympathy, he would be unſocial, he would be a monſter among his fellow-creatures.

Would you know the moſt infallible way to make your child miſerable? It is to accuſtom him to obtain every thing he deſires: for, thoſe deſires ſtill increaſing from the facility of gratification, your incapacity to ſatisfy them muſt

ſooner or later reduce you to the neceſſity of a refuſal; and that refuſal, ſo new and uncommon, will give him more trouble than even the want of that which he deſires. From wanting your cane, he will proceed to your watch; he will next want the bird that flies in the air, the ſtar that glitters in the firmament, in ſhort, every thing he ſees: nothing leſs than omnipotence would enable you to ſatisfy it.

It is natural to man to regard every thing as his own which he has in his power. In this ſenſe, the principle of Hobbes is true to a certain degree. Could we increaſe with our deſire the means of gratifying them, every one would conceive himſelf the lord over all. The child, therefore, who needs only deſire a thing to obtain it, is led naturally to imagine himſelf the proprietor of the univerſe: he looks upon all mankind as his ſlaves; and when any thing is at length refuſed him, he, who conceives not the impoſſibility of executing any of his commands, eſteems ſuch refuſal as an act of rebellion: all the reaſons that can be given him at an age incapable of reaſoning, appear to him only pretexts: he ſees your ill-will through the whole: the ſenſe of an imaginary injuſtice ſours his diſpoſition, he begins to hate every body; and without ever thinking himſelf obliged by their complaiſance, is enraged at their contradiction.

How is it poſſible for me to conceive that a child, thus ſubject to be made the prey of the moſt iraſcible paſſions, can ever be happy! a tyrant, that is at once the meaneſt of ſlaves, and the moſt miſerable of human beings! I have ſeen children, educated in this manner, who wanted

wanted their nurſe to overturn the houſe, by ſetting her ſhoulder againſt it; who would aſk for the weather-cock on the top of the ſteeple; for a regiment in full march to ſtand ſtill, that they might hear the drums; piercing the air with their cries, and refuſing to hear any thing that could be ſaid to them, if their requeſts were not immediately complied with. It is in vain you would, on ſuch occaſions, endeavour to pacify them: their deſires, irritated by the facility with which they have uſually been gratified, are bent on impoſſibilities, whilſt they meet on every ſide with nothing but contradictions, obſtacles, ſufferings, and ſorrow. Always grumbling, fractious, and paſſionate, they paſs their time amidſt perpetual tears and complaints: can theſe be ſuppoſed very happy in their ſituation? Imbecility and authority united, generate only folly and miſery.

If theſe notions of tyranny and command make men miſerable in their infancy, how much more will they do ſo as they grow up, when the relations they ſtand in to others become more numerous and extenſive? Accuſtomed to ſee every thing give way to their deſires, how will they be ſurpriſed, in entering on the world, to ſee every thing reſiſt their will, and to find themſelves oppreſſed by the weight of that univerſe which they imagined they could move about at pleaſure! Their puerile airs of inſolence and vanity will only incur mortification, raillery, and contempt; they will have continual affronts to encounter; cruel encounters, that will ſoon convince them they neither know their circumſtances nor their abilities. Thus, finding themſelves

ſelves unequal to every thing, they will begin to think themſelves equal to nothing; diſguſted by ſo many unexpected obſtacles, and ſo much mortified by contempt, they will hence become baſe, timid, and ſervile; falling as much below their capacity as they had been abſurdly educated above it.

Let us recur, then, to our firſt rule. Nature hath conſtituted children to claim our love and aſſiſtance; but has ſhe made them to be obeyed and feared? Has ſhe given them a peremptory air, a ſevere look, a bold and menacing tone of voice, to render them formidable? I can comprehend that the roaring of a lion may terrify other animals, and that the ſight of him ſhould make them tremble; but if ever there was a ſight truly indecent, deteſtable, and ridiculous, ſurely it muſt be that of a reſpectable body of magiſtrates, with their preſident at their head, in their robes of ſtate, proſtrating themſelves before an infant in ſwaddling-cloaths, and addreſſing him in a florid harangue, to the pompous terms of which he returns a moſt gracious anſwer, by whimpering and bedewing his ſlabbering bib.

If we conſider the ſtate of childhood in itſelf, is there in the world a more feeble and helpleſs being, more expoſed to the mercy of every thing about it, that hath more need of pity, aſſiſtance, and protection, than an infant? Doth not even its innocent looks and engaging figure ſeem peculiarly calculated to intereſt in its favour all that approach it, and to induce them to ſuccour its weakneſs? What then is more diſguſting, and contrary to the nature of things, than to ſee a child,

a child imperious and refractory, commanding every one that comes near it, and impudently uſurping the tone of a maſter over thoſe who have only to leave it, and it muſt periſh?

On the other hand, who muſt not ſee that a child lies under ſo many reſtrictions on account of its natural weakneſs, as to acknowledge it barbarous to add to this reſtraint that of our caprices, in depriving it of ſo confined a liberty, which it can ſo little abuſe, and is of ſo little uſe to itſelf, or to us who take it away? If there be no object ſo deſerving contempt as an inſolent child, there is none ſo deſerving our compaſſion as a timid and baſhful one. Since we enter, at the age of diſcretion, into public ſlavery, why ſhould we be previouſly ſubjected to private ſervitude? Let us permit one moment at leaſt of human life to be exempted from that yoke which nature has not impoſed; let us permit our children the free exerciſe of that natural liberty which keeps at a diſtance, for ſome time at leaſt, thoſe vices which are contracted in the bondage of ſociety. Let the advocates for ſeverity, then, on the one hand, and thoſe fond parents who are ſlaves to their children, on the other, offer what frivolous objections they pleaſe; it is proper for them, before they boaſt the excellence of their own methods, to ſtudy that of nature.

But to return to practice: I have already ſaid your child ſhould obtain nothing merely becauſe he aſks for it, but becauſe he ſtands in need of it *; that he ſhould be made to do nothing out of

* It ought to be obſerved, that as pain is often a neceſſity, ſo pleaſure is ſometimes a natural want. Children have therefore,

of obedience, but only out of neceſſity: thus the words *command* and *obey* ſhould have no place in his dictionary, much leſs thoſe of *duty* and *obligation*; but thoſe of power, neceſſity, impotence, and reſtraint, ought to ſtand forth in capitals. Before children arrive at years of diſcretion, they can form no ideas of moral beings or ſocial relations: it is proper, therefore, to avoid, as much as poſſible, the uſe of thoſe terms which expreſs them; leſt, if made uſe of in their hearing, children ſhould at firſt annex ideas to them which afterwards it may be difficult to ſeparate. The firſt wrong idea that he forms, becomes the ſeed of error and of vice. It is to this firſt ſtep that we ſhould give particular attention. Order it ſo, therefore, that, while he continues to be affected only by ſenſible objects, all his ideas be confined to his ſenſations; let him perceive nothing but the material world about him: otherwiſe you may be aſſured, that either he muſt hear you ſay nothing of the moral world at all, or he will form ſuch fantaſtical notions of it as you will not be able to efface all the days of his life.

Mr Locke's maxim was to educate children by reaſoning with them; and it is that which is now moſt in vogue. The ſucceſs of it, however, doth not appear to recommend it; for my own

fore but one deſire only which ſhould not be gratified, and this is the deſire of exacting obedience. Hence it follows, that in every thing they demand, it is the motive which excites them to make ſuch demand, which ought to engage our attention. Indulge them, as much as poſſible, in every thing which may give them real pleaſure; but conſtantly refuſe them what they require from motives of caprice, or merely to exerciſe their authority.

own part, I meet with no children ſo ſilly and ridiculous, as thoſe with whom ſo much argument hath been held. Of all the faculties of man, that of reaſon, which is in fact only a compound of all the reſt, unfolds itſelf the lateſt, and with the greateſt difficulty; and yet this is what we would make uſe of to develope the firſt and eaſieſt of them. The great end of a good education is to form a reaſonable man; and we pretend to educate a child by the means of reaſon! This is beginning where we ſhould leave off, and making an implement of the work we are about.

If children were capable of reaſoning, they would ſtand in no need of education; but, in talking to them ſo early a language they do not underſtand, we uſe them to content themſelves with words, to cavil at every thing that is ſaid to them, to think themſelves as wiſe as their maſters, and to become petulant and captious: at the ſame time, whatever we imagine to obtain of them by reaſonable motives, is effected by thoſe of covetouſneſs, fear, or vanity, always annexed.

We may reduce almoſt all the leſſons of morality that have, or can be, formed for the uſe of children, to the following formula.

Maſter. You muſt not do ſo.

Child. And why muſt I not do ſo?

Maſter. Becauſe it is naughty.

Child. Naughty! what is that being naughty?

Maſter. Doing what you are forbid.

Child. And what harm is there in doing what one is forbid?

Maſter.

Maſter. The harm is, you will be whipped for diſobedience.

Child. Then I will do it ſo that no body ſhall know any thing of the matter.

Maſter. O, but you will be watched.

Child. Ah! but then I will hide myſelf.

Maſter. Then you will be examined.

Child. Then I will tell a fib.

Maſter. But you muſt not tell fibs.

Child. Why muſt not I?

Maſter. Becauſe it is naughty, *&c.*

Thus we go round the circle; and yet, if we go out of it, the child underſtands us no longer. Are not theſe very uſeful inſtructions, think you? I could be very curious to know what could be ſubſtituted in the place of this fine dialogue. Locke himſelf would certainly have been embaraſſed had he been aſked ſo puzzling a queſtion. To diſtinguiſh between good and evil, to perceive the reaſons on which our moral obligations are founded, is not the buſineſs, as it is not within the capacity, of a child.

Nature requires children to be children before they are men. By endeavouring to pervert this order, we produce forward fruits, that have neither maturity nor taſte, and will not fail ſoon to wither or corrupt. Hence it is we have ſo many young profeſſors and old children. Childhood hath its manner of ſeeing, perceiving, and thinking, peculiar to itſelf; nor is there any thing more abſurd than our being anxious to ſubſtitute our own in its ſtead. I would as ſoon require an infant to be five feet high, as a boy to have judgment at ten years of age. In fact, of what uſe would reaſon be to him at that age?

Rea-

Reaſon is given us as a check upon our power; a child has no need of ſuch reſtraint.

In ſtriving to perſuade your pupils to look upon obedience as their duty, you always add, to this pretended perſuaſion, the force of compulſion or menace; or, what is ſtill worſe, enforce it by flattery and promiſes. And thus it is that, allured by intereſt or conſtrained by violence, they affect to be convinced by reaſon. They ſee very well that to be obedient is advantageous, and to be refractory hurtful, as ſoon as you yourſelf perceive either the one or the other. But, as you require nothing of them but what is diſagreeable, and, as it is always diſagreeable to do the will of others, they conceal themſelves in order to be at liberty to do their own; perſuaded that, ſo long as their diſobedience is undiſcovered, they are doing right; but very ready to confeſs themſelves wrong when detected, for fear of ſeverer chaſtiſement. The rational principles of moral obligation are beyond their comprehenſion; there is not a man in the world capable of making them truly ſenſible of them; though the fear of puniſhment, the hope of pardon, importunity, and the perplexity of knowing what to ſay, draw from them the confeſſion required, and we imagine them convinced when they are only haraſſed and intimidated.

The conſequence of all this is, that, in the firſt place, by impoſing on them an obligation they are inſenſible of, you ſet them againſt your authority, and alienate from you their affections; you teach them to diſſemble, lie, and deceive, in order to extort rewards, or avoid puniſhment: and laſtly, by uſing them to conceal their real mo-

motives under apparent ones, you yourſelf furniſh them with the means of perpetually abuſing you, of preventing your knowledge of their true characters, and of amuſing you and every body elſe, occaſionally, with empty words. The laws, you will ſay, though obligatory in point of conſcience, uſe the ſame means of reſtraint with grown perſons. I confeſs it; but what are theſe perſons but children ſpoiled in their education? This is the very thing we ſhould endeavour to prevent. Uſe force with children, and argument with men: ſuch is the order of nature: the philoſopher ſtands in no need of legal reſtrictions.

Treat your pupil according to his years. Put him at firſt into his place, and keep him there ſo ſtrictly, that he may never afterwards be tempted to go from it. Thus, before he may have learned what prudence is, he will have practiſed the moſt important of all its leſſons. Never command him to do any thing in the world. Let him not even imagine you pretend to have any authority over him. Let him only be made ſenſible that he is weak, and you are ſtrong; that, from your ſituation and his, he lies neceſſarily at your mercy: let him know, let him learn to perceive this circumſtance; let him early feel on his aſpiring creſt the hard yoke nature hath impoſed on man, the heavy yoke of neceſſity under which every finite being muſt bow; let him ſee that neceſſity in the nature and conſtitution of things, and not in the caprices * of mankind. The bridle of his reſtraint ſhould

* We may be very certain that a child will think every injunction capricious that is contrary to its own inclinations, and for

ſhould be force, and not authority. As to doing thoſe things from which he ought to abſtain, forbid him not, but prevent him, without explanation or argument: whatever you indulge him in, grant it to his firſt requeſt without ſolicitation or intreaty, and particularly without making any conditions. Grant with pleaſure, and refuſe with reluctance; but, I ſay again, let all your denials be irrevocable; let no importunity overcome your reſolution; let the *no!* once pronounced, be as a braſen wall, againſt which when a child hath ſome few times exhauſted his ſtrength without making any impreſſion, he will never attempt to overthrow it again.

By this method, you will render his diſpoſition patient, equal, reſigned, and peaceable, even when he is not indulged in the purſuit of his own inclinations: for it is in the nature of man to endure patiently the abſolute neceſſity of his circumſtances, but not the capricious and evil diſpoſition of his fellow-creatures. *It is all gone*, is an anſwer againſt which a child never objects, at leaſt if he believes it true. After all, it muſt be obſerved, there is no mean to be preſerved in our conduct in this particular; we muſt either exact nothing of children at all, or ſubject them, at once, to the moſt perfect obedience. The worſt education in the world is that which keeps a child wavering between the will of the tutor and its own, and eternally diſputing which of the two ſhall be maſter: I had an hundred times rather mine ſhould be always maſter. It is very

for which it ſees not a reaſon. Now, a child ſees no manner of reaſon in any thing that contradicts its own humour.

ſtrange, that, ever ſince mankind have taken it into their heads to trouble themſelves ſo much about the education of children, they ſhould never have thought of any other inſtruments to effect their purpoſe than thoſe of emulation, jealouſy, envy, pride, covetouſneſs, and ſervile fear; all paſſions, the moſt dangerous, the moſt apt to ferment, and the moſt proper to corrupt the ſoul, even before the body is formed. With every premature inſtruction we inſtill into the head, we implant a vice in the bottom of the heart. Senſeleſs preceptors, thoſe, who think they work wonders, by making children actually vitious, in order to inſtruct them in the theory of virtue, and then gravely tell us, Such is man. Yes, ſuch, indeed, is the man of your making.

Almoſt every method has been tried but one, and that the only one which can ſucceed, natural liberty duly regulated. No one ought to undertake the education of a child who cannot conduct him at pleaſure, merely by the maxims of poſſibility and impoſſibility. The ſphere of both being equally unknown to infancy, it may be extended or contracted as we pleaſe. A child may be equally excited or reſtrained, by the ſingle plea of neceſſity, without murmuring: he may be rendered pliant and docile by the force of circumſtance only, without ever giving occaſion to ſow the ſeeds of vice in his heart: for the paſſions will never be irritated ſo long as they muſt be exerted without effect. Give your pupil no kind of verbal inſtructions; he ſhould receive none but from experience: inflict on him no kind of puniſhment, for he knows not what it is to be in fault: require him never to aſk pardon,

don, for he cannot offend you. As he is inſenſible of all moral obligation, he cannot do any thing morally evil, or that is deſerving of puniſhment or reprimand.

I foreſee the reader will be already frightened, if he judges of ſuch a child by his own: in this, however, he is miſtaken. The conſtant reſtraint in which you keep your pupils irritates their vivacity; the more they are reſtrained under your eye, the more turbulent they are when they eſcape from it; they muſt indemnify themſelves, when they can, for that ſevere confinement you impoſe on them. Two ſcholars, broke looſe from a ſchool in town, will do more miſchief in a country village than all the boys in the pariſh. Shut up one of theſe young gentlemen with the ſon of a peaſant of the ſame age; and the firſt will have broke or turned all the moveables in the room topſy-turvy, before the latter ſhould have ſtirred from his ſeat. What can be the reaſon of this, if the one be not in a hurry to abuſe his momentary liberty, while the other, accuſtomed to freedom, is not in any haſte to make uſe of it? and yet the children of peaſants, being frequently humoured and thwarted, are very far from being in that order in which I could wiſh to ſee yours.

Let us lay it down as an inconteſtable maxim, That the firſt emotions of nature are always right: there is no original perverſity in the human heart. I will venture to ſay, there is not a ſingle vice to be found there, that one could not ſay how and which way it entered. The only paſſion natural to man is the love of himſelf, or ſelf-love taken in an extenſive ſenſe. This paſ-

ſion conſidered in itſelf, or as relative to us, is good and uſeful; and, as it has no neceſſary relation to any one elſe, it is in that reſpect naturally indifferent: it becomes good or evil, therefore, from our application of it, and the ſeveral relations we give it. Till the guide of ſelf-love, then, which is reaſon, appears, a child ſhould do nothing merely becauſe he is ſeen or heard, nothing from cauſes merely relative to others, but only thoſe things which nature requires and inſtigates; and then he will never do wrong.

I do not mean that he will never do any miſchief, that he will never hurt himſelf, or perhaps break in pieces a valuable utenſil that may happen to be unluckily placed within his reach. He may do a great deal of harm without doing ill: becauſe the evil of the action depends on his intention to do an injury, and he will be always free from ſuch intention. Should he not, and ſhould he once acquire an evil intention, he is already ſpoiled; he is vitious almoſt beyond remedy.

An action may be evil in the eyes of avarice, that is not ſo in thoſe of reaſon. In leaving children at full liberty to play about as they pleaſe, it is proper to remove every thing out of their way that may render their agility or wantonneſs expenſive; thus nothing that is brittle and coſtly ſhould be left within their reach. Let the furniture of their apartment be coarſe and ſolid: let them have no looking-glaſs, no china, nor other objects of luxury. As to my Emilius, whom I educate in the country, his chamber ſhall have nothing in it whereby it may be diſtinguiſhed from that of the meaneſt peaſant. To what purpoſe

poſe ſhould it be carefully ornamented, when he is to ſtay in it ſo ſhort a time? But I forget; he will himſelf decorate it after his own fancy; we ſhall ſee preſently in what manner.

If, notwithſtanding your precaution, your child ſhould commit ſome diſorder, or break ſome piece of furniture, do not go to puniſh or rate him for your own negligence: do not let him hear from you a ſingle word of reproach; let him not even perceive you are diſpleaſed, but act exactly in the ſame manner as if it had been broke by accident: in a word, you may think you have effected a great point, if you can prevail on yourſelf to ſay nothing about the matter.

May I venture here to lay down the greateſt, moſt important, and moſt uſeful rule of education? It is this, Not to gain time, but to loſe it. The generality of readers will be ſo good as to excuſe my paradoxes; there is an abſolute neceſſity for them in making reflections: and, ſay what you will, I had rather be remarkable for hunting after a paradox, than for being miſled by prejudice. The moſt critical interval of human life is that between the hour of our birth and twelve years of age. This is the time wherein vice and error take root, without our being poſſeſſed of any inſtrument to deſtroy them: and when the implement is found, they are ſo deeply grounded, that they are no longer to be eradicated. If children took a leap from their mother's breaſt, and at once arrived at the age of reaſon, the methods of education now uſually taken with them would be very proper; but according to the progreſs of nature, they require thoſe which are very different. We ſhould not

tamper with the mind, till it has acquired all its faculties: for it is impoſſible it ſhould perceive the light we hold out to it while it is blind; or that it ſhould purſue, over an immenſe plain of ideas, that route which reaſon hath ſo ſlightly traced as to be perceptible only to the ſharpeſt ſight.

The firſt part of education, therefore, ought to be purely negative. It conſiſts, neither in teaching virtue nor truth; but in guarding the heart from vice, and the mind from error. If you could be content to do nothing yourſelf, and could prevent any thing being done by others; if you could bring up your pupil healthy and robuſt to the age of twelve years, without his being able to diſtinguiſh his right hand from his left, the eyes of his underſtanding would be open to reaſon at your firſt leſſon; void both of habit and prejudice, his paſſions would not operate againſt your endeavours, and he would become, under proper inſtructions, the wiſeſt of men. It is thus, by attempting nothing in the beginning, you might produce a prodigy of education.

Take the road directly oppoſite to that which is in uſe, and you will almoſt always do right. As we think it not enough children ſhould be children, but it is expected they ſhould be maſters of arts; ſo fathers and preceptors think they can never have too many checks, corrections, reprimands, menaces, promiſes, inſtructions, fair ſpeeches, and fine arguments. You will act wiſer than all this, by being reaſonable yourſelf, and never arguing with your child, particularly in ſtriving to reconcile him to what he

he diſlikes: for to uſe him to reaſon only upon diſagreeable ſubjects, is the way to diſguſt him, and bring argument early into diſcredit with a mind incapable of underſtanding it. Exerciſe his corporeal organs, ſenſes, and faculties, as much as you pleaſe; but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as poſſible. Be cautious of all the ſentiments he acquires previous to the judgment which ſhould enable him to ſcrutinize them. Prevent or reſtrain all foreign impreſſions; and, in order to hinder the riſe of evil, be not in too great a hurry to inſtil good; for it is only ſuch when the mind is enlightened by reaſon. Look upon every delay as an advantage; it is gaining a great deal, to advance without loſing any thing: let the infancy of children therefore have time to ripen. In ſhort, whatever inſtruction is neceſſary for them, take care not to give it them to-day, if it may be deferred without danger till to-morrow.

Another conſideration, which confirms the utility of this method, is the particular genius of the child; which ought to be known before it can be judged what moral regimen is beſt adapted to it. Every mind hath its peculiar turn, according to which it ought to be educated; and it is of very material conſequence to our endeavours, that it be educated according to that turn, and not to any other. The prudent governor will watch a long time the workings of nature, will obſerve his pupil well before he ſpeaks the firſt word to him. Leave then his natural character at liberty to unfold itſelf; lay it under no reſtraint whatever, that it may the better be laid open to view. Do you think the

the time loſt in which a child in thus left at liberty? Quite the contrary; it will be ſo beſt employed: for is it not thus you yourſelf learn to huſband time ſtill more precious? If you ſet about any thing, before you know in what manner to act, you proceed at random: liable to miſtake, you are frequently obliged to undo what is done; and find yourſelves farther from the end deſigned, than if you had been leſs precipitate to begin the work. Act not like the miſer, who loſes much becauſe he is unwilling to loſe a little; but ſacrifice in infancy that time which you will regain with uſury in a more advanced age. A prudent phyſician does not go blundering to preſcribe, at firſt ſight of the ſick; he inquires firſt into the temperament and circumſtances of the patient, and then adapts his preſcription to them: He begins late to adminiſter his remedies, and hence effects a cure; while the precipitate phyſician infallibly kills.

But where, will it be ſaid, muſt we place an infant thus to be educated as an inſenſible being, as a mere automaton? Shall we take him to the world in the moon, or to ſome deſert iſland? Shall we ſeparate him from the reſt of his ſpecies? Will he not, if in the world, have before him continually the proſpect and example of the paſſions of others? Will he never meet in company with children of his own age? Will he not ſee his parents, his neighbours, his nurſe, his governeſs, his ſervant, and at laſt his governor himſelf, who, after all, will be no angel? This objection is reaſonable and ſolid. But have I told you the natural education of a child was an eaſy undertaking? Is it my fault, ye men

men of ſociety! that you have made every thing which is right, ſo difficult to be put in execution? I perceive the difficulties, I acknowledge them; and perhaps they are inſurmountable. It is, however, certain, that, by endeavouring to obviate them, we may ſucceed to a certain degree. I only take upon me to point out the end we ſhould aim at: I do not affirm it is poſſible to reach it; but I affirm that he who approaches the neareſt this end, hath ſucceeded the beſt.

One thing, however, is to be remembered, and this is, before any one undertakes to form a man, it is proper he ſhould be formed ſuch himſelf; it is proper he ſhould find in himſelf the model he propoſes to imitate. While a child is as yet without knowledge, there is time to prepare every thing that approaches him, and to introduce to his firſt obſervations thoſe objects which are proper for him to ſee. Render yourſelf reſpectable to all: begin by making yourſelf beloved, ſo ſhall every one be deſirous to pleaſe you. You will never be maſter over your pupil, if you are not maſter of all thoſe about him: nor will your authority be of any ſervice, if it be not founded on virtuous eſteem. It will be to no purpoſe to empty your purſe, or give your money away by handfuls; I never knew money make any one beloved. It is doubtleſs wrong to be covetous and niggardly, and to content ourſelves with lamenting the miſerable objects we might relieve; but you may in vain open your coffers; if you do not alſo open your heart, the hearts of others will remain ſtill ſhut againſt you. It is your time, your care, your affections, it is yourſelf you muſt give;

give; for otherwiſe, do what you will, it will always be remarked that your money is not you. There are inſtances of concern and benevolence which have a greater effect, and are really more uſeful, than all pecuniary gifts. How many of the unfortunate, and of the ſick, have more need of conſolation than alms! How many are there of the oppreſſed whom protection would ſerve more than money! Reconcile thoſe who are at variance, prevent law-ſuits; bring children to a ſenſe of their duty, and parents to that of indulgence; promote happy marriages; oppoſe oppreſſion; ſpare not the credit and intereſt of your pupil's family, in favour of the poor and helpleſs to whom juſtice is refuſed, or whom wealth overpowers. Declare yourſelf boldly the protector of the unhappy. Be juſt, humane, and beneficent. Do not only give alms, but perform the deeds of charity. Acts of mercy and compaſſion relieve more evils than money. Love others, and they will love you; ſerve them, and they will ſerve you; be a father to them, and they will be your children.

Here preſents itſelf, alſo, another reaſon for educating Emilius in the country, at a diſtance from the mob of ſervants, who, excepting their maſters, are the vileſt of mankind; at a diſtance from the deteſtable manners of the town, which are varniſhed over ſo ſpeciouſly as to become ſeductive and contagious to children; whereas the vices of the peaſants, groſs and without diſguiſe, are more apt to diſguſt than ſeduce ſuch as are not intereſted in their imitation.

Beſides this, a tutor would, in ſuch a ſituation, be more completely maſter over the objects that

that might be preſented to his pupil; his reputation, his diſcourſe, his example, would carry with them an authority that would not accompany them in town. By rendering himſelf generally uſeful in his neighbourhood, every one would be eager to oblige him; to merit, in return, his eſteem; and to appear before his pupil ſuch as he himſelf in fact would wiſh: and tho' they ſhould not be corrected of their vices, they would abſtain from the public ſcandal of them; which is all that is required for our preſent purpoſe.

Forbear to charge your own faults on others. Children are leſs corrupted by the ill examples they ſee, than by the wrong precepts you teach them. Always moralizing, ſententious, and pedantic, for one idea that you give them, thinking it a good one, you inſtil at the ſame time twenty others that are good for nothing: full of what paſſes in your own head, you ſee not the effect it produces in thoſe of your pupils. Amidſt that profuſion of words, with which you confound and weary them out in your ſermons, do you think there are none whoſe meaning they take wrong? Do you think they do not make their own comments on your diffuſe explications, and that they do not find means to patch up a little ſyſtem of their own, to oppoſe to yours as occaſion offers?

Liſten but to one of theſe young gentlemen who have been thus lectured; let him talk, aſk queſtions, and run on at pleaſure; you will be ſurpriſed to find what a ſtrange turn your fine reaſonings have taken in his mind: he confounds all you have ſaid, perverts every thing; he

he will tire out your patience, and almoſt diſtract you by unforeſeen and unthought of objections. Thus will he reduce you to ſilence, or to impoſe ſilence on him; and what can he think of the ſilence of a man who loves talking ſo much? If once he gains this advantage, and is ſenſible of it, adieu to education; all is at an end at once, he will no longer ſeek opportunities to inſtruct himſelf, but the means of refuting you.

Ye zealous tutors, be plain, therefore, diſcreet, and reſerved; be never in haſte to act, unleſs it be to prevent the action of others. Again, I repeat it, put off your good inſtructions, if poſſible, for fear of inculcating bad ones. This earth was conſtituted by nature to be the firſt paradiſe of man: beware of acting the part of the tempter, in corrupting innocence by the knowlédge of good and evil. As you cannot prevent children from inſtructing themſelves by external examples, confine your ſolicitude to the imprinting thoſe examples on their minds in the form beſt adapted to their circumſtances.

Violent paſſions produce a great effect on a child who is witneſs of them, becauſe their marks are ſtriking, and command attention. Anger, in particular, is ſo boiſterous in its expreſſions, that it is impoſſible not to perceive it when near at hand. You will aſk, perhaps, if this does not afford a fine opportunity for a pedagogue to make an excellent diſcourſe? No. No excellent diſcourſe at all; not a word ſhould be ſaid on the occaſion. Let the child only be a witneſs to the ſcene; he will be too much ſurpriſed at the ſight not to aſk you the meaning of

of it. Your anſwer is very ſimple, and naturally ariſes from the very objects that ſtrike his ſenſes. He ſees an inflamed countenance, ſparkling eyes, menacing geſtures; he hears violent exclamations; all ſigns that the body is out of order. Tell him therefore, ſeriouſly, and without appearance of affectation, the poor man is taken ſuddenly ill; that he is ſeized with a fit of an ague. You may hence take occaſion to give him, in few words, a general notion of diſeaſes and their effects: for theſe depend immediately on nature, and form one of thoſe chains by which he ſhould perceive himſelf bound to the immoveable weight of neceſſity.

Is it not probable, that from this notion, which is far from being a falſe one, he may contract an early repugnance to all exceſs of paſſion, which he would regard as a diſtemper? Do not you think, at leaſt, that ſuch a notion, properly inculcated, might produce as ſalutary an effect as a tedious moral ſermon? The future advantages attached to this notion alſo are not inconſiderable; as you are thereby authoriſed, if there ſhould be occaſion for it, to treat a fractious child as if he were ſick; to confine him to his chamber, or even to his bed, if needful, and to preſcribe him a ſtrict regimen: by which means he will become afraid of theſe growing vices, and will look upon them as odious and formidable; without ever regarding the ſeverity you are obliged to make uſe of, in order to cure him of them, in the light of a puniſhment. Should it ſo happen, alſo, that you yourſelf, in ſome unguarded moment, ſhould depart from that temperance and moderation which it ſhould be

your conſtant ſtudy to maintain, you need not ſeek to diſguiſe your error; but apologiſe, for ſuch fally of your paſſion, by frankly telling him, with a tender reproach, that he hath made you very ill.

It is further to be obſerved, as a matter of great conſequence, that none of thoſe ſimple and ingenuous expreſſions, which may give a child an idea of the ignorance in which he is educated, ſhould be taken notice of and repeated in his hearing. An indiſcreet fit of laughter in a byſtander might diſconcert all that you had been doing for ſix months, and do him an irreparable injury perhaps all his lifetime. I cannot too often repeat, that to be maſter of a child, it is neceſſary to be maſter of one's ſelf. I conceive my young Emilius to be preſent at a furious ſcholding-bout between two female neighbours; and that going up to the moſt violent, he ſays to her, in a tone of compaſſion, *Good woman, you are extremely ill; I am very ſorry for it.* This inſtance of ſimplicity would undoubtedly have its effect on the ſpectators, if not on the actreſſes themſelves. Without either ſmiling, chiding or commending him, however, I take him inſtantly away, before he perceives that effect, at leaſt before he can have time to reflect on it; and, by diverting his mind to other objects, ſoon drive it entirely out of his mind.

My deſign is not to be circumſtantial on every occaſion; but only to lay down general maxims, and illuſtrate what is difficult by examples. I hold it to be impoſſible to bring up a child in the midſt of ſociety, to the age of twelve years, with-

without giving him ſome idea of the relations between man and man, and of the morality of human actions. It is ſufficient, therefore, to defer inſtructing him in theſe neceſſary notions as long as poſſible; and that, when it becomes abſolutely requiſite, ſuch inſtruction be confined to objects of preſent utility; being calculated only to prevent his thinking himſelf at liberty to do what he pleaſes. There are children of diſpoſitions ſo mild and conformable, that they may be conducted very far without danger, in their primitive innocence: but there are others ſo ſtubborn and violent, that it is neceſſary to make men of them as ſoon as poſſible, that we may not be obliged to chain them up as too unruly for children.

The firſt obligations we lie under, reſpect ourſelves: our primary ſentiments centre in our own exiſtence; all our natural emotions, at firſt, relating to ſelf-preſervation. Hence, our firſt ſenſe of juſtice ariſes not from what we owe to others, but from what is due from them to us: a circumſtance which manifeſts another blunder in the common methods of education; wherein, by talking to children of their duties inſtead of their claims, we begin by telling them the reverſe of what we ought to do, by endeavouring to inculcate what they cannot underſtand, and of courſe that in which they cannot be intereſted. If I had, therefore, the direction of one of thoſe children juſt ſpoken of, I ſhould ſay to myſelf, a child ſtrives not ſo much to gain the maſtery over perſons * as over things; and he

* We ſhould never permit a child to play with grown perſons in the ſame manner as with his inferiors, nor even as with his

will ſoon learn from experience to reſpect thoſe of the former who are ſuperior to him in ſtrength and years, whereas the latter cannot ſtand up in defence of themſelves. The firſt notion to be given ſuch a child, is leſs that of liberty than of property; and in order to give him that idea, it is neceſſary he ſhould become the proprietor of ſomething. To tell him of his cloaths, his furniture, and his play-things, is ſaying nothing; becauſe although ſuch things are at his diſpoſal, yet he knows not how or why he is poſſeſſed of them. To tell him they are his, becauſe they are given to him, is to juſt as little purpoſe; for, in order to give them to him, ſomebody muſt have a prior right to them; and it is the principle of property itſelf which we want to explain to him. Add to this, that a gift betokens a convention or agreement between the parties, and a child cannot be made to comprehend the nature of a convention *. I beg my readers will remark, that in this example, as well as in a thouſand others, we might fancy our-

his equals. If he ſhould ever ſtrike any one in earneſt, though it were a footboy, or the meaneſt ſervant, let them always return his blows with intereſt, and in ſuch a manner as to make him take heed how he ſtrikes them again. I remember to have ſeen many an imprudent governeſs encourage the anger of children, exciting them to ſtrike others, and even herſelf, while ſhe laughed at their feeble attempts; not thinking that ſuch attempts were intentional murders in the little creature, whoſe blows would have been fatal had its ſtrength been equal to its fury.

* This is the reaſon that children want to have thoſe things again which they give away, and cry when they are not returned to them. This, however, is not the caſe when they come to know the nature of a gift; they are then only more circumſpect and cautious of what they give away.

ourſelves giving excellent inſtructions to children, while at the ſame time we were only filling their heads with words that conveyed no meaning.

It is our buſineſs to recur to the origin and foundation of property; for thence our firſt ideas thereof ſhould ariſe. My pupil, living in the country, has of courſe acquired ſome little notion of huſbandry; to this end he wanted only obſervation and leiſure, both which he poſſeſſed. It is natural to people of all ages, and more particularly to children, to wiſh to ſhew ſigns of their power and activity, and to exert themſelves in the imitation, creation, and production of things. Emilius has not twice ſeen the gardener ſow, and raiſe beans and peaſe, and he has already conceived a ſtrong deſire to become a gardener.

Agreeable to the principles already eſtabliſhed, I oppoſe not his inclination; on the contrary, I encourage him in it, ſecond his deſign, and work along with him, not merely to pleaſe him, but myſelf; at leaſt I make him think ſo. Thus am I become a gardener's labourer, and, as my pupil wants ſtrength to handle the ſpade, am contented to turn up the ſoil for him. He takes poſſeſſion of it by planting a bean; a poſſeſſion certainly as ſacred and reſpectable as Nunes Balbao took of South America, in the name of the king of Spain, by planting his ſtandard on the coaſt of the South ſea.

We come every day to water our beans, and ſee them with great pleaſure come out of the ground. At the ſame time, I increaſe this ſatisfaction of my pupil by informing him that

this little ſpot belongs to him; explaining the nature of his property therein, by repreſenting to him that he hath ſpent his time, his trouble, and in ſhort employed his whole perſon in the cultivation; that he has as much right to reclaim the produce thereof from any perſon whatever, as to wreſt his arm out of the hands of any one who would retain it againſt his conſent.

Having thus made him ſenſible of his right to the produce of his labour, he comes on a fine day, as uſual, to water his riſing plants; when behold, his beans are all torn up by the roots, the ground turned up, and the place hardly to be known. What a ſight! what cauſe of affliction is here! His boſom ſwells with grief and indignation. Alas! he cries, what is become of my labour and pains, the fruit of all my toil and induſtry? who hath deprived me of my property? who hath taken away my beans? Thus, venting his exclamations at his firſt ſenſe of injuſtice, he ſheds a flood of tears, and fills the air with his cries and complaints. In the mean time, I take part in his diſtreſs, and endeavour to find out the author of the miſchief. This is found to be the gardener, who is immediately ſent for.

Here again is poor Emilius deceived in his expectations; the gardener, underſtanding our complaint, begins to complain louder than we. So! Gentlemen, it is you, I find, that have deſtroyed my fine melons with your pretended gardening. Did you not know that I had ſown ſome choice Malteſe melon-ſeed on that very ſpot, which you have dug up to plant your worthleſs beans Yes,—the ſeeds were given me as a curioſity, and I was in hopes to regale you daintily

tily with the fruit when it became ripe. But you have deſtroyed the plants juſt peeping out of the ground, and have not only done me an irreparable injury, but have deprived yourſelves of the pleaſure of taſting the moſt exquiſite melons in the world.

Rouſſeau. Forgive us, honeſt Robert; we did not know that you had beſtowed your toil and pains on that ſpot. I ſee that we have been to blame, in ſpoiling your work; but we will ſend for ſome other ſeed, to ſupply the place of that we have dug up; and will take care, when we go to digging again, that nobody hath been at work there before us.

Robert. Then you may throw aſide your tools, Gentlemen; for there is no ground lies here uncultivated. For my part, I labour on the ſoil my father improved before me; and my neighbours do the ſame; ſo that all the land you ſee, has been occupied long ago.

Emilius. Then there muſt be a good deal of melon-ſeed deſtroyed, Mr. Robert.

Rob. Excuſe me there, young Gentleman; we do not often meet with ſuch wild little gardeners as you. With us, nobody meddles with another's garden; but has a regard to the fruits of his labour, in order to ſecure thoſe of his own.

Emil. Well, but what muſt I do? I have no garden.

Rob. That is nothing me. I aſſure you, if you ſpoil mine, you ſhall walk in it no more; for, take notice, I will not throw my time and labour away.

Rouſſ. No, that would be unreaſonable; but can-

cannot we ſomehow accommodate this matter? What if our friend Robert was to allot us a corner of his garden to ourſelves, on condition of ſharing with us in the produce of it.

Rob. That I will do without conditions; but remember that I ſhall dig up your beans, if you meddle with my melons.

In this ſpecimen, of the manner of implanting the firſt notion of moral principles in the minds of children, it is obſervable how naturally the idea of property refers to the right of the firſt occupier. This method is plain and ſimple, and agreeable to the capacity of a child. Having given my pupil thus an idea of the right of property, and after that of exchanging poſſeſſion, I ſhould not let him go above one ſtep farther before I ſtop him quite ſhort.

It is to be obſerved here, that my inſtructions on this head, which in theory are laid down in two or three pages, may take up a whole year to put in practice; for in the purſuit of moral ideas we cannot advance too ſlow, nor tread too ſecurely. Think of this example, ye young preceptors; and remember, that your lectures ſhould always conſiſt rather of action than diſcourſe: for children eaſily forget what they ſay, as well as what is ſaid; but not what they do, or what is done to them.

Inſtructions of this kind ſhould be given, as I before obſerved, either ſooner or later, according as the mild or turbulent diſpoſition of the child may render them neceſſary. Their utility is obvious to the moſt ſuperficial obſerver. To omit nothing, however, of import-

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ance on a difficult ſubject, I ſhall give another example.

Your child, I will ſuppoſe, is ſo rude and boiſterous as to ſpoil every thing he lays his hands on. Be not angry with him; but remove what you are fearful of his ſpoiling, out of his reach. If he break the utenſils which he ſtands in daily need of, be not in haſte to give him others; but let him experience the want of them. If he break the windows of his apartment, let the wind blow day and night in upon him, without troubling yourſelf about his catching cold; for it is better he ſhould catch cold, than be indulged in ſuch frantic airs: never complain of the inconveniences to which he may put yourſelf, but contrive ſo that he may be the firſt to feel their effects. After ſome time, indeed, you may have your windows mended; but without ſaying any thing to him: and ſhould he break them again, change your method. In that caſe ſay to him, very coldly, and without putting yourſelf into a paſſion, 'Theſe windows are mine; I took care to have them placed there, and will prevent their being broke, by ſhutting you up in a dark room where there are no windows to break. At the novelty of this proceeding, he will begin to cry and ſtorm; nobody, however, muſt ſeem to hear him. On this, he will ſoon change his tone, to the milder notes of ſighs and complaints. At this time, let one of the ſervants paſs by accidentally, of whom he will doubtleſs beg his deliverance. Without any other pretence, however, the ſervant ſhould be directed to ſay, *I have alſo windows to preſerve*, and then walk away. In ſhort, after the child

child ſhould have remained there ſome hours, long enough to tire him heartily, and make him remember it, ſomebody ſhould ſuggeſt to him the making you a propoſal to ſet him at liberty, on condition of his breaking no more windows. He would deſire no better terms, and accordingly would ſend for you to come to him. You ſhould go, and hear his propoſal; which being made, you ſhould inſtantly accept of it; obſerving that it was a prudent thought, and that it was a pity he did not hit on it ſooner, as you would both have been gainers by it. You ſhould then, without requiring any proteſtation or verbal confirmation of his promiſe, ſalute him in the moſt friendly manner, and lead him immediately to your apartment; regarding the agreement made between you as ſacred and inviolable as if atteſted on oath. What an idea do you think he will deduce from this procedure, of the faith and utility of engagements? I am much miſtaken if there be a child in the world, not already quite ſpoiled, who could withſtand ſuch proceeding, or would wilfully break a window ever afterwards *.

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* Were even the obligation we are under to perform our promiſes, not ſo firmly rooted in the mind of a child by the force of its utility, his innate ſenſe of right and wrong, juſt now beginning to exert itſelf, would ſoon impoſe it on him as a dictate of conſcience. This is the internal ſource of all moral principle; and, in order to diſplay itſelf, waits only for the acquirement of that knowledge which is neceſſary for it to work upon. The dictates of conſcience are not inculcated by man, but engraven in the heart by the Author of all juſtice. Deprive man of the original laws of mutual convention, with the obligations they impoſe, and every thing is vain and deluſive in human ſociety: he who is not obliged by his own intereſt to keep his promiſe, is no more obliged than if he had not

We enter now on the moral world. Behold the opening to vice: with our ſenſe of mutual conventions and reciprocal duties ariſe falſehood and deceit. No ſooner do we find ourſelves capable of doing what we ought not to do, than we are prompted to conceal our having done what we ought not to have done. When intereſt induces us to promiſe, intereſt in a greater degree tempts us to violate that promiſe; all that is required is to do it with impunity. The reſource is natural; we endeavour to hide our actions, and to deceive by our words. Not being able to prevent vice, we are already in the circumſtances of puniſhing it: hence ariſe the miſeries of human life which take root in our errors.

I have already ſaid enough to give the reader to underſtand, that I would never have puniſhment inflicted on children as a puniſhment, but that it ſhould be made to follow as a natural conſequence of their miſdeeds. Hence you ſhould never declaim againſt lying, nor puniſh them directly for telling untruths; but you ſhould ſo manage it, that they ſhould feel the ill effects of lying, by not being believed when they ſpeak truth, and by being ſtill accuſed of facts they are innocent of, notwithſtanding all their aſſeverations. But we ſhall give an explanation of what may be called lying in children.

Falſehoods are of two kinds; the one relating to matters of fact, which reſpects the paſt; the other

not promiſed at all; or, at moſt, is no more bound than a gameſter, who, by taking the odds at play, knows how in any caſe to bring himſelf off. This principle is of the laſt importance, and deſerves to be well conſidered; for it is here that man begins to act in contradiction to himſelf.

other relative to matters of right, and reſpecting the future. The firſt takes place when we deny having done what we actually have done, or affirm our having done what we have not done; and, in general, when we ſpeak knowingly againſt the truth of things. The latter takes place, when we promiſe what we have no deſign to perform; and, in general, when we declare our intention to be contrary to what it really is. Theſe two kinds of falſehood may ſometimes be joined together *; but I conſider them here by what is peculiar to each.

An helpleſs being, ſenſible of its ſtanding in need of the aſſiſtance of others, and conſtantly experiencing their benevolence, can have no intereſt in deceiving them; on the contrary, it is very evidently his intereſt that they ſhould ſee things as they really are, leſt, if they are deceived, it ſhould turn out to his prejudice. Hence it is clear, that it is not natural for children to deceive in matters of fact: but it is the law of obedience, to which they are ſubjected, that produces the neceſſity for lying; becauſe obedience being in itſelf painful, children diſpenſe with it in private as much as poſſible, and their preſent intereſt in avoiding puniſhment or reproach, is more powerful than the future one ariſing from telling truth. When a child is educated, therefore, agreeable to the natural prin-

* As when a culprit, accuſed of any bad action, defends himſelf from that accuſation in particular, by inſiſting in general that he is an honeſt and innocent man. Here he is not only guilty of falſehood as to the matter of fact, but alſo as to matter of right.

principles of liberty, why ſhould he deceive you in his words, or hide from you his actions? As you never reprehend nor puniſh him, never require any thing of him; why ſhould he not make you privy to his actions, as well as any of his little companions? Whence ſhould he apprehend more danger on one ſide than on the other?

It is ſtill leſs natural for children to deceive in matters of right; as all promiſes to do any thing, or abſtain from it, are deeds of convention, which are not included in a ſtate of nature, but derogate from its freedom. Add to this, that all engagements entered into by children are null and void of themſelves; in as much as, not being able to extend their limited views beyond the preſent, they know not what they are about in making ſuch engagements. Nay, a child can hardly be ſaid to deceive, at the very time of entering therein; for thinking about nothing but diſengaging himſelf from ſomething elſe for the preſent, whatever he undertakes to do hereafter is in fact nothing. If, for inſtance, he ſhould be able to eſcape a whipping-bout, or obtain a box of ſugar-plumbs, by promiſing to throw himſelf out of the window the next day, he would very readily promiſe to do it. Hence it is that the law very prudently pays no regard to engagements entered into by children; and when fathers, or maſters, more ſevere, inſiſt on their fulfilling them, it is only in caſes where a child ought to have ſo done, had he made no ſuch promiſe.

A child, not knowing what he is about in making engagements, cannot be ſaid therefore to tell a lie, or deceive, in ſo doing. It is not

the ſame, however, in his refuſing to fulfil them; for he may remember very well the promiſe he hath made, but he does not ſee the importance of keeping it. Having little or no abilities to judge of the future, he cannot foreſee the conſequences of things; and though he ſhould break his engagements, he does nothing inconſiſtent with the underſtanding of his years.

It follows hence, that deceit and lying in children muſt all be attributed to their maſters; and that, in endeavouring to teach them the truth, they only inſtruct them to lie. In our great haſte to regulate, to govern and inſtruct them, we find not ſufficient means to compaſs our end: we endeavour, therefore, to lay ſtronger hold on their minds by maxims without foundation, and precepts without reaſon; while we had rather they ſhould learn our leſſons and be deceitful, than remain ignorant and be ſincere. As to myſelf, in particular, who give my pupil only practical leſſons, and had rather ſee him good than learned, I require him not to know even the truth, leſt he ſhould diſguiſe it; and never exact any promiſe of him, for fear he ſhould be tempted to break it. If any miſchief be done in my abſence, and I know not the author of it, I take care never to tax Emilius with it, or to aſk him if it was he that did it *; for in ſo doing

* Nothing can be more indiſcreet than ſuch a queſtion, particularly when the child is culpable; for, if he thinks you know that he is ſo, he will ſee you are laying a trap for him; a circumſtance that will influence him greatly in your diſfavour: and if he thinks you know it not, he will very naturally ſay to himſelf, Why ſhould I diſcover my own guilt? And thus your imprudent queſtion will be a temptation to his telling a lie.

ing I ſhould only teach him to deny it. And if at any time his intractable diſpoſition ſhould oblige me to enter into any engagement with him, I ſhall take my meaſures ſo well, that the propoſal ſhall always come from him, not from me; that, when he is once engaged, he ſhall always perceive a preſent and actual intereſt in fulfilling his engagement; and that, if he ever fails ſo to do, the ill conſequences of ſuch failure ſhall appear to riſe naturally from the order and conſtitution of things, and not from the reſentment of his tutor. So far, however, from being under a neceſſity of recurring to ſuch cruel expedients, I am almoſt certain it will be long before Emilius knows what it is to tell a lie; and that when he firſt hears of it, he will be greatly ſurpriſed, not being able to conceive the uſe of deceit. It is very plain, that the more independent I render his welfare, either of the will or judgment of others, the more I deprive him of any intereſt in practiſing falſehood.

When we are not in haſte to inſtruct, we are not in haſte to exact any thing of children; and we take our time, in order not to require it out of ſeaſon. Thus an infant is properly formed without being ſpoiled; but, when a blundering preceptor, ignorant of his duty, is every moment requiring him to promiſe this or that, without diſtinction, choice, or reaſon, the child, wearied out and overburdened with ſuch a heap of engagements, neglects, forgets, or deſpiſes them; regarding them all as ſo many mere formalities, he diverts himſelf with making and breaking them. Would you have him, therefore, be al-

ways faithful to his word, you muſt be diſcreet in exacting it of him.

The examples I have here given concerning falſehood, are applicable in many reſpects to all thoſe other obligations which we impoſe on children, by rendering them not only diſagreeable, but impracticable. By appearing to preach up virtue, we make them in love with vice; and encourage them to practiſe by forbidding it. In order to render them pious, we tire out their patience at church; and by making them mutter their prayers perpetually, we compel them to ſigh for the liberty of praying no longer. To teach them charity, we make them give alms, as if we were above doing it ourſelves. It is the maſter, however, that ſhould give alms, and not the ſcholar: indeed, how fond ſoever the former may be of his pupil, he ought to diſpute with him that honour: he ought to make him believe that a child of his age is as yet unworthy ſo great a privilege. To give alms is the action of a man, who may be ſuppoſed to know the value of what he beſtows, and the want his fellow-creature has of it. A child who knows nothing of either, can have no merit in giving alms: give what he will, it is without charity or beneficence; indeed he will be almoſt aſhamed to give, when, judging from your example, he muſt think it is the buſineſs of children, and that he ſhall do ſo no more when he grows up.

It is to be obſerved alſo, that we generally uſe children to give thoſe things only of which they know not the value. What are to them the round pieces of metal they carry in their pockets,

pockets, and which ſerve to no other purpoſe but to give away? A child would ſooner give a beggar an hundred guineas than a cake: but require the little prodigal to give away his play-things, his ſweet-meats, and other trifles he is fond of, and we ſhall preſently ſee whether or not you have made him truly liberal.

An expedient, however, is readily found in this caſe, which is by returning to children immediately whatever they give us; ſo that they are ready enough to give what they know will be ſpeedily returned to them again. I have never ſeen any generoſity in children but what was of one of theſe two kinds; that is, they either gave away that which was of no uſe to them, or what they were certain of having again. Mr Locke adviſes us to manage this matter ſo, as to convince children by experience, that the moſt liberal is always the beſt provided for. This, however, is to render a child only liberal in appearance, and covetous in fact. He adds, that children would thus acquire an habit of liberality; yes, the liberality of an uſurer, who would give a penny for a pound. But when they come to the point of giving things away in good earneſt, adieu to habit: when they found things did not come back again, they would ſoon ceaſe to give them away. We ſhould regard the habit of the mind, and not that of the hand. All the other virtues which are taught children, reſemble this of their liberality; and it is by preaching them up to no purpoſe, that we load their early years with vexation and ſorrow. Is not ſuch a very wiſe ſcheme of education?

Throw aſide, then, ye miſtaken tutors, your grimace and affectation; be virtuous and good yourſelves, that your examples may be engraven in the memory of your pupils, till they have weight enough to ſink into their hearts. Inſtead of being in haſte to require mine to perform acts of charity, I had rather perform them myſelf in his preſence, and deprive him of the means of imitating me, as being an honour too great for his years; for it is of conſequence that he ſhould not look upon the obligations of men merely as thoſe of children. If hereafter, ſeeing me diſtribute alms to the poor, he ſhould aſk me queſtions concerning it, and it ſhould be then * proper to reply to him on this head, I ſhould tell him, "That when the poor conſented to others being rich, the rich on their part promiſed to provide for thoſe who could not ſubſiſt on their property or their labour. ——You, then, have promiſed that; he might reply.——Doubtleſs I am not the proprietor of what paſſes through my hands, on any other conditions than thoſe annexed to propriety."

On hearing this diſcourſe, which, as we have already ſhewn, a child might be ſoon brought to underſtand, any one but Emilius would be tempted to imitate the behaviour of the rich; in which caſe I ſhould at leaſt prevent his doing it with

* It is to be obſerved, that I do not anſwer his queſtions whenever he pleaſes to aſk them, but when I think proper. I ſhould otherwiſe ſubject myſelf too much to his pleaſure; and lay myſelf under the worſt ſtate of dependence that a governor can be in with reſpect to his pupil.

with oſtentation; I ſhould like better his privately uſurping my privilege, and giving his money away by ſtealth. Such a piece of fraud would be compatible with his age, and the only one I ſhould forgive him.

I know that the imitative virtues are but the virtues of an ape, and that no action is morally good which is not performed as ſuch, and not merely becauſe it is done by others. But at ſo early an age, while the heart is as yet inſenſible, children ought to be inſtructed to imitate thoſe actions of which we want them to acquire an habit, and which they may afterwards perform from principle and a love to virtue. Man is an imitative being; mere animals are ſo too; this turn for imitation is well adapted to a ſtate of nature, but degenerates into vice in a ſtate of ſociety. The monkey imitates man whom he fears, but imitates not the animals he deſpiſes; he approves the actions of a being ſuperior to himſelf. Among us, on the contrary, we ſee our harlequins both of the theatre and the world, imitate the beautiful only, to debaſe and render it ridiculous: they endeavour to make out of their own meanneſs, ſomething equal to thoſe who are better than themſelves; or, if they attempt really to imitate what they admire, they diſcover in the choice of their objects the falſe taſte of imitators: they are more deſirous of impoſing on others, or of diſplaying their talents, than of making themſelves better or wiſer. The ſource of imitation among us, ariſes from a deſire of tranſporting ourſelves out of our own characters. If I ſucceed in my enterpriſe, Emilius will certainly have no ſuch deſire. We

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muſt therefore relinquiſh the apparent good of which it might be productive.

Examine the rules of the common method of education; and you will find them all wrong, particularly thoſe which relate to virtue and manners.

The only leſſon of morality proper for children, and the moſt important to perſons of all ages, is never to do an injury to any one. Even the poſitive precept of doing good, if not made ſubordinate to this, is dangerous, falſe, and contradictory. Who is there that doth not do good? All the world, even the vitious man does good to one party or the other: he will often make one perſon happy at the expence of making an hundred miſerable; hence ariſe all our calamities. The moſt ſublime virtues are negative; they are alſo the moſt difficult to put in practice, becauſe they are attended with no oſtentation, and are even above that pleaſure ſo flattering to the heart of man, that of ſending away others ſatisfied with our benevolence. O, how much good muſt that man neceſſarily do his fellow-creatures, if ſuch a man there be, who never did any of them harm! What intrepidity of ſoul, what conſtancy of mind, are neceſſary here! It is not, however, by reaſoning on this maxim, but by endeavouring to put it in practice, that all its difficulty is to be diſcovered *.

Thus

* The injunction of doing no one harm, infers that of doing the leaſt poſſible harm to the community in general; for in a ſtate of ſociety the good of one man neceſſarily becomes the evil of another. This relation is eſſential to the thing itſelf, and cannot be changed. We may inquire, on this principle, which is beſt, man in a ſtate of ſociety or in a ſtate of ſolitude? A certain

Thus have I endeavoured to give my readers ſome imperfect ideas of the precautions to be taken, in giving children thoſe inſtructions which cannot be ſometimes neglected without expoſing them to the danger of injuring themſelves and others, or of contracting ill habits of which they cannot afterwards be corrected: but you may be aſſured, the neceſſity of doing this will ſeldom happen where children are properly educated; becauſe it is impoſſible they ſhould become intractable, miſchievous, lying, and ſelfiſh, unleſs we ſow in their hearts the ſeeds of thoſe vices which make them ſo. What I have ſaid on this head, therefore, may ſerve rather as exceptions and rules: theſe exceptions, however, are the more numerous and frequent in proportion as children depart from their natural ſtate of innocence, and contract the vices of men. It will be neceſſary, in the public education of children, to make uſe of inſtructions more premature than in a private education of an individual in the country. In the latter, it is always beſt to take thoſe methods which give childhood time to grow up at leiſure to maturity.

There are other exceptions of a different kind, adapted to ſuch whoſe natural genius raiſes them above their years. As there are men who remain

certain noble author hath ſaid, None but a wicked man might exiſt alone: for my part, I ſay, None but a good man might exiſt alone. If the latter propoſition be leſs ſententious, it is more true and more reaſonable than the former. If a vicious man were alone, what harm could he put in practice? It is in ſociety only that he finds the implement of miſchief. If this argument be retorted upon me, againſt the man of virtue, I refer to what I have ſaid above concerning the negative merit of doing good.

main children all their lives, ſo there are others who may be ſaid to have been men almoſt from their birth. The misfortune is, that the number of the latter are but few; that it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh them in infancy; and that every mother, fondly conceiving her own child to be a prodigy, generally concludes he is one. Nay, fond mothers, as well as fathers, do more! they take for ſigns of extraordinary parts, the moſt uſual and ordinary tokens; ſuch are thoſe lively ſallies, and that ſubtile ſimplicity, which are characteriſtics of their years, and demonſtrate that a child is but a child. Is it at all to be wondered at, that one who is made to talk much, and permitted to ſay what he pleaſes, who is reſtrained in no motive of fear or decorum, ſhould throw out ſome lucky expreſſions? It would be much more ſurpriſing if it were not ſo, as it would be that an aſtrologer, among a thouſand lies, ſhould not tell ſome truth. They are ſo often in the wrong, ſaid Henry IV. that they muſt be ſome time or other in the right. Whoever is deſirous of ſaying ſome good things, has only to ſay a number of bad ones. How deſpicable are thoſe who have no other pretenſions to a good reception in the polite world!

The moſt brilliant thoughts may happen to enter into the heads of children; or rather the moſt ſtriking expreſſions may drop from their lips, as diamonds of the firſt water from their hands, without either the thoughts or the diamonds belonging properly to them: there is in fact no property of any kind annexed to childhood. Whatever expreſſions children may make uſe of, they convey not the ſame meaning to them

them as to us. Their ideas, ſuch as they have, are looſe and unconnected: there is nothing fixed and determinate in any of their reflections. Examine your imaginary prodigy: you will ſometimes conceive him poſſeſſed of an amazing genius, an active and penetrating ſpirit, capable of ſoaring to the clouds; and yet you will more often find this very genius inactive, indolent, inſipid, dull, and, as it were, wrapt in a thick fog. Sometimes he will fly before you; and at others, remain motionleſs and immoveable. At one inſtant, you will admire him as a prodigy of wit and ingenuity; and the next, deſpiſe him for a fool: you will in both, however, be equally miſtaken; he is neither a genius nor a blockhead, but a child. He is a young eagle, that ſoars one moment up to the ſky, and drops immediately after into his neſt.

Treat him, therefore, agreeable to his age, notwithſtanding appearances; and beware of exhauſting his ſtrength by an unſeaſonable deſire to ſee him exert it. If you obſerve his young brain grow warm, if you ſee him overflow and confound himſelf, let his ideas at firſt ferment freely; but never excite or increaſe their fermentation, leſt they ſhould all evaporate. When the firſt agitation is over, and the more volatile ſpirits are exhaled, reſtrain and condenſe the reſt, till, ripening with his years, the whole acquires genuine warmth and real ſpirit. You will, otherwiſe, loſe both your time and pains; you will defeat your own deſigns, and, after having indiſcreetly intoxicated yourſelf with theſe inflammable vapours, you will find remaining only

only an inſipid, taſteleſs ſubſtance, without ſpirit and without vigour.

Forward, pratting children, uſually make but ordinary men: I know no obſervation more certain and general than this. There is nothing more difficult than to diſtinguiſh, in children, between real ſtupidity and that apparent dulneſs which is the uſual indication of ſtrong intellects. It may appear ſtrange, at firſt ſight, that two ſuch different extremes ſhould be indicated by the ſame ſigns, and yet it is nevertheleſs what we ought to expect: for at an age when we have as yet acquired no true ideas, all difference between a child of genius and one that has none, is, that the latter admits only of falſe ideas of things; while the former, meeting with none but ſuch, refuſes to admit any: both therefore appear to be equally dull; the one becauſe he has no capacity for the comprehenſion of things, and the other becauſe the repreſentations of things are not adapted to his capacity. The only means to diſtinguiſh between them depend on accident, which may offer to the latter ſome idea within his comprehenſion; whereas the former is always the ſame in all places and circumſtances. Cato himſelf, during his infancy, was eſteemed by his whole family as almoſt a fool. He was particularly reſerved and obſtinate, which was all they could judge of him. It was in the anti-chamber of Sylla that his uncle firſt learned to know him better. Poſſibly, had he not been introduced thither, he might have paſſed for a mere brute till he had arrived at years of diſcretion: if Cæſar alſo had not ſurvived, that very Cato might have been treated as a viſionary and a mad-

a madman, who had penetration enough to read his deſtructive genius, and to foreſee at ſo great a diſtance his fatal projects. How ſubject are thoſe who judge precipitately of children, to be egregiouſly deceived! They often betray, in this, leſs judgment than the children of whom they judge. I know a man, whoſe friendſhip does me honour, that paſſed among his friends and relations, even in a pretty advanced age, for a perſon of very ordinary underſtanding; his intellectual faculties, however, unfolded themſelves, and grew mature in ſilence; when, on a ſudden, he appeared the complete philoſopher; and I doubt not that poſterity will aſſign him an honourable place among the moſt acute reaſoners and profound metaphyſicians of his time.

We ſhould reſpect a ſtate of infancy, and not too precipitately judge either in favour or to the prejudice of children. If they are to be excepted in our general rules of education; let the motives for ſuch exception be clearly indicated, and frequently confirmed, before we adopt particular methods. Let nature act a conſiderable time, before we take upon us to put ourſelves in her place, leſt we counteract her operations. You know the value of time, you perhaps will ſay, and will not loſe it. But do you not loſe much more by making a bad uſe of time, than by entirely ſtanding ſtill? Is not a child badly inſtructed, more incapable than he who is not inſtructed at all? You are alarmed at ſeeing a child paſs its time in doing nothing. Is it nothing, then, to ſpend its time in freedom and happineſs? Dancing, playing, and running about all day, is this doing nothing? Depend on

it, he will never be ſo fully employed again during life. Plato, in the ſyſtem of his republic, which we eſteem ſo ſevere, brings up the children only amidſt feaſting, mirth, ſongs, and amuſements: one might ſay his whole ſcheme was to teach them how to divert themſelves. Seneca, alſo, ſpeaking of the youth of the ancient Romans, ſays, they were always upon their feet, and that nothing was taught them which required them to ſit down to learn. Were they leſs qualified by all this, when they grew up to manhood? Do not be apprehenſive, therefore, of any danger from this pretended loſs of time. What would you think of a man, who, in order to make the moſt of life, ſhould determine never to go to ſleep: you would doubtleſs call him either a fool or a madman; he would not take the proper means to make uſe of his time, but to deprive himſelf of it: to avoid ſleep, he would ruſh into the arms of death. Think this, then, a parallel caſe; infancy is the ſleep of reaſon.

The apparent facility with which children ſeem to learn, operates greatly to their prejudice, and, though we do not obſerve it, is a plain proof they learn nothing. The delicate texture of their brain reflects, like a mirrour, every object preſented to them; but nothing penetrates the ſubſtance, or remains behind. A child retains the words, but the ideas accompanying them are reflected back again; thoſe who hear him repeat, may underſtand what he means; but he himſelf knows nothing of the matter.

Although the memory and judgment are two faculties eſſentially different; yet the one cannot unfold itſelf without the other. Before a child

child arrives at years of underſtanding, he entertains not the ideas, but ſimply the images, of things; the difference between which conſiſts in that ſuch images are only the direct paintings of perceptible objects, and ideas are the notions of ſuch objects determined by their reſpective relations to each other. A ſingle image may ſubſiſt in the mind that is ſenſible of it; but every idea neceſſarily ſuppoſes the concomitance of others. To ſimple imagination, or the mere formation of images, nothing more is neceſſary than to have ſeen objects; but to conceive any thing about their exiſtence, or to form ideas of them, it is required that we ſhould be able to compare them. Our ſenſations are merely paſſive, whereas our perceptions, or the ideas formed in conſequence of thoſe ſenſations, riſe from an active principle capable of judging of them. This will be hereafter demonſtrated.

I ſay, therefore, that children, being incapable of forming a judgment of things, have no real memory. They retain, it is true, ſounds, figures, and ſenſations; but ſeldom ideas, and ſtill more ſeldom the connections between them. In objecting to what I advance, that children may be taught geometrical elements, this inſtance may be ſuppoſed to make againſt me; on the contrary, however, it makes for me. It may be ſhewn, that, ſo far are they from being capable of reaſoning of themſelves, they are incapable of retaining the arguments of others; for, trace theſe little geometricians in the ſolving any problem, and you will ſee they retain only the exact impreſſion of the figure, and the terms of the demonſtration. On the leaſt unforeſeen ob-

jection, they are quite at a loſs; vary the figure, and they are totally diſconcerted; all their knowledge lies clearly in their ſenſations, and has not penetrated into the underſtanding. Their memory itſelf, however retentive, is as little perfect as their other faculties; as they are almoſt always obliged to learn, when they are grown up, the meaning of the words they got by rote in their childhood.

I am far, however, from thinking that children are capable of no kind of reaſoning *. On the contrary, I obſerve that they reaſon very well as to things they are acquainted with, and which regard their preſent and obvious intereſt. But it is in the depth of their knowledge we deceive ourſelves, in attributing to them what they have not, and ſetting them to reaſon about things they cannot comprehend. We are ſtill farther deceived, in wanting to render them attentive to ſuch

* I have an hundred times, while I have been writing, made this reflection, viz. That it is impoſſible, in a long work, to give always preciſely the ſame meaning to the ſame words. There is no language rich and copious enough, to furniſh as many terms, turns, and phraſes, as our ideas may require modifications. The method of defining all our terms, and conſtantly ſubſtituting the definition in the place of what is defined, is very accurate; but it is impracticable; for how ſhall we avoid running round the circle? Definitions might be very uſeful, did we not make uſe of words in their conſtruction. I am perſuaded, however, a writer may be perſpicuous and clear, notwithſtanding the poverty of our language; not, indeed, by taking words always in the ſame acceptation; but in ſo managing the matter, that every time a word is made uſe of, the acceptation given it ſhall be determined by the ſenſe of the period. In ſome places, I ſay, children are incapable of reaſoning; in others again, I make them reaſon very acutely; and yet I do not think I am contradictory in my ſentiments; tho' I cannot deny that I frequently contradict myſelf in my expreſſions.

ſuch conſiderations as cannot in any degree affect them, ſuch as their future intereſt, their happineſs when they come to be men, the eſteem in which they will be held when grown up, and ſo forth; all which pleas, when made uſe of to beings void of all foreſight, abſolutely ſignify nothing, nor can ſerve to any good purpoſe. Now, all the ſtudies impoſed on theſe poor unfortunates, tend to ſuch objects as are entirely foreign to their minds. Judge then of the attention they are like to beſtow on them.

The pedagogues, who make ſo circumſtantial a parade with the inſtructions they pretend to give their ſcholars, are paid to talk in a different ſtrain: one may ſee plainly, however, by their conduct, that they are exactly of my opinion; for, after all their mighty profeſſions, what is it they teach them? Words; ſtill words, and nothing but words. Among the various ſciences they pretend to teach, they take particular care not to fall upon thoſe which are really uſeful; becauſe they would depend on the knowledge of things, and in theſe they would never ſucceed; but they fix on ſuch as appear to be underſtood when their terms are once gotten by rote, *viz.* geopraphy, chronology, heraldry, the languages, *&c.* all ſtudies ſo foreign to the purpoſes of man, and particularly to thoſe of a child, that it is a wonder if ever he may have any occaſion for them as long as he lives.

It may ſeem ſurpriſing that I reckon the ſtudy of languages among the uſeleſs branches of education; but it ſhould be remembered that I am here ſpeaking of the early part of childhood; and, whatever may be ſaid to the contrary, I

very much doubt whether any child, prodigies excepted, is capable of learning two languages, till it arrive at the age of twelve or thirteen.

I agree, that, if the ſtudy of languages conſiſted only in that of words, that is to ſay, of the figures and ſounds that expreſſed them, it would be a proper ſtudy for children; but languages, in varying the ſigns, diverſify alſo the modification of the ideas they repreſent. The memory charges itſelf with two languages; but our thoughts take a tincture of the different idioms. The judgment only is common to both; the imagination takes a particular form from every language; which difference may probably be in part the cauſe or effect of national characteriſtics: what appears alſo to confirm this conjecture, is, that among all nations in the world, their language changes with their manners, or remains unaltered with them.

Of theſe various forms of thinking and ſpeaking, a child becomes habituated to one; and that is the only one he ſhould make uſe of, till he comes to years of reaſon. In order to acquire two, it is neceſſary he ſhould be able to compare his ideas; and how ſhall he compare theſe when he is hardly in a ſituation to conceive them? To every object he might learn to give a thouſand different names; but every idea muſt have one determinate form; he cannot therefore learn to ſpeak more than one language. Will it be told me, that children do actually learn ſeveral? I deny the fact. I have, indeed, ſeen little wonderful prattlers, who were imagined to talk five or ſix different languages. I have heard them ſucceſſively talk German, in Latin, French, and Italian

Italian words. They made uſe, it is true, of the different terms of five or ſix dictionaries; but they ſtill ſpoke nothing but German. In a word, fill a child's head with as many ſynonimous terms as you pleaſe, you will change his words only, but not his language, for he can know but one.

It is to conceal the incapacity of children in this reſpect, that preceptors prefer the uſe of the dead languages, in which there are no proper judges to find fault with them. The familiar uſe of thoſe languages being long ſince loſt, they are content to imitate, as well as they can, what they find written in books; and this they call ſpeaking. If ſuch be the Greek and Latin of the maſters, it is eaſy to judge what muſt be that of their ſcholars. No ſooner have they gone through the rudiments of grammar, of which they abſolutely underſtand nothing, than they are ſet to render a diſcourſe ſpoken in their native tongue into Latin words; when they are advanced a little farther, they are ſet to patch up a theme in proſe by tacking together the phraſes of Cicero, and in verſe with centos from Virgil. They then begin to think themſelves capable of talking Latin; and who is to contradict them?

In any ſtudy whatever, unleſs we poſſeſs the ideas of the things repreſented, the ſigns repreſenting them are of no uſe or conſequence. A child is, nevertheleſs, always confined to theſe ſigns, without our being capable of making him comprehend any of thoſe things repreſented by them. Thus, while we imagine we are teaching him the deſcription of the earth, we are only

ly teaching him to underſtand the map: we teach him the names of countries, towns, and rivers, of whoſe exiſtence he has no other idea, than as they are marked on the paper before him. I remember ſomewhere to have ſeen a tract of geography which began as follows: *What is the world? — It is a globe of paſte-board.* This is exactly the geography of children: for I lay it down as certain, that there is not a child of ten years of age, though he may have ſpent two years in the ſtudy of coſmography and the uſe of the globes, can tell, by the rules he has been taught, how to find his way from Paris to St Dennis; nay, I will venture to ſay, there is not one, who, by means of a plan of his father's garden, would be able to go through the ſeveral walks and windings without loſing himſelf. Yet ſuch are theſe learned geographers, who can tell to a minute the longitude and latitude of Pekin, Iſpahan, Mexico, and all other countries in the known world.

I have heard it ſaid, that children ſhould be engaged in ſtudies that require nothing more than that they ſhould be able to ſee: this maxim may poſſibly be right, if there be any ſuch ſtudies; but, for my part, I know of none.

From a miſtaken notion ſtill more ridiculous, they are directed to the ſtudy of hiſtory: it is imagined that hiſtory is not above the capacity of children, becauſe it is only a collection of facts: but may we not aſk what is underſtood by the word *facts?* Is it conceived that the relations which determine hiſtorical facts are ſo eaſily taken in, that the ideas of them are formed without any trouble in the minds of children? Is it

ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed that the knowledge of events is ſo eaſily ſeparable from that of their cauſes, or that hiſtorical knowledge depends ſo little on moral, as that one can be obtained without the other? If, in the conduct of men, you ſee nothing more than merely external and phyſical actions, what is it you can learn from hiſtory? Abſolutely nothing; but, diveſted of all that renders it intereſting, this ſtudy would afford as little pleaſure as inſtruction. On the other hand, if you would regard their actions as connected by moral relations, and endeavour to give your pupils an idea of thoſe relations, you would ſoon ſee whether or not the ſtudy of hiſtory were above the capacity of children.

Forget not, readers, that the perſon who addreſſes you in this work, is neither a man of learning nor a philoſopher, but a plain man, a friend to truth, attached to no ſyſtem nor party; that he is a mere ſolitary, who, converſing little with mankind, has leſs opportunity of imbibing their prejudices, and more time to reflect on thoſe things which appear more ſtriking to him in his occaſional commerce with the world. My arguments are leſs founded on principles than on facts; and I conceive that I cannot better enable you to judge of their validity, than by frequently illuſtrating them by ſuch examples as my experience may ſuggeſt.

I engaged myſelf once to ſpend ſome days in the country, at the houſe of a very prudent mother, who took great care of her children, and of their education. While I was there, I happened one morning to be preſent when the elder was repeating his leſſon. The preceptor, a man of

of merit, who had inſtructed his pupil very well in ancient hiſtory, taking up that of Alexander, began to comment on the well-known ſtory of his phyſician Philip, expatiating thereon, as it well deſerved, at large. On this occaſion he made many reflections on the intrepidity of Alexander, which by no means pleaſed me; but I avoided entering into any diſpute about the matter, that I might not diſcredit him in the eyes of his pupil. Being afterwards at table, the company did not fail, agreeable to the French cuſtom, of making the young gentleman talk pretty fluently on various ſubjects. The vivacity natural to his age, and the expectation of certain applauſe, made him throw a number of ſilly remarks; among which, however, now and then a lucky hit made up for the reſt. At length the hiſtory of the phyſician was brought on the carpet, which he related very plainly and gracefully. After the uſual tribute of applauſe expected by the mother, and expected by the ſon, the company began to make their obſervations on what had been related. The majority blamed the temerity of Alexander; while ſome few, after the example of the preceptor, admired his fortitude and courage: from all which I gathered, that not one perſon at table knew in what conſiſted the beauty of that paſſage. For my part, ſaid I, it appears to me, that if there was the leaſt courage or fortitude in that action of Alexander, it was only a piece of extravagance. On this every one agreed with me that it was indeed extravagant. I was going to reply, and grow a little warm, when a female friend, who ſat next me, and had not before opened her mouth,

mouth, whiſpered me aſide, Hold your tongue, Rouſſeau, they will not underſtand you. I looked at her, was reproved, and remained ſilent.

After dinner, conceiving, from ſeveral ſymptoms, that the young ſtudent comprehended nothing of the hiſtory he had been relating, I took him by the hand, and taking a turn with him in the park, where I could converſe with him freely, I found that he admired the boaſted courage of Alexander more than any of the company: but can you gueſs in what he thought that courage conſiſted? merely in that of ſwallowing, at one draught, a diſagreeable potion, without heſitation or mark of diſguſt. The poor boy, whom they had obliged to take phyſic not a fortnight before, and who ſwallowed it with infinite reluctance, had ſtill the taſte of it in his mouth. As to the conſequences, death, and the effects of poiſon, he conceived nothing more of them than as of diſagreeable ſenſations, and analogous to a draught of ſena. It muſt be confeſſed, that the fortitude of the hero had made a great impreſſion on his young mind, and that he had reſolved, the very next medicine he ſhould be required to take, to rival Alexander. Without entering into ſuch explanations as I ſaw were above his capacity, I endeavoured to confirm him in his laudable diſpoſitions, and returned, ſmiling, within myſelf, at the great ſagacity of thoſe parents who pretend to teach hiſtory to their children.

It is eaſy for us to teach them to repeat the words *kings*, *emperors*, *wars*, *conqueſts*, *revolutions*, *laws*; but when we come to annex preciſe ideas to theſe terms, we ſhall ſtand in need of

of ſuch a converſation as we held with Robert the gardener, in order to make ourſelves underſtood.

I foreſee that ſome of my readers, diſſatisfied with my having ſo readily conſented to be ſilent, will be deſirous to know what I myſelf find ſo great in the action of Alexander. Indeed, reader, you are to be pitied if you muſt be told. In what other light can you poſſibly view it, than that Alexander put a confidence in virtue? that he truſted in it, at the hazard of his life? that his great ſoul was formed for ſuch a confidence? What a noble confeſſion of faith was his taking off that medicine! Never did mortal make one more ſublime: No. If we have any modern Alexander, let him ſhew himſelf by diſplaying the like inſtances of true heroiſm.

As no ſcience conſiſts in the knowleege of words, ſo there is no ſtudy proper for children. As they have no certain ideas, ſo they have no real memory; for I do not call that ſo which is retentive only of mere ſenſations. What ſignifies imprinting on their minds a catalogue of ſigns which to them repreſent nothing? Is it to be feared, that, in acquiring the knowledge of things, they will not acquire alſo that of ſigns? Why then ſhall we put them to the unneceſſary trouble of learning them twice? And yet what dangerous prejudices do we not begin to inſtil, by impoſing on them, as a ſcience, a heap of words, which to them are without meaning! In the very firſt unintelligible ſentence with which a child ſits down ſatisfied, in the very firſt thing he takes upon truſt, or learns from others, without being himſelf convinced of its utility, he loſes

ſes part of his underſtanding; and he may figure long in the eyes of fools before he will be able to repair ſo conſiderable a loſs*.

No; if nature has given to the texture of the brain in children that pliability which renders it proper to receive all impreſſions, it is not with a view that we ſhould imprint thereon the names of kings, dates, technical terms, or any of thoſe words or phraſes with which we burden their infant memories, though unintelligible to them, and uſeleſs to every one elſe; but rather that we may give them all ſuch ideas as are adapted to their capacity, and may be uſeful; all ſuch as relate to their preſent happineſs, and tend to enlighten their underſtandings concerning their future welfare: theſe ſhould be made to ſink deep into their minds, being early traced in indelible characters, as ſerving to influence their conduct in life in a manner agreeable to their being and faculties.

That kind of memory which is poſſeſſed by

* The ſcholarſhip of moſt of the learned reſembles greatly that of children. Great erudition is not ſo much the reſult of a multitude of ideas as of a multitude of images. Names, dates, places, and all ſingle objects, or thoſe unaccompanied by ideas, are retained only by the remembrance of ſigns; and it is ſeldom they are recollected, without our recollecting at the ſame time the form of the page whereon we have ſeen them printed, or the figure under which they firſt appeared. Such was in a great degree the ſcience of the laſt age. That of the preſent is different. Men of ſcience now neither ſtudy nor make obſervations; they only dream, and very gravely give out the viſionary productions of a few reſtleſs nights, as profound ſyſtems of philoſophy. It may be replied, perhaps, that I am only dreaming too. I will deny it: but then, I ſo far differ from others, that I publiſh my dreams as ſuch; leaving the reader to determine, whether there may not be ſomething uſeful in them to perſons who are awake.

children, may, without ſetting them to ſtudy books, be fully employed. Every thing they ſee, or hear, appears ſtriking, and they commit it to memory. A child keeps in his mind a regiſter of the actions and converſation of thoſe who are about him; every ſcene he is engaged in, is a book, from which he inſenſibly enriches his memory, treaſuring up his ſtore till time ſhall ripen his judgement, and turn it to profit. It is in the choice of theſe ſcenes and objects, in the care of preſenting thoſe conſtantly to his view which he ought to be familiar with, and in hiding from him ſuch as are improper, that conſiſts the true art of cultivating this primary faculty of a child. By ſuch means alſo it is that we ſhould endeavour to form that magazine of knowledge which ſhould ſerve for his education in youth, and to regulate his conduct afterwards. This method, it is true, is not productive of little prodigies of learning, nor doth it tend to enhance the characters of the governeſs or preceptor; but it is the way to form robuſt and judicious men, perſons ſound in body and mind, who, without being admired while children, know how to make themſelves reſpected when grown up.

Emilius ſhall never be ſet to learn any thing by heart, not even fables, not even the fables of Fontaine, ſimple and beautiful as they are; for the words of a fable are no more the fable itſelf, than thoſe of a hiſtory are the hiſtory. How is it poſſible men can be ſo blind as to call fables the moral lectures for children, without reflecting that the apologue, in amuſing, only deceives them; and that, ſeduced by the charms of falſehood,

hood, the truth couched underneath it eſcapes their notice? Yet ſo it is; and the means which are thus taken to render inſtruction agreeable prevents their profiting by it. Fables may inſtruct grown perſons, but the naked truth ſhould ever be preſented to children: for if we once ſpread over it a veil, they will not take the trouble to draw it aſide in order to look at it.

Children univerſally read the fables of Fontaine, and yet there is not one who underſtands them. It would be ſtill worſe, however, if they did underſtand them; for the moral is ſo complicated and diſproportionate to their capacities, that it would rather induce them to vice than virtue. Here, again, you will ſay, I am at my paradoxes: be it ſo; let us ſee whether what I affirm be not true.

I advance, that a child does not comprehend the fables which he gets by rote; becauſe, whatever pains we take to render them ſimple, the inſtruction we would deduce from them is attended with other ideas above his capacity; and becauſe that even the poetic turn given them, in order to make them the more eaſily remembered, makes them, at the ſame time, the leſs eaſily comprehended; ſo that they are rendered entertaining at the expenſe of perſpicuity. Not to mention many of theſe fables that are totally unintelligible and uſeleſs to children, and which nevertheleſs are indiſcreetly taught them becauſe they are found mixed with the reſt, we ſhall confine ourſelves to thoſe which the author appears to have written expreſly for children.

In the whole collection of Fontaine's fables,

I know of but five or ſix that are eminently diſtinguiſhed for puerile ſimplicity: of theſe I ſhall, by way of an example, take the firſt; the moral of which is the moſt adapted to children, being that which they underſtand beſt, and learn with the greateſt pleaſure; it is that alſo which the author has, for this reaſon, placed at the beginning of his book. On the ſuppoſition that the object of this fable be intelligible to children, and capable of affording them inſtruction and amuſement, it is doubtleſs his maſter-piece; I will take the freedom therefore to give it a ſhort examination.

Le Corbeau at le Renard.
The Raven and the Fox.

Maitre Corbeau, ſur un arbre perche,
Maſter Raven, on a tree perched,

Maitre! What is the ſignification of the word *Maſter*, in itſelf? what is the uſe of it before a proper name? and what is the particular meaning of it on this occaſion?

We muſt next tell the child what is a raven. But what is, *ſur un arbre perche?* We do not ſay, *on a tree perched*, but, *perched on a tree.* We muſt therefore talk to him of the tranſpoſition of words, by poetical licence, and inſtruct him in the difference between verſe and proſe.

Tenoit dans ſon bec un fromage.
Held in his beak a cheeſe.

What kind of a cheeſe? Was it a Swiſs or a Dutch cheeſe? If a child has never ſeen ravens, what can you get by talking to him about them?

and

and if he has ſeen them, how will he conceive they could hold whole cheeſes in their beaks? Let our deſcriptions be ever agreeable to nature.

Maitre Renard, par l' odeur alléché,
Maſter Fox, by the ſmell allured,

Maſter again! but this may be thought a good title for a fox, who may be ſuppoſed to have taken up his degrees in the arts of his profeſſion. We muſt, however, deſcribe the nature of the fox, and diſtinguſh between his natural character and that which is given him in fable. *Alléché* is an obſolete word, and uſed only in verſe: a child, being informed of this, will naturally aſk, why we talk otherwiſe in verſe than in proſe? What anſwer will you make to ſuch a queſtion? Again, *Allured by the ſmell of a cheeſe!* This cheeſe held by a raven perched on a tree, muſt ſurely have a ſtrong ſmell to be ſcented by a fox luking in a thicket or earthed in a burrow. Is this the method you would take to exerciſe the genius of your pupil; to teach him to ſuffer himſelf not to be impoſed on, and to diſcern truth from falſehood in the relations of others?

Lui tint à peu-près ce langage:
Held with him nearly this diſcourſe:

Ce langage! Do foxes talk, then? and do they ſpeak the ſame language as ravens? Take care, ſagacious preceptor; conſider well before you reply to theſe queſtions of your pupil. It is of more conſequence, perhaps, than you imagine.

Eh! bon jour, Monſieur le Corbeau!
Ha! good morrow, Mr Raven!

Monſieur! So, *Mr* is a title which the child hears turned into ridicule before he knows it is a mark of reſpect. Again, thoſe who may read this paſſage, *Monſieur* du *Corbeau*, will have enough to do before they explain a child the meaning of the particle *du*.

Que vous etes charmant! que vous me ſemblez beau!

How charming you are! how beautiful you ſeem to me!

Wretchedly expletive and redundant! A child, hearing the ſame thing repeated in different words, will hence learn a looſe and inaccurate method of ſpeaking. If you ſay this redundancy is a piece of art in the writer, and agreeable to the deſign of the fox, who would ſeem to multiply his praiſes by making uſe of different terms; this excuſe is ſufficient with me, but is a very bad one to be given to my pupil.

Sans mentir, ſi votre ramage

Without lying, if your ſinging

Without lying! So, then it is uſual to lie ſometimes: But what would your pupil think, if you were to tell him the fox ſays this only becauſe he is actually telling the raven a lie?

Repondoit à votre plumage,

Be anſwerable to your feathers,

Repondoit! What can the word mean? Endeavour to teach a child to compare two qualities ſo different as the plumage and the ſinging of a bird; and ſee how well he will underſtand you.

Vous ſeriez le phenix des hôtes de ces bois.

You are a phœnix among the lords of theſe woods.

A phœ-

A phœnix! what is a phœnix? Behold us already entering upon the fictions of the ancient mythology. *The lords of the woods!* How figurative! The flatterer raiſes his language, and gives it more dignity, in order to render it the more ſeductive. How is a child to underſtand this fineſſe? Does he know, is it poſſible that he ſhould know, the difference between an elevated and a mean ſtyle?

A ces mots, le Corbeau ne ſe ſent pas de joie:
At theſe words the raven is out of his wits with delight;

A child muſt have already experienced very lively and ſtrong paſſions, to be able to comprehend this proverbial mode of expreſſion.

Et pour montrer ſa belle voix,
And, to diſplay his fine ſinging,

It muſt not be forgotten, that, in order to underſtand this verſe and the whole fable, a child ought to be previouſly made acquainted with the fine ſinging of a raven.

Il ouvre un large bec, laiſſe tomber ſa proie.
He opens his large beak, and lets fall his prey.

Il ouvre, &c. This verſe is admirable; the ſound and the ſenſe go incomparably well together. Methinks I ſee his wide beak open, and hear the cheeſe rattle down through the boughs: but this kind of beauty is loſt on children.

Le Renard s'en ſaiſit; et dit, Mon bon Monſieur,
The fox ſnapt it up; and then ſaid, My good Sir,

Good

Good Sir! See already goodneſs made ſynonymous to folly: is it not indeed mere loſs of time thus to inſtruct children?

Apprenez que tout flateur
Learn that every flatterer

A general maxim! children know nothing of general maxims.

Vit aux depens de celui qui l'ecoute.
Lives at the coſt of thoſe who liſten to him.

No child of ten years of age can underſtand the meaning of this line.

Cette leçon vaut bien un fromage, ſans doute.
This leſſon is worth a cheeſe, without doubt.

This line is intelligible, and the thought is good. There are, nevertheleſs, but few children who are capable of comparing a moral leſſon to a cheeſe; and fewer who would not prefer the cheeſe to the leſſon. They muſt be taught, therefore, to look upon this as a piece of raillery. What a deal of ſubtilty is here required of children!

Le corbeau, honteux et confus,
The raven, aſhamed and confuſed,

Another pleonaſm; but this is inexcuſable:

Jura, mais un peu tard, qu'on ne l'y prendroit plus.
Swore, though ſomewhat too late, he would never be ſo deceived again.

Swore! Where is the preceptor weak enough

nough to explain to a child the nature of an oath?

You may think, perhaps, I have been here too circumſtantial: I have been much leſs ſo, however, than would have been neceſſary to analyſe all the complex ideas of that fable, and to reſolve them into the ſimple and elementary ones of which they are compoſed. But who thinks ſuch analyſis neceſſary to make ourſelves underſtood? We are none of us philoſophers enough to put ourſelves in the place of children. But to proceed to the moral of the fable:

I would aſk, if there are any children of ſix years of age, whom it would be proper to teach, that mankind flatter and deceive each other through motives of ſelf-intereſt? One might teach them, indeed, that there are ſatyriſts who laugh at little boys, and privately ridicule their childiſh vanity: but the cheeſe ſpoils all; and they learn leſs to prevent its falling from their own mouths, than how to make it fall from the mouths of others. This is another paradox, and not the leaſt important.

Trace the progreſs of children in learning fables, and you will find, that, when they are in a capacity to make any application of them, they almoſt always do it in a manner contrary to the intention of the fabuliſt; and that, inſtead of remarking the error or fault you are deſirous of guarding them againſt, they fall in love with the vice of the party expoſed. In reading the fable above cited, for inſtance, children laugh at and deſpiſe the ſilly raven; but they are fond of the fox. In the next fable of the ſame collection, you think alſo to ſet them an

ex-

example of the graſhopper: you are miſtaken; they prefer that of the ant. None are fond of humiliation; all chuſe to act the ſhining part: it is the choice of ſelf-love, it is in every reſpect natural. But what a ſhocking leſſon is this fable for children? A covetous child would be the moſt deteſtable of all monſters, when ſenſible of what was aſked of it, and what it refuſed. The ant in the fable does more than this; he not only refuſes to aſſiſt the ſuppliant in diſtreſs, but aggravates that refuſal with raillery and reproach.

In all fables where a lion is introduced, as it is generally the moſt ſhining character, a child never fails to take upon himſelf the part of the lion; and when he preſides at any diſtribution, he generally profits by his model, and ſweeps all to his own ſhare. But when the gnat ſtings the lion to the quick, it is another affair: the child is then no longer the lion, but the gnat; and learns thence in what manner he may ſome time or other kill thoſe with the prick of a pin, whom he durſt not attack openly.

In the fable of the lean wolf and the fat dog, inſtead of deducing from it the leſſon of moderation deſigned, he is encouraged to licentiouſneſs. I ſhall never forget the circumſtance of once ſeeing a little girl, quite diſtreſſed by being teazed with this fable, in order to make her docile and tractable. It was ſome time before the cauſe of her tears came to be known; which, however, was at length diſcovered: the poor child was heartily tired of her chain; ſhe felt her neck galled, and was very ſorry ſhe was not in the condition of the wolf.

Thus

Thus the moral of the firſt fable, is to a child a leſſon of the moſt ſervile flattery; that of the ſecond, a leſſon of inhumanity; that of the third, of injuſtice; that of the fourth, of ſatire; and that of the fifth, of independence. This laſt leſſon is ſuperfluous to my pupil, and not more expedient for yours: for when the precepts you inſtil are contradictory to each other, what good can you expect from them? But, perhaps, this defect in the moral of fables, which makes me object to them, may furniſh a reaſon for your preſerving their uſe. In the world, there is one kind of morality in diſcourſe, and another in actions; both which never agree together. The firſt is to be found in the catechiſm, where we ſhall leave it: the other we meet with in Fontaine; in his fables, as to what regards children; and in his tales, as to what relates to their *mammas*. The ſame author ſuffices for both.

But I am willing to compromiſe this matter with La Fontaine. I promiſe you, for my own part, my dear author, to read and admire your fables, becauſe I am not afraid of being miſtaken in their deſign. But as for my pupil, you muſt excuſe me, if I do not ſuffer him to read a line in your book, till you have convinced me that it is proper for him to get words by rote, of which he does not underſtand one fourth part; that the meaning which he may annex to ſome, cannot be falſe; and that, inſtead of profiting by the example of the dupe, he may not form himſelf on that of the knave.

In thus relieving children from the various obligations injudiciouſly impoſed on them, I free them

them from their greateſt ſource of uneaſineſs, that of poring over their books.

Reading is a vexation to children, and yet it is the only occupation they are uſually employed in. Emilius will hardly know what a book is at twelve years of age: but you will ſay, he ought ſurely to learn to read, at leaſt. Yes, he ſhall learn to read when reading will be of any uſe to him; till then, it is good for nothing but to diſguſt and fatigue him.

If nothing is to be required of children merely out of obedience, it follows that they will learn nothing, whether of uſe or amuſement, unleſs they perceive ſome preſent advantage in it; for what other motive ſhould induce them? The art of ſpeaking to perſons who are abſent, of underſtanding them in turn, of communicating to thoſe who are at a great diſtance our ſentiments, our inclinations, and deſires; this is an art the utility of which may be made known to the ſimpleſt underſtanding. Whence comes it, then, that an art ſo uſeful and agreeable ſhould prove ſo tormenting to children? The reaſon is plain; the conſtraint they lie under of cultivating it againſt their inclinations, and the miſapplication of it to uſes they cannot comprehend. It cannot be expected a child ſhould be very curious to perfect thoſe means by which he is tormented: find out the way of making them uſeful to his pleaſures, and he will then apply to them of his own accord.

It has been made a matter of great importance, to find out the beſt method of teaching children to read; to this end cards and other implements have been invented, ſo various and numerous, that

that they made the nurſery reſemble the work-ſhop of a printer. Mr Locke would have a child taught to read by means of letters carved on dice. Is not this an excellent invention! A more certain method than any of theſe, and that which is nevertheleſs always neglected, is to excite in children a deſire to learn. Give a child this deſire, and do as you will with your cards and dice; any method will then be ſufficient.

The grand motive, indeed the only one that is certain and effectual, is preſent intereſt. Emilius ſometimes receives written invitations from his father, mother, and other friends, to dinner, to go on a party of pleaſure, or to ſee ſome public entertainment. Theſe invitations are ſhort, plain, preciſe, and well written. When received, it is neceſſary for him to find ſomebody to read them to him: ſuch a perſon is not always at hand, or complaiſant enough to comply with his requeſt. Thus the opportunity is loſt: the billet, indeed, is read to him afterwards, but then it is too late to obey the ſummons. How ardently muſt he wiſh on ſuch an occaſion to be able to read himſelf! He receives others, equally ſhort and intereſting: he ſets immediately about deciphering them; ſometimes receiving aſſiſtance, and at others denied it. By dint of ſtudy, he at length hammers out that he is invited to go to-morrow to eat cream; but where or with whom he cannot diſcover. How many efforts will he not make to find out the reſt! Emilius will learn to read by ſuch means as theſe, without ſtanding in need of horn-books, cards, or dice. I might here ſpeak

of teaching him to write; but I am aſhamed of deſcending to ſuch trifling objects in a treatiſe on education.

I will only add a word or two on this head: it is an important maxim, that children in general acquire ſpeedily and certainly what they are not importuned to learn. I am almoſt certain, that Emilius will know perfectly well how to read and write before he is ten years old, becauſe I give myſelf very little trouble whether he learn it or not before he is fifteen; but I had much rather he ſhould never learn to read at all, than to acquire that knowledge at the expence of every thing that would render it uſeful to him; and of what uſe would be his knowing how to read, if ſo diſguſted with learning it, that he ſhould hate to look in a book ever afterwards? *Id in primis cavere oportebit, ne ſtudia, qui amare nondum poterit, oderit, et amaritudinem ſemel perceptam etiam ultra rudes annos reformidet* *.

The more I inſiſt on my inactive method, the ſtronger I perceive the objections that may be made againſt it. If your pupil, it may be ſaid, learns nothing of you, he will learn it of others. If you do not prevent his falling into error, by teaching him the truth, he will give into falſehood; the prepoſſeſſions you are fearful of giving him, will flow in upon him from every ſide: hence his underſtanding will be viciated before it is formed; or his intellects, blunted by long inaction, will be loſt in the corporeal functions of mere animal nature. The want of being

* Quintil. lib. i. cap. 1.

being accuſtomed to think in his infancy, will deprive him of the faculty of thinking as long as he lives.

I believe I could obviate theſe objections; but why muſt I be ever anſwering objections? if they are anſwered by the method of education I preſcribe, it is a good one; if not, it is defective and wrong. I leave it, therefore, to anſwer for itſelf.

If, proceeding on the plan I have begun to delineate, you follow rules directly contrary to thoſe which are generally received; if, inſtead of exciting the attention of your pupil to diſtant objects, and perpetually bewildering him with different places, climates, and ages; if, inſtead of perplexing his mind in excurſions to the extremities of the earth, and the diſtant regions of the ſkies, you keep him conſtantly attentive to what paſſes in and about himſelf; you will then find him capable of perception, memory, and reaſon: this is the order of nature. In proportion as the ſenſitive becomes an active being, he acquires a diſcernment proportional to his corporeal abilities: when he poſſeſſes more of the latter, alſo, than are neceſſary for his preſervation, it is with that redundancy, and not before, that he diſplays thoſe ſpeculative faculties which are adapted to the employment of ſuch abilities to other purpoſes. Are you deſirous, therefore, to cultivate the underſtanding of your pupil? cultivate thoſe abilities on which it depends. Keep him in conſtant exerciſe of body; bring him up robuſt and healthy, in order to make him reaſonable and wiſe: let him work, let him run about, let him make a noiſe, in a word,

let him be always active and in motion. Make him once a man in point of health and vigour, and he will ſoon become a man in underſtanding.

It is true, you will check and diſguſt him, even with this method, if you proceed by way of directing him in every thing he is to do; by telling him when he is to come and go, to run about, or ſtand ſtill, to do this thing or the other. If your head be always to direct his hands, his own will become uſeleſs. But remember, reader, the agreement already made between us; if you are a mere pedant, it is not worth your while to go through this treatiſe.

It is a wretched miſtake, to think the exerciſe of the body prejudicial to the operations of the mind; as if the action of both were incompatible, or that the one could not always direct the other.

There are two kinds of men who live in a continual exerciſe of body, and think juſt as little of the cultivation of their minds: theſe are peaſants and ſavages. The former, nevertheleſs, are clowniſh, brutal, and dull; while the latter are as remarkable for their ſtrong ſenſe, as for their ſubtlety. Generally ſpeaking, nothing is ſo ſtupid as a clown, nor ſo cunning as a ſavage. Whence comes this difference? Doubtleſs it ariſes hence: the former being accuſtomed to do what he is bid, or what his father uſed to do before him, plods on in the ſame beaten track; and being little better than a mere machine, conſtantly employed in the ſame manner, habit and obedience ſtand with him in the place of reaſon.

As to the ſavage, the caſe is widely different; being attached to no one place, having no ſettled

tled taſk, obedient to none, and reſtrained by no other law than his own will, he is obliged to reaſon upon every action of his life; he makes not a motion, nor takes a ſtep, without having previouſly conſidered the conſequences. Thus the more his body is exerciſed, the more is his mind enlightened; his mental and corporeal faculties advance together and reciprocally improve each other.

Which would moſt reſemble the ſavage, and which the peaſant, Emilius, or the more poliſhed pupil of a faſhionable preceptor? The latter, ſubjected in every thing to dictatorial authority, does nothing but what he is commanded: he dares not eat when he is hungry, ſmile when he is pleaſed, or weep when he is ſad; he dares not preſent one hand inſtead of the other, nor take a ſtep otherwiſe than he is directed; in a little time he will ſcarce venture to breathe, except agreeably to ſome ſtated rules. To what purpoſe do you require him to think, when you always take the trouble to think for him? Being always aſſured of your forecaſt, what buſineſs hath he for any of his own? ſeeing that you charge yourſelf with the care of his preſervation and welfare, he finds himſelf freed from that ſolicitude; his judgment repoſes ſafely on yours; all that you do not expreſsly forbid him to do, he does without reflection, well knowing that he runs no riſk.

What buſineſs hath he to learn to foretell rain? he knows that you are careful to preſerve him from the ſhower. Why ſhould he take care to regulate the length of his excurſions? he is not afraid that you will let him loſe his dinner. If

you forbid not his eating, he eats; when you bid him give over, he hath done: he obeys not his own appetite, but yours. You may enervate his body by inaction, and make it as delicate as you pleaſe, but you will not render his underſtanding the more acute and refined. On the contrary, you will only proceed to diſcredit the uſe of reaſon, by making him uſe the little he has on ſubjects which appear frivolous and uſeleſs. By never ſeeing what it is good for, he begins at length to conclude it is good for nothing. The worſt that can happen to him, from his miſtaken reaſoning, is to be ſet right; and this happens ſo often, that he ſoon learns to think light of it.

Notwithſtanding this, you conceive him to have wit, and he has juſt enough to prattle with the women in the manner I have already ſpoken of; but what would he do in a ſituation where ſuch idle chatter would ſtand him in no ſtead? You would find him, in any caſe wherein the exertion of his perſonal abilities ſhould be required, an hundred times more ſtupid and incapable than the child of the moſt clowniſh peaſant.

As to my pupil, or rather that of nature, being early reduced to ſerve and provide as much as poſſible for himſelf, he is not accuſtomed to apply continually to others, much leſs to make a diſplay of his great learning. On the other hand, however, he judges for himſelf, reaſons and provides for every thing relative to his own intereſt. He does not ſport idly and capriciouſly about, but employs himſelf in action; he knows nothing of what other children of his age

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may do in the world, but he knows very well what is proper for him. As he is perpetually in motion, he is of courſe obliged to note many things, and obſerve a variety of effects; he acquires an early and extenſive experience, taking his leſſons from nature, not from men; and improves himſelf by ſo much the more, as he ſees no profeſſed deſign going forward for his improvement. Thus both his body and mind are at once kept in exerciſe. Acting always from his own thoughts, and not from the dictates of others, he conſtantly unites the operations both of his corporeal and mental faculties; and as he increaſes in ſtature and ſtrength, becomes ſenſible and judicious. This is the way to acquire thoſe qualities which are generally eſteemed incompatible, and which have been united, nevertheleſs, in almoſt all great men; ſtrength of body with that of the mind, the underſtanding of a philoſopher with the nerves and agility of a wreſtler.

I am teaching the young preceptor a very difficult art; that of inſtructing without precepts, and of doing every thing in the way of education by doing nothing. This art, I muſt confeſs, is not adapted to your age or views; it is not calculated to make an immediate diſplay of your talents, nor to recommend you to the generality of fathers: it is the only one, however, in which you can ſucceed in the education of your pupil; you will never accompliſh your deſign of forming ſenſible men, unleſs you begin by making playful children. This was the method of education among the Spartans: inſtead of tying down their ſons to their books, they were

were taught to look out ſharp for their dinner. Were they the greater blockheads for this when they grew up? The force and keenneſs of their repartees are, on the contrary, well known. Formed for univerſal conqueſt, they triumphed over their enemies in every kind of warfare; the talkative Athenians being equally afraid both of their tongues and their ſwords.

In the uſual method of education, the maſter commands, and thence imagines that he governs his pupil; whereas it is in fact the latter who governs him. A child makes uſe of what you require of him, to obtain what he pleaſes of you; and knows very well how to make you beſtow on him eight hours of complaiſance for one of his diligence. You are every moment obliged to enter into treaty with him; the covenants of which, as you propoſe them in your manner, and he executes them in his, always turn out to the gratification of his humours; particularly when you are ſo indiſcreet as to make ſuch offers to him as he is ſure to obtain, whether he perform the conditions of the agreement or not. A child generally penetrates farther into the deſigns of the maſter, than the maſter into the inclinations of a child: this indeed is but natural; for the whole ſagacity of a child, which, if leſt to himſelf, had been employed in the ſecurity of his perſon, is now employed in preſerving his native liberty from the chains of his tyrant; whereas the maſter, having no ſuch preſſing occaſion to penetrate the inclinations of the child, finds it ſometimes expedient to indulge his idleneſs or vanity.

Take a contrary method with your pupil; let him

him always be his own maſter in appearance, and do you take care to be ſo in reality. There is no ſubjection ſo complete as that which preſerves the appearance of liberty; it is by theſe means even the will itſelf is led captive. The poor child, who knows nothing, who is capable of nothing, is ſurely ſufficiently at your mercy. Do not you diſpoſe, with regard to him, of every thing about him? Are not you capable of affecting him juſt as you pleaſe? His employment, his ſports, his pleaſures, his pains, are they not all in your power, without his knowing it? Aſſuredly, he ought not to be compelled to do any thing contrary to his inclinations; but then he ought not to be inclined to do any thing contrary to yours: he ought not to take a ſtep which you had not foreſeen, nor open his lips to ſpeak without your knowing what he is about to ſay.

When you have once brought him under ſuch regulations, you may indulge him freely in all thoſe corporeal exerciſes which his age requires, without running the hazard of blunting his intellects. You will then ſee, that inſtead of employing all his ſubtile arts to ſhake off a burthenſome and diſagreeable tyranny, he will be buſied only in making the beſt uſe of every thing about him. It it in this caſe, you will have reaſon to be ſurpriſed at the ſubtilty of his invention, and the ingenuity with which he makes every thing that is in his power contribute to his gratification, without being obliged to prepoſſeſſion or opinion.

In thus leaving him at liberty to follow his own will, you will not augment his caprice.

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By being accuſtomed only to do that which is proper for his ſtate and condition, he will ſoon do nothing but what he ought; and, though he ſhould be in continual motion of body, yet, while he is employed only in the purſuit of his preſent and apparent intereſt, you will find his reaſoning faculties diſplay themſelves better, and in a manner more peculiar to himſelf, than if he was engaged in ſtudies of pure ſpeculation.

Hence, ſeeing you never intent on croſſing him, having no reaſon to be ſuſpicious or hide any thing for you, he would never deceive you; but would ſhow himſelf ſuch as he is, without fear or reſtraint. Thus you might ſtudy his character and diſpoſition at leiſure, and diſpoſe him to receive ſuch leſſons as you might intend to give him, without his being ſenſible of receiving any at your hands. Add to this, that he would be no more tempted to keep a jealous eye over your actions, nor would take any ſecret pleaſure in detecting you in a fault. This inconvenience, which is by theſe means prevented, is very great. One of the moſt material objects of a child's concern, as I obſerved before, is to diſcover the foibles of thoſe who ſuperintend his education. This propenſity leads to vice indeed, but does not ariſe from it; its ſource is in the child's deſire of getting rid of an authority which is burthenſome to it. Oppreſſed and galled by the yoke impoſed on them, children try all means to ſhake it off; to which end the faults they can find in their maſters contribute not a little. At the ſame time, alſo, they acquire the ill-natured habit of obſerving people only by their faults, and take a pleaſure in diſcovering them. This

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is another cauſe of vice in the human heart, which in that of Emilius I take care to remove: having no intereſt in diſcovering my faults, he will not pry into my actions, and will be under little temptation to find faults in others.

All theſe directions ſeem difficult to put in practice, becauſe they are not duly conſidered; but in reality they are not ſo difficult as may be imagined. I have a right to ſuppoſe you poſſeſſed of the neceſſary qualifications for the employment you have undertaken. It is to be preſumed you are not unacquainted with the natural progreſs of the human heart; that you are capacitated for the ſtudy of mankind in general, and your pupil in particular; and that you know beforehand to which ſide he will incline on any intereſting occaſion. Now, what more can be required than to poſſeſs the implements of education, and underſtand the uſe of them?

Do you raiſe an objection on the capricious humours of the child? in this you are wrong. Caprice in children is never the work of nature, but the effect of wrong diſcipline: it ariſes from their being accuſtomed either to command or obey; neither of which, as I have already ſaid an hundred times, ought to be the caſe. Your pupil, therefore, will have no more capricious humours than you may have inſtilled; and it is but juſt that you ſhould take the trouble you have brought on yourſelf. But you will aſk, How is this fault to be repaired? I anſwer, Only by a different conduct, and much patience.

I once undertook, for ſome weeks, the care of a little boy; accuſtomed not only to do as he pleaſed, but to make every body in the family

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do ſo too; and thus, of courſe, very capricious and humourſome. The very firſt night, in order to put my complacency to trial, he inſiſted on my getting out of bed at midnight. I was in a ſound ſleep, when he leaped out of his own bed, put on his night-gown, and waked me. I roſe accordingly, and lighted a candle: when I found this was all my young gentleman wanted; for in a quarter of an hour he grew ſleepy, and went to his bed again, ſatisfied with his experiment. Two nights after, he repeated it with the ſame ſucceſs, and without the leaſt appearance of reluctance on my ſide. But as he embraced me in going to bed again, I ſaid to him very gravely, *This goes very well hitherto, my good friend; but do not repeat this trick any more.* This, I ſuppoſe, excited his curioſity, and gave him an inclination to try if I ſhould dare to diſobey him. Accordingly, the next night, he waked about the ſame hour, and called me up as before. I now, therefore, aſked him what he wanted? he told me, he could not ſleep. *So much the worſe*, ſaid I, and lay ſtill. He aſked me, then to light the candle. *To what purpoſe?* ſaid I, ſtill remaining quiet in my bed. Being a little embarraſſed at my anſwering him ſo laconically, he groped about the room for the tinder-box; which having found, I could not help ſmiling at hearing him hit his fingers with the flint and ſteel. After ſeveral fruitleſs attempts to ſtrike a light, he brought the implements to me; when, telling him I had no occaſion for them, I turned myſelf to the other ſide. Upon this he began to ſtalk about the chamber, ſinging, hallooing, and making as much noiſe as he could

could; running every now and then againſt the chairs and tables, which I found he took care not to hit too hard, though he did not fail every time to make loud complaints, in hopes of making me uneaſy. All this, however, did not anſwer his end; and I ſaw that, reckoning upon my giving him good words, or falling into a paſſion with him, he was quite diſconcerted at my indifference.

Being reſolved, however, to overcome my patience by dint of obſtinacy, he continued his noiſe till I grew quite angry; but reflecting that I ſhould ſpoil all by expreſſing myſelf in anger, I took another method. I got up without ſpeaking a word, and went to the table for the tinderbox; which not finding there, I aſked him for it. This he readily gave me, chuckling for joy at the thoughts of having gained his point. Having ſtruck a light, I took my little gentleman by the hand, and led him quietly into a neighbouring cloſet, whoſe window-ſhutters were well faſtened, and where there was nothing he could break: there, locking the door upon him, I left him in the dark, and returned to bed without uttering a ſyllable. You need not aſk if this proceeding did not occaſion at firſt a terrible outcry: it was what I expected, and I did not trouble myſelf about it. After ſome time, however, the noiſe ceaſed; on which I liſtened to his motions, and finding him lay himſelf down to ſleep, I went to ſleep alſo. On opening the cloſet-door, by break of day next morning, I found my little rebel ſtretched out upon a couch, and in a profound ſleep; of

which, after ſo much fatigue, he had doubtleſs ſome need.

But the affair did not end here. His mother ſoon learned that her dear child had ſpent two thirds of the night out of bed. This was thought enough to kill him; and indeed he was looked upon as good as dead already. The cunning rogue, thinking a fine opportunity afforded him of being revenged, pretended accordingly to be very ill, not foreſeeing what would be the conſequence, and that he would get nothing by his pretence. A phyſician was immediately ſent for. Unhappily for the mother, the doctor was a wag, who to divert himſelf with her apprehenſions of danger, only increaſed them. At the ſame time, however, he whiſpered me in the ear to let him alone. I promiſe you, ſaid he, I will cure the child, for one while, of his whim of falling ſick. In ſhort, the doctor adviſed his being confined to his chamber, ſubjected him to a regimen, and turned him over to the apothecary. I could not help being grieved to ſee the poor mother thus deceived, and made the dupe of every one about her except myſelf, whom for that very reaſon ſhe hated.

After reproaching me in pretty ſevere terms, ſhe proceeded to tell me, that her child was of a delicate conſtitution; that being the only heir of the family, his life was very valuable; that it muſt be preſerved at all events; and that ſhe poſitively would not have him thwarted.

In the latter article I was of her opinion; but ſhe did not know the difference between not thwarting him, and paying him implicit obedience in every thing. I ſaw it was neceſſary to talk

talk to the mother in the ſame ſtrain as I had done to the child. Madam, ſaid I very coldly, I know not probably in what manner an heir is to be educated, nor do I deſire to learn; ſo that you will do well to take your own meaſures on that head. Having occaſion for me, however, ſome time longer, the father reconciled matters; the mother wrote to haſten the preceptor's return; and the child, finding he could get nothing by diſturbing my ſleep or by falling ſick, took it in his head to ſleep ſoundly himſelf, and be in good health.

It is not to be imagined to how many ſimilar caprices this little tyrant had ſubjected his poor preceptor; for he was educated conſtantly under the eye of his mother, who would not permit the heir of the family to be diſobeyed in any thing. At whatever hour he had a mind to go abroad, his governor muſt be ready to go with, or rather to follow him; and he always took particular care to make choice of thoſe times when he ſaw him moſt employed.

He wanted to exerciſe the ſame command over me, and to avenge himſelf in the day-time for the repoſe he was obliged to let me enjoy in the night. I entered at firſt very readily into all his deſigns, and ſet out with an endeavour to convince him of the pleaſure I ſhould take in obliging him. But having done this, I took different meaſures to cure him of his caprice.

It was neceſſary to confirm him firſt in the nature of his error, which was not difficult. Being ſenſible that children think only about the preſent, it was eaſy for me to take the advantage I had over him in point of foreſight. I

provided for him one day an amuſement within doors, of which I knew he was extremely fond; when, juſt as he was in the height of his enjoyment, I propoſed to take a walk with him. This was rejected; in conſequence of which, I inſiſted on it ſome time to no purpoſe. He would hear nothing of it; but grew ſo impatient, that I was obliged to give up the point; of which ſubmiſſion he took, as I intended he ſhould, very particular and aſſuming notice.

The next day it was my turn. He begun to be tired of home, which I had contrived to make as irkſome as I could, without his perceiving it; while I, on the contrary, ſeemed to be very earneſtly employed. There needed no ſuch preparation, however, to fix his determination, and induce him to call me in a great hurry from what I was about, to walk abroad with him. I refuſed to go, and he perſiſted in requiring it. No, ſaid I; by your following your own inclination yeſterday, you taught me to follow mine to-day: I will not go. Well then, returned he pertly, I will go alone. As you pleaſe, ſaid I; and turned about to my work.

He then begun to dreſs himſelf; ſeeming a little uneaſy that I did not follow his example. Being ready to go, he came to take his leave; when I readily returned his ſalutation; but, being deſirous to alarm me, he proceeded to tell me whither he intended to go: to hear him talk, you would have thought he deſigned to have made a voyage round the world. Without appearing concerned, however, about the matter, I wiſhed him a good journey, and applied myſelf again to my affairs. His embarraſſment

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now increaſed; but, reſolved to put a good face on the matter, and being juſt ready to go out of the door of his apartment, he called his footboy and bade him follow him. The footboy, however, being previouſly warned, anſwered he had not time, and that, being employed in my buſineſs, he ought to mind me rather than him. At this refuſal, the child knew no longer what to think or do. He could not conceive it poſſible that he ſhould be permitted to go out alone; he, who imagined himſelf ſo vaſtly important in the eyes of every one, and thought both heaven and earth intereſted in his preſervation. He began, nevertheleſs, to be ſenſible of his own weakneſs; and ſaw beforehand the riſks he was to run in going abroad among people he was unacquainted with: his obſtinacy, however, ſtill ſupported him in his reſolution; and he went down ſtairs; but very ſlowly, and with apparent reluctance. At length he ventured into the ſtreet, comforting himſelf a little in the conſideration, that whatever harm came to him, I muſt be anſwerable for it.

All this being what I expected, every thing was prepared for it; and, as it was a kind of public experiment, I had obtained the father's conſent to it. He had not gone far from the door before he heard the neighbours, on each ſide the way, taking notice and talking of him. A mighty pretty gentleman! cries one; where can he be going alone? he will certainly loſe himſelf; I have a good mind to call him in. No, no, take care of that, ſays another; do not you ſee it is a little knave whom his father has turned out of doors becauſe he is good for nothing?

I would have nothing to do with him; let him go where he pleaſes. Well then, replied the other, God go with him, but I ſhould be ſorry he ſhould come to any harm. A little farther he paſſed by ſome unlucky boys about his own age, who mocked and laughed at him. The farther he went, the more he found himſelf embarraſſed. Being alone and without protection, he ſaw himſelf turned into ridicule by every body he met; and found, to his great ſupriſe, that his fine cloaths did not entitle him to reſpect.

In the mean time, one of my friends, who was a ſtranger to him, and planted on purpoſe to keep an eye over him, followed him up and down, and at a proper time accoſted him, and conducted him home. This ſcene, which reſembled that of Monſieur Porceaugnac in the play, required a man of wit and underſtanding; and indeed it was admirably well performed. Without making the child timid, by frightening him too much, he made him ſo ſenſible of the imprudence of his deſign, that he returned to me, in about half an hour, ſo ſubmiſſive and confuſed, that he hardly durſt look me in the face.

To complete the misfortune of this expedition, alſo, his father, who was juſt going out as he entered, met him on the ſtairs. He was now obliged to give an account where he had been, and the reaſon why I did not accompany him *. This

* In ſuch a caſe as this, one runs no riſk in requiring a child to tell truth; becauſe he knows he cannot poſſibly diſguiſe it; and that if he ſhould tell a lie, he would be immediately detected.

This was ſuch a mortifying ſtroke, that the poor child could almoſt have wiſhed himſelf buried an hundred feet deep. Without taking the trouble of giving him a long reprimand, his father ſaid to him, more coolly than I expected, Well, Sir, whenever you are inclined to go out alone again, you may; but, as I do not chuſe to have any vagabonds in my houſe, I deſire you will take care not to come in again.

For my part, I received him without reproach or raillery, but a little gravely and reſerved; and leſt he ſhould ſuſpect what had happened to be only a trick, I would not take him out all day. The next morning, I obſerved with pleaſure, that he paſſed with an air of triumph along with me, in the face of thoſe very people that had ridiculed him the day before when he was alone. Hence it is eaſy to conceive he never threatened to go abroad again without me.

By theſe means, and others of a like kind, I ſo far prevailed, during the ſhort time I ſtaid with him, as to make him do every thing I required of him, without any injunctions, prohibitions, lectures, or uſeleſs exhortations. So that whenever I ſpoke, he was ſatisfied; while my ſilence was what he was moſt afraid of, for then he underſtood ſomething was wrong. I always left the circumſtances themſelves, however, to ſet him right. — But to return.

The continual exerciſe of a child left to the ſole direction of nature, not only ſtrengthens the body without weakening or blunting the mind; but, on the contrary, it tends to form the only ſpecies of reaſon the age of infancy is capable of, as well as that which is the moſt neceſſary to perſons

perſons of any age whatever. It teaches us to become acquainted with the proper exertion of our forces, the relation our bodies bear to thoſe which ſurround us, the uſe of thoſe natural implements which are within our reach, and which are adapted to our organs. Can any ſtupidity equal that of a child, brought up always in the nurſery, and under the wing of his mother; who, ignorant of the nature of weight and reſiſtance, attempts to pull down a tree, or to lift a rock? The firſt time in my life that I went out of Geneva, I remember, I attempted to keep up with a horſe on full gallop, and took up ſtones to throw over an hill two leagues diſtant: laughed at by all the children in the village, I appeared to them, doubtleſs, as a real ideot. At eighteen years of age, we learn, from the lectures of experimental philoſophy, the nature of a lever; in the mean time, there is not a boy in the country, of twelve, who does not know the uſe of a lever better than the firſt mechanic in the academy of ſciences. The leſſons which ſchool-boys learn of each other, in playing about their bounds, are an hundred times more uſeful to them than all thoſe which the maſter teaches in the ſchool.

Obſerve a cat, the firſt time ſhe comes into a room: ſhe looks about and peeps into every hole and corner, nor ſits a moment ſtill till ſhe has carefully examined every piece of furniture therein. In the ſame manner doth a child examine into every thing, when he begins to walk about, and enters, if I may ſo ſay, the apartment of the world. All the difference is, that the ſight, which is common both to the child and the cat,

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is in the firſt aſſiſted by the feeling of the hands, and in the latter by that exquiſite ſenſe of ſmelling which nature has beſtowed on it. It is the right or wrong cultivation of this inquiſitive diſpoſition that makes children either ſtupid or expert, ſprightly or dull, ſenſible or fooliſh.

Our primary impulſes, therefore, urging us to compare our forces with thoſe of the objects about us, and to diſcover the ſenſible qualities of ſuch objects as far as they relate to ourſelves; the firſt ſtudy of mankind is a ſort of experimental philoſophy relative to ſelf-preſervation; from the proſecution of which we divert the attention of children by the premature introduction of matters of ſpeculation. During the time that their ſupple and delicate organs are adapted to the making experiments on bodies; while their ſenſes are as yet exempt from illuſions; this is the interval in which we ſhould exerciſe both the one and the other in their proper functions; this is the time to teach children the perceptible relations of things. As every thing that enters the human underſtanding is introduced by the ſenſes, the firſt kind of ratiocination in man is a kind of ſenſitive reaſoning; and this ſerves as the baſis of his intellectual reaſon. Our firſt inſtructors in philoſophy are our feet, hands, and eyes. In ſubſtituting books in their place, we do not learn to reaſon, but to content ourſelves with the reaſoning of others: we learn indeed to believe a great deal, but to know nothing.

To exerciſe any art, we muſt begin by procuring the neceſſary implements; and to employ thoſe implements to any good purpoſe, they ſhould be made ſufficiently ſolid for their intend-

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ed uſe. To learn to think, therefore, we ſhould exerciſe our limbs, and our organs, which are the inſtruments of our intelligence; and in order to make the beſt uſe of thoſe inſtruments, it is neceſſary that the body furniſhing them ſhould be robuſt and hearty. Thus, ſo far is a ſound underſtanding from being independent on the body, that it is owing to a good conſtitution that the operations of the mind are effected with facility and certainty.

Should I engage to ſhow in what manner the long vacancy of childhood might beſt be employed, I ſhould deſcend to particulars which might appear ridiculouſly circumſtantial. Fine leſſons, indeed! it may be ſaid, that, according to my own confeſſion, are confined to ſuch things only as need not be taught. It may be aſked me, Why ſo much time ſhould be thrown away about inſtructions that will be ſuggeſted of themſelves without trouble or aſſiduity? What child, twelve years old, will not know all that you intend to teach yours, and what his maſters have taught him beſides?

My good friends, you are miſtaken: I inſtruct my pupil in an art, the ſtudy of which is tedious and difficult, and of which yours certainly knows nothing. This is the art of being ignorant; for the ſcience of any perſon whatever, who does not pretend to more than he poſſeſſes, may be reduced into a very ſmall compaſs. You inſtruct your child early in knowledge; I employ mine in perfecting the inſtruments to acquire it. It is ſaid, that the Venetians having one day made a pompous diſplay of their boaſted treaſure of St Mark to a Spaniſh ambaſſador, the latter paid them

them no other compliment than by looking under the tables, and saying with an affected surprise, *Qui non c' è la radice.* I never see a preceptor making a like display of his pupil's qualifications, but I am tempted to say the same thing.

All those who have made their reflections on the manner of living among the ancients, attribute to their gymnastic exercises that strength of body and mind which so eminently distinguish them from the moderns. The manner in which Montagne hath dwelt upon this sentiment, serves to show how extremely sensible he was of its truth. In speaking of the education of a child, he says, in order to increase the vigour of the mind, we ought to increase the strength of the muscles; by using a child to labour, we inure him to pain; we must prepare him by exercise to bear the accidents of dislocation, the colic, and other evils attendant on the human frame. The sagacious Locke, the good Rollin, the learned Fleury, and the pedantic de Crousaz, however they differ from each other in every thing else, all agree in recommending bodily exercise to children. This is the most judicious of all their precepts; and yet is that which is, and always will be, the most neglected. I have already spoken sufficiently of its importance; and, as it is impossible to give better reasons, or lay down better rules for the practice, than are to be found in Locke, I shall content myself with referring to him, after having taken the liberty to add some observations of my own.

The limbs of a growing child should have room enough in its cloaths; he should have nothing

thing to reſtrain his motions or growth, nothing too tight, no ligatures about him. The dreſs of the French, too cloſe and confined even for men, is particularly prejudicial to children. The blood and juices, retarded in their circulation, ſtagnate and grow foul; the diſorders ariſing from which, increaſed by an inactive and ſedentary life, bring on the ſcurvy; a diſtemper, common to us, and hardly known among the ancients, whom their dreſs and manner of living preſerved from it. The tight huſſar-dreſs, which mothers ſometimes affect for their ſons, inſtead of remedying, augments the inconvenience; as, in order to prevent a few ligatures in different parts of the body, it confines and compreſſes the whole. The beſt way is to let them go as long as poſſible in looſe veſts; and, afterwards, to let their cloaths be made large enough; and not to ſtand upon their diſplaying a fine ſhape, by means which will only ſerve to deſtroy it. Their defects, both in body and mind, ariſe almoſt all from the ſame cauſe; we are deſirous of making men of them before their time.

With reſpect to the colour of their cloaths, children are generally fond of the gay and lively; they ſuit them better alſo, and I ſee no reaſon why we ſhould not in ſuch caſes conſult their natural inclinations; but, as ſoon as ever they begin to prefer one ſtuff to another becauſe it is rich and coſtly, their hearts are infected by luxury and the caprices of opinion. This kind of taſte, aſſuredly, they have not acquired of themſelves. It is not eaſy to ſay what an influence the choice of cloaths, and the motives for that choice, have on education. We not only ſee

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fond mothers ridiculouſly promiſing their children fine cloaths, as a recompenſe for their good behaviour; but often hear fooliſh preceptors threatening their pupils with coarſer and plainer cloaths, as a puniſhment for their faults. "If "you do not mind your book better, if you do "not keep your cloaths cleaner, you ſhall go "dreſſed like a ploughboy." Is not this as much as to tell them, that the merit and importance of a man lie in his garb, and that theirs conſiſt entirely in their dreſs. Is it to be wondered at, that youth profit by ſuch wiſe leſſons? that they hold nothing in eſteem but dreſs, and judge of merit by external appearances?

If it were my buſineſs to correct a child that had been ſpoiled in this manner, I would take care that his richeſt cloaths ſhould be the moſt inconvenient; that he ſhould be hardly able to ſtir his arms and move about in them: I would take care that his liberty and gaiety ſhould in every ſhape be ſacrificed to his magnificence: if he at any time joined in the play of other children more plainly dreſſed, they ſhould give over and diſappear immediately: in a word, I would ſo tire him out with his finery, and render him ſo great a ſlave to his laced cloaths, that he ſhould ſoon think them the plague of his life, and prefer his being ſhut up in a dungeon rather than put them on. If a child be not ſubjected to our own idle notions and prejudices, his chief deſire is to be eaſy and at liberty. The moſt ſimple, the moſt convenient dreſs, is always the moſt prized.

There is an habit of body proper for perſons who take much exerciſe, and another more ſuit-

table to the ſedentary and inactive. The latter, preſerving an equal and uniform circulation of the fluids, ſhould be defended againſt the alterations of the air and the weather: the former, paſſing from labour to reſt, and from heat to cold, ought, on the contrary, to inure themſelves to ſuch alterations. Hence it follows, that ſtudious and indolent people ought always to go warmly clothed, in order to preſerve the body in the ſame temperature, as near as poſſible, at all times and ſeaſons. Thoſe, on the other hand, who come and go, in the wind, the ſun, and the rain, who take a good deal of exerciſe, and paſs moſt of their time in the open air, ought to be clothed lightly, in order to habituate themſelves to all the viciſſitudes in the temperature of the air, without injury. I ſhould adviſe both one and the other not to change their dreſs with the ſeaſons; this alſo ſhall be the conſtant practice with Emilius: not that I mean he ſhall wear a winter's habit in ſummer, like ſedentary perſons; but that he ſhall wear a ſummer's dreſs in winter, like the labouring-people. The latter, we are told, was the cuſtom of Sir Iſaac Newton, who lived to be fourſcore.

I would have little or no covering on the head in any ſeaſon. The ancient Egyptians went always bareheaded; the Perſians wore tiaras, and ſtill wear thick turbans: the uſe of which, according to Chardin, the air of the country renders neceſſary. I have elſewhere remarked a diſtinction that Herodotus made in the field of battle between the ſculls of the Perſians and thoſe of the Egyptians. As it is of conſequence, therefore, that the bones of the ſcull ſhould become

come hard and compact, the better to defend the brain, not only againſt contuſions and fractures, but alſo from cold and defluxions; you ſhould accuſtom your children to go, both winter and ſummer, by day and by night, bareheaded. If, for the ſake of neatneſs, and to keep their hair in order, you would put on them a cap at night, let it be made of thin light net-work. I know that the generality of mothers, more influenced by the obſervation of Chardin than with my reaſons, will conceit the air of Perſia univerſal; but, for my own part, I have not made choice of an European pupil to make him an Aſiatic.

Children, in general, are too warmly clothed; particularly in their earlieſt infancy. It is much better to inure them to bear cold than heat. The former will never hurt them, if they are expoſed to it early; but the looſe and porous texture of their ſkin, leaving too great an opening for perſpiration, ſubjects them to an inevitable waſte of ſtrength and ſpirits from extreme heat. Hence it is obſervable, that more people die in Auguſt than in any month in the year. Beſides this, it is evident, on a compariſon between the northern people and the inhabitants of the ſouthern climates, that mankind grow more robuſt by ſupporting exceſſive cold than they do by bearing exceſſive heat. As your child grows up, however, and his fibres gather ſtrength, you ſhould inure him by degrees to bear the rays of the ſun; which you may thus eaſily effect, till he ſhould run no riſk even from the ſcorching heat of the torrid zone.

It is remarkable, that Mr Locke, amidſt a

number of manly and ſenſible rules which he lays down for the government of children, falls into ſuch flagrant contradictions as we ſhould not expect in ſo exact a reaſoner. The ſame perſon, who adviſes that children ſhould in the heat of ſummer go into the cold bath, is againſt their drinking cold liquors when they are warm, or ſitting in moiſt places on the cold ground *. But, as he would have their ſhoes always take water, can it be ſuppoſed they will take it leſs when the child is hot? And may not we draw the ſame inferences concerning the whole body from the feet, as he does, about the feet and body, from the hands and face? If he is deſirous his pupil's body ſhould be all face, wherefore ſhould not I deſire mine to be all feet?

To prevent children drinking when they are hot, he adviſes us to uſe them to eat a piece of bread before they drink. This is ſurely very ſtrange! When a child is famiſhed with thirſt, we muſt give him ſomething to eat! I ſhould rather, when he is ſtarving with hunger, give him ſomething to drink. I ſhall never be perſuaded, that our natural appetites are diſorderly, and that we may not gratify them without endangering our health and lives. If this were really the caſe, the human race might have been deſtroyed before they had learned the precautions neceſſary to ſelf-preſervation.

Whenever Emilius is thirſty, I would have him

* Is it to be ſuppoſed the little peaſants take ſuch particular care to ſit or lie down only in dry places? and did we ever hear of the damp of the earth doing them any harm? To hear the phyſicians talk on this ſubject, one would think the ſavages muſt be all laid up with the rheumatiſm.

him drink, and that only pure water, without any mixture or preparation, even were he all over in a ſweat, and though it were in the depth of winter. The only precaution I would recommend, is to make a diſtinction between the qualities of the water. If it be river-water, give it him as it comes directly from the river; if ſpring-water, it ought to ſtand ſome time in the air before it be drank. In warm ſeaſons the rivers are warm; but it is not ſo with the ſprings, which are not in contact with the external air. Such water ought not to be drank, therefore, till it acquire the temperature of the atmoſphere. In the winter, on the contrary, ſpring-water is leſs dangerous than that of the ſtream. But it is neither natural nor frequent to be in a ſweat in winter, particularly in the open air; becauſe the cold air compreſſing the ſkin, repels the moiſture, and prevents the pores from opening ſufficiently for a very free perſpiration. Now, it is not my intention that Emilius ſhall exerciſe himſelf in the winter by the ſide of a good fire, but in the open fields amidſt the froſt and ſnow. Let him heat himſelf as much as he will in making and throwing ſnow-balls, he may ſafely venture to drink whenever he is dry; eſpecially if he returns to the ſame diverſion afterwards. Should he ever be put into a ſweat, alſo, by any other violent exerciſe, and be at the ſame time thirſty, he may even then drink cold water without danger. Take care only to lead him gently at ſome little diſtance to fetch it, and he will be cooled ſufficiently to drink. But be ſure to take theſe precautions without his perceiving it. I had much rather he ſhould be ſometimes ſick,

than to be perpetually attentive to the preſervation of his health.

Children require a good deal of ſleep, becauſe they uſe much exerciſe. The one ſerves to counterbalance the other; ſo that hence we ſee they have need of both. The proper time for reſt is pointed out by nature, and is in the night. It is a certain obſervation, that our ſleep is more tranquil and agreeable when the ſun is below the horizon; the air, heated by its direct rays, never involving our ſenſes in ſo profound a calm. Hence the moſt ſalutary habit is certainly to riſe and lie down with the ſun; and hence it follows, that, in theſe climates, men, as well as all other animals, require in general more ſleep in winter than in ſummer. But the ſtate of civil life is not ſufficiently ſimple and exempted from accident, for us to think of uſing a child to ſuch an uniformity, ſo far as to render it neceſſary. He ought, without doubt, to be ſubject to ſome regulations in this reſpect; but our chief rule ſhould be to enable him to depart from them when occaſion requires, without endangering his health. Do not enervate your pupil, therefore, by indulging him in ſoft and uninterrupted ſlumbers. Let him enjoy his reſt at firſt without reſtraint, as the law of nature dictates; but forget not, that in ſociety it is frequently neceſſary to be above that law: he ſhould be uſed, therefore, as he grows up, to ſit up late, and riſe early; to be waked unexpectedly out of his ſleep, and to ſit up occaſionally all night without inconvenience. By beginning with him early, and proceeding gently and gradually, we may thus form his conſtitution to

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bear thoſe things which might deſtroy it if already formed.

It is of great conſequence to accuſtom ourſelves betimes to indifferent lodgings; it is the way to prevent our ever meeting with bad beds: and in general an hardy way of living, when we are once uſed to it, increaſes the number of agreeable ſenſations; whereas a ſoft and luxurious life prepares us for an infinity of diſpleaſing ones. Perſons tenderly brought up cannot go to ſleep but on a couch of down; thoſe who are accuſtomed to lie on the floor, can ſleep any where. The man who falls aſleep as ſoon as he lies down, feels not the hardneſs of his bed.

A ſoft bed, in which we lie buried in feathers or elder-down, diſſolves, as it were, the whole body. The back and reins are overheated; whence come the ſtone and gravel, painful diſeaſes, and infallibly an enervated conſtitution, which nouriſhes all others.

The beſt bed is that which procures the beſt ſleep. Emilius and I are preparing for ours all day. We ſtand in no need therefore of Perſian ſlaves to make our beds; as, in turning up the earth, we are in effect ſhaking up our mattreſſes. I know by experience, that, when a child is in health, we may make it go to ſleep or keep it awake almoſt as we pleaſe. When children are put to bed, and the nurſe is tired with their prattle, nothing is more common than for the latter to bid them go to ſleep: but this is much the ſame thing as if ſhe ſhould bid them be well, when they are ſick. The right way to make children go to ſleep, is to weary them, and not ourſelves. Keep talking to them, therefore,

fore, inceſſantly; ſo that they muſt be forced to keep ſilence themſelves, and they will ſoon fall aſleep. Long diſcourſes, thus, you ſee, are good for ſomething; and preaching a ſermon is as good as rocking the cradle: but, though you make uſe of this narcotic in the night, I would have you be careful how you employ it in the day-time.

I ſhall ſometimes awaken Emilius, leſs for fear he ſhould get a habit of ſleeping too long, than to accuſtom him to every thing, even to the circumſtance of being awakened ſuddenly. Let me add to this, that I ſhould be very ill qualified for the office I have undertaken, if I did not know how to make him wake of himſelf, and riſe, in a manner, at my pleaſure, without ſaying a ſingle word to him about the matter.

If, for inſtance, I thought he did not ſleep enough, I ſhould let him foreſee over night that he would have but a diſagreeable morning; in conſequence of which, he would think all the time clear gain that he ſpent of it in ſleep. On the contrary, did he ſleep too much, I would provide for him ſome amuſement he was fond of againſt he ſhould wake. Am I deſirous of teaching him to wake at a certain hour? I ſay to him, "To-morrow morning at ſix o'clock I "propoſe the diverſion of angling, or I ſhall "take a walk to ſuch a place; will you be of "the party?" He conſents, and deſires me to wake him; this I either promiſe or not, as occaſion may require. If he wakes too late, he finds that I am gone out. Hence he ſees his misfortune if he does not ſoon learn to wake another time without being called.

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When it ſo happens, which however is very rare, that an indolent child gives itſelf up to ſloth and inactivity, it ſhould not be indulged in ſuch a vitious propenſity, but ſtimulated by ſome powerful motives to action. It will be readily conceived that I do not mean we ſhould proceed to uſe abſolute force, but only to employ the ſtimulus of ſome appetite that may anſwer that end: by which means alſo, if we follow the direction of nature, we ſhall effect two purpoſes at once.

For my own part, I conceive there is hardly any thing in the world, for which we might not, with a little addreſs, excite an inclination, or even an ardent deſire, in children, without vanity, jealouſy, or emulation. Their vivacity and turn for imitation may ſuffice, and particucularly their native cheerfulneſs, by which we may always have a ſure hold of them, although no preceptor has ever known how to make uſe of it. In their ſports and diverſions, while they think they are only at play, they will ſuffer without complaint, and even ſometimes laugh at injuries they would not otherwiſe have borne without ſhedding tears. Faſtings, ſtripes, burnings, and fatigues of every kind, are the ordinary amuſements of the young ſavages; which is a proof, that even pain itſelf will admit of a ſeaſoning to give a reliſh to its bitterneſs. Every maſter, however, has not the art of making this diſh palatable, nor every diſciple the appetite to taſte it without grimace. But I ſhall again, if I do not take care, bewilder myſelf with exceptions.

What is not long to be borne, however, is our ſub-

ſubjection to pain, to the evils incident to our ſpecies, to accidents, dangers, and death: the more we familiariſe ourſelves to theſe ideas, the more we diminiſh that importunate ſenſibility which adds to the evil the impatience of enduring it. The more we revolve in our minds the various ſufferings we have reaſon to expect, the more we deprive them of their ſting; the more we ſtrengthen the ſoul, and render it invulnerable. The body thus becomes the armour that repels all the ſhafts which might otherwiſe wound to the quick. Even the approaches of death, as they are not death itſelf, are hardly felt. A man, ſo armed, cannot be ſaid to die: he is living till the very inſtant he is dead: he knows no interval. One might ſay of ſuch a man, as Montagne ſaid of an emperor of Morocco, that no one ever lived ſo long in death. Reſolution and fortitude are, like the other virtues, to be learned in infancy: but it is not by teaching children thoſe terms, that they are taught to be bold and reſolute. They muſt be made to taſte and experience them, without which they will never know what they mean.

But, *a-propos*, as we are now on the ſubject of dying, how are we to act with our pupil in regard to the ſmall-pox? Shall we have him inoculated while ye is young, or ſhall we let him take it in the natural way? The former is moſt agreeable to our practice, as it is calculated to ſave our lives at an age when life is moſt valuable, at the riſk of loſing them at that age when life is of leaſt account; if indeed we may be ſaid to run any riſk at all in inoculation ſkilfully performed. The latter, however, is more conform-

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able to our general principles, of leaving every thing to nature, in caſes where ſhe chuſes to operate alone, and which ſhe gives up as ſoon as man interferes. Man, in a ſtate of nature, is always prepared for inoculation; let us leave the operation therefore to nature; ſhe knows her own time better than we. It muſt not hence be concluded, however, that I condemn inoculation: for the very ſame reaſon that I exempt my pupil, you ought perhaps to take a contrary method with yours. Your method of education prepares him for not eſcaping the ſmall-pox, whenever it attacks him: if you wait, therefore, till he takes it by accident, it is very probable he may die of it. I obſerve that the practice of inoculation meets with oppoſition, in various countries, in the exact proportion as it is neceſſary for them to adopt it: the reaſon of it, alſo, however contradictory to common ſenſe, is eaſy to be perceived.

I ſhall hardly think it worth while to determine this point, therefore, with regard to Emilius: he ſhall either be inoculated or not, as time, place, and circumſtance, require: it is to him almoſt a matter of mere indifference. If we inoculate him, it is true, we ſhall have the advantage of knowing his diſtemper, and providing for it beforehand; which to be ſure is ſomething: but then, if, on the other hand, he takes it naturally, we ſhall have no occaſion for the phyſician; which is a great deal more.

In a particular or excluſive method of education, calculated only to diſtinguiſh perſons ſo educated from the vulgar, thoſe inſtructions are always preferred which are the moſt coſtly; while

while the more common, which by the way are the moſt uſeful, are neglected. Thus young gentlemen, politely educated, go through the exerciſes of the riding-ſchool, becauſe this courſe is expenſive; but hardly any of them learn to ſwim, becauſe it coſts nothing, and a common peaſant may know how to ſwim as well as the firſt lord in the land. And yet we ſee the traveller, without having learned to ride the great horſe, mounts his nag, and manages him very well; but whoever falls into the water and cannot ſwim, muſt be drowned: and nobody can ſwim without having learned it. Beſides, I know not that any one is obliged on pain of death to ride on horſeback; whereas no one is certain of avoiding the danger to which we are ſo often expoſed from the water. Emilius ſhall learn to move in the water, as well as on land. Why ſhould he not be taught to live in all elements? Could I teach him to fly in the air, I would make him an eagle; and, if to bear the fire, a ſalamander.

We are generally afraid children ſhould drown themſelves in learning to ſwim; but whether they drown themſelves in learning, or are drowned when they have grown up for having never learned, it is the fault of thoſe who have the care of them when young. It is vanity only that inſpires temerity; we are never fool-hardy, or run ourſelves in danger, when alone; nor would Emilius be ſo, though the eyes of the whole univerſe were upon him.

As exerciſe does not depend on running into danger, he might learn, in the canal of his father's park, to croſs the Helleſpont; but it is neceſ-

neceſſary to familiariſe him in ſome degree to danger itſelf; that he may not be over-ſolicitous about it. This is a neceſſary part of that apprenticeſhip I ſhall ſpeak of hereafter. Being attentive alſo to adapt the riſk he may run to his ſtrength, and by ſharing the danger with him myſelf, I ſhall have nothing to fear from his imprudence, while I regulate my care of his preſervation by what I owe to my own.

A child hath neither the ſtrength nor the judgment of a man; but he is capable of ſeeing and hearing as well, or at leaſt nearly ſo. His palate alſo is as ſenſible, though leſs delicate: and he diſtinguiſhes odours as well, though not with the ſame nicety. Of all our faculties, the ſenſes are perfected the firſt: theſe therefore are the firſt we ſhould cultivate: they are, nevertheleſs, the only ones that are uſually forgotten, or the moſt neglected.

To exerciſe the ſenſes, is not merely to make uſe of them; it is to learn rightly to judge by them; to learn, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, to perceive; for we know how to touch, to ſee, to hear, only as we have learned.

Some exerciſes are purely natural and mechanical, and ſerve to make the body ſtrong and robuſt, without taking the leaſt hold on the judgment; ſuch are thoſe of ſwimming, running, leaping, whipping a top, throwing ſtones, *&c.* All theſe are very well: but have we only arms and legs? have we not alſo eyes and ears? and are not theſe organs neceſſary to the expert uſe of the former? Do not only exerciſe your ſtrength, therefore, but all the ſenſes that direct it; make the beſt poſſible uſe of each, and let

the impreſſions of one confirm thoſe of another. Meaſure, reckon, weigh, and compare. Exert not your force till you have eſtimated the reſiſtance you are going to encounter; always ſo contriving it, that an eſtimation of the effect may precede the uſe of the means. Let your pupil ſee his intereſt in never making ſuperfluous or inſufficient efforts. By thus uſing him to foreſee the effect of all his motions, and to correct his errors by experience, is it not clear, that the more extenſive and various his exerciſe, the more judicious he will grow?

Let us ſuppoſe him going to move an heavy body by means of a lever; if he takes one too long, he will find it unmanageable with his ſhort arms; if too ſhort, he will not have ſufficient force: experience will teach him to chuſe one of the proper length. This kind of knowledge is not above his age. Does the matter in queſtion regard the lifting a burden? If he would take up one as heavy as he could carry, and not make a fruitleſs endeavour to raiſe one he could not lift, is he not under a neceſſity of eſtimating the weight by his eye? When he knows how to make a compariſon between maſſes of the ſame matter, but of different bulk, let him learn to do the ſame between maſſes of the ſame bulk, but of different matter; he will then experience the difference of their ſpecific gravity. I remember a young man, very well educated, who could not be perſuaded, till he had made the experiment, that a tub, full of cleft wood, was lighter than the ſame tub filled with water.

We are not all equally expert in the uſe of our ſenſes. There is one, to wit, the touch, whoſe

whoſe action is never ſuſpended while we are awake, and which is extended over the whole ſurface of the body, as a continual guard to give us notice of every thing that may be offenſive. It is by means of the continual and involuntary exerciſe of this ſenſe, that we acquire our earlieſt experience, which makes it the leſs needful for us to give it any particular cultivation. We find, however, that blind people have a much ſtronger and more delicate ſenſe of feeling than we; becauſe, having no information from the ſight, they are obliged to deduce the ſame concluſions from the former ſenſe only, which we are furniſhed with by the latter. Why then ſhould we not learn to walk, like them, in the dark, to know bodies by the touch, to judge of the objects that ſurround us; to do, in ſhort, by night without candles, all they do by day without eyes? While the ſun is above the horiſon, we have the advantage of them, and lead them about; but in the dark they are our guides, and take the lead in turn. We are blind as they during one half of our lives, with this difference, that thoſe who are really blind can at all times find their way about, whereas we that have eyes hardly dare to ſtir a foot in the night. Will it be ſaid, We may call for candles and torches? We may ſo: but this is to be always recurring to machines; who can aſſure us they will always be at hand? For my own part, I had much rather Emilius ſhould have eyes at his fingers ends than in the chandler's ſhop.

Should you be ſhut up in a houſe in the middle of the night, clap your hands, and you may perceive by the eccho whether the room you

are in be large or ſmall; whether you are in the middle or in one corner. Within ſix inches of the wall, the very air will give a different ſenſation to your face to what it does in the middle of the room. Turn yourſelf round ſucceſſively, facing every part of the room, and if there be a door open, you will perceive it by a gentle draught of air. Are you in a veſſel upon the water? you may know by the manner in which the air ſtrikes againſt your face, not only which way you are going, but whether you go faſt or ſlow. Theſe obſervations, and a thouſand others of a ſimilar kind, can be made only in the night; for, whatever attention we beſtow on them in the day-time, we are always ſo far either aſſiſted or prevented by the ſight, that the experiment eſcapes us. We here make uſe neither of hands nor ſticks; indeed, we might acquire a conſiderable ſhare of ocular information by the touch, even without touching any of the objects in queſtion.

I would have a variety of diverſions for the night. This piece of advice is of much greater importance than it may at firſt appear. The night naturally ſtrikes a terror into men as well as brute animals *. Reaſon or knowledge, wiſdom or courage, deliver few perſons from paying this tribute to darkneſs. I have ſeen caſuiſts, free-thinkers, philoſophers, and even ſoldiers, whom nothing could daunt by day, tremble by night, like women, at the ruſtling of the leaves of a tree. This timidity is uſually attributed

* This terror has been very remarkable in ſome great eclipſes of the ſun.

buted to the idle tales told us when young by our nurſes. This, however, is a miſtake: it is founded in nature; the cauſe of it being the ſame as that which makes deaf people miſtruſtful, and the vulgar ſuperſtitious; that is, our ignorance of the things that ſurround us, and of what is paſſing about us †. Being accuſtomed to

 perceive

† A philoſopher, whoſe book I have often quoted, and whoſe extenſive views have more often afforded me inſtruction, aſſigns another cauſe for this fear, as follows.

" When we are prevented, by any particular circumſtance, from forming a true idea of the diſtance of objects, and are enabled to judge of them only by the angle, or rather the image, under which they appear to the eye, we neceſſarily deceive ourſelves as to the magnitude of ſuch objects. Every one knows, that, in the night, it is common to miſtake a ſhrub which is near us for a tree at a diſtance, *et vice verſa*. In the ſame manner, if we know not an object by its form, and therefore cannot by that method judge of its diſtance, we are again of courſe miſtaken: a fly, paſſing ſwiftly before our eyes, at ſome little diſtance, will appear the ſame as a large bird farther off: an horſe, in the middle of a field, placing itſelf in the attitude of a ſheep, will be taken for a large ſheep, till we diſcover it to be an horſe; when it will appear as big as that animal; the firſt judgment we paſſed on it, being inſtantly rectified.

" Whenever we are benighted in ſtrange places, where we cannot judge of diſtances, nor diſcover the form of objects, on account of the obſcurity of the medium, we are every moment in danger of falling into miſtakes concerning thoſe things which preſent themſelves: hence ariſes the terror, that kind of innate fear, which almoſt every body is ſenſible of in a dark night. Here alſo we trace the foundation of thoſe apparitions of gigantic and formidable figures, which ſo many people affirm they have ſeen. They are uſually told indeed, on theſe occaſions, that thoſe figures exiſted only in their imagination; they might, however, really exiſt in their eyes, and it is very poſſible that they actually ſaw what they declare themſelves to have ſeen: for it muſt neceſſarily happen, when we can judge of an object only by the angle it forms in the eye, that ſuch unknown object muſt increaſe in magnitude in proportion as it approaches that organ: ſo that if it at firſt appears to the ſpectator (ignorant of what he ſees, and incapable of judging its diſtance)

perceive objects at a diſtance, and to anticipate their impreſſions, how can I help ſuppoſing, when I no longer ſee any thing of ſuch objects, that there may be a thouſand hurtful things in motion around me, from which I cannot guard myſelf? It is to no purpoſe that I am convinced of my ſecurity in the place where I am; I can never be ſo fully perſuaded, as if I had ocular proof of it: I have, therefore, always a motive for fear in the night, which I ſhould not have in the day-time. I know, it is true, that in general, another body cannot act againſt mine, without

ſtance) to be a few feet high at the diſtance of twenty or thirty paces, it would appear ſeveral fathoms high when at the diſtance only of a few feet; a circumſtance that might very naturally ſtrike terror into the ſpectator, till he ſhould go up cloſe to it, and, by touching it, diſcover what it was: in which caſe this object, which before appeared ſo enormous and gigantic, would be diminiſhed to its natural ſize. But if, through fear, he ſhould not go up to ſuch object and be undeceived, it is certain he could form no other idea of it, than that ariſing from the image which it formed in his eye; and would believe he had really ſeen ſomething terrible both for its ſize and form. Thus the notion of ſpectres is really founded in nature, and thoſe appearances do not depend altogether, as the philoſophers ſuppoſe, on the imagination." Buffon hiſt. nat. tome vi. p. 22. 12mo edit.

I have endeavoured to ſhew in the text, how far theſe appearances do always depend on the imagination, in part; and as to the cauſes ſet forth in the above citation, it is clear that the cuſtom I recommend, of walking about in the dark, will learn us to diſtinguiſh the appearances which the reſemblance of forms and the diverſity of diſtances give to objects in the night. For when there is juſt light enough to enable us to perceive the outlines of objects, as we know there is the greater quantity of air between us and objects at the greater diſtance, thoſe outlines ſhould appear leſs diſtinct than if thoſe objects were nearer. Thus habit, we ſee, is ſufficient to prevent us from falling into the miſtake pointed out by M. Buffon: but whatever explication be preferred, my method is efficacious, and perfectly conformable to experience.

out giving me notice of its approach by ſome noiſe; for this reaſon it is, that in the dark the ear is always liſtening. At the leaſt noiſe that I cannot immediately account for, the intereſt I take in my own preſervation makes me directly ſuppoſe every thing which tends to make me be on my guard, and, of courſe, every thing that tends to increaſe my fears.

Is every thing ſilent around me? I am not the more tranquil on that ſcore; for, after all, it is poſſible for me to be ſurpriſed without noiſe. It is neceſſary for me, therefore, to conceive every thing about me in the ſtate it was before, to conceive them to be as they ought ſtill to exiſt, and that I ſee what I actually do not. Being thus reduced to bring imagination into play, I ſoon loſe the maſtery of it; but the method I take to encourage myſelf ſerves only to alarm me the more. If I hear a noiſe, I am alarmed for fear of robbers; if all is in profound ſilence, the imagination is haunted with ſpectres and phantoms: that vigilance which ſelf-preſervation inſpires, excites only ſuggeſtions of fear. Every thing that tends to give me encouragement depends on my reaſon; whereas inſtinct, more powerful, ſpeaks in a different ſtrain. To what end, therefore, ſhould we reflect that we have no cauſe to fear, when in that caſe we have alſo nothing to do?

The cauſe of the evil being found, it ſufficiently indicates the remedy. Habit, in every thing, deſtroys the effects of imagination: theſe are excited only by the novelty of the object. The imagination is never employed in thoſe which are familiar to us; theſe affect only the

memory; and hence we see the reason of the axiom, *Ab assuetis non fit passio*; for the passions are lighted up only at the fire of the imagination. Never argue, therefore, with those whom you are desirous to cure of the fear of being in the dark; but entice them often into it; and be assured, that all the philosophical arguments in the world will be of less avail than that practice. A bricklayer, or a tyler, is never made giddy by looking down from the roofs of houses; nor do we see those who are accustomed to go about in the obscurity of the night, under any terrors on that score.

Here, then, is another advantage arising from our nocturnal entertainments, to be added to the former: but, in order that such diversions should answer the end proposed, I cannot too much recommend cheerfulness and gaiety. Nothing is more dismal than to be in darkness: never shut up a child, therefore, to remain in a dungeon. On the contrary, let him go laughing into the dark, and come laughing out again, taking care that the notion of the amusement he had just left, and is going again to partake of, may defend him from those fantastic ideas which might otherwise intrude on his imagination.

There is a certain term of life, beyond which we go backward even in advancing. I perceive that I myself have reached that term. I have begun, as it were, a new career. In growing old, I become again a child; and recollect with greater pleasure what I did at ten years of age than at thirty. Forgive me, readers, if I sometimes draw an example from myself; for to write this

this book as it ſhould be, it is neceſſary I ſhould do it with pleaſure.

When I was a boy, I boarded in the country, under the care of a clergyman whoſe name was Lambercier. I had for my companion, at the ſame place, a couſin, whoſe parents being much richer than mine, he was treated like the heir of a family, while I, at a diſtance from my father, was ſlighted like a poor orphan. This great couſin of mine was a remarkable coward, particularly in the night: on which account, I uſed to jeer and laugh at him ſo much, that Mr Lambercier, being wearied with my boaſting, took it into his head to put my courage to the proof. Accordingly, one very dark evening, in the autumn, he gave me the key of the church, and bid me fetch the Bible that he had left in the pulpit; adding ſome reflections on my boaſted magnanimity, that made it impoſſible for me to recede.

I ſet out, therefore, without taking a light; and perhaps if I had taken any, it had been only ſo much the worſe. I went through the churchyard very manfully; for, in the open air, I never was fearful by night. In unlocking the church-door, however, I heard an echoing ſound, that I thought reſembled the human voice, and which began to ſtagger my reſolution. Having opened the door, I went in a little way, but ſoon ſtopped. The profound and ſilent darkneſs that reigned throughout the vaſt ſpace before me, made my hair perfectly ſtand on end; I turned back, therefore, and ran trembling out of the church. In my return, however, meeting with a little dog, which we uſed to call Sultan,

tan, the notice he took of me revived my ſpirits; and, being aſhamed of my fears, I returned back toward the church, endeavouring, though to no purpoſe, to entice Sultan to follow me. Puſhing open the door boldly, I went in; but had hardly taken three ſteps farther, before I was again ſeized with affright, and that ſo powerfully, that my head fairly turned round: for though the pulpit ſtood to the right, and I knew the circumſtance very well, yet, having turned about without perceiving it, I poked about a long time to the left, and bewildered myſelf among the forms: not knowing where I was, or how to find either the door or the pulpit. At length, however, I perceived the door, and made again out of the church, fully determined never more to ſet foot in it, unleſs in the day-time.

Being returned to the houſe, and juſt ready to open the door, I overheard Mr Lambercier laughing very heartily, as I ſuppoſed, at my expence: I therefore ſtopt to liſten, and heard Miſs Lambercier bid a ſervant fetch a lanthorn, while her father roſe up, in order to look after me, attended by my intrepid couſin, on whom I did not doubt would devolve the honour of the expedition. At this inſtant my fears diſappeared; at leaſt I had no other than that of being overtaken before I reached the church: I flew back, and without any heſitation mounted the pulpit, ſnatched up the Bible, jumped down again immediately, and in two or three ſtrides was out of the church. I did not ſtay to lock the door; but making the beſt of my way home, threw down the Bible on the table. I was out of breath,

breath, and frightened enough, you may ſuppoſe, but was ſecretly rejoiced to find I had prevented the aſſiſtance intended me.

It will be aſked me, if I lay down this example as proper to be followed, and as an inſtance of that mirth and cheerfulneſs which I think required in theſe nocturnal amuſements? I anſwer, No. But I bring it as a proof that nothing is ſo proper to encourage thoſe who are fearful of being in the dark, as the circumſtance of hearing company laughing and talking cheerfully in the next room. Inſtead of amuſing myſelf with Emilius alone in theſe caſes, I would get together ſeveral good-humoured children of his age, none of which I would at firſt ſend into the dark alone, but two or three, or more together; nor would I ever venture any one abſolutely alone, without being firſt pretty well aſſured he would not be too much frightened.

I do not conceive any thing more diverting and uſeful than ſuch kind of amuſement, eſpecially if managed with a little addreſs. I would, in a large ſaloon or dark antichamber, make a kind of labyrinth, with ſtools, tables, ſcreens, *&c.* In the moſt inacceſſible part of theſe, I would place eight or ten little boxes, all of a ſort and ſize, one of which only ſhould be filled with ſweatmeats: I would then deſcribe in ſhort and plain terms the place where this box lay; and after making the little candidates caſt lots for precedency, each ſhould go in his turn, till the prize ſhould be found. I would give directions that ſhould appear plain enough to perſons in any degree more attentive and leſs blundering than

than children *; and ſhould increaſe the difficulty of finding the box in proportion to their dexterity. Figure to yourſelf a little Hercules coming in with a box in his hand, elated with the ſuppoſed ſucceſs of his expedition. It is laid down on the table, and opened with a deal of ceremony. Methink I hear hither the peals of laughter and hiſſes of the joyous little company, when, inſtead of the expected ſweetmeats, nothing is found in it but a ſnail-ſhell, a coal, an acorn, a little turnip, or ſome ſuch trifle, carefully wrapt up in moſs or cotton.

At other times, I would hang ſome little toy againſt a wall newly white-waſhed, and ſend them in the dark to fetch it without touching the wall. We ſhould preſently ſee, when they came into the light, whether they had fulfilled the conditions preſcribed; the corners of their hats, the ſkirts of their coats, or their ſleeves, would betray their want of dexterity. Theſe hints, I conceive, will be ſufficient; perhaps ſome will think them more than neceſſary, to give the reader an idea of theſe kind of amuſements. Thoſe who require me to be more particular, ſhould not read me at all.

What advantages would not a man, educated in this manner, have, in the night, over others? His feet accuſtomed to tread firm and ſecure, his hands exerciſed in the touch of ſurrounding objects, are capable of conducting him with eaſe through

* To uſe children to be attentive, never talk to them about any thing in which they are not very ſenſibly intereſted; but, above all, avoid amplification and prolixity. At the ſame time, alſo, beware of being ambiguous or obſcure.

through the thickeſt darkneſs. His imagination, full of the nocturnal amuſements of his youth, is eaſily diverted from terrifying objects. If he hears the fits of unexpected laughter, inſtead of conceiting them to be the effects of ludicrous ſpirits, they recall to mind thoſe of his former companions: if his imagination raiſes up a nocturnal aſſembly, it is not a meeting of witches, but that he formerly attended in the apartment of his preceptor. The night, recalling to his mind nothing but cheerful ideas, will never appear hideous: on the contrary, having nothing to fear, he will delight in it. Is he required to go on a military expedition? he will be ready at any hour, either with his company, or alone. He will be able to go into the camp of Saul, to explore every part of it, without bewildering himſelf; to march forward even to the king's tent, without awakening the guard, and to return unperceived by any one. Are you to carry off the white horſes of Rheſus? apply boldly to him. Among perſons differently educated, you will not eaſily find an Ulyſſes.

I have known people endeavour to cure children of being fearful in the night, by uſing them to frequent ſurpriſes. This method, however, is a very bad one, and productive of a contrary effect to that for which it is calculated; rendering them in fact only the more timid. Neither reaſon nor habit can poſſibly make us perfectly eaſy concerning an object of preſent danger, of which we know neither the kind nor the degree; much leſs can they deprive us of the fear ariſing from thoſe ſurpriſes we may have often experienced.

To ſecure my pupil, however, in the beſt manner I could, from ſuch accidents, I ſhould give him the following advice. "You know, Emilius, that, in this caſe, you have always an undoubted right to ſtand on your own defence; for as the aggreſſor does not give you time to judge whether he intends to injure or only to terrify you, and as he has taken his advantages, you may poſſibly find no ſafety in flight. Seize faſt hold, therefore, boldly, of whatever ſurpriſes you in the night; whether it be man or beaſt, it is no matter. Graſp and ſqueeze him with all your force; if he reſiſts, ſtrike him; be not ſparing of your blows; but whatever he may ſay or do, let him not go, till you know who and what he is. On explanation, you will find probably you had no great cauſe to be afraid: this method of treating jeſters, alſo, will naturally diſguſt them with the ſport."

Although the touch is more conſtantly exerciſed than any other of our ſenſes; the judgement immediately formed from it, is, as I before obſerved, more groſs and imperfect than that which is formed on any other; becauſe perſons who enjoy their eye-ſight, are continually making uſe of that ſenſe inſtead of it; and as the eye reconnoitres a body much more eaſily and ſpeedily than the hand, we almoſt always judge of bodies without employing the latter. On the other hand, however, the judgment of the touch is more certain; and that purely becauſe it is more confined: for this ſenſe not extending itſelf to bodies beyond the reach of our hands, it ſerves to rectify the miſtakes of the others, which, lanching forth to a great di-

diſtance, are exerted on objects barely perceptible; whereas, whatever is perceived by the touch is fully and completely ſo. Add to this, that, joining, when we pleaſe, the force of the muſcles to the action of the nerves, we unite in one ſimultaneous ſenſation, the temperature, magnitude, figure, weight, and ſolidity of the object perceived. Thus the touch being, of all our ſenſes, that which informs us beſt of the impreſſion which other bodies make on ours, it is that for which we have the moſt frequent uſe, and which more immediately ſupplies us with the knowledge neceſſary to our preſervation.

As our ſenſe of feeling, when properly exerciſed, becomes a ſupplement to ſight, why may it not alſo ſupply that of hearing to a certain degree; eſpecially as ſounds are known to excite, in ſonorous bodies, vibrations ſenſible to the touch? Lay your hand upon the body of the violencello, and you will be able, without the aſſiſtance of either eyes or ears, to diſtinguiſh, by the manner in which it vibrates, whether the ſound it gives be grave or acute, whether it ariſe from the treble ſtring or the baſe. Were the ſenſes exerciſed, with attention, in this manner, I doubt not but, in time, we might acquire ſuch a degree of ſenſibility as to be able to diſtinguiſh a whole air by means of the fingers. On this ſuppoſition, it is plain, we might eaſily talk to deaf perſons by muſic: for notes and time being no leſs ſuſceptible of regular combinations than articulate words, they may be made uſe of in the ſame manner as the elements of ſpeech.

There are ſome exerciſes, however, that im-

pair the ſenſe of feeling, and make it dull; others again render it more fine and delicate. The former, uniting a good deal of motion and force to the continual impreſſion of hard bodies, make the ſkin hard and callous, depriving it of its natural ſenſibility: the latter are thoſe which vary the ſame ſenſation, by light and frequent contact, in ſuch a manner that the mind, intent on ſuch impreſſions inceſſantly repeated, acquires a facility of comprehending all their modifications. This difference is very ſenſible in the uſe of muſical inſtruments: the hard and deſtructive touch of the violoncello, the baſs-viol, and even of the violin, in rendering the fingers more flexible, hardens their extremities; whereas the ſlight and ſmooth touch of the harpſichord or ſpinnet, at the ſame time that it makes them pliant and flexible, makes them alſo ſtill more ſenſible. The ſpinnet, therefore, is in this reſpect to be preferred.

It is requiſite that the external ſkin ſhould be ſo far hardened, as to endure the impreſſions and alterations in the air: for this it is that defends all the reſt. After this, however, I would not have the hands applied too long and often to the ſame kind of labour, as by this means the ſkin becomes callous, and loſes that exquiſite degree of ſenſibility which enables us to judge of bodies by ſlightly paſſing the hand over them, and which, according to the different ſpecies of contact, makes us, in the dark, frequently to ſhudder.

Where is the neceſſity for my pupil to have his feet always ſecured by the hide of an ox? Where would be the harm, if his own ſkin

ſhould

ſhould ſerve him inſtead of the ſoles of his ſhoes? It is evident, that the delicacy of the ſkin, in this part of the body, can never be uſeful, tho' it may be ſometimes hurtful. When the citizens of Geneva were alarmed in the night, in the depth of winter, by the enemy, they found their muſkets ſooner than their ſhoes. Had none of them ever been uſed to walk bareſoot, who knows if their city might not have been taken?

A man ſhould always be armed againſt unforeſeen accidents. Emilius, therefore, ſhall accuſtom himſelf to run bareſoot, in all ſeaſons, about his chamber, up and down ſtairs, and into the garden: ſo far from blaming him for it, I would imitate him, taking care only to keep the way clear of broken glaſs. I ſhall treat of his manual ſports and labour preſently; in the mean time, I would have him learn all thoſe ſteps which favour the various turnings and windings of the body, and to aſſume an eaſy and firm poſition in all its various attitudes. He ſhould learn to leap well, both as to diſtance and height, as well as to climb up a tree, and to ſpring over a wall; he ſhould acquire the knack of being always maſter of his equilibrium in theſe exerciſes, all his motions and geſtures being regulated by the laws of gravity, long before I ſhould trouble him with an explanation of the principles of ſtatics. By the manner in which his foot reſts on the ground, and his body on his leg, he ſhould feel whether it were well or ill placed. A ſteady poſture is always graceful, and the firmeſt attitudes are ever the moſt elegant. If I were a dancing maſter, I would not

teach the monkey-tricks of Marcel *; though it muſt be ſaid they were well enough adapted to the country where he taught them: but, inſtead of employing my pupil perpetually in cutting capers, I would lead him to the foot of ſome ſteep and rugged rock: there I would inſtruct him in the various attitudes it might be neceſſary for him to aſſume; in what manner to carry his head, his body, and where to reſt his hands and his feet, as occaſion required, to leap from point to point, both in aſcending and deſcending. I would rather make him emulous of a roebuck, than of a dancer at the opera.

As the operations of the ſenſe of feeling are confined within the reach of our hands, ſo thoſe of the ſight are extended beyond it. It is this circumſtance which renders the latter ſo deluſive: at one view, the ſight comprehends the various objects contained in half the horiſon; how is it poſſible it ſhould not be ſometimes deceived, amidſt that multitude of ſimultaneous ſenſations, and the judgment they excite? The ſight is, indeed, the moſt defective of all our ſenſes; and that preciſely becauſe it is the moſt comprehenſive, and that, leaving the reſt at ſo great

* A celebrated dancing-maſter at Paris, who, knowing very well with whom he had to do, affected to play the extravagant, and to give his art an air of importance, which people pretended to think ridiculous; but for which, nevertheleſs, they in reality held him in great reſpect. There is at preſent another inſtance of the like kind, in an art not leſs frivolous; a comedian takes upon him the man of importance, affecting the enthuſiaſt in his profeſſion, and ſucceeds in the ſame manner. This is a ſure method of ſucceeding in France. Real abilities, more ſimple and leſs empirical, are not encouraged there; modeſty being ſuppoſed only an indication of folly.

great a diſtance behind it, its operations are too extenſive and inſtantaneous to be corrected by them. We may add further, that the very illuſions of perſpective are neceſſary to enable us to form a right notion of extenſion, and compare its ſeveral parts and relations. Were there no deception in the appearances of things, nothing would ſeem to exiſt at a diſtance: without the gradations of magnitude and ſhade we could not perceive any diſtance; or rather, with regard to us, there would in fact be none at all. If of two trees of equal height, the one at an hundred paces diſtance ſhould appear as tall and as diſtinct as the other which ſtood but ten paces off, we ſhould naturally place one cloſe by the ſide of the other. If we were to perceive the dimenſions of all objects, ſuch as they really are, we ſhould perceive no ſpace, but every thing would appear immediately in the eye.

The ſenſe of ſeeing has but one ſtandard whereby to judge of the magnitude and diſtance of objects; and this is the angle they make in the eye; and, as this angle is the ſimple effect of a compound cauſe, the judgment immediately excited thereby, leaves every particular cauſe undeterminate, or neceſſarily defective. For how is it poſſible for us to tell, on mere inſpection, whether the angle, under which I ſee one object leſs than another, is ſo, becauſe the firſt object is really leſs, or becauſe it only exiſts at a greater diſtance.

We muſt in this caſe take a method different from the preceding: inſtead of reducing the ſenſation to its ſimpleſt form, we muſt double it, or confirm it by another; ſubjecting the viſual

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to the tactile organ, and repreſſing, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the impetuoſity of the former ſenſe, by the more preciſe and regular operations of the latter. For want of being accuſtomed to this practice, we eſtimate heights, diſtances, and magnitudes, very innacurately. A proof, alſo, that this is not the defect of the ſenſe, but of the uſe of it, is, that engineers, ſurveyors, architects, maſons, and painters, have generally more dexterity this way than any other people, and eſtimate dimenſions and diſtances much more exactly. Their profeſſion affording them that experience which we neglect to acquire, they correct the ambiguity of the angle, by thoſe more determinate appearances which accompany it.

It is eaſy to prevail on children to engage in any thing that requires them to move freely about. There are a thouſand ways, therefore, to intereſt him in meaſuring and eſtimating diſtances. Let us ſuppoſe we have a very high cherry-tree; what muſt we do to gather ſome cherries from the top? is the ladder in the barn long enough? Here is a rivulet too wide for us to jump over; how ſhall we get acroſs? will one of the planks that lie in the court-yard reach from ſide to ſide? We have a mind to fiſh, out of our chamber-window, in the moat that ſurrounds the houſe; how many fathoms muſt be our line? I would make a ſwing to reach from tree to tree; how many yards of rope is neceſſary? They tell me that our room in the other houſe is to be five and twenty feet ſquare: do you think it will be big enough for us? is it bigger than this? We are out on a ramble, and are very hungry: there are two villages in ſight;

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at which ſhall we dine?—Theſe and a thouſand other occaſions of the like kind might be laid hold of to effect this purpoſe.

Do you want to excite an indolent and lazy child to the exerciſe of running, when he has no natural inclination for that or any other, though perhaps intended for the army? He is perſuaded, we will ſuppoſe, I know not how, that perſons of his birth and expectations ought to do and know nothing; and that his rank will ſerve him inſtead of arms, legs, and every kind of abilities. The addreſs of Chiron himſelf might hardly ſuffice to make ſuch a gentleman an Achilles. The difficulty would, indeed, be ſo much the greater to me, as I would preſcribe him abſolutely nothing. I have already deprived myſelf of the means of exhortations, promiſes, menaces, and emulation: how then am I to excite him to run, without ſaying any thing to him? To run myſelf, would not be a very certain, and it would alſo be an inconvenient method. Beſides, it is neceſſary that he ſhould, at the ſame time, deduce from this exerciſe ſome object of inſtruction; in order to accuſtom the operations of the corporeal machine, and thoſe of the underſtanding, to proceed in concert. This therefore ſhould be my method, that is, if I ſhould take upon me to act, in ſuch an inſtance.

In walking out with my young ſluggard after dinner, I would ſometimes put a couple of cakes, ſuch as he ſhould be moſt fond of, in my pocket; we would each of us eat one *, and return contentedly

* The reader will eaſily underſtand theſe walks are meant to be taken in the country. The public walks of great cities are deſtructive

tentedly home. I would after ſome time let him ſee that I had taken out three cakes with me. As he could very eaſily eat half a dozen, he ſoon diſpatches his own, and aſks me for the third. No, ſay I, I can eat it very well myſelf, or we will divide it; or, ſtay, we had better let thoſe two little boys there run a race for it. I call them to us, ſhow them the cake, and propoſe the terms. The boys deſire no better conditions; and the cake is accordingly placed on a great ſtone which ſerves for the goal. The diſtance being marked, we go and ſit down: at the ſignal given, the racers ſet off; the victor ſeizing the cake, and devouring it without mercy, before the faces of the vanquiſhed and the ſpectators.

This amuſement is certainly of more value than the cake; but ſuppoſing he does not take to it, and that this firſt eſſay produces nothing, I am neither offended nor impatient; the education of children is a profeſſion in which we muſt ſtudy to loſe time in order to gain it. We continue our walks as uſual; often taking three cakes, ſometimes four; and giving from time to time one, and ſometimes two, to the racers. If the prize were not conſiderable, thoſe who diſputed it would not be ambitious of obtaining it; the winner, therefore, is always highly commended

deſtructive to children of both ſexes. It is there they imbibe the principle of vanity, and a deſire of being admired. It is at the Luxembourg, the Tuilleries, and particularly in the gardens of the Palais-royal, that the young people in Paris go to learn thoſe foppiſh and impertinent airs, which render them ſo ridiculous, and make them ſo much hiſſed at and ſo deteſtable in every part of Europe.

mended and careſſed, as having done ſomething extraordinary. To diverſify the ſcene, and render it more intereſting, I make the courſe longer, and admit ſeveral canditates. They are now hardly entered the liſts, before the paſſengers ſtop to look at them, animating them, as they run, with acclamations, ſhouting, and clapping of hands; at the ſame time, I ſee my little gentleman, every now and then, eagerly take part with one or the other of the runners, riſing up and crying out when one is getting before another. Theſe afford to him the amuſement of the Olympic games.

The runners, however, are ſometimes guilty of foul play; they lay hold of each other, tumble one another down, or throw flints in their way to cut their feet. This furniſhes me with a juſt pretext to ſeparate them, and to make them run from different places equally diſtant from the goal. The reaſon of this precaution will appear preſently; for this important affair muſt be treated circumſtantially.

Being ſo frequently mortified at ſeeing his favourite cakes thus devoured by others before his eyes, my young gentleman at length begins to ſuſpect that to run well is of ſome uſe; and ſeeing that he has two legs as well as other boys, he begins in ſecret to make ſome trials of his abilities. I take care to ſeem not to obſerve him, but find that my ſtratagem takes. After ſome time, he begins to think himſelf equal to the enterpriſe; and, as I foreſaw, affects to importune me for the remaining cake. I, of courſe, refuſe him; on which he ſeems to take pet, and ſays, "Well, Sir, lay it down on the ſtone;

"mark

"mark the diſtance, and we will ſee who wins "it." Mighty good! I reply ironically; can ſo fine a gentleman as you run? You will only whet your appetite, and get nothing to eat. Piqued at my raillery, however, he exerts his ſtrength, and bears off the prize; which is the more eaſy for him to do, as I have made the courſe but ſhort, and have taken care to exclude one or two of the beſt runners. It is readily to be conceived that my point thus gained, it is not difficult for me to keep him up to this exerciſe. Indeed he acquires, in a ſhort time, ſo great an inclination for it, that, without partiality, he is able to beat almoſt all his companions, be the courſe as long as it will.

This advantage gained, is productive of another which I did not think of: when he won the prize but ſeldom, he uſed to eat it up alone, as did the others; but being accuſtomed to win it often, he becomes generous, and lets the vanquiſhed partake of it. This circumſtance furniſhes me with a moral obſervation, and teaches me the true principle of generoſity.

By continuing to make my little runners ſet out from different places at one time, I contrive the diſtances, without his perceiving it, to be unequal; ſo that one having farther to run than another, has a viſible diſadvantage: but, though I leave my diſciple to his own choice, he knows not how to profit by this inequality. Without troubling himſelf about the diſtance, he always prefers the ſmootheſt ground; ſo that, foreſeeing his choice, I can make him win or loſe the cake at pleaſure: this piece of addreſs anſwers more ends alſo than one. As my deſign, however,

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is, that he ſhould perceive the difference in queſtion, I endeavour to make him ſenſible of it: but, however indolent at other times, he is ſo animated in his diverſion, and diſtruſts me ſo little, that I have all the trouble in the world to make him perceive I have tricked him. At length, nevertheleſs, in ſpite of his inattention, I gain my point; and he reproaches me accordingly for the deception. To this I reply, by aſking him, what right he has to complain? "If "I give you a cake, have not I a right to make "my own conditions? Who obliges you to run? "Did I promiſe to make your diſtances all e-"qual? Have not you, beſides, always your "choice? Take the ſhorteſt; who will hinder "you? Do not you ſee that I favoured you in "this matter, and that the difference you com-"plain of is to your advantage, if you know how "to make uſe of it?" All this is very plain; my young gentleman underſtands it; and, in order to make a proper choice, looks more narrowly after the diſtances preſcribed. He ſets out with meaſuring each by the number of ſteps: this method, however, he finds ſlow and defective: beſides, I take it into my head to diverſify and increaſe their number, on the ſame day; by which means the amuſement of running becomes a kind of paſſion; and it is with regret that time is loſt in meaſuring the ſeveral diſtances, which ſhould be employed in running the race. The vivacity of infancy ill agrees with ſuch delays; he learns, therefore, to ſee better, and to eſtimate diſtances by his eye. In a word, after repeated trials for ſome months, and correcting a few of his miſtakes, I ſucceed ſo well

in thus teaching him to meaſure by his eye, that when I place a cake on any object, he knows its diſtance as well by looking at it as if he had meaſured it with a chain.

As the judgment is more inſeparably attached to the ſight than to any other of the ſenſes, it requires a great deal of time to learn to ſee: a long time is requiſite for us to compare the ſenſations of the ſight with thoſe of the touch, in order to habituate the former of thoſe ſenſes to make a faithful report of figures and diſtances. The moſt penetrating ſight in the world can give us no idea of extenſion without the touch or a ſenſe of progreſſive motion. The whole univerſe muſt appear to an oyſter but as a ſingle point; nor would it ſeem otherwiſe were that oyſter animated by a human ſoul. It is only by means of walking about, touching, counting, and taking the dimenſions of objects, that we learn to judge of them: but if we accuſtom ourſelves always to meaſure them, the ſenſe confiding on the inſtrument, acquires no accuracy to eſtimate without it. Neither is it proper for a child to paſs immediately from the menſuration of objects to eſtimate them; he ſhould begin to eſtimate by parts what he cannot comprehend altogether; comparing ſuch imaginary diviſions to aliquot parts of admeaſurement: theſe again he ſhould learn to apply by the ſight only, and not by the hand. I would have him, however, confirm his operations at firſt, by taking afterwards the real admeaſurement, in order to correct his errors, and that, if any falſe appearance remained in the ſenſe, he might be able to rectify it by his judgment. There are natural mea-

meaſures, which are nearly the ſame in all places; ſuch are the ſtep of a man, the extent of his arms, his height, *&c.* When a child can eſtimate the height of a ſtory, his preceptor may make him employ it as the meaſure of a fathom; ſo that when he would eſtimate the height of a ſteeple, he may meaſure it by the ſtories of an houſe. If he would know how many leagues he has travelled, let him reckon the time he has been in going; which will ſerve him very well, particularly if you give him no aſſiſtance in any of theſe things, but let him diſcover them all himſelf.

It is impoſſible to judge accurately of the dimenſions of bodies, unleſs we learn alſo to know their figures, and even to imitate thoſe figures: for this imitation is founded on nothing elſe but the rules of perſpective; and we cannot eſtimate the extenſion of bodies by their appearance, unleſs we have ſome knowledge of thoſe rules. Children, being great imitators, all attempt to deſign: I would have my pupil cultivate that art, not for the ſake of the art itſelf, but only to give him a good eye and a ſupple hand. It is to be obſerved, indeed, in general, that it is of little conſequence whether he be expert at any of the exerciſes he partakes of, provided he acquires that perſpicacity and agility which they are calculated to teach him. I ſhall take particular care, therefore, he ſhall have no drawing-maſter, who will only teach him to imitate imitations, and deſign after deſigns. I would have him have no other maſter than nature; no other model than the objects themſelves. He ſhould have before his eyes the

original itſelf, and not the paper repreſenting it: thus he ſhould deſign an houſe from an houſe, a tree from a tree, a man from a man, that he might be accuſtomed to obſerve minutely and accurately the appearances of bodies, and not take falſe and artificial imitations, for true and genuine. I would even diſcourage him from endeavouring to trace any thing from memory, till, by frequent and repeated obſervations, its figure ſhould be ſtrongly imprinted on his imagination; leſt he ſhould otherwiſe, by ſubſtituting ſome fantaſtic image inſtead of the real one, loſe the knowledge of proportion, and a taſte for the genuine beauties of nature.

I know, that, by going to work in this manner, he will continue to blot and ſcratch a long time, without producing any likeneſs: that it will be long before he acquires by theſe means an elegance in ſketching the outlines, and the light touches of the maſter; nay, it is poſſible he may never attain any diſcernment in the fine effect of painting, or a good taſte for deſign. By way of recompenſe, however, he will certainly contract a juſter ſight, and a more ſteady hand; he will acquire the knowledge of the true relations of ſize and figure between animals, plants, and other natural bodies, and a more perfect experience in the effects of perſpective. This is the very point I am at; my intention being, not ſo much that he ſhould know how to imitate objects, as to become fully acquainted with them. I had much rather, for inſtance, that he ſhould ſhew me the acanthus in the plant itſelf, and that he ſhould be leſs expert in drawing the leaves of a chapiter.

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In this exercise, as well as in all the reſt, I intend not that my pupil ſhould amuſe himſelf alone. I would make it ſtill more agreeable, by conſtantly partaking it with him. I would have him have no other rival than myſelf; ſuch, however, I would always be, without relaxation or riſk: this would make our employment intereſting, without exciting jealouſy. I would follow his example, in taking up the crayon, and in drawing at firſt as bad as himſelf. Though I were an Apelles, I would appear to him as a mere dauber. I would begin by ſketching out the figure of a man, as boys do againſt the wall; an horizontal ſtroke for each arm, and a vertical one for each leg, and the fingers as big as the wriſts. After ſome time, we ſhould both of us obſerve the diſproportion of this wretched ſketch; we ſhould obſerve that a man's leg is not equally thick all the way, that the length of the arms bears a certain proportion to the height of the body, *&c.* In his progreſs in this art, I take care to keep pace with him as cloſely as I can; or, if I advance a little, it is ſo much only as to give him room eaſily to overtake me, and ſometimes to go before me in his turn. Being properly provided with pencils and colours, we endeavour to imitate the appearance and colouring of objects as well as their figure and outlines. The artiſt will readily perceive, that, by this method of proceeding, we muſt make ſtrange work. In our rudeſt ſketches, however, and amidſt the worſt of our daubings, there is ſome reſemblance of nature, as we never fail to keep our eye on the works of our great maſter. We were ſome time ago concerned about ornamen-

tal furniture for our apartment; at preſent, you ſee, we are provided with the means of ſupplying ourſelves. I get our drawings framed and glazed, to the end that they may receive no additional touches, but be preſerved in their primitive imperfection. Hence each of us is intereſted in executing our works at firſt as well as poſſible. Theſe are accordingly arranged in order round the room: each deſign is repeated perhaps twenty or thirty times, and diſplays the progreſs of the artiſt, from the time when his draught of a building was only that of a ſhapeleſs front, till it received its juſt proportions of figure, lights, and ſhades. The gradations of this progreſs give us occaſion to make many curious and intereſting compariſons, that always excite our emulation.

Our firſt and groſſeſt daubings, I take care to have ſet in fine gilt frames, which ſerve as a foil to their deformity; and, in proportion as the deſign itſelf is improved, and the imitation becomes more exact, I diminiſh the luſtre of the frames; giving as a reaſon, that when the painting is good, it requires no ornament to ſet it off, and that it would be a pity the frame ſhould engage the attention that ſhould be beſtowed on the picture. Hence we both aſpire to the honour of having our pieces ſet in plain frames; and when either of us deſpiſes the performance of the other, he condemns it, of courſe, to a gilt one. Some time or other, no doubt, our conduct in this particular will become proverbial with us; and we ſhall admire how fond many people are to do themſelves juſtice, by having their pictures ſo finely framed.

I have ſaid that geometry is above the capacity of children; but that it is ſo, is our own fault. We do not perceive that their method is not ours; and that what is the art of reaſoning in us, is nothing more than the art of perceiving in them. Inſtead of teaching them, therefore, our method, we ought to ſtudy theirs. For our way of learning geometry is as much an affair of the imagination, as of reaſoning. When once the propoſition is laid down, we ſet about conceiving the demonſtration of it; that is, we endeavour to find from what propoſition already known, the other is a neceſſary conſequence; and, from all the conſequences which may be drawn from ſuch propoſition, to fix on that which is preciſely ſought.

By this method, however, the moſt exact reaſoner in the world, unleſs he is alſo poſſeſſed of invention, muſt ſoon be obliged to ſtop ſhort. And what is the conſequence? Inſtead of being inſtructed to trace out demonſtrations, we only receive thoſe which are dictated to us; inſtead of being taught to reaſon, the maſter reaſons for us, and exerciſes only our memories.

If you cut out and form exact geometrical figures, combine them, place them one upon another, and examine their relations, you will ſoon make yourſelf maſter of the elements of geometry; without ever troubling yourſelf about definitions, problems, or any other theoretical modes of demonſtration. For my part, I do not pretend to teach Emilius geometry; but deſign that he ſhall teach it me. I will ſearch for the proper relations, and he ſhall find them; which he will the more eaſily do, as I ſhall look for them

them merely with that view. Inſtead of taking a pair of compaſſes, for example, to deſcribe a circle, I would do it with a piece of thread, turning on a point. By which means, when I ſhould come afterwards to compare the length of the different radii of ſuch a circle, Emilius would naturally laugh at my ſimplicity, and give me to underſtand, that the ſame thread being conſtantly extended from the centre, in tracing the periphery, it is impoſſible that all the parts of the latter ſhould not be at equal diſtances from the former.

Were I deſirous of meaſuring an angle of ſixty degrees, I would not deſcribe only a ſegment, but a whole circle; for with children nothing ſhould be left to ſuppoſition. By doing thus, I find that the ſegment bounded by the two ſides of the angle is juſt a ſixth part of the whole circle. After this, keeping the point of the compaſſes in the ſame centre, I would deſcribe a ſecond circle; of which I ſhould find the ſegment to be alſo a ſixth part of the whole, as before: I would then deſcribe a third, and ſo go on with deſcribing concentric circles, and meaſuring the angle on each, till Emilius, ſtruck with my ſtupidity, ſhould inform me, that, whether the arch be greater or leſs, the ſame angle would be always the ſixth part of a circle. By this example alone my pupil would become perfectly acquainted with the uſe of a protractor.

To prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, they are uſually deſcribed in a circle. I, on the contrary, would ſo contrive it that Emilius ſhould firſt obſerve this in the circle itſelf; when I would obſerve

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to him, that, if the circle were rubbed out, and the right lines only remained, the angles would remain ſtill the ſame.

It is common to neglect the nicety of geometrical figures, as they are ſuppoſed perfect in the demonſtration. But, as we ſhall never trouble ourſelves about demonſtrations, our moſt important concern will be to draw our figures exactly; to make a ſquare as perfectly ſquare, and a circle as completely round, as poſſible. To prove the accuracy of the figure, we ſhould examine it by all its perceptible properties, and this would give us every day an opportunity of diſcovering new ones. We ſhould compare the two halves of a circle, by folding it together in the line of its diameter; and of thoſe of a ſquare, by doubling it in that of its diagonal. We ſhould diſpute whether the equality obſervable in the circle and ſquare thus folded, obtained alſo in the parallelogram, the trapezium, and other figures. Sometimes, alſo, we ſhould attempt to foreſee the ſucceſs of the experiment, before we made it; to endeavour to aſſign the reaſons, *&c.*

Thus geometry would be, to my pupil, only the art of uſing the ſcale and compaſs; nor ſhould he be ever ſuffered to confound it with the art of deſign, in proſecuting which he ſhould uſe neither of theſe inſtruments. Theſe indeed ſhould be always kept under lock and key; and Emilius be very ſeldom, and but for a ſhort time, indulged with them, that he might not acquire a ſlovenly way of ſketching his deſigns: we ſhould, however, frequently take out our drawings in our excurſions, and diſcourſe on what we had

had done, or might deſign to do, at our return.

I ſhall never forget having ſeen a young man at Turin, who was taught, in his infancy, the various relations between the outlines and ſurfaces of bodies, by having cakes ſet before him, cut into all manner of regular ſolids; by which means he exhauſted the ſcience of Archimedes, in ſtudying which form contained the greateſt quantity.

When a child plays at battle-door and ſhuttle-cock, he exerciſes his eye and arm; when he whips a top, he acquires freſh ſtrength by exerting what he poſſeſſes: but in this exerciſe what does he learn? I have often aſked, why children are not made to apply themſelves to many of thoſe games of ſkill and dexterity which are practiſed by men, ſuch as tennis, fives, and billiards, or to play on muſical inſtruments? To this queſtion it hath been conſtantly replied, that ſome of theſe diverſions are above their capacity, and that their limbs and organs are not ſufficiently formed for the others. Theſe reaſons, however, appear to me very unſatisfactory; a child, it is true, has not the ſtature of a man, and yet he wears cloaths made in the ſame form and manner. I do not mean that he ſhould play with the ſame maſs, or at a billiard-table three feet high; that he ſhould make one in a party at our tennis-courts, or that we ſhould load his little arm with our heavy rackets: he might exerciſe himſelf, however, in a ſaloon, where means ſhould be previouſly taken to ſecure the windows; he might at firſt make uſe of ſoft balls, his rackets might be made of light wood, afterwards of parchment, and at length of cat-gut, as he increaſed

creaſed in ſtrength. You prefer the ſhuttlecock, becauſe it is leſs fatiguing and dangerous. For both theſe reaſons, however, you are in the wrong. This is mere womens play: but you will find no woman who is not frightened at the motion of a tennis-ball. Their white and delicate ſkins are not adapted to bruiſes, nor are their complexions and features to be marred by contuſions. But men, deſtined to be hardy and vigorous, muſt not expect to become ſuch without peril; and what defence can we be ſuppoſed capable of making, if we are never attacked? We always indulge ourſelves in thoſe amuſements at which we may remain inexpert without danger; a ſhuttlecock, in falling, hurts nobody: but nothing renders the arms ſo active as the neceſſity of ſecuring the head, nor the ſight ſo quick as that of preſerving the eyes. To ſpring from one ſide of a tennis-court to the other; to judge of the rebounding of a ball while it is in the air; and to return it with a ſure and ſteady arm; theſe are diverſions leſs adapted to the amuſement of grown perſons, than proper to form them in youth.

The fibres of a child, it may be ſaid, are too ſoft: his muſcles may indeed be leſs elaſtic, but they are more ſupple; his arm may have leſs force than that of a man; it is nevertheleſs an arm, and capable of doing every thing, proportioned to its ſize and ſtrength, of which any other machine of the like kind is capable. Children, it is ſaid, have no dexterity in their hands and arms; it is for this reaſon I would teach it them: a man with as little exerciſe would not have a jot more. The uſe of our organs is to be known

known only by employing them. Nothing but long experience can teach us how to turn them to the greateſt advantage: we cannot alſo too much apply ourſelves to the acquirement of this experience.

Every thing that has once been done is certainly practicable. Now, nothing is more common than to ſee ſprightly and dextrous children have as much activity of body as grown men. At the fairs, we ſee the little æquilibriſts dance upon the wire, walk on their hands, leap, and tumble about with great agility. For how many years together hath not the attention of the public been engaged, by the Italian comedy, with the performances of children? Who hath not heard, throughout Germany and Italy, of the little pantomimical company of the famous Nicolini? Did any one ever remark that the motions of thoſe children were leſs free, their attitudes leſs graceful, their ear leſs nice, or their dancing leſs eaſy, than thoſe of performers full grown? At firſt, indeed, our fingers are generally ſhort, thick, and ſtiff in their motion; our hands are plump, and little adapted to graſp any thing: all this, however, doth not hinder many children from learning to write and draw at an age when others are equally incapable of holding the pen or the crayon. All Paris muſt remember the little Engliſh girl, who at ten years of age performed ſuch wonders on the harpſichord; and I ſhall never forget, that I myſelf one ſaw, at the houſe of a certain magiſtrate, a little boy, his ſon, whom the placed, like a ſtatue, on the table, in the middle of the deſſert; while he played on the violin almoſt as big as him-

himſelf, and ſurpriſed even the beſt artiſts by the compaſs of his execution.

Theſe, and an hundred other examples that might be given of the like kind, appear to me convincing proofs, that the ſuppoſed inaptitude of children for the various exerciſes of grown perſons, is merely imaginary; and that, if we do not ſee them ſucceed in many, it is becauſe they have not practiſed them.

It may be here objected, that I fall into the ſame error, with reſpect to the premature cultivation of the corporeal powers of children, as I have condemned in thoſe of their minds. There is, however, a very material difference; for in the one caſe the progreſs they make is only apparent, and in the other it is real. I have already proved that they do not actually poſſeſs the degree of underſtanding they appear to have; whereas in their actions, whatever they appear to do, they actually effect. Beſides this, it ſhould always be remembered, that what we propoſe in this way is merely as an amuſement, as an eaſy and voluntary exertion of thoſe powers which nature requires to be exerted. It is the art of varying the amuſements of children in order to render them more agreeable, without laying any ſuch reſtraint on their young minds as would turn their diverſions into labour. For, after all, in what manner can they amuſe themſelves, without my being able to convert the object of their pleaſure into that of inſtruction? and tho' this ſhould not be always the caſe, yet provided their time paſſed away in innocence, their progreſs in any kind of knowledge would not be of any great conſequence: whereas, when they

are laid under a neceſſity of learning this thing or the other, it is impoſſile, in the uſual method of inſtruction, for the preceptor to carry his point, without trouble, vexation, and reſtraint.

What I have already ſaid concerning thoſe two ſenſes, whoſe uſe is the moſt conſtant and important, may ſerve as an example in the manner of exerciſing the reſt. The ſight and the touch are equally applied to bodies in motion and at reſt: but, as a vibration in the ambient air is neceſſary to affect the organs of hearing, nothing leſs than a body in motion can excite in us the ſenſation of ſound; and if all the bodies that ſurround us were conſtantly at reſt, we ſhould never hear the leaſt ſound. In the night, therefore, when moving ourſelves as little as we pleaſe, we need be apprehenſive of danger only from other moving bodies, it is neceſſary that we ſhould have a quick ear, and be able to judge from the ſenſation that affects us, whether the body cauſing it be great or little, near or at a diſtance, weak or violent in its motion. The air, when ſo agitated as to produce ſounds, is ſubject to repercuſſions that reflect its vibrations: Hence ariſe echoes, that repeat the former ſenſation, and make the ſonorous body appear to exiſt in a different place to that in which it really is. On a plain, or in a valley, alſo, if we lay our ear cloſe to the ground, we ſhall hear the voice of men and the trampling of horſes much farther than if we ſhould ſtand upright.

As we have compared the ſight to the touch, it will be proper to compare it alſo to the ſenſe of hearing, and to know which of the two impreſ-

preſſions is made the ſooneſt on the organs by the ſame object. When we ſee the fire of a piece of ordinance, it may be yet time enough to avoid the ball; but when you hear the report, it is too late; the ball hath already done its execution. One may judge of the diſtance of the clouds in a ſtorm, from the interval of time between the flaſh of lightning and the clap of thunder. Take care to make a child acquainted with this ſort of experiments; let him make all thoſe which are not above his capacity, and find the others by induction; but I had rather an hundred times he ſhould be ignorant of them, than that you ſhould give him the information.

We have an organ which anſwers to that of hearing, *viz.* that of the voice; but we have none that anſwers in the like manner to that of the ſight, nor can we imitate colours as we do ſounds. Hence we have one method more of cultivating the former ſenſe than the latter: this is by exerciſing the active and paſſive organs reciprocally on each other.

Man hath three kinds of voice; the ſpeaking or articulate voice, the ſinging or melodious voice, and the pathetic or accented voice, which is the language of the paſſions, and animates both our ſinging and our ſpeech. A child hath theſe three kinds of voice, as well as a grown perſon, but without knowing how to conjoin them in the ſame manner: he diſplays, like us, laughter, cries, complaints, exclamations, *&c.* but he is incapable of modifying theſe with the various inflections of the other two modes of voice. In the moſt perfect union of theſe three voices,

conſiſts the moſt complete muſic. Children are incapable, therefore, of this muſic, and thus have no expreſſion in their ſinging. It is the ſame with their verbal diſcourſe, in which they have no emphaſis: they cry out, it is true, but they lay no accent on their words; and as there is little energy in what they ſay, there is nothing emphatic in their voice and language. Our pupil will be ſtill more plain and ſimple in his ſpeech and diſcourſe, becauſe his paſſions, not being as yet excited, will not mix their language with his. Never ſet him, therefore, to recite ſpeeches out of plays, nor teach him the arts of declamation. He will have too much good ſenſe to know how to give an affected tone to the words he does not underſtand, or expreſſion to ſentiments he has never felt.

Teach him to ſpeak plainly, articulately, and to pronounce his words clearly, and without affectation; to know and practiſe the grammatical accent, to ſpeak always loud enough to be heard; but never to raiſe his voice higher than the occaſion requires, which is a common fault in the ſchools. In every thing avoid what is ſuperfluous.

In the ſame manner, in ſinging, you ſhould endeavour to render his voice clear, equal, eaſy, and ſonorous; and his ear ſuſceptible of meaſure and harmony: but nothing more. Imitative and theatrical muſic is above his capacity. I would not have him even make uſe of words in ſinging; or if it were required, I would endeavour to compoſe ſongs on purpoſe for him, which ſhould be adapted to his years, intereſting and equally ſimple with his ideas.

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It will be eaſily imagined, that, as I am not very preſſing to teach him to write, I ſhall not be more ſo to make him learn muſic. No, we ſhall not require him to pay a very earneſt attention to any thing, nor to be in too much haſte to exerciſe his judgment on ſigns. In this particular, I muſt own, this delay ſeems attended with ſome difficulties; for, though the knowledge of notes may not at firſt appear more neceſſary for thoſe who learn to ſing, than that of letters to ſuch as learn to read, there is however this difference, that in ſpeaking we make uſe of our own ideas, and in ſinging of the ideas of others. Now, to expreſs the ideas of others, it is neceſſary we ſhould firſt able to read them.

But, in the firſt place, inſtead of reading, we may hear them, and a tune is more faithfully conveyed to us by the ear than by the eye. Add to this, that to underſtand muſic, it is not ſufficient to be able to play or ſing; we muſt learn to compoſe at the ſame time, or we ſhall never be maſters of this ſcience. Exerciſe your little muſician at firſt in regular, harmonious periods; join them afterwards together by a very ſimple modulation, and at length mark their different relations by correct punctuation, which is done by a good choice of ſtop and cadence. Above all things, avoid any thing fantaſtic and whimſical, nor ever affect the pathetic in your expreſſion; but chuſe a melody always eaſy and ſimple, always naturally ariſing from the chords eſſential to the tune, and indicating the baſe in ſuch a manner as that he may eaſily perceive and follow it: for, to form the voice and the ear, it is

to be obſerved, he ſhould never ſing to any inſtrument but the harpſichord.

For the better diſtinction of the ſound of the notes, they are pronounced articulately; hence the cuſtom of ſol-fa-ing, by means of certain ſyllables. To diſtinguiſh the degrees on the ſcale, it is neceſſary to give appellations to thoſe degrees, and alſo to the fixed terms of their difference; hence the names of harmonic intervals, and alſo the application of thoſe letters of the alphabet, which are marked on the keys of the harpſichord, *&c.* and the notes of the gamut. *C* and *A* ſignify certain fixed and invariable ſounds, always made by the ſame ſtops. *Ut* and *la* are very different. *Ut* is conſtantly the fundamental note of a greater mode, or the mediante of a leſſer. *La* is conſtantly the fundamental of a leſſer mode, or the ſixth note of a greater. Thus the letters denote the invariable terms of the relations in our muſical ſyſtem, and the ſyllables expreſs the terms of ſimilar relations in different tunes. The letters indicate the ſtops on the keys, and the ſyllables the degrees of the mode. The French muſicians have ſtrangely perplexed theſe diſtinctions; confounding the intent of the ſyllables with that of the letters, and by multiplying without neceſſity the ſigns of the ſtops, they have left none to expreſs the chords: inſomuch, that with them *Ut* and *C* are always the ſame thing; which is not, nor ought to be, the caſe; for to what purpoſe then ſhould *C* find a place in the ſcale? Hence the French manner of ſol-fa-ing is extremely difficult, and quite uſeleſs, conveying no preciſe ideas to the mind; as by their method the two

ſyllables

ſyllables *ut* and *mi*, for example, may either ſtand for a third greater or leſſer. By what ſtrange fatality is it that a country productive of the fineſt books of muſic in the world, ſhould be that wherein this ſcience is the moſt difficult to be attained?

Let us accompany our pupil in a more ſimple and clear method; let him know only two modes, the relations of which ſhould always be the ſame, and always indicated by the ſame ſyllables. Whether in learning to ſing, or play on an inſtrument, let him learn to ſound his mode on every one of the twelve tones, and whether he fix *D*, *C*, *G*, &c. to make the final always *ut* or *la*, according to the mode. By this method he will always form a right conception of what you are teaching; the eſſential relations of the mode, whether in ſinging or playing, will be always preſent to his mind, his execution will be more correct, and his progreſs more ſpeedy. There is nothing more whimſical and extraordinary than the French method of ſol-faing, as they call it, *au naturel;* as by this, they ſubſtitute ideas foreign to the thing, inſtead of thoſe which properly belong to it. Nothing is more natural than to ſol-fa by tranſpoſition, when the mode is tranſpoſed. But enough on this ſubject: you may teach him muſic in what manner you pleaſe, provided you only let him conſider it as an amuſement.

We are already well acquainted with the ſtate of external bodies with relation to our own, of their weight, figure, colour, ſolidity, magnitude, diſtance, temperature, motion, and reſt. We are informed concerning thoſe which ſhould be

be ſuffered to approach us, or ſhould be kept at a diſtance; of the methods we are to take to overcome their reſiſtance, or to make uſe of other bodies in our own preſervation. All this, however, is not enough: our own bodies are conſtantly waſting, and ſtand in need of being perpetually recruited. Although we are capable of converting ſome other bodies into the ſubſtance of ours, we are not indifferent as to the choice of them. Every thing that offers itſelf doth not yield aliment for the human body; and all thoſe ſubſtances that do, are more or leſs proper to this end, as they are adapted to the conſtitution of our ſpecies, the climate we inhabit, our own particular temperament, and manner of living.

We ſhould be poiſoned, or might periſh with hunger, if, in order to make choice of proper aliment, we were obliged to wait till experience had inſtructed us: but that Supreme Goodneſs, which hath made the pleaſures of ſenſible creatures the inſtruments of their preſervation, informs us, by that which is pleaſing to the palate, what will agree with the ſtomach. There is naturally no phyſician ſo infallible as the appetite; and I doubt much whether, in our primitive ſtate, thoſe aliments which were the moſt agreeable to our taſte, were not alſo the moſt wholeſome.

Add to this, that our Creator has not only provided for the neceſſities he hath laid us under, but alſo for the wants we bring on ourſelves; and that it is with a view of making our deſires go hand in hand with our neceſſities, that our taſte and inclinations change and alter with

with our manner of living. The farther we depart from a ſtate of nature, the more we loſe of our natural taſte and inclinations; or rather, habit conſtitutes a ſecond nature, which we ſo ſubſtitute in the place of the former, that none of us diſcover the difference.

It follows hence, that the moſt natural taſtes are the moſt ſimple: for theſe are the moſt eaſily transformed; whereas, by whetting and irritating them by our caprices, they become inflexible and unchangeable. The man who is as yet of no country, will eaſily fall into the cuſtoms of any country whatever; but one countryman cannot become another.

This appears true to me in all ſenſes, but more particularly in that of taſte, properly ſo called. Our firſt aliment is milk; we are even diſguſted at firſt with ſtrong ſavours, and accuſtom ourſelves to them by degrees. Fruits, pulſe, herbs, and at length broiled meat, without ſalt or ſeaſoning, were the aliments of primitive mortals. The firſt time a ſavage taſtes wine, he is diſguſted with it, and ſpits it out; and, even among us, we find, that thoſe who attain their twentieth year without taſting fermented liquors, can never bring themſelves to reliſh them afterwards. We ſhould have been all abſtemious, if wine had not been given us in our younger years. In a word, the more ſimple our taſte, the more univerſal; the moſt common diſguſts are entertained againſt compounds. Did we ever know a perſon entertain a diſtaſte againſt bread or water? Hence we ſee the path indicated by nature; this therefore is what we ſhall follow. Let us endeavour, as much as poſſible,

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to preſerve the taſte of children in its primitive and unvitiated ſtate; let their nutriment be ordidinary and ſimple, nor familiariſe their palates to any thing that is high flavoured.

I do not inquire here whether ſuch a manner of living is healthful or not, as this is not to my preſent purpoſe. It is ſufficient for me to give it the preference, to know that it is moſt conformable to nature, and that it is the moſt eaſily convertible into any other. Thoſe who ſay we ought to accuſtom children to thoſe aliments which they are to make uſe of when grown up, reaſon, in my opinion, very improperly. Why ſhould their nutriment be the ſame, when their manner of living is ſo very different? A man, whoſe ſpirits are waſted with care, labour, and fatigue, ſtands in need of ſucculent aliments that may furniſh him with new ſpirits; whereas a child that is growing, and always ſporting about, requires an abundant nouriſhment, productive of good chyle. Beſides this, a grown perſon hath already ſome ſettled rank, employment, and reſidence; but who can be certain what may happen to be the future circumſtances of a child? Take care, in every caſe, not to give him too determinate a form, leſt it ſhould coſt him too dear to change it when occaſion requires. Let us not ſo educate him that he muſt periſh with hunger in a foreign country, unleſs he travel with a French cook; nor that he may be induced to ſay hereafter, that the people know how to eat only in France. Have not I occaſionally introduced a mighty pretty encomium! For my own part, however, I am of a different opinion, and ſay, on the contrary, that

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it is in France only people know not how to eat, as ſo much art is required to make their victuals eatable.

Of all our various ſenſations, thoſe we receive by means of the taſte affect us moſt: for we are more intereſted to judge of thoſe ſubſtances which are to become part of our own, than of thoſe which barely exiſt around us. A thouſand things are indifferent to the touch, the hearing, and the ſight; but there is hardly any thing indifferent to the taſte. Add to this, that the activity of this ſenſe is altogether phyſical; it is the only one which has nothing to ſay to the imagination; at leaſt, it is that into which the imagination enters leſs than into any other; whereas imitation and fancy often unite a moral impreſſion to the phyſical in all others. Thus, generally ſpeaking, voluptuous and ſuſceptible characters, eaſily affected by the other ſenſes, are cold and indifferent to this. For this reaſon alone, which ſeems to place the taſte below them, and to render our deſire of gratifying the palate contemptible, I conclude, on the contrary, that the beſt method to govern children, is to lead them by their mouth. The motive of gluttony is at worſt preferable that of vanity; in that the firſt is a natural appetite, depending immediately on the gratification of the ſenſe; whereas the ſecond ariſes only from opinion, is ſubject to the caprices of mankind, and to all manner of abuſe. Gluttony is the paſſion of children; nor takes place of any other, but diſappears preſently when others make their appearance. Believe me, a child will ceaſe but too ſoon to think of what he is to eat; when his heart is fully engaged,

gaged, his palate will have but little to do. As he grows up, a thouſand impetuous ſentiments will divert his attention from eating to excite his vanity: for this latter paſſion is that which profits by the others, and at length engroſſes them all. I have ſometimes made my obſervations on thoſe perſons who hold good eating to be of ſo much importance; who begin to think, as ſoon as they wake in the morning, what they ſhall have to eat during the day, and deſcribe a a feaſt with more exactneſs than Polybius deſcribes a battle. I have always found, that ſuch pretenders to manhood were only great boys, thirty or forty years of age, without vigour and without conſiſtence; *fruges conſumere nati.* Gluttony in grown perſons is the vice of thoſe who have no hearts. The ſoul of a glutton lies always in his palate; he is formed for nothing but to eat. Incapable of every other enjoyment, he is nothing but when at table, and is incapable to judge of any thing in the world but made diſhes. There let us leave him, without regret, to his brutal employment; it is fitter for him than any other, as well for his ſake as our own.

To be fearful leſt gluttony ſhould take root and grow up in a child of any capacity, is the effect of a narrow way of thinking. In childhood, we think only on what we are to eat; in youth, we think little on this ſubject; every thing goes down, when we have other affairs to mind. I would not, however, adviſe an indiſcreet uſe to be made of ſo mean a motive, nor that we ſhould render the honour of doing a noble action dependent on ſweetmeats and biſcuits.

But

But I ſee no reaſon, as childhood is, or ought to be, employed in mere amuſements, why exerciſes purely corporeal ſhould not be attended with a perceptible and material prize. When the little Majorcans were uſed to fetch down a baſket from the top of a tree, by ſlinging ſtones at it, was it not very juſt that a good breakfaſt ſhould repair the ſtrength they had exhauſted in the enterpriſe *?

When the young Spartan, at the riſk of having his bones broke, ſlipt into the kitchen and brought off a young fox alive, and actually ſuffered the rapacious animal to eat into his bowels, without making the leaſt complaint, for fear of a diſcovery, was it not very right that he ſhould profit by his dear-bought prey, and that he ſhould make a meal of the cub that had made a meal of him? A dainty repaſt ought not indeed to be made a reward, but why ſhould it not be made the effect of the pains taken to procure it? Emilius does not regard the cake I lay on the ſtone as the reward of having run well; he knows only that he hath no other way of getting the cake than by arriving firſt at the end of the courſe.

This doth not contradict the maxims I advance concerning the wholeſome ſimplicity of viands: for to flatter the appetite of children, it is not neceſſary to make them nice, but only to ſatisfy them; and this may be done by the moſt ſimple and common things in the world, if we do not endeavour to refine their taſte. That conſtant

* It is now ſome ages ſince the Majorcans have given up this cuſtom, which was uſual in the time of their famous ſlingers.

ſtant appetite which is excited in them by their tendency to growth, is a certain ſauce which ſupplies the place of many others. Fruits, milk-meats, cakes ſomewhat better than common bread, and particularly the art of diſpenſing theſe things moderately, are ſufficient to lead a whole army of children round the world, without giving them any taſte for high-flavoured meats, or running the riſk of ſpoiling their palates.

One proof that the taſte of meat is not natural to the human palate, is the indifference which children have for that kind of food, and the preference they give to vegetable aliments, ſuch as milk-meats, paſtry, fruit, *&c.* It is of the utmoſt conſequence not to vitiate this primitive taſte in children, to make them carnivorous. Were even their health not concerned, it would be expedient on account of their diſpoſition and character; for it is ſufficiently clear from experience, that thoſe people who are great eaters of meat, are in general more ferocious and cruel than other men. This obſervation holds good of all times and all places. The Engliſh * barbarity is well known; whereas the Gaures

* I know that the Engliſh boaſt much of their humanity, and of the good diſpoſition of their nation; that they call themſelves *good-natured people*: they may cry themſelves up, however, for this good quality as much as they pleaſe; there is nobody elſe will join with them.

—[Our author appears, in this note, to have forgotten, what he maintains elſewhere, that ſtrength of body and of mind are eſſential to the conſtitution and character of a man. If he ſhould ever have an opportunity of being better acquainted with the Engliſh nation than he appears to be at preſent, he may know that they do not pride themſelves on that weakneſs of humanity, or that meek ſpecies of *good nature*, which is characteriſtic of milk-ſops.]

Gaures * are, on the contrary, the meekeſt creatures in the world. All ſavages are cruel; and as their manners do not tend to cruelty, it is plain it muſt ariſe from their aliments. They go to war as to hunting, and treat their fellow-creatures as they treat bears. Even in England itſelf, butchers are not admitted on a jury: familiarity with blood hardens abandoned wretches to murder.

Homer hath made the Cyclops, who were fleſh-eaters, horrid monſters of men; and the Lotophagi a people ſo amiable, that, when ſtrangers had once become acquainted with them, and taſted the fruits on which they lived, they even forgot their native country, to take up their abode with their hoſts.

"You aſk me," ſays Plutarch, "for what reaſon Pythagoras abſtained from eating the fleſh of brutes? For my part, I am aſtoniſhed to think, on the contrary, what appetite firſt induced man to taſte of a dead carcaſe; or what motive could ſuggeſt the notion of nouriſhing himſelf with the fleſh of animals, which he ſaw the moment before, bleating, bellowing, walking, and looking about them. How could he bear to ſee an impotent and defenceleſs creature ſlaughtered, ſkinned, and cut up for food? How could he endure the ſight of the convulſed limbs and muſcles? how bear the ſmell ariſing from their diſſection? Whence comes it that he was not diſguſted and ſtruck with horror when he came to

* The Banians, who abſtain from fleſh more ſtrictly than the Gaures, are almoſt as meek as they; but as their ſyſtem of morals is leſs pure, and their religious worſhip leſs rational, they are not, on the whole, ſo good a ſort of people.

handle the bleeding flesh, and clear away the clotted blood and humours from the wounds. Poetical fiction might imagine,

The hides still crawling, and the mangled beasts
Half-raw, half-roasted, bellowing their complaints.

"Such a picture might even naturally enough have represented itself to the man who first conceived an appetite for the flesh of a living animal, and directed the sacrifice of the helpless creature, that all the while might stand licking the hand of its murderer. We should, therefore, rather wonder at the conduct of those who first indulged themselves in this horrible repast, than at such as have humanely abstained from it. And yet the first flesh-eaters, perhaps, might justify themselves, by pleading an act of necessity, and the want of that plenty of other provision of various kinds, which luxury has introduced in our times, and which renders our conduct in this respect by so much the more inexcusable.

"Happy mortals! might they exclaim, in addressing the men of our days; how highly favoured by the gods, in comparison with your predecessors! How fertile are your fields, your orchards, your vineyards, in comparison with ours! In our unhappy times, the earth and atmosphere, loaded with crude and noxious vapours, were intractable to order, and obeyed not the due return of the seasons. The uncertain course of the rivers broke down on every side the insufficient banks; so that lakes, bogs, and deep morasses, occupied three fourths of the surface

face of the globe, while the other quarter of it was covered with woods and barren foreſts. The earth produced not ſpontaneouſly delicious fruit; we had no implements of agriculture; we were ſtrangers to the art of huſbandry; and employing no ſeed-time, we had no harveſt. Thus famine was perpetually at our heels. In the winter, moſs and the bark of trees was our ordinary food. The freſh roots of dog's-graſs and broom were a feaſt for us; and when, by chance, we found a repaſt of nuts and acorns, we danced for joy round the hazel and the oak, to the ſound of ſome ruſtic muſic, calling, in our grateful tranſports, the earth our nurſe and mother. Such were our only feſtivals, ſuch our only ſports: all the reſt of our lives was made up of nothing but ſorrow, pain, and miſery.

"At length, when the impoveriſhed earth no longer afforded us ſubſiſtence, we were compelled to commit an outrage on nature for our own preſervation; and thus we began to eat our companions in miſery, rather than periſh with them. But you, cruel mortals! what motive have you for ſhedding innocent blood? Behold what affluence on every ſide ſurrounds you! How liberal is the earth of fruits! How bounteous are your fields and vineyards! The animals afford you milk in plenty for aliment, and wool to clothe and keep you warm. What can you require more? What barbarous rage induces you to commit ſo many murders, when already loaded with viands and fated with plenty? Why do you falſely accuſe your mother earth of being incapable of affording you nouriſhment? Why do you rebel againſt Ceres, the inventreſs

of laws, againſt Bacchus the comforter of mankind, as if their laviſh bounties were not ſufficient for the preſervation of the human race? How can you have the heart to mix, with the delicious fruits of the earth, the bones and fleſh of dead carcaſes, and to eat with the ſweeteſt milk the blood of the very cattle that afford it you. The lion and the panther, which you call wild beaſts, act neceſſarily from a natural inſtinct, and deſtroy other animals to preſerve their own life. But you, an hundred times more wild and cruel than they, act contrary to inſtinct, without any ſuch plea of neceſſity, and only to indulge yourſelves in your barbarous delicacy. The animals which you devour, are not thoſe which devour others; you do not eat carnivorous animals, but imitate their ſavage nature. You have no appetite but for meek and innocent brutes that hurt nobody, but, on the contrary, fondly attach themſelves to your perſons, who faithfully ſerve you, and whom you devour in return for their ſervices.

"Unnatural murderers! if you ſtill perſiſt that you are made to devour your fellow-creatures, creatures of fleſh and blood, living and ſenſible as yourſelves, ſuppreſs at once that horror which nature inſpires againſt ſuch cruel repaſts: kill, yourſelf, the animals you would eat; I ſay, kill them with your own hands, without knives or cleavers. Tear them to pieces with your own fingers, as the lions and bears do with their claws: ſet your teeth into the ox, and pull him to pieces; ſtick your nails into his hide: eat the tender lamb up alive; devour his fleſh yet warm, and drink up his ſoul with his blood. Do

you

you ſhudder? Dare you not hold a piece of living fleſh in your teeth? Deſpicable mortals! you kill the animal firſt, and eat him afterwards, as if you endeavoured to kill him twice. Nor is even this ſufficient; even raw fleſh diſguſts you; your ſtomach cannot digeſt it; it muſt be tranſformed by cookery over the fire; it muſt be boiled, roaſted, and ſeaſoned with ſalt and ſpices that entirely diſguiſe its natural taſte. You muſt be furniſhed with butchers, bakers, and cooks, with people whoſe buſineſs it is to diſpel the horror of murder; and dreſs up the limbs of dead carcaſes in ſuch a manner, that the palate, deceived by the artificial preparation, may not reject what is ſo unnatural, but find a pleaſure in the taſte of cadaverous morſels, which the eye can hardly look on without horror."

Although the above citation be ſomething foreign to my ſubject, I could not reſiſt the temptation of tranſcribing it; and I imagine few of my readers will be diſpleaſed at the peruſal of it.

As to what relates farther to the regimen of children, provided you accuſtom them only to ſimple and common aliments, you may let them eat, run about, and play as much as they will, without any danger of their eating too much, or of being incommoded by indigeſtions. But if you let them go famiſhed one half of their time, and they can poſſibly eſcape your vigilance, they will doubtleſs indemnify themſelves, and eat till they are almoſt ready to burſt. Our appetites are irregular only becauſe we would impoſe rules on them that are not dictated by nature. Being for ever buſied in regulating, preſcribing, adding or retrenching, we do nothing without a pair of

ſcales

ſcales in our hands; but theſe ſcales ſerve only to weigh our own caprices, and are not the balance of our appetite. Among the peaſants, the cup-board and orchard are always open, and we do not find that either the old or young among them know any thing of indigeſtions.

If it ſhould ever happen, however, that a child is given to eat too much, which I hardly think poſſible in my way of education, it is very eaſy ſo far to divert his attention, by ſuch amuſements as he is fond of, that he may become almoſt famiſhed without even thinking of his victuals. Is it not ſtrange, that ſuch ſimple and eaſy means ſhould have eſcaped all thoſe who have treated this ſubject of education?

Herodotus relates, that the Lydians, being oppreſſed by a great famine, invented and inſtituted certain games and other amuſements, in order to divert their attention from the cravings of appetite, and enable them to paſs away whole days without thinking of any thing to eat *. Ye learned governors and tutors! you have read this paſſage probably an hundred times, without ever thinking of what application might be made of it to children. Some of you, probably, will tell me, that a child will never voluntarily leave his dinner to go to his leſſon. Moſt grave preceptor, you are certainly in the right of it: but this is

* The ancient hiſtorians preſent many uſeful things to our view, were even the facts on which they are founded confeſſedly falſe. But we know not how to make any good uſe of hiſtory. Critical erudition ingroſſes every thing, as if it was of more conſequence to know the truth of a fact, than to draw from it any uſeful inſtruction. Senſible men ought to look upon hiſtory as a collection of fables, whoſe morals may be uſeful to mankind.

is not the kind of amuſement I ſhould recommend in ſuch a caſe.

The ſenſe of ſmelling is to the taſte, what that of the ſight is to the touch: it precedes, and informs the taſte of the manner in which different ſubſtances will affect it; and thence diſpoſes it to ſeek or ſhun ſuch ſubſtance, according to the previous impreſſion it thus receives. I have been told, that this ſenſe, in ſavages, is affected very differently from ours, and that they judge quite otherwiſe of good and bad ſcents. For my part, I am apt to believe it. Odours are in themſelves feeble ſenſations: they affect the imagination more than the ſenſe; and influence us leſs by thoſe ſenſations they actually excite, than by ſuch as they give us reaſon to expect. This being ſuppoſed, the taſte of ſome perſons becoming, from their manner of living, ſo different from the taſte of others, they ought to form a very different judgment of the ſame ſavours, and of courſe of the odours that accompany them. Thus a Tartar may as luxuriouſly feaſt his noſe on a ſtinking quarter of a dead horſe, as our lovers of game ſnuff up the ſteams of putrefaction that ariſe from a tainted hare or partridge.

Perſons who are always hungry cannot take any great pleaſure in ſcents that do not accompany ſomething to eat. Our feeble and indolent ſenſations ſhould therefore be almoſt imperceptible to thoſe who walk too much to love walking, and labour too little to find any great pleaſure in reſt.

The ſmell is a ſenſe intimately connected with the imagination. By its bracing the nerves, it

ſhould

ſhould more ſtrongly agitate the brain: hence it is that odours firſt relieve the ſpirits, but afterwards, by continued uſe, are deſtructive. Their effect is well known in the paſſion of love: the ſweet effluvia that perfume the toilette of a fine lady are not ſo deſpicable a ſnare as may be imagined; and I know not whether to felicitate or lament the man of great ſenſe, and little ſenſibility, whoſe heart never felt a palpitation from the ſcent of the roſes in the boſom of his miſtreſs.

The ſenſe of ſmelling cannot be very active in the firſt age of youth, in which the imagination, little animated by the paſſions, is hardly ſuſceptible of emotion; and in which we have not acquired experience enough to know, by the information of one ſenſe, what is promiſed by another. This obſervation is confirmed by experience; for it is certain that this ſenſe is very dull in moſt children. Not that the ſenſation itſelf is not as ſubtile, and perhaps more ſo than in men; but becauſe, annexing to it no idea, they do not eaſily derive from it a ſenſe of pain or pleaſure, and are not delighted or offended as we are.

I believe, that, without departing from this ſyſtem, or having recourſe to the comparative anatomy of the two ſexes, it would not be difficult to give a reaſon why women in general are more affected by odours than the men.

It is ſaid that the ſavages of Canada acquire, in their infancy, ſo ſubtile a ſenſe of ſmelling, that, notwithſtanding they have good dogs, they diſdain to make uſe of them in the chace, and are their own dogs when they go out a-hunting.

I can

I can eaſily conceive, that if we ſhould educate children to ſcent or ſmell out their dinner, in the ſame manner as dogs are uſed to ſcent the game, we might poſſibly bring that ſenſe to the ſame degree of perfection in men as in dogs: not that I ſee, in fact, that they can deduce any great uſe from ſuch a degree of perfection in this ſenſe, unleſs in regard to the relations between this and that of the taſte. Nature hath taken care to make us experience theſe relations; having almoſt inſeparably united the action of the latter ſenſe to that of the former, by placing their organs near to each other, and opening an immediate communication between both, ſo that we can taſte nothing perfectly without ſmelling it at the ſame time. What I would adviſe is, that we ſhould not alter theſe natural relations, to cheat a child by concealing, for example, under ſome agreeable aromatic, a diſagreeable medicine: for the diſcord of the two ſenſes is then too great to be eaſily abuſed; the moſt active ſenſe abſorbing the effect of the other, and rendering the medicine not the leſs diſguſtful. This diſguſt extends itſelf, alſo, to all the ſenſations that affect us at the ſame time; the imagination is excited by the weakeſt to recall the ſtronger: thus a perfume too ſweet, becomes only diſguſting; and thus it is that our indiſcreet precautions augment the ſum of our diſpleaſing ſenſations at the expence of thoſe which are agreeable.

It remains for me to treat, in the ſucceeding books, of the cultivation of a kind of ſixth ſenſe; called *common ſenſe*: not ſo much becauſe it is common to all men, as becauſe it reſults from the

the well-regulated uſe of the other ſenſes, and inſtructs us in the nature of things from their concurrent appearances. This ſixth ſenſe has, of courſe, no particular organ; but reſides in the brain; its ſenſations, which are purely internal, being called *perceptions* or *ideas*. It is the number of theſe ideas that limits the extent of our knowledge; it is their perſpicuity that determines the clearneſs of the underſtanding; and it is the art of comparing them with each other, that is called human reaſon. Thus, what I call ſenſitive or puerile reaſon, conſiſts in forming ſimple ideas from the concurrence of various ſenſations; and what I call intellectual or human reaſon, conſiſts in forming complex ideas from the concurrence of many ſimple ideas.

On the ſuppoſition, then, that my method is natural, and that I am not deceived in the application, I have conducted my pupil through the region of ſenſation to the confines of puerile reaſoning: the firſt ſtep we take beyond theſe limits, ought to be that of a man. But before we enter on this new career, let us caſt our eye, for a moment, over that through which we have paſſed. Every age, every ſtate of life, has its particular degrees of perfection, a kind of maturity peculiar to itſelf. We have often heard talk of a full-grown man; let us conſider a little what is a full-grown child: this object will be more new to us, and perhaps hot leſs agreeable.

The exiſtence of finite beings is ſo poor and limited, that when we ſee them only as they are, we are little affected. The real object is ag-

aggrandized by chimeras; and if the imagination added no charm to thoſe which actually ſtrike our ſenſes, the barren pleaſure we ſhould take therein would be confined to the organ, and would leave the heart unaffected. The fields and vineyards, adorned with all the treaſures of autumn, preſent a ſcene which the eye naturally admires: but this admiration is cold and unaffecting; if it pleaſes, it is more from reflection than ſentiment. In the ſpring, the country appears bleak and naked; the woods afford no ſhade, and the verdure is hardly perceptible on the plain; and yet the heart is immediately affected with the proſpect. At the ſight of re-animated nature, it feels itſelf re-animated; the images of delight are excited all around; the companions of its pleaſures, thoſe tears of joy which are ever ready to accompany delightful ſentiments, ſtand already in our eyes. But the proſpect of harveſt, however animated, lively, and agreeable, we always behold with different ſenſations.

Whence is this difference? It is, that, to the proſpect of the ſpring, the imagination joins that of the ſucceeding ſeaſons; to the tender buds which the eye juſt beholds, it adds the flowers, the fruits, the ſpreading ſhades, and ſometimes the myſterious pleaſures they ſpread themſelves to conceal. The imagination preſents, in one point of view, various, ſucceſſive ſcenes, and takes a proſpect of objects, not as they really are, but as it could wiſh them to be. In autumn, on the contrary, nothing more is to be ſeen in idea than exiſts in fact. If we would anticipate the ſpring, cold winter intervenes,

and the imagination is chilled amidſt froſt and ſnows.

Such is the ſource of thoſe charms which are preſented us by promiſing infancy, in preference to the perfection of maturer age. When do we conceive any real pleaſure in taking a view of the ſituation of a man? It is then only when the rememberance of his actions enables us to take a retroſpect of his life, and to repreſent him in the time of his youth. If we are reduced to the neceſſity of conſidering him ſuch as he is, or to ſuppoſe him ſuch as he will be in old age, the idea of declining nature effaces all our pleaſures. We can take no delight in ſeeing a man advance with haſty ſtrides to the tomb; the image of death involves every thing in deformity.

But when I take a view of a child, ten or twelve years of age, robuſt, and well-formed, every idea that his ſituation excites is agreeable, whether relative to the preſent or the future. I ſee him animated, lively, active, ſporting about without care, and undiſturbed by the thoughts of futurity; capable of enjoying all his faculties; and ſo full of life, as to ſeem deſirous to infuſe it into every object around him. I foreſee him in a more advanced age, exerting that ſenſe and genius which his faculties are daily diſplaying: I contemplate the object before me; as a child, he gives me great delight; as a future man, he delights me ſtill more; his youthful blood ſeems to give freſh motion to mine; I catch from him a new portion of life, and grow young again in his vivacity.

But the clock ſtrikes; the ſchool hour is come:

come: what an alteration! In a moment his eyes loſe their fire, his chearfulneſs is at an end: farewell to joy and play. A ſevere and crabbed preceptor takes him by the hand, and ſaying gravely, *Come, Sir*, forces him away. The chamber he is led into is furniſhed with books. Books! Dull furniture indeed for a child of his age; but the poor infant ſuffers himſelf to be dragged thither, caſting in ſilence an eye of regret on every object around him, his eyes ſwimming in tears he dares not ſhed, and his heart ſwelling with ſighs he dares not vent.

O thou, who haſt nothing of this kind to fear; thou, who art always a ſtranger to trouble and reſtraint; thou, who paſſeſt the day without diſquietude, the night without impatience, and reckoneſt the hours only by thy pleaſures; come, my happy, my amiable pupil, and comfort me, by thy preſence, for the departure of this little unfortunate. He comes——I feel at his approach a ſenſation of joy, of which I ſee him with pleaſure partake. It is his friend, his comrade, the companion of his ſports, who called him; he is certain, that, whenever he ſees me, he ſhall not be long without ſome agreeable amuſement: we never are dependent on each other, yet always agree; and are never ſo happy with any other perſon, as when we are together.

His figure, attitude, and countenance, ſpeak aſſurance and contentment; his face is the picture of health; his firm ſtep gives him an air of ſtrength and vigour; his complexion, delicate without being pale and wan, has nothing in it of effeminate ſoftneſs; the ſun and the wind ha-

having already given to his ſkin the honourable teint of his ſex: his features, though ſtill plump, begin to ſhow ſome diſtinguiſhing marks of phyſiognomy; his eyes, as yet unanimated by the glow of ſentiment, have all their natural ſerenity; they are not grown dull and heavy, from care or ſorrow, nor have inceſſant tears made furrows in his cheeks. On the contrary, you may ſee, in his alert but ſteady motions, the vivacity of his age, the firmneſs of his independence, and the experience he hath gained from the many and various exerciſes to which he has been accuſtomed. He has an open and liberal mein, without the leaſt air of inſolence or vanity: as he has not been kept poring over his books, his looks are not directed downwards, nor is there any occaſion to bid him hold up his head; neither fear nor ſhame ever made him hang it down.

Make room for him, Gentlemen, in the midſt of an aſſembly; examine him, aſk him what queſtions you pleaſe: you need neither fear his impertinence, his prate, nor his indiſcretion. You need be under no apprehenſions that he will expect to ingroſs your employment or converſation, or that you ſhould not be able to get rid of him at pleaſure.

At the ſame time, you muſt as little expect of him ſmart repartees, or witty and agreeable diſcourſe. You muſt not think he will retail to you a ſet of pretty phraſes that I may have taught him by rote. All that you have to expect from him, is ſimple and native truth, without ornament, without preparation, and without vanity. He will as readily tell you his evil thoughts and actions, as his good ones, without giving

giving himſelf any concern about the effect it may have on thoſe to whom he is ſpeaking. He will uſe the privilege of ſpeech with all the ſimplicity of its firſt inſtitution.

We are fond of forming good preſages of children, and always feel regret at that torrent of impertinence, which uſually overturns thoſe hopes that are ſo apt to be excited when any lucky hit eſcapes them. If mine ſhould ſeldom excite ſuch hopes, he will in return never occaſion ſuch regret; for he will never make uſe of an uſeleſs word, nor waſte his breath in talking what nobody will liſten to. His ideas, it is true, are confined, but clear; if he knows nothing by rote, he knows a great deal by experience. If he hath read leſs than other children in printed volumes, he hath read much more in the volume of nature. His underſtanding does not lie on his tongue, but in his brain. He hath leſs memory than judgment: he can ſpeak only one language, but then he underſtands what he ſays; and though he may not talk of things ſo well as others, he will do them much better.

He knows nothing at all of cuſtom, faſhion, or habit: what he did yeſterday, hath no influence at all on what he is to do to-day *: he

* The influence of habit ariſes from the natural indolence of man, and this indolence increaſes in proportion as he indulges himſelf in it. It is leſs trouble to do as we have done before, than to ſtrike out any thing new: the road is beaten, and it is eaſier trod. Thus it is remarkable that the influence of habit is very great over old men and idle perſons, and very little over youth and ſuch as are active and lively. Habit is convenient only for weak minds, which it enfeebles daily more and more.

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purſues no formula, is influenced by no authority or example, but acts and ſpeaks from his own judgment. Hence you muſt never expect of him ſtudied diſcourſes nor affected manners; but always the faithful expreſſion of his ideas, and a conduct influenced only by his inclinations.

You will find in him a few moral notions relative to his actual ſtate, but none on the relative ſituation in which he ſtands to ſociety: and indeed of what uſe would the latter be to him, as, while a child, he is not yet become an acting member of the community? Talk to him about liberty, property, or even the right of convention, he will ſo far underſtand you: he knows why that which belongs to him, is really his own; and why that which does not belong to him, is not his own. But go beyond this, and he will underſtand nothing of the matter. Speak to him of duty and obedience, and he will not know what you are talking about. Command him to do any thing, he will not underſtand what you mean by it: but tell him, that, if he will do you ſuch or ſuch a favour now, you will return it on ſome other occaſion, he will fly immediately to oblige you; for he deſires nothing more than to increaſe his rights, and to acquire over you thoſe which he thinks inviolable. Perhaps he will not even be ſorry to be held in eſtimation, and be looked upon

The only habit that can be uſeful to children, is to accuſtom them to ſubmit without reluctance to neceſſity; and the only uſeful one to grown perſons is that which teaches them to ſubmit in like manner to reaſon. Every other habit is a vice.

upon as of ſome conſequence; but if you diſcover this laſt motive, he hath already deviated from nature, and we have not taken care to cloſe up all the avenues of vanity.

If, on his part, he ſhould have any occaſion for aſſiſtance, he will aſk it indifferently of the firſt perſon he meets, of a king as well as a footboy: all men are, in his notions, equal. You would ſee, by the manner of his requeſt, that he thinks nothing due to him. He knows that which he aſks is a favour, and alſo that it is humanity to grant it him. His expreſſion is ſimple and laconic: his voice, his looks, his geſtures, are thoſe of a being equally accuſtomed to meet with compliance and refuſal. He affects neither the mean and ſervile ſubmiſſion of a ſlave, nor the imperious tone of a maſter; but diſplays a modeſt confidence in his fellow-creature, the noble and affecting complacence of a free, ſenſible, and feeble being, who deſires the aſſiſtance of another being, equally free and independent, but powerful and beneficent. If you comply with his requeſt alſo, he will not thank you for ſo doing; but will be ſenſible that he has contracted an obligation which he will ever be ready to repay. If, on the contrary, you refuſe him aſſiſtance, he will not complain, nor inſiſt on your compliance; he knows that will be needleſs; but he will ſay to himſelf, "It could not be;" and, as I have obſerved already, we never refuſe to ſubmit to an acknowledged neceſſity.

Leave him alone at full liberty, and take notice of his actions, without ſpeaking to him; obſerve, in ſuch a ſituation, what he does, and how

how he goes about it. As he is under no temptation or neceſſity to convince himſelf of his freedom, he will do nothing out of wantonneſs, or merely to exert an act of power; he is very ſenſible he is always maſter of himſelf. He is alert, light, and active; his motions have all the vivacity of his age, but you will ſee none of them but what are directed to ſome end. Whatever he may have a mind to do, he will undertake nothing above his abilities; for theſe he has tried, and knows them perfectly well: the means he makes uſe of, alſo, are always duly adapted to his deſigns, and he ſeldom attempts any thing without being aſſured of ſucceſs. He hath an attentive and accurate eye; he never goes about idly, aſking other people concerning what he ſees; but examines it himſelf, and will rather take a great deal of trouble to find out what he hath a mind to know, than aſk about it. If ever he falls into unforeſeen embarraſſments, he is leſs perplexed, and, if there be danger, ſtill leſs frightened, than others would be in the like circumſtances. As his imagination remains as yet inactive, he only ſees what is true in reality; he rates the danger at what it is, and always preſerves a coolneſs of temper. He has been obliged too often to ſubmit to neceſſity, to think of oppoſing it now; he hath felt its yoke from the cradle, and is prepared for the worſt that can happen.

Whether he is at work or at play, he knows no difference; both are alike to him; his diverſions are his buſineſs. In every thing he does, he is gayly intereſted, and pleaſingly at liberty;

berty; diſplaying at once the turn of his genius and the compaſs of his knowledge. Is it not a moſt delightful picture, to ſee a well made youth, with a lively and cheerful eye, a contented and ſerene air, and an open ſmiling countenance, taking a delight in the moſt ſerious occupations, or profoundly buſied in the moſt frivolous amuſements?

Would you take a view of this object in the light of compariſon? Let him mix in the company of other children, you will ſee preſently which is moſt completely formed, and comes neareſt to the perfection of their age. Among the children educated in town, none will be found more acute and expert than he, and yet he will ſurpaſs them all in point of ſtrength. Among thoſe which are brought up in the country, he will equal the young peaſants in ſtrength, and ſurpaſs them greatly in addreſs and ingenuity. With reſpect to every thing within the capacity of young perſons of his age, he will judge, reaſon, and foreſee, better than all thoſe who are educated in the common methods either in town or country. In running, leaping, moving or liſting bodies; in eſtimating diſtances, inventing amuſements, and carrying off the prize at each; one would imagine all nature at his command, he knows ſo well how to carry his point in whatever he undertakes. He is formed to guide, to govern his equals; ingenuity and experience ſerve him in the place of right and authority. Give him what garb and name you pleaſe, it is no matter; he will be always at the head of his companions, and they will ever be ſenſible of his ſuperiority over them. Without the

the deſire of commanding, he will be their maſter; without believing they obey, they will be obedient to him in every thing.

He is arrived at the maturity of infancy, he hath lived the life of a child, and has not purchaſed the perfection he hath attained at the expence of his happineſs; on the contrary, both have concurred in his education. Even in acquiring the knowledge and underſtanding of his age, he hath been as free and happy as his conſtitution would permit him: So that if Providence ſhould deprive us of him in the bloſſom of our hopes, we ſhall not have at once to lament both his life and his death; our ſorrows will not be aggravated by the remembrance of thoſe which we have occaſioned him: we ſhall have it to ſay, at leaſt, that he enjoyed life in his infancy, and that we did not deprive him of any of thoſe good things nature beſtowed on him.

The great inconvenience in this mode of education, is, that the effects of it are not perceptible to any but perſons of diſcernment; and that children, educated with all the care I have been ſpeaking of, would appear to vulgar eyes only as ſo many blundering uncultivated boys. A preceptor uſually ſtudies more his own intereſt than that of his pupil; he endeavours to make it appear that his time and pains are not thrown away, and that he deſerves a much better ſalary than he is paid. He furniſhes his diſciple, therefore, with acquiſitions pompous in their form, and eaſily diſplayed: he does not trouble himſelf whether the inſtructions he gives his pupil be uſeful or not, provided what he teaches

teaches him is calculated to make a figure in the eyes of others. To this end, he indiſcriminately ſtuffs the memory with a heap of paltry literature, not more burdenſome than uſeleſs.

When the child is to be examined, he is made to exhibit his ſtock of merchandiſe; he diſplays it at large; we admire it for a while; and then he packs up his bale again, and marches off. My pupil is not ſo rich; he has no ſuch packet of baubles to diſplay; he hath nothing to exhibit but himſelf. Now, a child is no eaſier to be known at firſt ſight than a man. Where are the penetrating obſervers, who can fix in a moment on thoſe features by which they are characteriſed? Doubtleſs there are ſuch; but there are very few, and not to be met with in one father in a hundred.

A multiplicity of queſtions tire and diſguſt every body, much more children. They are fatigued in a few minutes, and pay no longer attention to the obſtinate inquiſitor who continues to queſtion them; anſwering him only at random. This method of examination, therefore, is futile and pedantic; a ſingle word, ſometimes, let fall by chance, gives us a better inſight into their genius and character than a tedious converſation: but we muſt be careful to mark that ſuch word was neither accidental nor acquired. It requires a good deal of judgement in one's ſelf to eſtimate that of a child.

I remember a ſtory, which I heard related by the late Lord Hyde, concerning one of his friends, who, returning from Italy after an abſence of three years, had a mind to examine into the progreſs of his ſon, a boy about nine or

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ten years old. To this end he took an opportunity, as he was walking out one evening, with the child and its governor, in a field where the ſcholars were amuſing themſelves with flying their kites. Obſerving the ſhadow of one of the kites in the path along which they were walking, the father aſked the ſon, "Where was the kite of which they ſaw the ſhadow?" To which the boy, without heſitating or lifting up his head, readily anſwered, "In the highway." And in reality, added my Lord Hyde, the highway was ſituated between us and the ſun. The father embraced the child in rapture at his reply: and ſo finiſhed the examination. The next day he ſettled an annuity alſo on his governor, independent of his other allowance.

How ſenſible a father! how promiſing a child! The queſtion aſked was preciſely adapted to his age; the anſwer was certainly very ſimple; but do you ſee what an accuracy of infantine judgement it ſuppoſes? Thus it was that the pupil of Ariſtotle managed the celebrated courſer that none of his equeries could tame.

BOOK. III.

ALTHOUGH, till the age of puberty, the whole courſe of life be one continued ſeries of imbecility, there is a certain period in this firſt age of life, in which the progreſs of his paſſions exceeding that of his neceſſities, the growing animal, though abſolutely weak, becomes relatively ſtrong. His wants not being wholly diſplayed, his actual abilities are more than ſufficient to provide for thoſe which he really feels. Conſidered as a man, he is very weak; but as a child, he is abundantly ſtrong. Whence proceeds the weakneſs of man? From the diſproportion he finds between his faculties and his deſires. It is our paſſions that render us feeble; becauſe, to gratify them, requires greater powers than nature has furniſhed us with. Diminiſh, then, the number, check the extravagance, of your deſires, and you increaſe your powers of gratification. He who can compaſs more than he requires, hath ability to ſpare, and is certainly a powerful being. Here begins the third ſtage of infancy, of which I am now about to treat; it being that ſtate of childhood which approaches nearly to puberty, without being quite arrived at the term.

At twelve or thirteen years of age, the faculties of a child diſplay themſelves more rapidly than his wants. The moſt impetuous, the moſt coercive of all phyſical neceſſities he hath not yet experienced. The very organs that pro-

vide for its gratification are as yet imperfect, and ſeem to wait the exertion of the will to capacitate them for action. Unaffected by the inclemency of the weather, or the change of ſeaſons, his natural heat ſupplies the artificial warmth of apparel, and his keenneſs of appetite the provocatives of ſauce. At his age, whatever is but nouriſhing, is good; if he be drowſy, he ſtretches himſelf on the ground, and falls aſleep. Whatever he hath occaſion for, is within his reach; he craves not after imaginary dainties; he feels no diſguſt from prepoſſeſſion. His deſires confined within the ſphere of his abilities, he is not only capable of providing for himſelf, but poſſeſſes ſuperfluous faculties for which he has no uſe. This, however, is the only time, during life, in which he will be in ſuch a ſituation.

It may be objected, that, though I have not ſuppoſed the wants of my child fewer than they really are, yet that I attribute to him too great a power of ſatisfying them. It ſhould always be remembered, however, that I am ſpeaking particularly of my own pupil, and not of thoſe enervated puppets, who make it a journey to waddle out of one room into another; who gaſp for breath in ſtrait-laced ſtays, or labour under a load of whale-bone or buckram. It may be ſaid, that manly abilities are diſplayed only in a ſtate of manhood; that the animal ſpirits duly prepared and diſtributed in their proper channels through the whole body, are only capable to give that conſiſtence, activity, tone, and elaſticity to the muſcles which conſtitute real ſtrength. Such, indeed, is the philoſophy of the cloſet; but

but I appeal to experience. I ſee ſturdy boys daily employed in the fields about the moſt laborious parts of huſbandry; ſo that they might be taken for grown men, if their voices did not betray them. Even in our cities, we ſee the young artiſans frequently as robuſt as their maſters, and equally expert for the time they have ſerved. If there be any difference in their capacity and abilities, and I confeſs there is ſome, it is much leſs, I ſay again, than that between the impetuous deſires of a man and the confined inclinations of a child: for, it is to be obſerved, we are not here ſpeaking of mere corporeal abilities; but more particularly of thoſe mental faculties and talents by which the former are directed and ſupplied.

This interval, in which the individual is able to effect more than he requires, though it be not the period of his greateſt abſolute ſtrength, is, as I before obſerved, that of his greateſt relative ability.

This interval contains the moſt precious moments of his life; moments never to return, few and tranſitory; hence the more precious, as to employ them well becomes of the greater importance.

To what uſe, then, is it proper a child ſhould put that redundancy of abilities, of which he is at preſent poſſeſſed, and hereafter will ſtand in need of? He ſhould employ it on thoſe things which may be of utility in time to come. He ſhould throw, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the ſuperfluity of his preſent being into his future exiſtence. The robuſt child ſhould provide for the ſubſiſtence of the feeble man; not in laying

up his treaſure in coffers, whence thieves may ſteal, nor by intruſting it in the hands of others; but by keeping it in his own. To appropriate his acquiſitions to himſelf, he will ſecure them in the ſtrength and dexterity of his own arms, and in the capacity of his own head. This, therefore, is the time for employment, for inſtruction, for ſtudy. Obſerve alſo, that I have not arbitrarily fixed on this period for that purpoſe: Nature itſelf plainly points it out to us.

So circumſcribed is human intelligence, that we are not only denied the power of attaining univerſal knowledge, but it is impoſſible even to know perfectly the little that is attained by others. As the reverſe of every falſe propoſition is true, the ſource of truth muſt be as inexhauſtible as that of error. A proper choice therefore ſhould be made of the ſubjects, as well as of the time, for inſtruction. Of the arts and ſciences within our acquiſition, ſome are fallacious, others uſeleſs, and others again ſerve only to flatter the vanity of their reſpective profeſſors. The ſmall number of ſuch as really contribute to our well-being, are thoſe only that merit the attention of a wiſe man, and of courſe of the child that we are ſolicitous to make ſo. The point in view, therefore, is not what may be true, but what is uſeful.

From this ſcanty proportion of uſeful knowledge, we muſt yet farther ſubtract thoſe truths which require an underſtanding already formed, ſuch as preſuppoſe the knowledge of thoſe different relations and circumſtances with which a child cannot be acquainted, and which, though true

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in themſelves, diſpoſe an unexperienced mind to form a wrong judgment on other occaſions.

Thus are we reduced, in our ſyſtem of education, to a very ſmall circle, compared with the ſyſtem of things. This, however, appears an immenſe ſphere to the contracted faculties of a child: ſo dark are the clouds that obſcure the dawn of the human underſtanding! Where is the man who hath temerity enough to attempt their diſſipation; what an abyſs hath fruitleſs knowledge dug round the hapleſs youth! Tremble, preſumptuous man! thou who art about to conduct him through its dangerous paths, and to draw from before his eyes the ſacred curtain of nature; be firſt well aſſured of his capacity and your own, leſt the intellects of one or the other, and perhaps both, be perverted in the attempt. Beware of the ſpecious allurements of falſehood, and the intoxicating fumes of pride. Remember, conſtantly remember, that mere ignorance hath never been hurtful; that error alone is deſtructive; and that we do not err in things we are profeſſedly ignorant of, but in thoſe which we conceive we know.

The progreſs which your pupil makes in geometry, will ſerve both as a proof and guide in the diſplay of his capacity. As ſoon, however, as he is capable of diſtinguiſhing what is uſeful, it requires great addreſs and circumſpection to introduce ſpeculative ſubjects. Are you deſirous, for inſtance, that he ſhould know how to find a mean proportional between two given lines? Begin by inducing him practically to find a ſquare equal to a given rectangle. If the queſtion be, to find two mean proportionals, it

will be requiſite to make the problem of doubling the cube peculiarly intereſting. Hence you ſee, in what manner we might approach by degrees thoſe truths on which are founded the moral diſtinctions of good and evil. Hitherto we have been governed by no law but that of neceſſity; at preſent we begin to conſider what is uſeful, and ſhall not be long before we come to the conſideration of what is good and proper.

The various faculties of men are excited by the ſame inſtinct. To the activity of the body, making conſtant efforts to diſplay its abilities, ſucceeds that of the mind, as conſtantly ſeeking after information. Children, when very young, ſeem endowed only with a capacity and inclination for motion: they afterwards become inquiſitive and curious; and this curioſity, well directed, becomes, at the age they have now attained, their chief ſpring of action. Let us be always careful to diſtinguiſh thoſe propenſities which are implanted by nature, from thoſe which are ingrafted by the dictates of prejudice and opinion. A thirſt after knowledge may proceed merely from the vanity of deſiring to be thought learned; it may alſo ariſe from that curioſity which naturally excites us to inquire after every thing in which we may be either directly or indirectly intereſted. Our innate deſire of happineſs, and the impoſſibility of our fully gratifying that deſire, are the cauſe of our conſtant reſearches after new expedients to contribute to that end.

This is the firſt principle or motive of curioſity: a principle which is natural to the heart of man, but which diſplays itſelf only in obedience

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to our paſſions, and in proporoion to our acquirements of knowledge. Let us ſuppoſe a philoſopher caſt aſhore on a deſert iſland, together with his books and inſtruments, and that he was under an abſolute certainty of ſpending in that ſolitude the remainder his days. He would never trouble himſelf farther about the ſyſtem of the univerſe, the laws of attraction, or the fluxionary calculus. It is probable he would never after look in a book, during his whole life; but he certainly would not fail to explore the iſland, however extenſive, even to its remoteſt corners. Let us, therefore, in our early ſtudies, reject thoſe ſciences for which man has not a natural turn, and confine ourſelves to thoſe which inſtinct directs us to purſue.

The earth is the iſland on which mankind are caſt, and the moſt ſtriking objects of their obſervation is the ſun. As ſoon as our ideas begin to extend beyond ourſelves, our attention will therefore naturally be ingroſſed between two ſuch intereſting ſubjects. Hence the philoſophy of almoſt every ſavage nation is confined ſolely to the imaginary diviſions of the earth, and the divinity of the ſun. "What an excurſion!" cries the reader. "We were but juſt now employed about objects that immediately ſurround us, and we are now traverſing the globe, and ſoaring to the diſtant extremities of the univerſe." This excurſion, however, is the ſimple effect of the progreſs of our faculties, and the bent of our underſtanding. During our infant ſtate of weakneſs and incapacity, all our thoughts, influenced by ſelf-preſervation, are confined within ourſelves. On the contrary, in a more advanced age,

age, as our abilities increaſe, the deſire of improving our exiſtence carries us out of ourſelves, and our ideas extend to their utmoſt limits. As the intellectual world, however, is as yet unknown to us, our thoughts cannot extend farther than we can ſee; but our comprehenſion dilates itſelf with the bounds of ſpace.

Let us convert our ſenſations into ideas; but let us not fly at once from ſenſible to intellectual objects. It is by a due and rational attention to the former we can only attain the latter. In the firſt operations of the underſtanding, let our ſenſes then always be our guide, the world our only book, and facts our ſole preceptors. Children, when taught to read, learn that only; they never think; they gain no information; all their learning conſiſts in words.

Direct the attention of your pupil to the phænomena of nature, and you will ſoon awaken his curioſity; but to keep that curioſity alive, you muſt be in no haſte to ſatisfy it. Put queſtions to him adapted to his capacity, and leave him to reſolve them. Let him take nothing on truſt from his preceptor, but on his own comprehenſion and conviction: he ſhould not learn, but invent the ſciences. If ever you ſubſtitute authority in the place of argument, he will reaſon no longer; he will be ever afterwards bandied like a ſhuttle-cock between the opinions of others.

You intend, we will ſuppoſe, to teach your child geography, and for that purpoſe provide for him maps, ſpheres, and globes. What an apparatus! Wherefore all theſe mere repreſentations of things? Why do you not rather begin by

by ſhewing him the object itſelf, that he may at leaſt know what it is you are talking about?

Walk out with him ſome fine evening to a convenient ſpot, from whence an extenſive horizon may give you a full view of the ſetting ſun; and then take particular notice of ſuch objects as mark the place of its going down. Return the next morning, with a profeſſed deſign only of taking the freſh air, to the ſame place, before the ſun riſes. There you will ſee the fiery rays it ſcatters among the clouds, as harbingers of its approach. The illumination increaſes, the eaſt ſeems all in flames, and you expect the glorious orb long before it diſcovers itſelf above the horizon; you think you ſee it every moment; it at length appears. Its rays dart like lightening over the face of nature, and darkneſs vaniſhes at the ſight. Man glories in his habitation, and ſees it embelliſhed with new beauty. The lawn is refreſhed by the coolneſs of the night, and the light of the morn diſplays its increaſing verdure: the dew beſpangled-flowers that enamel its ſurface glitter in the ſun-beams, and, like rubies and emeralds, dart their colours on the eye. The cheerful birds unite in choirs, and hail in concert the parent of life: not one is ſilent, at this inchanting moment none are mute, though in feeble notes, more ſlow and ſoft than thoſe they chaunt all day, as if from peaceful ſlumbers ſcarce awoke, they join in languid harmony. The aſſemblage of ſo many pleaſing objects imprints a glowing ſenſation that ſeems to penetrate the ſoul. Who can withſtand the rapture of this ſhort interval of inchantment? it is impoſſible ſo grand, ſo beautiful, ſo delightful a ſcene,

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can be ever beheld with indifference. Full of that enthuſiaſtic rapture with which a preceptor is inſpired on ſuch an occaſion, he endeavours perhaps to communicate it to his pupil; he expects to excite the ſame emotions in the child, by attracting its attention to thoſe ſenſations which he experiences within himſelf. Ridiculous expectation! it is the heart only that contemplates the beauties of nature: to be ſeen, they ſhould be always felt. A child indeed may perceive the ſeveral objects, but their connection is to him inviſible; he is inſenſible to the harmony of the ſpheres. He requires an experience he hath not yet attained, and ſentiments to which he is as yet a ſtranger, to be ſuſceptible of that complex impreſſion which is the general reſult of all theſe ſenſations. If he has not travelled over deſerts; if his feet have never been parched by burning ſands; if he never hath felt the ſcorching ſun-beams reflected from the ſurrounding rocks, how can he taſte the freſh air of a fine morning? How ſhould he be enraptured with the fragrance of the flowers, the refreſhing verdure of the graſs, the dew drops ſparkling in the ſun, or the ſoft carpet of the downy moſs? How ſhould the warbling of birds inſpire him with glowing raptures, who is a ſtranger to the ſoft accents of love and delight? How can he behold with tranſport the dawn of ſo lovely a day, whoſe imagination cannot paint to itſelf the joys it is capable of beſtowing? In a word, what tender ſenſations can be excited by the charms of nature, in him who is ignorant by whoſe hand ſhe is ſo beautifully adorned? Talk not to children in a language they do not comprehend; make

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uſe of no pompous deſcriptions, no flowers of ſpeech, no tropes and figures, no poetry; taſte and ſentiment are at preſent quite out of the queſtion: ſimplicity, gravity, and preciſion are all that are yet required; the time will come but too ſoon when we muſt aſſume a different ſtyle.

A pupil educated agreeable to theſe maxims, and accuſtomed to receive no aſſiſtance till he has diſcovered his own inabilities, will examine every new object with a long and ſilent attention. He will be thoughtful without aſking queſtions. Content yourſelf, therefore, with preſenting proper objects opportunely to his notice, and when you ſee they have ſufficiently excited his curioſity, drop from leading laconic queſtions, which may put him in the way of diſcovering the truth.

On the preſent occaſion, having for ſome time contemplated the riſing ſun, and made your pupil obſerve the hills and other neighbouring objects on that ſide, permitting him the while to talk about them without interruption, ſtand ſilent a few moments, and affect a profound meditation. You may then addreſs him thus: "I am thinking that, when the ſun ſet laſt "night, it went down yonder behind us; "whereas, this morning, you ſee, he is riſen "on the oppoſite ſide of the plain here before "us. What can be the meaning of this?" Say nothing more; and, if he aſks you any thing about it, divert his attention, for the preſent, by talking of ſomething elſe. Leave him to reflect on it himſelf, and be aſſured he will think of your obſervation.

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To accuſtom a child to give attention to objects, and to make ſenſible truths appear ſtriking to his imagination, it is neceſſary to keep him ſome time in ſuſpenſe before they are explained or diſcovered to him. If he ſhould not ſufficiently comprehend the nature of the preſent queſtion by the means propoſed, it may be rendered ſtill more obvious by diverſifying the terms of it. If he cannot comprehend in what manner the ſun proceeds from its ſetting to its riſing, he knows at leaſt how it proceeds from its riſing to its ſetting: he hath ocular information of this. Explain the firſt queſtion, then, by the ſecond; and if your pupil be not extremely dull indeed, the analogy is too obvious to eſcape him.

Such is our firſt lecture in coſmography.

As we proceed ſlowly from one ſenſible idea to another, making ourſelves familiarly acquainted with each as we go on, and as our pupil's attention is never required upon compulſion, the diſtance will be very conſiderable, from the object of this firſt leſſon, to the knowledge of the ſun's courſe and the figure of the earth: but as the apparent motion of all the heavenly bodies depends on the ſame principle, and as the firſt obſervation naturally leads to all the reſt, it requires leſs capacity, though more time, to proceed from the diurnal rotation of the earth to the calculation of an eclipſe, than to acquire clear ideas of the phænomenon of day and night.

As the ſun turns round the earth, he deſcribes a circle, and every circle hath a centre; this we already know. This centre, alſo, muſt needs be

be inviſible, becauſe it is in the middle of our globe; but we can ſuppoſe two points on the ſurface ſo correſponding with it, that a road paſſing through all three, and extended both ways to the heavens, would be at once the axis of the earth and of the ſun's apparent diurnal motion. A whirl-bone or globular totum, turning upon one of its points, may ſerve to repreſent the heavens turning upon their axis, the two points of this plaything being the two poles; one of which may be pointed out to our pupil, near the tail of the little bear. This would furniſh us with an amuſement for the night; by which means we ſhould become gradually acquainted with the ſtars, and thence in time grow anxious to diſtinguiſh the planets and conſtellations.

Emilius and I have ſeen the ſun riſe at midſummer: we ſhall next take a view of his riſing, ſome fine morning, in the depth of winter. We are neither of us idle, you know, and both deſpiſe the cold. I have taken care to make the ſecond obſervation on the very ſame ſpot where we made the former; ſo that, in conſequence of a little preparatory diſcourſe to introduce the remark, one or other of us will infallibly cry out when the ſun firſt appears above the horizon, "Ha! this is pleaſant enough! the ſun does "not riſe in the place it uſed to do. Here, "you ſee, are our old marks to the left; and "now he riſes yonder, to the right. So it "ſeems there is one eaſt for the ſummer, and "another for the winter." Theſe examples will be ſufficient to ſhew the unexperienced preceptor the way to bring his pupil acquainted with the ſphere, by making uſe of the earth it-

ſelf inſtead of a globe, and the apparent revolution of the ſun inſtead of any imperfect repreſentation of it. It ought, indeed, to be laid down as a general rule, never to ſubſtitute the ſhadow unleſs where it is impoſſible to exhibit the ſubſtance; for the repreſentation ingroſſing the attention of the child, generally makes him forget the object repreſented.

The armillary ſphere appears to me a very ill-contrived and diſproportioned machine. Its confuſed circles, and the ſtrange figures delineated thereon, give it an air of necromancy, which is enough to frighten children. The earth is, beſides, too ſmall; the circles too wide and numerous; while ſome, particularly the two colures, are entirely uſeleſs. Each circle exceeds in breadth the diameter of the earth, and their thickneſs gives them ſuch an air of ſubſtance and reality, that when you tell your pupil they repreſent only imaginary circles, you confound him; he neither knows what he ſees, nor comprehends what you ſay to him.

We never know how to ſuppoſe ourſelves in the place of children; we never enter into their manner of thinking. On the contrary, we attribute to them our ideas; and, purſuing our own method of argumentation, fill their heads, even while we are diſcuſſing inconteſtable truths, with extravagance and error. It is diſputed, whether the ſciences are beſt taught by the ſynthetic or analytic method. It is not always neceſſary to abide by either. We may ſometimes compound and reſolve in the ſame diſquiſition, and inſtruct a child by the former mode of argument, while he thinks himſelf employing the latter.

latter. Add to this, that, by making uſe of both methods indifferently, they ſerve reciprocally to confirm each other. Setting out at the ſame time from two different points, without ſeeming to take the ſame route, he will be ſurpriſed to find himſelf directed two ways to one and the ſame object; and that ſurpriſe cannot fail of giving him great ſatisfaction. In teaching him geography, for example, I would begin at its two extremes; and, with the ſtudy of the apparent aſtronomical revolutions, unite that of the diviſions and meaſurement of the earth. While he is ſtudying the ſphere, and thus tranſporting himſelf in imagination to the heavens, I would call back his attention to the diviſions of the earth, and point out to him their relation to his own place of abode.

The two firſt objects of his geographical ſtudies ſhould be the town where he reſides, and his father's ſeat in the country. After having well obſerved the ſituation of theſe, he ſhould take the like notice of the neighbouring villages and country-ſeats on the road, together with the adjacent rivers; obſerving the ſituation and aſpect of each object, in regard to the riſing and ſetting of the ſun. This is the point of reunion. He ſhould make a map from this ſurvey; beginning ſimply with the two firſt objects before mentioned, and inſerting the others by degrees, as he comes to know, or eſtimates their poſition and diſtance. You ſee, already, the advantages he will have in this reſpect, by having accuſtomed him to meaſure objects and diſtances by his eye.

Notwithſtanding this advantage, however, it

will be neceſſary to direct a child in theſe operations a little; but this ſhould be very little and imperceptibly. If he falls into a miſtake, let him. Be in no haſte to ſet him right; but wait with patience till he himſelf in a ſtate to diſcover and correct his error; or at moſt take occaſion only, at a favourable opportunity, by ſome diſtant hint, to make him ſenſible of it. If he ſhould never miſtake, he would make but little improvement. It is not neceſſary that he ſhould know at preſent the topography of the country, but the means whereby ſuch knowledge is obtained; it is of no importance to him to have a number of maps in his head, provided he knows what they ſerve to repreſent, and has clear ideas of the art by which they are conſtructed. Here you ſee the difference between Emilius and the pupils of others. Their knowledge lies in maps and charts, that of my pupil in the ſcience of geography. His progreſs in the art of map-making will hence furniſh new ornaments for his apartment. You will remember it is my conſtant maxim, not to teach a child a multiplicity of things, but to prevent his acquiring any but clear and preciſe ideas. His knowing but little is of no conſequence, provided he imbibes no falſe principles. I ſtore his head with truth, only to prevent the entrance of error. Reaſon and judgment advance but ſlowly, while prejudice attacks with early impetuoſity; we muſt carefully guard therefore againſt the latter. If you regard ſcience, indeed, for its own ſake, and aim at knowledge in general, you enter upon an unfathomable ocean, without a ſhore, to founder among the rocks. When

I ſee

I ſee a man enamoured by the charms of univerſal knowledge, and flying from the purſuits of one ſcience to another, I think I ſee a child gathering ſhells on the ſea-ſhore. He firſt loads himſelf indiſcriminately with as many as he can carry; when, tempted by others of a gayer appearance, he throws the former away, taking and rejecting, till, fatigued and bewildered in his choice, he hath thrown all away, and returns home without a ſingle ſhell.

During the firſt term of childhood, we endeavour only to loſe time, to avoid the ill employment of it. The caſe is now altered; and we have not time ſufficient for every thing that might be uſeful. The paſſions advance upon us apace, and the moment they give notice of their arrival, your pupil will give no ear to any other monitor. The term of diſpaſſionate intelligence is ſhort and tranſitory; and is, beſides, employed on ſo many ſubjects of preſent utility, that it is a folly to think it ſufficiently long for a child to acquire much learning or wiſdom. It is not our buſineſs at preſent to make him an adept in the ſciences, but to give him a taſte for them, and point out the method of improving it. This is moſt certainly the fundamental principle of a rational education.

The preſent is alſo the proper time to accuſtom your pupil by degrees to fix his attention, for ſome time, on one and the ſame object. This attention, however, muſt always be accompanied by pleaſure or inclination, and never be the effect of compulſion. We muſt be careful, alſo, not to keep it too long upon the ſtretch, leſt wearineſs and diſguſt ſhould enſue.

Keep, therefore, a watchful eye over your pupil, and by no means permit him to fatigue himself by too intense application. He had better learn nothing, than learn upon compulsion.

When he asks a question, be your answer always calculated rather to keep alive than satisfy his curiosity; especially when you observe he has a mind to trifle rather than be instructed. You ought to pay less regard to the terms of interrogation, than to his motives for enquiry. This conduct becomes of the greatest importance when a child begins to reason.

The sciences are connected together by a series of propositions, all dependent on some general and common principles, which are gradually displayed. The philosophers make use of these; with us they are as yet out of the question. There is another chain of reasoning, of a different construction, by which every particular object is connected to some other, and points out that which succeeds it. This order of succession, which, from our natural curiosity, keeps alive our attention, is generally made use of by grown persons, and is peculiarly adapted to children.

Before we begin to delineate our map, we must trace a meridian. The two points of intersection found by shadows of equal length in the morning and evening, will give an excellent meridian for an astronomer of thirteen. To find these, however, will require time, and oblige us to work constantly on the same spot. This method might be too troublesome and disgusting; having foreseen this inconveni-

venience, therefore, we have provided againſt it.

But I am now fallen again into my uſual cuſtom of being tediouſly circumſtantial. I hear your murmurs, grumbling reader, and diſregard them. I am determined I will not ſacrifice the moſt uſeful part of my book to your impatience. Act as you pleaſe with regard to my prolixity, I am, for my part, perfectly eaſy about your complaints.

My pupil has long ſince obſerved, that amber, glaſs, wax, and ſeveral other bodies, on being rubbed, attract bits of ſtraw, feathers, and the like; and that other bodies in general have not that quality. Among them, however, we have accidentally diſcovered one, which is poſſeſſed of a yet more ſingular property: it attracts ſteel-filings and bits of iron, not only at a diſtance, but without friction. This diſcovery engages our attention for ſome time, without anſwering any other purpoſe than amuſement. At length, we perceive it communicates its attractive property to iron and ſteel. About this time, I take my pupil to ſee the diverſions of a neighbouring fair, where, among other wonderful performances, a juggler produces a duck of wax, ſwimming about in a baſon after a piece of bread, which he holds in his hand. We are greatly ſurpriſed at this ſtrange phænomenon; but as we are unacquainted with the fables of witchcraft, we charge not the artiſt with being either a wizard or conjuror. As we are daily accuſtomed to various ſtriking effects, of whoſe cauſes we are confeſſedly ignorant, we are not very anxious to account for every thing we ſee; but

but reſt contented till ſome fortunate event affords us information.

At our return home, however, our converſation very naturally turns on this extraordinary duck, and accordingly a thought ſuggeſts itſelf of imitating it. We take a large needle, and touching it on the loadſtone, cover it with wax, which we mould as well as we can into the ſhape of a duck, the needle paſſing through its body from the beak to the tail. We then ſet it afloat in a baſin of water, and preſenting a key to its beak, we find, to our great joy, the duck follows it, in the ſame manner as that of the juggler followed the bread. As to the line of direction in which the body of the duck remains when at reſt, we may obſerve that ſome other time: at preſent we are too much taken up with the firſt object of attention, to think of any thing elſe. In the evening we repair to the juggler's booth, with a piece of bread, properly prepared, in our pocket; when the boaſting artiſt having performed his trick, my young philoſopher, who had with difficulty ſo long contained himſelf, tells him there is nothing in it, and that he himſelf can do as much. He is taken at his word; and inſtantly pulls the bread with the concealed iron out of his pocket. His heart flutters as he approaches the table, and his hand trembles as he preſents the bread. The duck, however, follows it; on which he leaps for joy, and triumphs in the applauſe of the ſpectators. The juggler, though a little confounded, embraces him, felicitates him on his ſucceſs, and begs he will honour him with his preſence the next day, when he promiſes to collect a more

numerous aſſembly to witneſs and applaud his abilities. Our young naturaliſt, in the mean while, ſo proud of his ſcience, is juſt on the point of diſcovering the ſecret, when I hurry him away from the ſcene.

Full of the applauſe he is to receive to-morrow, he counts the moments, in the mean time, with ridiculous impatience. He invites every one he knows, and would be glad the whole world ſhould be witneſſes of his triumph. At length the appointed hour is come; we haſten to the place of rendezvous, and find the room already crouded with ſpectators. His young heart is elated with joy at the ſight. Other tricks in their courſe preceding ours, the juggler ſurpaſſes his uſual dexterity, and performs wonders. My pupil, however, pays no attention to what is doing; but keeps fumbling all the while in his pocket, with his piece of bread in his hand, fetching his breath ſhort, and ſweating with impatience and anxiety. At length it is his turn to exhibit: the artiſt pompouſly introduces the apparatus, and prepares the ſpectators for the trick. Emilius, though ſomewhat abaſhed, approaches the table, and offering his bread to the duck—what a new turn in human affairs! tame as it was yeſterday, it is become a mere wild-duck to-day: inſtead of preſenting its beak, it turns tail and ſwims away, flying from the bread, and the hand preſenting it, as faſt as it before had followed them. After many fruitleſs trials, for which he is conſtantly hiſſed by the company, my pupil complains that he is impoſed on, and that this is not the duck he practiſed on yeſterday; defying the jug-

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gler himſelf to draw this about in the ſame manner.

The artiſt, without making a reply, takes up a piece of bread, and preſenting it to the duck, draws it immediately after his hand. Emilius takes up the ſame piece of bread; but inſtead of ſucceeding better than with the former, has the mortification to ſee the duck turn regardleſs from him, and make circles round the baſon. On this he retires in confuſion, unable to ſtand the hiſſes of the company any longer.

The juggler now takes the piece of bread my pupil had brought, and makes uſe of it with as much ſucceſs as he did his own: he takes the iron from within it; and expoſing it to the company, raiſes another laugh at our expence: he even draws the duck about, as before, with the bread thus ſeparated from the iron. He performs the ſame trick, alſo, with another piece, cut from the loaf by a third perſon; he does the ſame thing with his glove, and with the bare end of his finger. He next advances into the middle of the room, and declaring aloud, with that emphatic tone ſo peculiar to theſe gentry, that his duck would obey his call as well as his motions; he ſpeaks to it, and it immediately obeys the word of command. If he bids it move to the right, to the right it goes; if to return, it returns; if to turn about, about it turns; its motion conſtantly obedient to his order. The repeated ſhouts of applauſe that follow theſe ſpecimens of his art, are ſo many inſults upon us; we therefore privately ſlip out, and making the beſt of our way home, ſhut ourſelves up in our appartment, inſtead of going about,

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as we had projected, to tell every body of our ſucceſs.

The next morning ſomebody knocks at the door; who ſhould this be but our friend the juggler? He enters, and modeſtly complains of our conduct; he cannot think what he has done to us, that we ſhould endeavour to diſcredit his tricks, and deprive him of his bread; or that there is any thing ſo very wonderful in the art of drawing about a duck of wax, that we ſhould be ambitious of that honour at the expence of a poor man's ſubſiſtence. Faith, Gentlemen, continues he, if I could get a living by any other talent, I ſhould never be proud of this. You ſhould reflect, that a man who has ſpent great part of his life in the exerciſe of this pitiful induſtry, muſt of courſe know more of the matter than you who only throw away a few minutes on it. If I did not exhibit the maſterpieces of my dexterity at firſt, it was becauſe one ſhould not be in haſte to make an unneceſſary diſplay of one's knowledge: I have always taken care to preſerve my beſt tricks for particular occaſions; and have, beſides what you have ſeen, many others to check young and indiſcreet obſervers. I am come, nevertheleſs, Gentlemen, very readily to acquaint you of the ſecret that ſo much embarraſſed you; at the ſame time hoping you will make no ill uſe of it to my prejudice, and that you will another time be more reſerved.

He produces his machine; when, to our very great ſurpriſe, we ſee it conſiſts only of a powerful loadſtone, which a child, hid under the ta-

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ble for that purpoſe, moved about without being perceived.

As he is putting his loadſtone up again, we thank him, and, excuſing ourſelves for what is paſſed, offer to make him a preſent, which he refuſes. No, Gentlemen, ſays he, you do not deſerve ſo well of me, that I ſhould accept your favours; you ſhall be obliged to me againſt your will; this is all the revenge I ſhall take. You may learn hence that there are men of ſpirit in all conditions of life: I am paid for the exerciſe of my hands, and not of my tongue. In going out, he addreſſes to me, particularly, the following reprimand. "I can eaſily excuſe the child, ſays he aloud, as he offended only through ignorance: but you, Sir, who ought to have known his error, why did you permit him? As you both live together, you, as the elder, owe him your advice and direction; your experience ſhould be the authority for his conduct. In reproaching himſelf, as he grows up, for the faults of his youth, he will doubtleſs reproach you for thoſe of which you did not adviſe him."

Having ſaid this, he departs, leaving us both in a good deal of confuſion. I blame myſelf for my own eaſy and pliant temper; promiſing my pupil to ſacrifice it another time to his intereſt, and to warn him of his faults before he commits them. For the time is now approaching when our relation to each other muſt change, and the ſeverity of the maſter give place to the complacence of the companion. This change ought to be effected by degrees; and, like every other, be timely and early provided for.

We return the next day to the fair, to ſee the trick

trick repeated, of which we are let into the ſecret. We acceſt our Socratic juggler, with a profound reſpect; hardly daring to look him in the face. He, on the other hand, loads us with civilities; and in ſeating, mortifies us with the moſt humiliating marks of diſtinction. He performs his uſual ſleights, and amuſes himſelf a long time with the trick of the duck, caſting every now and then a ſevere and confident look at us. In the mean time, we, though privy to the whole, keep the moſt profound ſilence. Should my pupil dare but to open his mouth on ſuch an occaſion, I ſhould have no hopes of him.

The circumſtantial account of this example is of more conſequence than it may at firſt appear. How many leſſons are contained in this one! How many mortifying conſequences are ſure to follow this firſt emotion of vanity! Watch with care, young preceptor, the firſt emotion in your pupil; and be aſſured, that, if you can thus make it productive of humiliation and diſgrace, you will be long before you ſee any appearance of a ſecond. What preparations are here! you will ſay; I confeſs; and all to make us a compaſs to ſerve us inſtead of a meridian.

Having learned that a load ſtone acts through the ſubſtance of other bodies, we have nothing to do but to conſtruct a machine like that we have ſeen. To this end, we procure a large flat baſon; placing it on a table, and filling it with water; we make our duck a little neater than the former; and thus our apparatus is ready. From our conſtant attention to what paſſes in the baſon, we at length remark that the body of

the duck, when at reſt, preſerves always nearly the ſame direction. We repeat the experiment, and, on examination, find this direction to be from ſouth to north. This is ſufficient; our compaſs is now as good as made.

The earth hath various climates, and theſe climates different temperatures; the ſeaſons varying more conſiderably in proportion as we approach either pole. All bodies contract with cold, and dilate with heat: this effect is ſtill more conſpicuous in fluids than ſolids, and is commenſurable by ſpirituous liquors; by means of which, the thermometer was conſtructed. The wind blows againſt our faces: hence we find air is a body, a palpable fluid, although we cannot by any means ſee it. Preſs a drinking glaſs turned upſide down, into water, the fluid will not occupy the whole ſpace within it, unleſs by leaning it ſidewiſe you let the air eſcape: hence we find air is capable of reſiſtance. Preſs the glaſs with a ſtill greater force downwards, and the water will gain upon the air without ever being able entirely to fill the glaſs: hence we find air is capable of a certain degree of compreſſion. A ball filled with compreſſed air will rebound better than another filled with any other ſubſtance: air, then, is an elaſtic body. Lying down at one's full in a bathing tub, if we endeavour to raiſe our arms in an horizontal poſition out of the water, we ſhall find them loaded with a prodigious weight: air, therefore, is evidently heavy, and may be weighed againſt other fluids; hence the contrivance of the barometer, the ſyphon, the wind-gun, and the air-pump. All the laws of ſtatics and hydroſtatics

ſtatics diſcover themſelves by experiments equally obvious and common. I would not, therefore, have him enter the cabinet of an experimental philoſopher to learn any of theſe. His apparatus and pomp of machinery diſguſt me; their ſcientific air is deſtructive to ſcience itſelf; thoſe various engines either frightening a child, or taking up that attention to their figure, which he ought to beſtow on their effects. I would have all our machines be of our own conſtruction, and would not begin to conſtruct the inſtrument before I had made the experiment; but, after having made this imperfectly, and as it were by chance, we would by degrees invent the inſtrument to confirm it. I had rather our machines ſhould be leſs accurate and complete, and that we ſhould have more juſt ideas of what they ought to be, and of their operations. For my firſt leſſon in ſtatics, inſtead of providing myſelf with a balance and ſcales, I lay a ſtick acroſs the back of a chair; I meaſure the length of both ends when it hangs in equilibrio. I next hang different weights on each; placing them nearer or farther off the point of ſuſpenſion, as occaſion requires: by theſe means I find, that the equilibrium depends on a reciprocal proportion between the weights and the length of the levers; and thus I inſtruct my young mechanic to rectify a balance before he has ever ſeen one.

We acquire, without doubt, notions more clear and certain, of things we thus learn of ourſelves, than of thoſe we are taught by others. Another advantage alſo reſulting from this method is, that we do not accuſtom ourſelves to a

ſervile ſubmiſſion to the authority of others; but, by exerciſing our reaſon, grow every day more ingenious in the diſcovery of the relations of things, in connecting our ideas, and in the contrivance of machines; whereas, by adopting thoſe which are put into our hands, our invention grows dull and indifferent, as the man who never dreſſes himſelf, but is ſerved in every thing by his ſervants, and drawn about every where by his horſes, loſes by degrees the activity and uſe of his limbs. Boileau boaſted that he had taught Racine to rhyme with much difficulty: among the many admirable methods taken to abridge the ſtudy of the ſciences, we are in great want of one to make us learn them with difficulty.

The moſt obvious advantage of theſe ſlow and laborious reſearches, is to preſerve, in the cultivation of ſpeculative ſtudies, the activity of the body; to preſerve the ſuppleneſs of the limbs, and to be always buſied in ſome manual operation, or employment, of uſe to mankind. The diverſity of inſtruments, invented to direct us in our experiments, and make up for the deficiency of our organs of ſenſe, makes us neglect the exerciſe of the latter. A theodolite diſpenſes with our eſtimating the extent of angles; the eye, which is capable of meaſuring diſtances with great exactneſs, gives up the taſk to the chain; the ſteel-yard excuſes me from judging of the weight of any thing by poiſing it in my hand. Thus the more ingenious and accurate our inſtruments, the more unſuſceptible and inexpert become our organs: by aſ-

ſembling

ſembling a heap of machinery about us, we find afterwards none in ourſelves.

But when we ſet about the conſtruction of theſe machines ourſelves, and employ therein that ſagacity and addreſs which are required to do without them, we loſe nothing: on the contrary, we gain every thing; and, by adding the knowledge of art to nature, become more ingenious without being leſs dexterous. If, inſtead of keeping a boy poring over books, I employ him in a work-ſhop, his hands will be buſied to the improvement of his underſtanding; he will become a philoſopher while he thinks himſelf only an artiſan. In ſhort, this practice hath other uſes which I ſhall ſpeak of hereafter, and ſhow in what manner theſe philoſophical amuſements lead to the exerciſe of the proper functions of a man.

I have already obſerved, that the mere ſpeculative part of ſcience is by no means adapted to children, even when they approach adoleſcency; it is proper, nevertheleſs, though you do not enter with them too profoundly into the depth of phyſical theory, to connect their experiments by ſome chain of deduction, that they may arrange them in ſome order in their minds, for the ſake of remembering them: for it is very difficult to retain ſeparate and independent facts and concluſions long in the memory, without ſome leading clue for occaſional recollection.

In your reſearches into the laws of nature, begin always with the moſt common and obvious phænomena; accuſtoming your pupil to look upon them always as mere facts. I take up, for inſtance, a ſtone; and, pretending to place it

in the air, open my hand, and it immediately falls to the ground. I look upon Emilius, who ſtands all the while attentive to what I am doing, and aſk him why the ſtone falls? Where is there a child who would not have an anſwer ready to that queſtion? There is none, not even Emilius, if I had not taken great pains to prepare him not to know how to anſwer it. Every one will ſay, The ſtone falls becauſe it is heavy. And what is heavy? The thing that falls. So the ſtone falls becauſe it falls. Here my little philoſopher is ſtopt in good earneſt; and thus ends my firſt lecture of phyſical theory; whether he profits by it, alſo, in this ſcience or not, it is a general leſſon of good ſenſe.

As a child advances in underſtanding, other important conſiderations oblige us to be more nice in the objects of his employment. As ſoon as he acquires ſo much knowledge of himſelf, as to conceive in what his happineſs conſiſts; or becomes ſenſible of ſuch extenſive relations, as to be able to judge what is fitting or unfitting to his ſtate and condition; he is then in a ſituation to perceive the difference between labour and amuſement, and to regard the latter only as a relaxation from the former. Objects of real utility may then make part of his ſtudy, and engage him to give a more conſtant application to it than he might do to mere amuſements. The law of neceſſity, ever recurring to the mind, teaches us betimes to do that which is diſagreeable, in order to prevent conſequences ſtill more diſpleaſing. Such is the uſe of forecaſt; in the regulation of which conſiſts all the wiſdom, and depends all the miſery, of mankind.

Every

Every individual would be happy: but, in order to arrive at happineſs, it is firſt neceſſary to know what it is. The happineſs of man, in a ſtate of nature, is as ſimple as his manner of living: it conſiſts in his being free from pain; and is conſtituted by health, liberty, and the neceſſaries of life. The happineſs of man, in a ſtate of ſociety, is another thing; but this is at preſent out of the queſtion. I cannot too often obſerve, that objects purely phyſical are thoſe only which can intereſt children, particularly thoſe whoſe vanity is not yet excited, and who are not already vitiated by the prejudices of opinion.

When they come to foreſee their wants, their underſtanding is conſiderably advanced, and they begin to be ſenſible of the value of time. It is of conſequence now, to uſe them to employ themſelves on ſubjects of utility; this utility, however, ſhould be applicable to their age, and adapted to their knowledge. Every thing that depends on moral inſtitutions and the practice of ſociety, ſhould not be ſo early preſented to their view; becauſe they are not in a capacity to underſtand it. It is a folly to require them to apply themſelves to things, merely becauſe they are told in general terms, that ſuch things are good for them, while they are ignorant in what that good conſiſts: we may in vain aſſure them they will find their intereſt therein as they grow up; while they are unintereſted by their preſent uſe, they are incapable of comprehending the future.

Let a child do nothing merely becauſe he is bid; nothing is good for him which he cannot perceive to be ſo. In hurrying him on before his

his knowledge, you think yourſelves making uſe uſe of forecaſt, and you only betray the want of it. In providing him with many implements he may never uſe, you deprive him of the moſt univerſal and uſeful of all others, that of good ſenſe. You uſe him to permit himſelf to be always conducted, and to be only a machine in the hands of others. In requiring him to be docile and tractable when he is little, you prepare him to be a credulous dupe when he is grown up. You are for ever telling him, "All I deſire of you, child, is for your own advantage, "though you are as yet incapable of knowing "it to be ſo. What is it to me whether you do "what I require or not? It is for your own "good only you ſhould do it." With ſuch fine ſpeeches as theſe, intended to make him wiſe, you only pave the way for the ſucceſs of thoſe who may hereafter take him to ſome projector, alchymiſt, falſe prophet, or any kind of cheat, with a view to intrap him by ſome ſnare, or in order to make him adopt their own folly.

It is requiſite men ſhould be acquainted with many things, of which children cannot in the leaſt comprehend the utility: but is it neceſſary, or even poſſible, that a child ſhould learn every thing it is requiſite a man ſhould know? Endeavour to teach a child every thing that is uſeful to him at his age; and you will find him full employment. Why will you inſiſt on his application to the ſtudies proper for an age to which he may never arrive, in prejudice of thoſe which are proper for him at preſent? But you will aſk me, perhaps, whether he will have time to learn what he ought to know, when it is required

quired of him to make uſe of his knowledge? This I cannot tell; but I am very certain it is impoſſible to learn it ſooner, for our real and only true inſtructors are experience and ſentiment. Never can man be made truly ſenſible of what is uſeful to him but from the circumſtances in which he is ſituated. A child knows he is deſigned to grow up to manhood; all the ideas he can form of that ſtate will be to him ſo many opportunities of inſtruction: but, as for thoſe which are above his capacity to comprehend, it is better he ſhould remain in abſolute ignorance of them. This whole treatiſe is calculated to illuſtrate this principle of education.

As ſoon as we are ſo far advanced as to give our pupil an idea of the word *uſeful*, we have attained a conſiderable influence over his future conduct; this term being very ſtriking, provided the ſenſe annexed to it be adapted to his years, and he ſee clearly its relation to his preſent welfare. Ordinary children are not affected by this term, becauſe no care has been taken to affix to it an idea conformable to their underſtandings, and becauſe others taking upon them to provide for them what is uſeful, they have no need to think of it themſelves, and therefore remain ignorant of the meaning of utility.

What is the uſe of that? ſhall, for the future, be the determinate queſtion between my pupil and me, on all occaſions. On my part, I ſhall infallibly make uſe of it in anſwer to all his interrogatories; which may ſerve as a check to that multiplicity of ſilly, troubleſome queſtions, with which children are inceſſantly teazing thoſe about them, more for the ſake of indulging them.

themſelves in a kind of imperiouſneſs, than out of a deſire of information. The child who is taught, as the moſt important leſſon, to know nothing but what is uſeful to him, will interrogate with the views of a Socrates: he will not put a queſtion, without having an anſwer ready to that which he knows will be put to him before his own is reſolved.

What a powerful inſtrument have I here put into your hands, for the conduct of your pupil! Knowing a reaſon for nothing, he is reduced to ſilence whenever you pleaſe; while, on the other hand, you can make uſe of every advantage your knowledge and experience give you, to demonſtrate the utility of what you propoſe. For you muſt not miſtake the end of this queſtion; it is only to inſtruct him to queſtion you in his turn; and you muſt expect, in whatever you propoſe to him afterwards, to have him reply by aſking you, Of what uſe is this or that? in the terms of your propoſal.

This will lay a ſnare, perhaps, which a governor will not eaſily avoid falling into. If on a child's aſking this queſtion, you only endeavour to divert the affair, by giving him an anſwer he cannot well comprehend, he will think that you reaſon on your own ideas, and not on his; and will believe what you call uſeful to be ſo to yourſelf only, and not to him: he will no longer place any confidence in you, and then all is over. But where is the preceptor who will ſtop ſhort, and own his want of knowledge or miſtakes to his pupil? It is the general way with tutors not to confeſs their real ignorance, whereas I make it mine to affect to be more ignorant than

than I am, when I cannot adapt the required information to his underſtanding. Hence, always apparently candid in my behaviour, he does not ſuſpect my motives, and I gain more credit with him by affecting ignorance, than other preceptors would do by concealing theirs.

In the firſt place, you are to conſider how ſeldom it is proper for you to propoſe what he is to learn; it is his place to deſire to know, to ſeek for, to diſcover it: it is yours artfully to excite this deſire, to place the object within his reach, and to furniſh him with the means of attaining it. It follows hence, that your interrogations ſhould be few, but ſelect; and that, as he will have much more to do with you than you with him, you will be leſs expoſed than he, and more often in the circumſtances of ſaying to him, Of what uſe is it to you to know what you aſk?

Add to this, that, as it is of little conſequence whether he learns many things or not, provided he has a clear conception of what he does learn, and its uſe; whenever you have not a proper explanation of the thing required at hand, you may ſafely forbear to give him any at all. You may ſay to him without ſcruple, "I have no good reaſon to give you; I am ſomehow miſtaken;" and leave it there. If your inſtruction was really improper, it is not amiſs to give it up entirely; and, if not ſo, you will ſoon find occaſion to make him ſenſible of its utility.

I do not at all admire explanatory diſcourſes: young people give little attention to them, and never retain them in memory. The things themſelves are the beſt explanations. I can never enough repeat it, that we make words of too much

much conſequence; with our prating modes of education, we make nothing but praters.

Let us ſuppoſe, that, while I am ſtudying with my pupil the courſe of the ſun, and the method of its returning to the eaſt, he ſhould ſtop me ſhort, by aſking me to what purpoſe is all this? what a florid diſcourſe might I not make him, in anſwer to ſuch a queſtion? what a number of fine things might I not take occaſion to expatiate on by the way, particularly if there were any witneſſes to our converſation *? I might talk to him of the utility of travelling, the advantages of commerce, the produce peculiar to every climate; of the manners of different nations, of the uſe of the calendar, of the computations of the returning ſeaſons for agriculture, of the art of navigation, and the manner of conducting a ſhip at ſea. Politics, natural hiſtory, aſtronomy, and even morality itſelf, with the laws of nations, might all be introduced in the courſe of my harangue; with a view to give my pupil great ideas of the ſciences, and to excite in him a deſire to ſtudy them. When I had done, however, I ſhould only have been expoſing my own pedantry, without my pupil's having comprehended one ſingle thing I had been talking about. He would have ſtill a great mind to aſk me, as before, to what end the ſun returned to the eaſt, but that he would be fearful

* I have often remarked, that the learned inſtructions uſually given to pupils, have been calculated rather for the grown perſons, in whoſe preſence they were delivered, than for the puerile capacity of children. I am very certain, alſo, of the juſtice of this remark, as it is founded on my own repeated obſervation.

ful of offending. He would therefore find his account in pretending to underſtand what he was thus compelled to hear. This is the practice carried on in polite education. Our Emilius, however, brought up in greater ruſticity, and ſo difficult of comprehenſion, will liſten to nothing of all this. At the very firſt word he might not underſtand, he would turn away and play about the room, leaving me to finiſh my oration by myſelf. We muſt ſeek, therefore, ſome more obvious ſolution; this ſcientific method of explication being uſeleſs to him.

We were obſerving the poſition of the foreſt to the north of Montmorenci, when he interrupted me with this impertinent queſtion, of "To "what end is all this?" On which I anſwer, "You are in the right; we muſt think of this matter at leiſure; and if we find this inquiry is uſeleſs, we will drop it, for we have no need of uſeleſs amuſements." We then betake ourſelves to ſome other employment, and talk no more of geography during the reſt of the day.

I propoſe to him next morning a walk before breakfaſt: he likes nothing better; children in general are ever ready for running about, and mine is fit for exerciſe. We enter the foreſt, traverſe the country, and rambling about till we are almoſt tired, we loſe ourſelves, and know not which way to return home. Our time is ſpent; the heat of the day increaſes; we begin to grow hungry, and wander about from one place to another, among copſes, woods, and quarries, without meeting with any object we are acquainted with. At length, overheated, famiſhed, and fatigued, we find ourſelves only

more and more bewildered. We ſit down, therefore, to reſt ourſelves and deliberate on what is to be done. Suppoſing Emilius to have been educated like another child, he does not deliberate about the matter, but ſits down and begins to cry; ignorant that we are juſt by the gate of Montmorenci, which is concealed from us only by the trees of a narrow coppice: theſe trees, however, appear an impenetrable foreſt to him; ſuch a little gentleman as he, loſt in the buſhes.

After ſome few minutes paſſed in ſilence, I ſay to him, with an air of diſquietude, What ſhall we do, my dear Emilius, to get out of this foreſt?

EMILIUS, *all in a ſweat, with the tears running down his cheeks.* I know not: I am ſo weary, ſo hungry, ſo dry, I know not what to do.

Rouſſeau. Do you think that I am in a better ſituation than you; or that I ſhould not cry too if I could breakfaſt upon tears? Our buſineſs is not to weep, but to look about us. Look at your watch; what is it o'clock?

Emil. It is noon, and I have not yet breakfaſted.

Rouſſ. It is very true; it is noon, and I am faſting too.

Emil. You muſt then, ſurely, be very hungry?

Rouſſ. Yes; but the worſt on it is, my dinner will not come here to find me. Let me ſee—it is noon; that is preciſely the time at which we obſerved yeſterday the ſituation of this foreſt from Montmorenci: if we could but obſerve in like manner the poſition of Montmorenci from this foreſt——

Emil.

Emil. True, but yeſterday we ſaw the foreſt, and we cannot from hence ſee the town.

Rouſſ. That is our very misfortune.———If we could, by any means, but find its ſituation without ſeeing it——

Emil. O, my good friend! but how?

Rouſſ. Did not we obſerve that the foreſt lay—

Emil. To the north of Montmorenci.

Rouſſ. Montmorenci therefore ſhould be——

Emil. To the ſouth of the foreſt.

Rouſſ. We have a method to find out the north at noon.

Emil. We have ſo, by the direction of our ſhadow.

Rouſſ. But as for the ſouth.

Emil. How ſhall we find that?

Rouſſ. The ſouth is always oppoſite to the north.

Emil. That is true; we have only to take the direction contrary to our ſhadows: here, this muſt be to the ſouth. Montmorenci muſt certainly lie on this ſide: let us go this way.

Rouſſ. You may poſſibly be in the right; here, let us take this path through the wood.

EMILIUS, *clapping his hands, and ſhouting for joy.*

Ah! I ſee Montmorenci directly before us. Come along, let us go to breakfaſt, to dinner, let us make haſte: aſtronomy, I ſee, is good for ſomething.

Obſerve, that if he does not actually make uſe of this latter expreſſion, he will think ſo; it does not ſignify which, provided I do not teach it him. You may be aſſured, alſo, he never will forget this day's leſſon as long as he lives; where-

as, had I only ſuppoſed this adventure in my chamber, all that I could have ſaid on it would have been forgotten the next day. For this reaſon, we ought to inculcate all we poſſibly can by actions, and to ſay only what we cannot do.

The reader will not expect I can have ſo little opinion of his ſagacity, as to give him an example in every kind of ſtudy: but which ſoever may occaſionally relate to the point in queſtion, I cannot too much exhort the preceptor to adapt his explication to the capacity of his pupil; for I repeat it once more, the evil lies not in what he is ignorant of, but in what he imagines he underſtands.

I remember, that one day endeavouring to give a child a taſte for chemiſtry, after I had ſhewn him ſeveral metalline precipitations, I explained to him the method of making ink. I told him its blackneſs was occaſioned only by the very fine particles of iron ſeparated from the vitriol, and precipitated by an alcaline fluid. In the middle of my learned explication, the ſhrewd little queriſt ſtop me ſhort with my queſtion, which I had taught him, and which indeed not a little embarraſſed me. After thinking a little, however, I took the following method to reſolve it. I ordered a bottle of wine to be brought out of the cellar, and another of common ordinary wine to be fetched from the tavern. I then took a little phial full of a ſolution of fixed alcali; and, pouring out two glaſſes of wine, one out of each bottle, I thus prepared for the experiment *.

It

* A little preparation is neceſſary to every experiment exhibited to children, as it ſerves to render them attentive to what is doing.

It is cuſtomary, ſaid I, for the venders of certain commodities to adulterate them in order to make them look better than they really are. Theſe adulterations deceive both the eye and taſte; but are in themſelves hurtful, and make the adulterated commodity, notwithſtanding its appearance, worſe than before.

Liquors in particular, and wines more than any other, are ſubject to this adulteration; becauſe the deception is not eaſily detected, and is very profitable to the vender. The adulteration of tart or ſour wines is made with litharge, which is a preparation of lead. Lead united to an acid produces a ſugar or ſweet ſalt, which corrects the taſte of ſour wine, but is poiſonous to thoſe who drink it. It is requiſite therefore, before we drink any wine ſuſpected of adulteration, to know certainly whether there be litharge in it or not. Now, it is by this method of reaſoning I am led to the means of diſcovering it.

I know that wine contains not only an inflammable ſpirit, as you have ſeen in the brandy diſtilled from it; but alſo an acid, as you may be convinced, by the tartar ſubſiding from it, and the vinegar into which it is converted.

The acid is attracted by metallic ſubſtances, and adheres to them in their ſolution, forming a compound ſalt; ſuch, for example, as is the ruſt of iron, which is nothing more than the particles of the metal diſſolved by the acid ſpirit contained in the air or in water: ſuch alſo is verdigreaſe, which is only copper diſſolved by vinegar.

At the ſame time this acid has a ſtronger attraction, however, to alcaline than to metalline

ſubſtances; in ſo much that, by the intervention of the former between the compound ſalts above mentioned, the acid is ſeparated from the metal to which it was before united, and adheres to the alcali. Hence the metalline ſubſtance, detached from the acid which kept it in a ſtate of ſolution, is precipitated, and makes the fluid black.

If then either of the wines before us be adulterated with litharge, its acid keeps it in a ſtate of ſolution. So that if I pour this alcaline fluid into them, it will compel the acid to let go its hold of the metal, and adhere to itſelf; when the lead, being no longer kept floating, will again appear, trouble the wine, and at length be precipitated to the bottom of the glaſs.

On the contrary, if there be no lead nor mixture of other metal in the wine *, the alkali will unite itſelf quietly to the acid †, the whole will remain diſſolved, and you will ſee no precipitation.

On this, I poured the alcaline ſolution ſucceſſively into both glaſſes; the liquor in one of them remaining afterwards clear and tranſparent; that in the other became thick and troubled, and in

* The wines which are ſold by retail by the wine-merchants at Paris, although they ſhould not be purpoſely adulterated with litharge, are ſeldom without ſome lead in them: becauſe their meaſures and other implements are uſually made of lead; and the wine, in paſſing through them, always diſſolves ſome part. It is ſtrange ſo manifeſtly abuſive and dangerous a practice ſhould be ſuffered in a city ſo reſpectable for its police. It is true, people of faſhion and ſubſtance, never drinking theſe retailed wines, are not ſo liable to be poiſoned.

† The vegetable acid is very mild. If it were a mineral one, their union would not be effected without fermentation.

in leſs than an hour we could ſee clearly the lead precipitated to the bottom.

There, ſaid I, you ſee one of theſe wines is pure and genuine, and the other adulterated and poiſonous. This diſcovery we make by means of that kind of knowledge of which you require to know the utility. When we know how to make ink, we know how to detect adulterated wine.

I was myſelf very well ſatisfied with the explication and example I had given; I obſerved, however, that it did not ſtrike the child. It required ſome time for me to diſcover it to be very idle, and that I had been all the while talking to no purpoſe. For, ſetting aſide the impoſſibility that a boy of twelve years of age ſhould follow the courſe of my argument, the utility of the experiment would never enter his head; becauſe, taſting both wines, and finding both good, he had annexed no meaning to the term of *adulteration*, which I thought I had ſo clearly explained; the words *pernicious* and *poiſonous* conveying no idea to his apprehenſion.

Thoſe relations between cauſe and effect of which we cannot perceive the connection, that good and evil of which we have no idea, and the neceſſities we have never felt, have no influence on our underſtanding. We have as vague notions, at fifteen years of age, of the happineſs attendant on wiſdom, as, at thirty, of the celeſtial glories of the New Jeruſalem. If we have no clear conceptions of the one or the other, we ſhall take but little trouble to obtain them; and, though our ideas were ever ſo preciſe on theſe ſubjects, we ſhould take juſt as little,

tle, unleſs we felt ſome attachment to, or deſire after them. It is eaſy to convince a child of the utility of whatever we have a mind to teach him; but it ſignifies little to convince him of this, unleſs you can perſuade him alſo to purſue it. Reaſon in vain may induce us coldly to approve or blame; the paſſions only are the ſprings of action; and how can our paſſions be excited by objects or circumſtances in which we do not perceive ourſelves at all intereſted?

Never point out any thing to a child which is beyond his views. While he is a ſtranger to the relations and duties of humanity, as you cannot raiſe his comprehenſion to the ſtate of manhood, you ſhould bring down the ſtate of manhood to a level with his capacity. In projecting what may be uſeful to him hereafter, ſpeak to him directly only of what is apparently uſeful to him at preſent. Beware, alſo, in general, of making compariſons between your pupil and other children; let him have no rival, no competitor, not even in his corporeal exerciſes, as ſoon as he begins to reaſon. I had much rather he ſhould not learn at all whatever muſt be taught him by means of vanity or jealouſy. I would content myſelf, in this reſpect, with remarking his annual progreſs, and comparing his ſituation and exploits in the preſent year with thoſe of the paſt. I would ſay to him, You are grown ſo much ſince ſuch a time; here is the ditch you leaped, the weight you lifted, the diſtance you threw a ſtone, ſo far you run without fetching breath; let us ſee what you can do more at preſent. Thus would I excite him to emulation, without making him jealous

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or envious of a rival: he would be desirous indeed to excel himself, and so he ought to be; I see no inconvenience in this kind of emulation.

I hate books; they only teach people to talk about what they do not understand. It is said that Hermes engraved the elements of the sciences on columns, to secure his discoveries from being lost in the time of a general deluge. Had he imprinted them on the minds of men, they had been better preserved by tradition. The organs of the memory, duly prepared, are the monuments on which human science would be most indelibly engraven.

Is there no expedient to be thought of, to collect the various instructions, scattered up and down in so many voluminous tomes? to unite them under one general head, which may be easy to comprehend, interesting to pursue, and which may serve as a *stimulus* even to children of this age? If one could but conceive a situation, in which all the natural wants of man would be displayed in a manner adapted to the understanding of a child, and wherein the means of satisfying those wants are gradually discovered with the same ease and simplicity, it would be in a just and lively description of such a state that we should first exercise his imagination.

I see the imagination of the philosopher already take fire. Impetuous genius! give yourself no trouble; such a situation is already discovered; it is already described, and I may say, without any impeachment to your talents, much better than you could describe it yourself; at least with more exactness and simplicity. Since we must have books, there is one already, which,

which, in my opinion, affords a complete treatiſe on natural education. This book ſhall be the firſt Emilius ſhall read. In this, indeed, will, for a long time, conſiſt his whole library, and it will always hold a diſtinguiſhed place among others. It will afford us the text, to which all our converſations on the objects of natural ſcience will ſerve only as a comment. It will ſerve as our guide during our progreſs to a ſtate of reaſon; and will even afterwards give us conſtant pleaſure, unleſs our taſte be totally vitiated. You aſk impatiently, what is the title of this wonderful book? Is it Ariſtotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No. It is Robinſon Cruſoe.

Robinſon Cruſoe, caſt aſhore on a deſolate iſland, deſtitute of human aſſiſtance, and of mechanical implements, providing, nevertheleſs, for his ſubſiſtence, for ſelf-preſervation, and even procuring for himſelf a kind of competency. In theſe circumſtances, I ſay, there cannot be an object more intereſting to perſons of every age; and there are a thouſand ways to render it agreeable to children. Thus, you ſee, I have realized that deſert iſland, which I at firſt made uſe of only by way of compariſon. Such a ſituation, I confeſs, is very different from that of man in a ſtate of ſociety. Very probably it will never be that of Emilius; but it is from ſuch a ſtate he ought to learn to eſtimate others. The moſt certain method for him to raiſe himſelf above vulgar prejudices, and to form his judgment on the actual relations of things, is to take on himſelf the character of ſuch a ſolitary adventurer, and to judge of every thing about him, as a man in ſuch circumſtances would, by its

its real utility. This romuace, beginning with his ſhipwreck on the iſland, and ending with the arrival of the veſſel that brought him away, would, if cleared of its rubbiſh, afford Emilius, during the period we are now treating of, at once both inſtruction and amuſement. I would have him indeed perſonate the hero of the tale, and be entirely taken up with his caſtle, his goats, and his plantations; he ſhould make himſelf minutely acquainted, not from books, but circumſtances, with every thing requiſite for a man in ſuch a ſituation. He ſhould affect even his dreſs, wear a coat of ſkins, a great hat, a large hanger; in ſhort, he ſhould be entirely equipped in his groteſque manner, even with his umbrello, though he would have no occaſion for it. I would have him, when at a loſs about the meaſures neceſſary to be taken for his proviſion or ſecurity upon this or the other occaſion, examine the conduct of his hero; he ſhould ſee if he omitted nothing, or if any thing better could be ſubſtituted in the room of what was actually done; and, on the diſcovery of any miſtake in Robinſon, ſhould amend it in a ſimiliar caſe himſelf: for I doubt not but he will form a project of going to make a like ſettlement. Not unlike to this were thoſe ancient caſtles in Spain, in that happy age, when the height of human felicity conſiſted in the enjoyment of liberty and the neceſſaries of life.

What opportunities of inſtruction would ſuch an amuſement afford an able preceptor, who ſhould project it only with a view to that end? The pupil, eager to furniſh a magazine for his iſland, would be more ready to learn than his

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tutor to teach him. He would be ſolicitous to know every thing that is uſeful, and nothing elſe: you would in ſuch a caſe have no more occaſion to direct, but only to reſtrain him. Let us haſten, therefore, to eſtabliſh him in this imaginary iſle, ſince to this he confines his preſent happineſs: for the time will now ſoon come, in which, if he is deſirous of life, it is not to live alone; and in which even a man *Friday*, the want of whom does not now affect him, would not be long ſatisfactory.

The practice of ſimple manual arts, to the exerciſe of which the abilities of the individual are equal, leads to the invention of the arts of induſtry, the exerciſe of which requires the concurrence of many. The former may be practiſed by hermits and ſavages; but the latter can be exerciſed only in a ſtate of ſociety, and render that ſtate neceſſary. While man is ſubject only to the calls of phyſical neceſſity, he is capable of ſatisfying them himſelf; but, by the introduction of ſuperfluous wants, the joint concern and diſtribution of labour become indiſpenſable: for though a man by his own labour, when alone, procures only ſubſiſtence for an individual; yet an hundred men working in concert, will eaſily procure, in the ſame time, ſubſiſtence for double the number. As ſoon, therefore, as one part of mankind take upon themſelves to live idle, it becomes neceſſary that the concurrent labour of numbers ſhould ſupply the place of thoſe who live without work.

Your greateſt care ſhould be, to keep from your pupil the notions of thoſe ſocial relations which he is not in a capacity to comprehend; but

but when the connection of his ideas obliges you to ſpeak of the mutual dependence of mankind, inſtead of preſenting him at firſt the moral ſide of the queſtion, divert his attention as much as poſſible to induſtry and the mechanic arts, which render men uſeful to one another. In going about with him to the workſhops of various artiſans, never let him ſee any thing performed without lending a hand to the work, nor come out of the ſhop without perfectly underſtanding the reaſon of what he obſerves there. To this end you ſhould work yourſelf, and in every thing ſet him an example. To make him a maſter, be you in every thing the apprentice; and reflect that he will learn more by one hour of manual labour, than he will retain from a whole day's verbal inſtructions.

The different arts are entitled to various proportions of public eſteem, and that in an inverſe ratio to their real uſe. This eſteem is directly as their inutility, and ſo it politically ought to be. The moſt uſeful arts are thoſe which are the worſt paid for, or leaſt rewarded; becauſe the number of workmen is proportioned to the wants of the whole ſociety, and the labour the poor muſt purchaſe muſt neceſſarily be at a low price. On the contrary, thoſe important artiſans, who, by way of diſtinction, are termed artiſts, and are employed only in the ſervice of the rich and idle, ſet an arbitrary price on their workmanſhip; and as the excellence of their baubles is mere matter of opinion, their high price conſtitutes great part of their merit, and they are eſteemed in proportion to what they coſt. The value thus ſet upon them is not on

account of any uſe they are of to the rich, but becauſe they are too coſtly to be purchaſed by the poor. *Nolo habere bona niſi quibus populus inviderit* *.

What will become of your pupils, if you permit them to adopt this ridiculous prejudice, if you encourage it yourſelf, or ſee them, for example, enter with more reſpect the ſhop of a jeweller than that of a lockſmith? What a judgement will they form of the real merit of the arts, and the intrinſic value of things, when they ſee whim and caprice univerſally oppoſed to real utility, and find the more a thing coſts, the leſs it is worth? If ever ſuch ideas as theſe take root in their minds, you may as well give up at once the remaining part of their education; they will, in ſpite of all you can do, be educated like the reſt of the world, and you will have taken, for fourteen years paſt, all your trouble for nothing.

Emilius will ſee things in a very different light, while he is employed in furniſhing his iſland. Robinſon Cruſoe would have ſet a greater value on the ſtock in trade of a petty ironmonger, than on that of the moſt magnificent and beſt furniſhed toy-ſhop in Europe. The firſt had appeared to him a reſpectable perſonage, while the owner of the latter had been deſpiſed as frivolous and contemptible.

I doubt not but ſome ſagacious member of ſociety will make the following objection. "My "ſon," he will ſay, "is formed to live in the "world; not to reſide among a ſet of philoſo-"phers, but to herd with fools; it is proper, "therefore,

* Petron.

" therefore, he ſhould be acquainted with thoſe " follies that influence their conduct. The " knowledge of things, as they are, may be " uſeful; but that of men and opinions is much " more ſo; for, in ſociety, the knowledge of " mankind is the beſt means to make the moſt " of them, and he is the wiſeſt man who ac- " quires the moſt, and makes the beſt uſe of it, " To what purpoſe, then, is it to give children " the ideas of an imaginary order of things di- " rectly contrary to that which cuſtom has e- " ſtabliſhed, and by which they muſt regulate " their behaviour? read them firſt lectures to " make themſelves wiſe, and then you may take " what method you will to inſtruct them in " what reſpect others are fools."

Such are the ſpecious maxims, on which is founded the falſe prudence of parents, who endeavour to make their children ſlaves to thoſe prejudices in which they themſelves are educated. How many things are neceſſary to be known, previous to the ſtudy of mankind! this is the laſt and moſt arduous taſk of the philoſopher, and you would have it be the firſt of a child. Before you inſtruct him in the knowledge of your own ſentiments, you ſhould begin by teaching him to form ſome eſtimate of their truth and propriety. Our opinions are imparted to children as reaſons; is this the way to teach them the folly of them? in order to attain wiſdom, it is neceſſary to be able to diſcern what is not ſo. How ſhall your child know how to ſtudy mankind, if he is incapable to judge of their ſentiments, or to detect their errors? It is a misfortune for him to know their opinions, while he

is ignorant whether they be true or falſe. Teach him firſt, therefore, what things are in themſelves; and you may afterwards inſtruct him at leiſure, what are the general ſentiments of mankind. Thus will he be enabled to judge of our opinions by the criterion of truth, and ſoar above the miſtaken notions of the vulgar. To adopt prejudices is not to know them as ſuch, nor are the multitude governed by thoſe who are like themſelves. If you begin by making your pupil acquainted with the opinions of the world, before you have taught him how to judge of them, you may aſſure yourſelf, ſay what you will, they will become his, and you will never after be able to eradicate them. I conclude this ſubject, therefore, by laying down as a maxim, that to render a youth ſenſible and judicious, we ought to form his opinion of things, and not to dictate ours.

You will obſerve that hitherto I have ſaid nothing to my pupil about mankind; he would have had too much good ſenſe to underſtand me, if I had: his connections with, and relations to his fellow-creatures, are not as yet ſtriking and conſpicuous enough to enable him to judge of others by himſelf. He has no ideas of human nature but what centre in his own perſon, and even his ſelf-knowledge is but very confined. If his ideas, however, are contracted, at leaſt they are juſt. He knows not the relative ſituation of others; but he is ſenſible of his own, and keeps his place. Inſtead of reſtraining him by ſocial ties, the force of which he could not comprehend, we have bound him by the obvious chains of neceſſity. He is as yet

little

little better than a mere phyſical being; let us continue to treat him as ſuch.

He forms his judgment, and eſtimates the value of the works both of nature and art, by their relation to his own convenience, ſecurity, and preſervation. Hence he looks upon iron as a more precious metal than gold, and glaſs to be more valuable than diamonds. For the ſame reaſon he hath more reſpect for a ſhoemaker, or a maſon, than for all the celebrated jewellers in Europe. A paſtry-cook is, in his opinion, a perſon of ſingular importance, and the whole academy of ſciences of leſs conſequence than the reſpectable perſonage of the meaneſt confectioner. Goldſmiths, engravers, and gilders, are, with him, idle inſignificant people, who amuſe themſelves in employments frivolous and uſeleſs; nay, he does not hold a watchmaker in very high eſtimation. Happy in the enjoyment of this native liberty, he profits by time without knowing its value. That tranquillity, which, undiſturbed by the violence of paſſion, makes its ſucceſſion equal, ſerves him inſtead of a machine to meaſure the quantity elapſed *. In ſuppoſing his pocket to be furniſhed with a watch, as in ſuppoſing him to cry, I only made uſe on that occaſion of an Emilius vulgarly educated, for the ſake of illuſtration: for, in fact, a child ſo different from all others, can hardly be made uſe of as an example in any caſe.

* We loſe our conſtitutional meaſure of time, when the paſſions would ſubject its duration to their will. The philoſopher's time-piece is evenneſs of temper and tranquillity of mind; he is always in his own time, and knows it exactly.

There is another order of diſtinction, not leſs natural, and ſtill more judicious, according to which the arts may be ranked agreeable to their order in that neceſſary chain which connects them together; placing the moſt independent in the firſt claſs, and thoſe which depend on the greateſt number of others in the laſt. This method of arrangement, which may furniſh important conſiderations to the order of ſociety in general, is ſimilar to the former, in that it is equally ſubject to be perverted by the prepoſſeſſions and caprices of mankind. Hence it is, that all manufactured ſubſtances are firſt laborioufly operated on by workmen below conſideration, and almoſt without pay; that the more hands they paſs though, the more expenſive becomes the labour, and the more creditable the profeſſion of each ſucceſſive artiſan. I will not here inquire whether it be true, that induſtry is more exerted in the elegant arts, than in thoſe which give the firſt form to the maſſive ſubſtance, and fit it for common uſes: but I affirm, that, in all caſes, thoſe arts which are the moſt general and indiſpenſable, are inconteſtably thoſe which deſerve to be held in the greateſt eſteem; and that ſuch as require the leaſt aſſiſtance from others, deſerve ſtill leſs to be degraded loweſt of all, when they are at the ſame time the moſt free and independent. Theſe rules form the true criterion whereby to judge of the merit and eſtimate the value of arts and induſtry. All other are arbitrary and capricious. The firſt and moſt reſpectable of all arts and profeſſions is that of agriculture: next to the huſbandman, I rank the ſmith; to the ſmith ſucceeds the carpenter, and

and ſo on. A child, who ſhould not have acquired a misjudging partiality from vulgar prejudices, would rank them alſo preciſely in the ſame order. How many important reflections on this ſubject may not Emilius deduce from Robinſon Cruſoe! What will he think in ſeeing the arts carried to perfection, by being divided and ſubdivided into ſuch a number of branches, and by the invention of ſuch an infinite variety of implements to work with? will he not call their ingenuity ridiculous, and think they are afraid their arms and fingers are not fit for uſe, that they have contrived ſo many expedients to work without them? To exerciſe one trade, they muſt be furniſhed with tools by a thouſand others: the artiſans of a whole town muſt be employed to ſet any one of them to work. As to my companion and myſelf, our ingenuity lies in our dexterity; we make uſe of the tools we carry about us. Let the proudeſt workman belonging to the nicknackitories of Paris come to our deſert iſland, his talents uſeleſs here, he will be glad in his turn to ſerve an apprenticeſhip to us.

Confine not your obſervation here, reader, to the corporeal exerciſe and manual dexterity of my pupil; but conſider the proper methods we take to gratify his childiſh curioſity, remark the effects of his good ſenſe, his genius for invention, his foreſight, and other intellectual abilities. In whatever he ſees, or is employed in, he wants to know the reaſon of every thing; tracing back one inſtrument from another, till he arrive at the firſt and moſt ſimple. He takes nothing upon ſuppoſition or on truſt; but refuſes

ſes even to learn any thing that requires a previous knowledge of which he is not poſſeſſed. If he ſees, for inſtance, a file, or a ſpring, he immediately recurs to the method of working up the materials from the ore. If he ſees the ſides of a cheſt fitted together, he muſt know the methods of felling the timber and ſawing it into planks. If he be himſelf at work, he never fails to reflect on every new tool he makes uſe of, and to conſider how he might have conſtructed ſuch an implement, or have made ſhift without it.

There is an error, however, difficult to avoid, in employing your pupil in theſe mechanical operations; and that is, you will always ſuppoſe him to have a taſte for thoſe you are fond of yourſelf: but you muſt beware, that while you are ſeeking your own amuſement, you do not fatigue and diſguſt your pupil, who perhaps will not let you perceive it. Your little artiſan ſhould find in himſelf every thing needful to execute his deſigns, but he ſhould find in you every thing needful to direct him in thoſe deſigns. You ſhould obſerve him, and watch his motions continually, without his knowing it; you ſhould anticipate his thoughts, and prevent thoſe which are improper; in ſhort, you ſhould keep him ſo employed, that he ſhould not only be ſenſible of the uſe of his own talents, but that he ſhould take delight in his employment, from a like ſenſe of its utility.

The intercourſe of the arts conſiſts in the reciprocal exchange of induſtry, that of commerce in the exchange of commodities, and that of money in the exchange of bills and caſh: all theſe

theſe are intimately connected with each other, and we have already acquired ideas of the principles on which they are founded, from our diſpute with Robert the gardener. At preſent we have nothing more to do than to generaliſe thoſe ideas, and to extend them to a variety of examples, in order to give to Emilius a juſt notion of the nature of commercial connections; which may be exemplified by the natural hiſtory of the produce peculiar to different climates, by enumerating the arts and ſciences which relate to navigation, and repreſenting the various obſtacles that are ſurmounted in tranſporting commodities from one country to another. No ſociety can exiſt without making uſe of the expedients of exchange, nor can any exchange be carried on without ſome common ſtandard: this alſo muſt be formed on ſome principle of equality. Hence every ſociety has, for its firſt law, ſome conventional equality, both of perſons and of property.

The conventional equality between perſons is very different from the natural, and therefore requires the protection of government and laws. The political knowledge of a child ſhould be very clear and confined: he ought to have no other idea of government in general, than what relates to the notion concerning the right of property which he hath already imbibed.

The conventional equality, between articles of property, gave riſe to the invention of money; which ſerves as the means of comparing the value of the different ſpecies of ſuch articles; and in this ſenſe money may be denominated the real bond of ſociety Every thing, however,

ver, may be converted into money. Formerly cattle were made uſe of as ſuch; ſo at preſent, in ſome countries, are ſhells, teeth, &c. The money of Sparta was iron, that of Sweden has been made of leather, as ours is now of gold and ſilver.

Metals, as the moſt eaſily tranſported, are generally made choice of to form this mean term in our uſual courſe of exchange. To facilitate this end, by ſparing the trouble of recurring to weights and meaſures, they are converted into regular coin. For the ſtamp imprinted thereon is no more than an atteſtation, that the piece ſo marked is of ſuch a certain weight; the ſovereign only having a right to coin money, ſo long as he is poſſeſſed of a right to require his atteſtation to paſs unqueſtioned through a whole people, or ſo long as he reſerves to himſelf ſuch excluſive privilege.

The uſe of this invention, thus explained, will be readily perceived by a child of the dulleſt apprehenſion. It is, indeed, difficult to make a direct compariſon between commodities of different kinds; as for example, between cloth and grain: but when a ſtandard common to both, ſuch as money, is eſtabliſhed, it is eaſy for the manufacturer and huſbandman to apply the value of their reſpective articles thereto, and to judge what quantity of each is equivalent to the other. For if ſo many yards of broad-cloath be worth a certain ſum of money, and ſo many buſhels of wheat be worth the like ſum, the draper, in taking the wheat for his cloath, makes a fair and equitable exchange. Thus it is, that, through the medium of money, the produce

produce and manufactures of different kinds and countries may be eſtimated and compared with each other.

Go no farther than this, nor enter into any diſquiſition concerning the moral effects of this inſtitution. It is of conſequence, in every caſe, to bring your pupil acquainted with the nature and end of every cuſtom before you point out its abuſe. If you attempt to explain to children in what manner ſigns are ſubſtituted for things, that money hath been productive of the numerous chimeras of prejudice and caprice, and that countries abounding in ſilver and gold muſt be proportionably deſtitute of real wealth; in doing this, I ſay, you treat them, not only as if they were profeſſed philoſophers, but alſo as men of experience; and attempt to give them exceptions of what even few philoſophers have clearly underſtood.

To what a variety of intereſting ſubjects may we not, by theſe means, direct the curioſity of our pupil, without ever quitting thoſe real and ſenſible relations which are contained within the ſphere of his knowledge, or exciting in his mind one idea beyond the reach of his capacity. A judicious preceptor will not dwell, with heavy prolixity, on frivolous ſubjects; but be conſtantly preparing his pupil for the knowledge of thoſe important relations, which will one day be neceſſary for him, in order to his forming a right judgment of the good or evil cuſtoms of ſociety. He will endeavour to adapt his converſation and amuſements to the turn of mind he has given him. A queſtion that would ſcarce excite the atten-

attention of another child, will perplex Emilius for ſix months together.

I take an opportunity, we will ſuppoſe, to carry him to dinner at the houſe of ſome opulent family; where when we arrive, we find great preparations making for an elegant entertainment, much company, a number of ſervants, a variety of diſhes, and a ſuperb ſide-board of plate. There is ſomething intoxicating, to thoſe who are unaccuſtomed to it, in this appearance of ſplendour and feſtivity. I foreſee the effect it will have on my pupil; and therefore, in the midſt of the hurry and clamour that prevail round the table, I whiſper in his ear, and aſk him, how many hands he thinks were employed in furniſhing the entertainment before us. What a croud of ideas will thoſe few words bring thronging into his mind! In an inſtant his delirium vaniſhes. He muſes, reflects, begins to calculate, and puzzles himſelf with thinking. While grave philoſophers, inſpired by the wine, or perhaps by the charms of the ladies, degrade themſelves by talking idly, and, in the gaiety of their hearts, behave like children, Emilius ſits philoſophiſing by himſelf at one corner of the table; he applies to me with an interrogation, which I refuſe to anſwer, deferring it to another opportunity. At this he grows uneaſy, he cannot eat a morſel, nor drink a drop more; but burns with impatience to get away from table, in order to converſe with me more freely. What an object this for his curioſity to work upon! what a text, pregnant with inſtruction! With a ſound judgment, unbiaſſed by prepoſſeſſion and untainted with prejudice,

judice, what ideas muſt he form of luxury, when he comes to find that all the countries in the world have been laid under contribution, that twenty millions of hands have been for a long time employed, that thouſands of men, perhaps, have loſt their lives, and all this to preſent him, in ſuch public pomp at noon, what he may privately diſburden himſelf of before night?

Be very attentive to thoſe concluſions which the heart of a child will deduce in ſecret from all his obſervations. If you have taken leſs pains with yours than I have preſcribed, he may be tempted, in ſuch a caſe as the above, to give his reflections quite a different turn, and look upon himſelf as a perſon of very great importance in the world, in ſeeing ſo much pains taken to provide for his dinner. If you foreſee this ſentiment, you may eaſily prevent it, or at leaſt preſently efface the impreſſion it makes on him. Being as yet ignorant of the means of appropriating any thing to himſelf, except by actual poſſeſſion and enjoyment, he cannot judge of their convenience or inconvenience to him, but by the pleaſure they afford him. Now the ſimple compariſon, between ſuch a ſplendid and formal repaſt, and a plain and homely dinner provided by his own labour, and ſeaſoned by appetite, liberty, and eaſe, is ſufficient to make him ſenſible that all that magnificent appearance of feſtivity had been of no real uſe; and that, his hunger being as fully ſatisfied at the table of the peaſant as at that of a lord, he enjoys nothing at the one more than at the other, which he can truly call his own.

Let us imagine what a polite governor would ſay to a child on ſuch an occaſion. Recollect the circumſtances, he would ſay, of each repaſt, and determine within yourſelf which afforded you the greateſt pleaſure. At which have you demonſtrated the greateſt expreſſions of joy? At which have you ſhewn the keeneſt appetite, drank the moſt cheerfully, and laughed the moſt heartily? Which laſted the longeſt without making you weary, or kept you longeſt from being again hungry? Yet, ſee the difference: this brown bread, which you reliſh ſo well, comes from the corn, ſown and reaped by the peaſant; this thick wine, ſo refreſhing and wholeſome, is produced from his own vine; his table-cloth is made of his own flax, ſpun in the winter by his wife and children: no other hands than thoſe of the family have been employed in providing for his table; the neareſt mill and the next market-town are to him the extremities of his univerſe. What then have you really enjoyed of all that profuſion, with which the moſt diſtant parts of the earth, and the complicated induſtry of man, ſo ſplendidly furniſhes the table at which you lately dined? If that ſplendor did not add to the ſatisfaction of your repaſt, what did you gain by all that ſuperfluity? What did you find there made for you? Had you even been the maſter of the houſe, might he add, the magnificence would be ſtill leſs, with any propriety, to be called yours: for your ſolicitude to diſplay the wealth and plenty you enjoyed, to others, would abſolutely deprive you of ſuch enjoyment: you only would have all the trouble, and your gueſts the pleaſure.

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This diſcourſe may be very fine, but it would be of no uſe to Emilius, being above his comprehenſion, and, moreover, to dictate his reflections is not our cuſtom. Speak to him, therefore, in a more ſimple manner. Having made both the above experiments, ſay to him ſome fine morning, Where ſhall we dine to-day? round that mountain of plate which covered three fourths of the table, and the deſſert of artificial flowers and looking-glaſs? among thoſe women with their great hoop-petticoats, who treated you like a puppet, and wanted to make you talk what you did not underſtand? or ſhall we rather go to the village two leagues off, where the good people received us ſo joyfully, and gave us ſuch excellent cream? Emilius will not heſitate a moment to determine; for he is neither given to babbling, nor puffed up by vanity; beſides this, he hates reſtraint, and has no reliſh for high-ſeaſoned ragouts; but he is always ready to run about the fields, and loves fine fruit, freſh vegetables, good cream, and good people *. There is no doubt, but the re-

* The taſte which I ſuppoſe my pupil to have for the country, is the natural effect of his education. Having, beſides, nothing of that foppiſh and affected air, which is ſo taking with the women, he is leſs careſſed than other children, and of courſe is leſs pleaſed with, and leſs ſpoiled by, being in their company, the charms of which he is at preſent incapable to perceive. I have taken care, in particular, not to learn him to kiſs the hand; to repeat their ceremonious nonſenſe; or ſhew them, in preference to the other ſex, even the reſpect which is their due. I lay it down as an inviolable rule, to require nothing of him, of which he is not in a capacity to comprehend the reaſon: now, no good reaſon can be given, why a child ſhould treat one ſex with more reſpect than another.

flection you want to inculcate, will ſuggeſt itſelf, during your excurſion; and that our pupil will obſerve, that the people who furniſh out ſuch grand entertainments, throw away their labour, or that they are quite ignorant of our enjoyments.

The examples which I introduce by way of illuſtration, though proper for one ſubject, may be improper for a thouſand others. If the reader enters into the ſpirit of them, however, he will ſee they may be varied as occaſion requires; their application depending on the genius and diſpoſition of the pupil; a knowledge of which is acquired by the opportunities given them to diſplay themſelves. It cannot be expected, that, in the ſpace of three or four years, we ſhould give a child, even of the moſt happy turn and diſpoſition, ſuch an idea of the arts and ſciences as is ſufficient to enable him to ſtudy them without farther aſſiſtance. In thus bringing him acquainted, however, with the various objects requiſite for him to know, we put him in a ſituation to diſplay his genius and taſte by degrees, to make the firſt advances to the proper objects, and to indicate the route which muſt be taken to ſecond the deſigns of nature.

Another advantage ariſing from our thus giving him a juſt, but limited, ſeries of ideas, is that of ſhewing him their proper relations and connection, of placing every thing in a due order in his eſtimation, and of preventing the riſe of thoſe prepoſſeſſions which moſt men entertain in favour of the talents they cultivate, and to the prejudice of ſuch as they have neglected. He who perceives the order of the whole, ſees the due

due place of every part; and though a man who knows only a part, if intimately acquainted with it, may be ſtyled a man of knowledge, the other only is the man of judgment; and it is to be remembered that the great object in view, in our method of education, is judgment, and not ſcience.

However this be, my method is independent of the examples I make uſe of to illuſtrate it. It is founded on the progreſs of the human faculties at different periods, and on the choice of thoſe proper objects on which ſuch faculties ſhould be employed. I conceive it will be very eaſy to find another method which will promiſe better; but, if it be leſs adapted to our ſpecies, age, and ſex, I doubt much if it will be attended with the ſame ſucceſs.

In the commencement of this ſecond period of childhood, we took the advantage of our abilities exceeding our wants, to extend our views beyond our own perſons: we ſoared into the expanſe of the heavens, took meaſure of the earth, deduced the laws of nature; in a word, we have explored our whole iſland: let us now, therefore, return home to our more immediate habitation; happy to find at our entrance, that no enemy hath taken poſſeſſion, or threatens to wreſt it from us by force!

What remains for us to do after obſerving every thing that ſurrounds us? To make uſe of every thing we can appropriate, and to employ our curioſity to our advantage. Hitherto we have made a proviſion of tools and implements of every kind, without knowing to what uſes we ſhall have occaſion to put them. Perhaps, uſe-

leſs to ourſelves, they might yet be of ſervice to others; and perhaps we, in our turn, may have need of theirs: hence we ſhould all find our account in making an exchange. In order to do this, however, it is neceſſary to learn our reciprocal wants; every one ſhould know what the other poſſeſſes that might be of uſe to himſelf, and what he might be willing to accept in return. Let us ſuppoſe, for inſtance, ten men, each of whom ſtands in need of ten different things. If they go about ſeparately to ſupply their wants, each muſt apply himſelf to ten different kinds of occupation; but, on account of their different turn and genius, ſome will ſucceed better at one occupation, and others at another: thus, though collectively they might ſucceed equally in all; yet, each attempting it ſeparately, they are every one but ill ſerved. Let us form a little ſociety, therefore, of theſe ten individuals, and let each apply himſelf ſolely to that kind of occupation at which he is moſt expert; by this expedient each will profit as much by the talents of the reſt as if he had poſſeſſed them all. By continued application, alſo, to one kind of employment, they would all acquire additional dexterity; and thus would not only be completely provided for themſelves, but ſoon acquire a ſuperfluity for the uſe of others. This is the apparent principle on which are founded our various mechanical and other inſtitutions. It is not my buſineſs to examine here into the conſequences: I have already done it in another treatiſe.

On this principle, a man who ſhould be deſirous to conſider himſelf as a ſolitary and independent

pendent being, could not fail of being miſerable. It would be even impoſſible for him to ſubſiſt; for, finding the earth already occupied and divided into *meum* and *tuum*, and having no implements or property, by what means would he provide himſelf with the neceſſaries of life? In departing ourſelves from a ſtate of nature, we oblige all our fellow-creatures to do the like; no one can remain therein, in ſpite of the reſt; and it would be to act moſt prepoſterouſly againſt nature, to be obſtinately tenacious of a ſituation in which it is impoſſible we ſhould exiſt; for the firſt law of nature is that of ſelf-preſervation. Thus may we form, by degrees, in the mind of a child, ideas of ſocial relations, even before he really becomes an active member of ſociety. Emilius ſees already, that, to acquire implements for his own uſe, he muſt poſſeſs ſome for the uſe of others, which he may exchange for thoſe he ſtands in need of: thus I lead him eaſily to perceive the neceſſity of this commercial intercourſe, and prepare him, when occaſion offers, to turn it to his advantage.

Sir, I muſt live, was the ſaying of a wretched libeller to a miniſter of ſtate who reproached him with the infamy of his profeſſion. *I cannot ſee the neceſſity of it*, replied the miniſter very coldly. This reply, excellent as it was from a ſecretary of ſtate, had been unjuſt and inhuman from any other perſon. Every man muſt live. This argument, which every one thinks more or leſs cogent in proportion to his humanity, appears to me unanſwerable with reſpect to the perſon who urges it. Of all natural antipathies, our averſion to die is the ſtrongeſt;

ſtrongeſt; it follows, therefore, that neceſſity has no law, and that nature authoriſes a man who hath no other poſſible means of living, to take any ſtep for his preſervation. The principles on which a virtuous man acquires a contempt for life, and learns to ſacrifice his exiſtence to his duty, are very different from this primitive ſimplicity. Happy people, among whom goodneſs requires no ſelf-denial, and men may be juſt without virtue! If there be ſo miſerable a ſtate in the world, as that wherein men cannot ſubſiſt without injuſtice, and whoſe citizens muſt of neceſſity be knaves, it is not their criminals who ought to be hanged, but thoſe who made them ſuch.

As ſoon as Emilius knows what life is, my firſt care ſhall be to teach him to preſerve it. Hitherto I have made no diſtinction of ſituation, rank, or fortune, nor ſhall I diſtinguiſh them otherwiſe in the ſequel; for man is the ſame in every rank and ſituation. The rich have not better appetites than the poor, nor quicker digeſtion: the maſter has not longer arms or ſtronger than his ſervant: a great man is no taller than the meaneſt artiſan; in a word, our natural wants being the ſame in every ſituation of life, the means of providing for them ought to be in all the ſame. Adapt the education of a man to his perſonal, and not accidental abilities. Do not you ſee, that; by bringing him up only to fill one ſtation in life, you make him unfit for every other? and that mere accident may render all the pains you have taken uſeleſs, or deſtructive to him? Is there a more ridiculous being on earth than a lord become a beggar,

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and retaining in his miſery the prejudices attached to his birth? What is more vile and contemptible than a rich man become poor, ſenſible of the diſgrace of poverty, and reduced to the loweſt of the human ſpecies? The one hath no other reſource than to turn common cheat, and the other ſervilely to put on a livery, with this fine phraſe in their mouths, *We muſt live.*

You make a dependence on the actual order of ſociety, without thinking that order ſubject to unavoidable revolutions, and that it is impoſſible to forſee or prevent that which may affect your children. The high may be reduced low, and the rich may become poor, and even the monarch dwindle into a ſubject. Are theſe changes of fortune ſo unfrequent, that you can flatter yourſelf that your pupil will be exempt from them? We certainly are approaching the criſis of human eſtabliſhments, the age of political revolutions *. Who can aſſure you what will be your lot? All that men have made, they may deſtroy. There are no characters indelible but thoſe imprinted by nature; and nature never made man royal, noble, or rich. What then will become of the pupil you have educated to live only with ſplendor, when debaſed into indigence and meanneſs? What will become of a farmer of the revenues, whoſe ſoul delights in nothing

* I hold it impoſſible, that the great monarchies of Europe can ſubſiſt much longer; they all affect magnificence and ſplendor. Every ſtate that doth this, is upon its decline. I could give very particular and cogent reaſons for this aſſertion: but it may not be proper; and indeed they are but too obvious.

nothing but wealth, when he is reduced to want and beggary? How miſerable muſt be the ſituation of that pampered helpleſs being, who, deſtitute of every thing, is incapable of providing in the leaſt for himſelf, and places all his ſatisfaction in things dependent on others? Happy is he who knows how to quit a rank that is quitting him, and to remain ſtill a man in ſpite of fortune. Let others laviſh what encomiums they pleaſe on the frantic behaviour of the vanquiſhed monarch, who wanted to bury himſelf alive in the ruins of his throne; for my part, I hold him in contempt. It appears to me, that his exiſtence depended on his crown; and that, had he not been a king, he would have been nothing at all. But the monarch who can throw aſide the robes of royalty and be ſtill himſelf, is, in my opinion, infinitely ſuperior to a crown. From the rank of a king, which may be filled up by a coward, a knave, or a fool, he riſes to that of a man, which ſo few are able to fill with decency and dignity. Such a man may brave the viciſſitudes of fortune, and will triumph over them. He owes nothing to any one but himſelf; and though deſtitute of all adventitious ſubſtance, is not therefore annihilated; he is ſtill ſomething. Yes, I prefer infinitely the character of a king of Syracuſe turned ſchoolmaſter at Corinth, of a king of Macedon become a notary at Rome, to that of an unhappy Tarquin ignorant how to ſubſiſt without a kingdom; of an heir to a race of kings, become the ſport of all who are brutal enough to exult in his miſery, wandering from court to court in ſearch of relief, and meeting on every ſide with nothing

nothing but mockery, inſult, and affronts; and all for want of knowing how to exerciſe any employment different from that to which he has been educated, and which is no longer in his power.

Whether we conſider ourſelves as men or citizens, or whatever be our ſtation in life, we can contribute nothing more than our own perſonal abilities to ſociety; all our other acquirements belong to it, in ſpite of ourſelves: hence, when a man becomes rich, he muſt either not enjoy his wealth himſelf, or the public will enjoy it alſo. In the firſt caſe, he only robs others of what he alſo deprives himſelf; and even in the laſt he gives them nothing. Thus the debt he owes ſociety remains undiſcharged ſo long as he pays it only with the uſe of his property. But, you will ſay, perhaps my progenitor, in amaſſing his wealth, was of public ſervice. He might be ſo; and therefore may have diſcharged his own debt, but not yours. Nay, you lie under ſtill greater obligations than if you had been born poor, as you have had greater opportunities of profiting by education. It is not equitable, that what one man hath done for the public ſhould diſcharge another of what it has a right to expect from him: for every one, ſtanding indebted, in himſelf, to ſociety, cannot ſubſtitute any thing in the room of his perſonal ſervice. A father cannot tranſmit to his ſon the right of being uſeleſs to his fellow-creatures; and yet, according to your notions, he actually does this, by tranſmitting to him his wealth, the proof and reward of his labour. The man who earns not his ſubſiſtence, but eats

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the bread of idleneſs, is no better than a thief; and a penſioner, who is paid by the ſtate for doing nothing, differs little, according to my notion of things, from a robber who is ſupported by the plunder he makes on the highway. Man, in a ſtate of ſolitude, not being indebted to the aſſiſtance or good offices of others, hath a right to live as he pleaſes: but in a ſtate of ſociety, where he muſt be neceſſarily maintained at the expence of the community, he certainly owes the ſtate ſo much labour as will pay for his ſubſiſtence; and this without exception to rank or perſons. To labour, then, is the indiſpenſable duty of ſocial or political man. Rich or poor, ſtrong or weak, every idle citizen is a knave.

Now, of all the occupations which ſerve to furniſh ſubſiſtence to mankind, thoſe which approach neareſt to a ſtate of nature are the manual arts: of all conditions of life, the moſt independent of fortune or the caprices of mankind, is that of the artiſan. The artiſan depends only on his own labour; he is as free as the huſbandman is a ſlave; for the latter depends on the produce of his fields, which lies at the diſcretion of others. The enemy, the ſovereign, a powerful neighbour, a law-ſuit, may run away with the crop which he hath laborioufly toiled for; he may be diſtreſſed a thouſand ways by means of the local ſtability of his property; whereas, if an artiſan be oppreſſed in one place, his baggage is eaſily packed up, he folds his arms about him, and diſdainfully marches off to another. Agriculture is, nevertheleſs, the principal profeſſion of mankind; it is the moſt honeſt, the moſt uſeful, and of courſe the moſt creditable

able in the world. I have no need to bid Emilius apply himſelf to agriculture: it is already his ſtudy: every kind of ruſtic employment is familiar to him. His firſt application was to the labours of the huſbandman, and it is in thoſe he regularly exerciſes himſelf. I ſay to him, therefore, cultivate the land thou inheriteſt from thy fathers. But it may be ſaid, ſuppoſe this were to be loſt, or that a child had no paternal inheritance, what muſt he do then? Learn a trade.

My child learn a trade! make my ſon a mechanic! conſider, Sir, what you adviſe.—I do, Madam, I conſider this matter better than you, who would reduce your child to the neceſſity of being a lord, a marquis, or a prince, or perhaps one day or other to be leſs than nothing. I am deſirous of inveſting him with a title that cannot be taken from him, that will in all times and places command reſpect; and, I can tell you, whatever you may think of it, he will have fewer equals in this rank than in that he may derive from you.

The letter deſtroys, and the ſpirit maketh alive. I would not have him learn a trade, merely for the ſake of knowing how to exerciſe it, but that he may overcome the prejudices uſually conceived againſt it. You will never be reduced, you ſay, to work for your bread. So much the worſe for you; I ſay, ſo much the worſe. But, no matter; if you labour not through neceſſity, do it for reputation. Stoop to the ſituation of an artiſan, that you may raiſe yourſelf above your own. To make fortune ſubſervient to your will, you muſt begin by rendering your-

ſelf independent. To triumph in the opinion of the world, you muſt begin by deſpiſing that opinion.

Remember, I do not adviſe you to acquire a talent, but a trade; a mechanical art, in the exerciſe of which the hands are more employed than the head; an art by which you will never get a fortune, but may be enabled to live without one. I have often obſerved, and that in families far enough removed from all appearance of wanting bread, a provident father very anxious to furniſh his children with various kinds of knowledge, that at all events they might be capacitated to earn a ſubſiſtence. In doing this, alſo, ſuch parents conceived they did a great deal in the way of making proviſion for their offspring, in caſe of the worſt accidents. In this, however, they did nothing; becauſe the reſources, with which they thus provided their children, depend on the ſame good fortune of which they wanted to render them independent. So that a man poſſeſſed of the fineſt talents, unleſs he find himſelf in favourable circumſtances to diſplay them, is as liable to periſh for want as he that hath none.

Ever ſince the intrigues of party have been in faſhion, it requires as much art and aſſiduity to live genteely by a liberal profeſſion, as to regain the eſtate you may have loſt. If you have cultivated thoſe arts whoſe ſucceſs depends on the reputation of the artiſt; if you have fitted yourſelf for ſuch employments as are in the giſt of the great; of what uſe to you will be all your acquirements, when, diſguſted with the world, you diſdain to make uſe of thoſe means, without

out which it is impoſſible you ſhould ſucceed? Let us ſuppoſe you may have ſtudied politics, and made yourſelf perfectly acquainted with the intereſts of princes; all this is very well: But what will you do with your knowledge, if you know not how to get acceſs to miniſters of ſtate, have no patroneſs in a woman of quality, no intereſt with the commiſſioners of the ſeveral departments of the finances; if you have not the art of making yourſelf agreeable to them, or the baſeneſs to do all the dirty buſineſs in which they might find you employment? But you are an architect or painter, we will ſay. It is very well; they are noble arts: but you muſt make your abilities known to the public. Do you think to carry your point merely by expoſing your deſigns at an exhibition? No, no, this will not do. You muſt be previouſly admitted into the academy; you muſt be honoured by the protection of the great: you muſt throw aſide your pencil and rule, take coach, and drive about from houſe to houſe, to make intereſt for reputation in your profeſſion; at the ſame time you are to obſerve, that the houſes you are to viſit, have all Swiſs or other porters, who underſtand nothing but facts, and have the gift of hearing only in their hands. Are you deſirous of teaching any of the arts and ſciences you have learned; to become a teacher of geography, of the mathematics, of languages, of muſic, or deſign? To do this, you muſt find ſcholars, and of courſe advocates and puffers. It is of more conſequence to be acquainted with the arts of quackery and impoſition, than to excel in your profeſſion; and you may depend on it, if you know nothing but

what you profeſs, you will ever be treated as a blockhead.

Thus you ſee how unſerviceable will be all thoſe fine accompliſhments on which you depend, and how much you ſtand in need of others to profit by theſe. What then muſt become of you in this humiliating ſtate of depreſſion? The rebuffs you meet with will debaſe without inſtructing you; ſubject more than ever to the caprice of public prejudice, how will you raiſe yourſelf above it, when it is become the arbiter of your fortune? How will you be able to deſpiſe that meanneſs and vice which are neceſſary to your ſubſiſtence? You will depend on the encouragement of wealth, and would ſoon become dependent on the perſons of the rich; you would only have added mortification to ſervility, and loaded yourſelf with miſery. Thus would you behold yourſelf poor, without being free; the moſt wreched and contemptible ſtate into which it is poſſible to fall.

But if, inſtead of returning to theſe ſublime profeſſions, which are rather calculated to nouriſh the mind than the body, you apply yourſelf, when occaſion requires, to the uſe of your hands, all theſe difficulties will diſappear; the arts of ſervility are needleſs; your reſources are at hand the moment you want to profit by them: probity and honour are no obſtacles to your ſubſiſtence; you have no need to fear or flatter the great, to creep or cringe to knaves, to be complaiſant to the world, or to be either a borrower or a thief, which is much the ſame thing when a man ſees no proſpect of paying what he borrows. The opinion of others will not affect you;

you; you will be under no neceſſity of paying your court to any one; you will have no ideot to humour, or Swiſs to ſoothe; no courtezan to bribe, nor, what is worſe, to flatter. Let knaves joſtle each other, and thruſt themſelves into preferment; it is nothing to you; this will not hinder you, in your obſcure ſituation, from being an honeſt man, or gaining a livelihood. You have only to go into the firſt ſhop of the trade you have learned, and deſire employment, and it will be readily given you Before noon you will have earned your dinner; and, if you are ſober and induſtrious, before the week is out you will have earned enough to ſubſiſt on a fortnight; thus may you live free, healthy, ſincere, diligent, and honeſt: a man's time is not thrown away in learning to make this proviſion.

I am determined, therefore, that Emilius ſhall learn a trade. A creditable one to be ſure! you will ſay. I ſhould like to know the meaning of that word. Is not every employment creditable that is uſeful; I would not have him learn to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or varniſher, like the fine gentleman of Mr Locke: I would have him neither a fiddler, a player, nor a pamphleteer. Except theſe profeſſions, and a few of a ſimilar nature, he might take his choice of all others; I would confine him to nothing. I had much rather he ſhould be a cobler than a poet; that he ſhould learn to pave the highway, than enamel or paint the flowers on china. But, you will ſay, ſpies, bailiffs followers, and even hangmen, are uſeful people in their way. That they are ſo, is the fault of government, which might render them uſeleſs: but to give up this poin-

I was indeed miſtaken; it is not enough to fix on a trade uſeful to ſociety, it ſhould be ſuch a one as doth not require thoſe who exerciſe it to be poſſeſſed of thoſe deteſtable qualities of mind which are incompatible with humanity. We will recur, therefore, to the term you made uſe of, and chuſe a creditable employment; always remembering, however, that nothing ſhould be called creditable that is not at the ſame time uſeful.

A celebrated modern author, whoſe books are full of extenſive projects and confined views, made the vows of chaſtity, like other prieſts of his communion, and had therefore no wife of his own. Being a little more ſcrupulous, alſo, in having to do with the wives of others than many of his profeſſion, it is ſaid, he choſe to have pretty ſervant-maids, with whoſe aſſiſtance he endeavoured to repair, as well as poſſible, the wrong he had done his ſpecies by entering into ſuch raſh engagements. He looked upon it as a duty incumbent on a citizen to provide children for the ſtate; and with the tribute he paid of this kind, he peopled the claſs of artiſans. As ſoon as his children were arrived at a proper age, he put them all to ſome profeſſion agreeable to their inclinations; excepting againſt thoſe only which were idle, frivolous, or ſubject to the faſhion; ſuch, for example, as is that of a peruke-maker, which is not at all neceſſary, and and may ſome time or other become uſeleſs, unleſs nature, indeed, ſhould take it into her head not to furniſh our heads with hair.

By theſe views ſhould we be conducted in chuſing a trade for Emilius; or rather, we ought to

to leave that choice entirely to him; as the maxims he hath already imbibed, giving him a natural contempt for things that are uſeleſs, he will never think of throwing away his time in an unprofitable employment; and he judges of their being profitable by their real utility: he would chuſe a trade that might have been of uſe to Robinſon Cruſoe in his deſert iſland.

By giving a child a ſucceſſive view of the various productions of nature and art, by exciting his curioſity and tracing its tendency, we may be enabled to ſtudy his taſte, inclinations, and propenſities; to diſcover the firſt ſpark of his genius, if he have one of any particular turn. But it is a common error, which you ought carefully to avoid, that of attributing to the warmth of genius the mere effect of opportunity, and to conſtrue into an inclination for a particular art, that ſpirit of imitation which is as common to the ape as to the human ſpecies, and leads him mechanically to do what he ſees done by others, without knowing very well to what purpoſe. The world is full of artiſans, and particularly of artiſts, who have no natural talents for the arts they profeſs, to which they have been trained from their infancy, either from motives of convenience, or from ſome apparent zeal which had operated as well in favour of any other art, had the ſame opportunities offered of ſeeing it exerciſed. One youth hears the beat of a drum, and conceives himſelf born to be a general; another ſees the maſons at work, and immediately forms the deſign of being an architect. Every one is tempted to make choice of

that

that profeſſion which offers itſelf, and appears to be held in eſteem.

I knew an inſtance in a footboy, who, from ſeeing his maſter deſign and paint pictures, took it in his head to be a limner and hiſtory-painter. From the moment he formed this reſolution, he took up the crayon, which he laid down only to aſſume the pencil, and this he will never quit while he lives. Without rules, without inſtructions, he ſet himſelf down to deſign every thing that fell in his way. Three whole years did he ſit poring over his wretched daubings, getting nothing but his labour for his pains, and yet without being diſguſted at the little progreſs his mediocrity of talents permitted him to make. I remember to have ſeen him, for ſix months together in a very hot ſummer, ſitting, or rather nailed to his chair, in a little antichamber open to the ſouth, before a globe, of which he was attempting to draw the figure on canvaſs; beginning, rubbing out, and beginning again, with the moſt invincible obſtinacy, till at laſt he hit off the rotundity of the ſphere to his ſatisfaction.

By the directions of an artiſt, and the patronage of his maſter, he at length ſo far ſucceeded as to throw off his livery, and live by the pencil. Perſeverance ſupplied his want of talents to a certain degree; having attained this, he could never go farther. The ſpirit of emulation and reſolution of this honeſt lad are commendable: he will be ever eſteemed for his aſſiduity, fidelity, and good behaviour; but he will never riſe in his profeſſion higher than to the merit of a ſign-painter. Who is there that has not been miſled by his inclinations,

clinations, and miſtaken them for real abilities? There is a conſiderable difference between being pleaſed with any occupation, and being capable of it. It requires much nicer obſervation than is generally imagined, to aſcertain the taſte and genius of children: their caſual inclinations diſplay themſelves oftener than their innate diſpoſitions; and we judge from the firſt, for want of knowing how to ſtudy the laſt. I wiſh ſome judicious hand would give us a treatiſe on the art of ſtudying children; an art of the greateſt importance to be acquainted with, though fathers and preceptors know not as yet even its ſimple elements.

But, perhaps, we here make the choice of our employment of too great conſequence. As it relates only to ſome handicraft buſineſs, Emilius need not heſitate, he hath already ſerved half his apprenticeſhip in the exerciſes to which he has been accuſtomed. He is ready to turn his hand to whatever you may require of him: he knows how to handle the ſpade and the hoe, to make uſe of the mallet, the plane, and the file; the tools of all kinds of workmen are familiar to him. All that he needs farther is to acquire the ſame dexterity and facility in the uſe of them, as a good artiſt in that peculiar branch to which he may apply. To this end, alſo, he hath a great advantage above moſt other children, in the agility of his body and the ſuppleneſs of his limbs, by means of which he can throw himſelf into any attitude, and continue any kind of exerciſe for a long time without tiring. Add to this, that his ſenſes are acute and experienced, and all the mechaniſm of the

arts

arts already known to him. To turn the work out of his hands like a maſter, he requires nothing but practice; and practice is to be gained only by time. All that we have to do, therefore, is to determine what kind of mechanic employment we ſhall beſtow ſo much time on, as to make ourſelves expert in the exerciſe of it.

Let every man apply himſelf to one that is becoming his ſex and age. A cloſe and ſedentary profeſſion, which enervates the body, will neither pleaſe nor be proper for youth. No one ever yet naturally aſpired to be a taylor; artificial motives are required to induce our ſex, for whom ſuch buſineſs was never deſigned, to embrace ſo effeminate an employment *. The ſword and the needle are not made for the ſame hands. Were I a ſovereign, I would permit none but women, or maimed and deformed perſons, to follow any ſuch kind of trade. On the ſuppoſition that eunuchs are neceſſary, I think the Turks very great fools for making them on purpoſe. Why do not they content themſelves with ſuch as are impotent by nature; ſelecting them from that herd of diſpirited, cowardly mortals, whoſe mutilated hearts render them unfit for the more manly offices of life: ſociety hath a uſe for all others. Every feeble, timid, and delicate male, is condemned by his conſtitution to a ſedentary life; he is formed to live among the females; or at leaſt after their manner. Let ſuch be early initiated into the myſteries of the taylor, the mantua-maker, and other profeſſions of the like

* There were no taylors among the ancients, the cloaths of the men being made at home by the women of the family.

like nature; and if it be abſolutely neceſſary to have real eunuchs, let thoſe only be made ſuch who diſhonour their ſex by their voluntary application to ſuch unbecoming employments. Their very choice ſufficiently indicates the error of nature; in correcting it therefore, either one way or the other, you can do no harm.

I prohibit my pupil following any unhealthy buſineſs; but not thoſe which are laborious, or even dangerous. The latter exerciſe at once both his ſtrength and his courage; they are proper for the men only, the women making no pretenſions to them: how comes it then the men are not aſhamed to encroach on thoſe properly exerciſed by the women?

Luctantur paucæ, comedunt colliphia paucæ.
Vos lanam trahitis, calathiſque peracta refertis
Vellera *.

In Italy no women are to be ſeen ſerving in the ſhops, which give the ſtreets a very dull and heavy appearance to thoſe who have been accuſtomed to the gay and lively figure they make in France and England. When I ſee your haberdaſhers and man-milliners, meaſuring out lace, ribbons, and gauze to the ladies, I cannot help thinking ſuch elegant commodities appear very ridiculous in thoſe clumſy fiſts, which would be with greater propriety employed in blowing a ſmith's bellows, or at the labours of the anvil. I ſhould think, that, in ſuch countries, the women ought by way of repriſals to turn ſword-cutlers and gunſmiths. Let each ſex manufacture

* Juven. ſat. 2.

ture and vend the arms peculiar to itſelf. To underſtand them well, it is requiſite we ſhould know how to employ them.

I would have a young man learn to exert a ſtrong arm; to handle the axe and the ſaw; to ſquare a piece of unhewn timber, to mount the roof of a houſe, to lay on the ridge, and to fit the joiſts and ſcantlings. Would it be more ridiculous in him, while thus employed, to call out to his ſiſter to come and aſſiſt him in his labour, than for her to bid him ſit down to her needlework?

I perceive I have already ſaid too much for my polite and delicate contemporaries; but I ſometimes permit myſelf to be hurried away by the force of my own arguments. Thus far, however, is certain, that if any man whatever be aſhamed of being ſeen to handle a plane, or wear a leather apron in public, he is only a ſlave to prejudice, one that would be aſhamed of the moſt commendable actions, if they were ridiculed as unfaſhionable. We may give up, nevertheleſs, to the prepoſſeſſions of parents, whatever be not injurious to the underſtanding of the child. It is not neceſſary to exerciſe indiſcriminately ſuch profeſſions as are uſeful, merely to do honour to them all; it is ſufficient not to hold any one in leſs eſteem than it deſerves. When we are at liberty to make our choice, and have no other motives to determine us, why may we not conſult our own inclination and convenience, in chuſing among profeſſions of the ſame rank? The manufacture of hardware is uſeful, perhaps the moſt uſeful of all others; and yet, without ſome particular reaſon for it, I ſhould not make

your

your ſon a brazier or a blackſmith; I ſhould not like to ſee him, at the forge, reſemble the figure of a Cyclops: neither would I make him a maſon or bricklayer, and ſtill much leſs a ſhoemaker. Somebody, doubtleſs, muſt be of thoſe trades; but he who can make choice of which he pleaſes, ought to have ſome regard to cleanlineſs and neatneſs: theſe do not depend on caprice, but affect our ſenſes. Add to this, I ſhould not like any of thoſe ſtupid profeſſions, in the exerciſe of which the workmen need neither induſtry nor ingenuity; but, like mere machines, employ their hands conſtantly in the ſame manner. Such are cloath and ſtocking weavers, ſtone-ſawers, and the like. To what purpoſe ſhould a man of any underſtanding be put to ſuch trades, wherein the workman and his engine are only one machine moving another.

All things duly conſidered, the trade I ſhould like beſt my pupil ſhould have a taſte for, is that of a joiner. This is neat, uſeful, and may be carried on within doors: it is ſufficiently laborious to keep the body in exerciſe, and requires both diligence and dexterity: at the ſame time, taſte and elegance are not excluded from being diſplayed on the form and contrivance of the work.

If it ſhould ſo happen, indeed, that your pupil has a natural turn for the ſpeculative ſciences, I ſhould not blame you for teaching him a mechanic art conformable to his inclinations; let him learn, for example, to deſign and conſtruct mathematical inſtruments, quadrants, teleſcopes, and the like.

When Emilius learns a trade, I alſo will learn

it with him; for I am convinced he will never learn, as ſhould be, what we do not learn together. We will, therefore, both ſerve an apprenticeſhip; not affecting to be treated as gentlemen, but as real apprentices who are not trifling with a profeſſion: nay, why ſhould we not be ſo in reality? Czar Peter worked as a common ſhip-carpenter in the yard, and ſerved as a drummer in his own troops: do you think that prince was not your equal, at leaſt either in birth or merit? The reader will obſerve, I do not aſk Emilius this queſtion, but put it to every one, of whatever rank he may happen to be.

Unfortunately we cannot ſpend all our time at the work-bench; as we do not only apprentice ourſelves to the profeſſion of a joiner, but to that of man, the latter of which is by much the moſt tedious and difficult to learn. What then ſhall we do? Shall we hire a maſter-joiner, for an hour in a day, as we do the dancing-maſter? No: that would not be making ourſelves his apprentices, but his ſcholars; and our ambition is not ſo much to learn the trade, as to raiſe ourſelves to the condition of a joiner. I am therefore of opinion that we ſhould go once or twice a-week, at leaſt, and ſpend the whole day at his ſhop; that we ſhould riſe at his hour in the morning, that we ſhould be at our work before him, that we ſhould eat at his table, work according to his orders, and, after having had the honour of ſupping with his family, return, if we pleaſed, to ſleep on our own hard mattreſſes. Thus you ſee how we might learn ſeveral trades at once, and exerciſe ourſelves with manual

manual labour, without neglecting our other accompliſhments.

Be ſimple in well-doing. Let us not encourage vanity by the means we are taking to deſtroy it. To take a pride in having overcome prejudice, is to ſubmit to it. It is ſaid, that from an ancient cuſtom peculiar to the Ottoman race, the Grand Signior is obliged to practiſe ſome mechanical employment, and every one knows the ſuperior merit of ſuch workmanſhip: a prince can turn nothing out of his hands but a maſterpiece. Theſe curious productions of his ingenuity he diſtributes about magnificently to the grandees of the court, and the work is paid for according to the quality of the workman. The real evil of this cuſtom is not in the pretended impoſition of it, againſt which ſome have ſo loudly exclaimed. This, on the contrary, is a benefit. For in thus obliging the baſhaws and other petty tyrants of his empire to divide with him the ſpoils of the people, the prince is excuſed from doing it directly himſelf. This is a neceſſary relief to deſpotiſm, without which that horrible mode of government could not poſſibly ſubſiſt.

The real inconvenience of ſuch a cuſtom lies in the idea it gives the poor wretch of his princely merit. Like Midas, he ſees every thing he touches changed into gold; but perceives not the long ears ſprouting out and expoſing the aſs. To preſerve Emilius from being expoſed in the like manner, we ſhall not give him any ſuch valuable talent; the price of his labour ſhall not depend on the workman, but on the work. We ſhall never ſuffer him to judge of

the merit of his workmanſhip, but by comparing it with that of the beſt artiſans. Of any thing that is well executed, we may ſay to him, *This is well made;* but it will be wrong to add, *Who made it?* And if he ſhould ever himſelf add, with an air of triumph and ſatisfaction, *It was I that made it*, it will be requiſite to anſwer coldly, *Whether you, or any body elſe, it is no matter; the work is very well done.*

Let every careful and well-meaning mother guard againſt the impoſitions to which ſhe may be liable in reſpect to the improvement of her child. If her ſon pretends to much knowledge, let her diſtruſt every thing he affects to know: if he has the misfortune to be rich, and to be educated at Paris, he is undone. So long as he is in the midſt of able artiſts, he will be poſſeſſed of all their talents; but, when he is at a diſtance from them, he will have none at all. At Paris, a man who is rich knows every thing; there is nobody ignorant there that is not poor. That capital is full of pretended connoiſſeurs, and ſuperficial judges, of both ſexes. I know but three honourable exceptions amongſt the men, though there may be more: but I know not of one among the women, and I much doubt that there is really any. In general, a name is acquired in the arts as in the law; we may become artiſts, and judge of artiſts, as readily as to take up a degree in the civil law, and become a magiſtrate.

If, therefore, it ſhould ever become faſhionable to be maſter of ſome mechanic art, your children

children would ſoon be expert at it, without taking the trouble to learn: they would paſs maſters of arts, like the counſellors of Zurich. I will admit of no mere ceremonies of this kind with Emilius; he ſhall make no appearances, but always poſſeſs the reality. He ſhall not talk of what he knows, but continue to improve himſelf in ſilence. He ſhall be always employed about a maſterpiece, without ever ſetting up for a maſter; and be known for a workman only by his labour, and not by what he profeſſes.

If I have hitherto made myſelf underſtood, the reader will perceive, that, while I have accuſtomed my pupil to corporeal exerciſe and manual labour, I have given him inſenſibly a taſte for reflection and meditaton; in order to counterbalance that indolence which would be the natural reſult of his indifference for the opinions of mankind and the tranquillity of his paſſions. It is neceſſary that he work like a peaſant, and think like a philoſopher, leſt he become as idle as a ſavage. The great ſecret of education is, to make the exerciſes of the body and the mind ſerve as a relaxation to each other.

Let us beware, however, of anticipating thoſe inſtructions which require a riper judgment. Emilius will not be long a workman before he becomes ſenſible in himſelf of that inequality of conditions which he at firſt barely perceived. Hence, proceeding on the maxims I have laid down, he will be diſpoſed, in turn, to examine me. In receiving every thing from me, and ſeeing himſelf ſo little removed from a ſtate of

poverty, he will be curious to know wherefore I appear to be ſo rich. Taking me unprovided on this head, he may put ſome very knotty queſtions. *You are rich*, he might ſay; *you have told me ſo, and I ſee it. But a rich man owes his labours to ſociety in his quality as man; and of what public utility are yours?* What anſwer a polite tutor might make to ſuch a queſtion, I know not. He might probably be ridiculous enough to talk to him of the nature and importance of his ſervices in taking care of his education. As for me, the joiner's work-ſhop affords me an apology; I might, therefore, put off the queſtion thus. *A very pertinent query, Emilius; and I promiſe to anſwer it, on my part, when you can make a ſatisfactory reply to it on your own. In the mean time, I ſhall take care to give my ſuperfluity to you and the poor, and to make a table or bench every week, that I may not be quite uſeleſs to the public.*

Thus are we again returned to ourſelves. Behold my pupil, juſt ready to throw off a ſtate of infancy, recur again to himſelf, and perceive more than ever that neceſſity he lies under to circumſtances and things. After having ſet out with the exerciſe of his body and its organs, we proceeded to that of his genius and underſtanding, and have at length united the uſe of his limbs with that of his faculties. We have ſucceeded in the formation of an active, thinking being; to complete the man, we have nothing more to do than to render him affectionate and ſuſceptible; that is to ſay, to perfect his reaſon by ſentiment. But before we enter upon this new diſpoſition of things, let us take

take a retroſpect of that we are about to leave, and trace, as exactly as poſſible, how far we have proceeded. Our pupil had at firſt only ſenſations, at preſent he has ideas; he once did nothing but perceive, he can now form a judgment of things. It is from the compariſon made between ſeveral ſucceſſive or ſimultaneous ſenſations, and the judgment formed thereon, that a kind of complex or mixed ſenſation ariſes, which I call an idea.

The peculiar manner in which we form ideas, is that which conſtitutes the genius and character of the mind. To form our ideas of things on their actual relations only, betokens a ſolid underſtanding; whereas, to be contented with their apparent relations, betrays a ſuperficial one. To conceive theſe relations, as they really exiſt, diſplays a right judgment; to conceive miſtaken notions of them, denotes a wrong one. Thoſe who ſee imaginary relations, that have neither reality nor appearance, are madmen; while thoſe who make no compariſon between them, are ideots. The leſs or greater aptitude to compare theſe ideas, and diſcover ſuch relations, is what conſtitutes a greater or leſs degree of genius and underſtanding.

Simples ideas are only the reſult of comparative ſenſations. A judgment is to be formed from ſimple as well as from complex ſenſations; and this I call a ſimple idea. In judging of our ſenſations, the judgement is merely paſſive; it deduces only the perception of what is immediately perceived. But in the ideas ariſing from thoſe ſenſations, the judgement is active; it collects, compares, and determines thoſe relations which

which the ſenſes could not. This is all the difference, but this is very conſiderable. Nature never deceives us; we are always deceived by ourſelves.

A child eight years old, hath ſome freezing milk ſet before him. He puts the ſpoon up to his mouth, without knowing what it is; and no ſooner doth the ice touch his lips, than he cries out, *he is burnt*. He feels a very acute ſenſation, and knowing none more ſharp and painful than that of heat, he imagines that to be the cauſe. He is nevertheleſs miſtaken; the ſudden cold may hurt, but it does not burn him; nor are the ſenſations of heat and cold alike, thoſe who are more accuſtomed to both never confounding them together. It is not the ſenſation, therefore, that deceives him, but the judgement he forms of it.

We are liable to the ſame kind of deception the firſt time we ſee a mirrour, or make uſe of any optical machine; when we go into a vault in the depth of winter, or in the height of ſummer; when we put a very warm or cold hand into water of a middle temperature; or when we hold a round ball between the finger and the thumb of each hand held croſswiſe. Should we content ourſelves, in any of theſe caſes, with declaring ſimply what we perceive or feel, the judgment would be merely paſſive; but when we judge of the thing itſelf by its appearance, the judgment is active, it compares, and reaſons on thoſe relations which are not perceived, and thence we become liable to deception. It is from experience only we learn to prevent, or correct, ſuch errors.

Shew your pupil in the night the clouds paſſing

ſing over the moon, and he will at firſt think the moon moves the contrary way, and that the clouds ſtand ſtill. He will conclude ſo from a precipitate induction, becauſe he is more accuſtomed to ſee little objects move than great ones, and the clouds appear to him much bigger than the moon, of whoſe diſtance he cannot judge. When ſtanding ſtill in a ſhip in full ſail, he views the ſhore at a ſmall diſtance, he falls into a contrary error; the trees and houſes on the beach appearing to move, becauſe not perceiving his own motion, he conceives the ſhip and the ſea as one immoveable object, of which the leſs objects on ſhore are only a part.

The firſt time a child ſees a ſtick plunged half-way into the water, he ſees it broken; he is not deceived by his ſenſation, which is a true one, and would be ſo were we even ignorant of the cauſe of this phænomenon. If you aſk him, therefore, what he ſees, he will tell you a broken ſtick; and it is very true, for it is very certain ſuch is the object of his perception. But if, deceived by his judgment, he ſhould go farther; and, after having affirmed that he ſees a broken ſtick, maintain that what he ſees is actually ſuch, or that the ſtick ſo placed in the water is really broken, he would then maintain a falſehood. And why ſo? Becauſe then his judgement becomes active; he judges not from immediate inſpection, but rational deduction, in affirming what he does not perceive, *viz.* that the conception ſuggeſted by one ſenſe would be confirmed by another.

All our miſtakes thus ariſing from error in judgment, it is clear, that, if we were under

no

no neceſſity of judging, we ſhould have no occaſion to learn any thing; we ſhould never be liable to be deceived, and ſhould be much happier in our ignorance than we can be in our knowledge. We do not deny that the learned know a thouſand things to be true, of which the ignorant will never know any thing. Are the learned, therefore, nearer the truth in general? Quite the contrary: the more they advance, the farther off they find themſelves; becauſe the vanity of judging of things making greater progreſs than our abilities to judge, we form an hundred erroneous concluſions for one that is juſt. Nothing is more evident than that the learned ſocieties of Europe are public ſchools of falſehood; and it is very certain that the academy of ſciences have adopted more errors than are to be found among the whole nation of Hurons.

Since our errors thus increaſe with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance. So long as you ſuſpend your judgment, you will not be deceived. This leſſon is inculcated by nature, as well as authoriſed by reaſon. If we except a very few of thoſe ſtriking relations, which things immediately bear to ourſelves, we have naturally a very great indifference for all the reſt. A ſavage will not ſtep a foot out of his way to view the mechaniſm of the fineſt machine, or the moſt aſtoniſhing phænomenon of electricity. *What is it to me?* is a phraſe the moſt familiar with the ignorant, and the moſt proper for the learned.

Unhappily, however, this phraſe is now uſeleſs. Every thing is ſomething to us, ſince we are

are become dependent on all things; and our curioſity neceſſarily extends with our deſires. For this reaſon I attribute great curioſity to a philoſopher, and none at all to a ſavage. The latter ſtands in need of nobody; and the former of every one, and particularly of numerous admirers.

Will it be ſaid that I here deviate from nature? I deny it. Natural maxims; it is true, are founded on neceſſity, and not opinion; but our neceſſities vary with our ſituations. There is great deal of difference between the natural man in a ſtate of ſolitude, and the natural man in a ſtate of ſociety. Emilius is not a ſavage, deſtined to prowl in the woods, but to inhabit towns and cities. It is requiſite for him, therefore, to know how to manage his fellow-citizens, and to live among, if not like them.

Amidſt the variety of connections and depencies of ſuch a ſtate, he will be under a neceſſity of forming various judgments concerning them; let us inſtruct him, therefore, to judge of them aright.

The beſt way to effect this, is that which tends to reduce our experience to bare matters of fact, and enable us even to proceed, though wanting ſuch experience, without falling into error. Hence it follows, that, after we have long accuſtomed ourſelves to explain and confirm the evidence of one ſenſe by another, we ſhould further learn to verify the teſtimony of each ſenſe by itſelf, without having recourſe to the others; by which means every ſenſation will ſtand in the place of an idea, and that idea will be always conformable to truth. Such are the

acquire-

acquirements which I have pointed out for this third ſtage of human life.

This manner of proceeding, I own, requires a degree of patience and circumſpection of which few tutors are capable, and without which the pupil will never learn to judge properly. If, for example, when the latter is deceived in the appearance of the broken ſtick, you are in haſte to convince him of his error, by precipitately taking it out of the water, you may undeceive him, it is true; but what will you teach him by it? Nothing but what he would ſoon have as well learned of himſelf. This, therefore, is not the thing you are to do. The point aimed at is leſs to teach him what is actually and particularly true, than to teach him how to diſcover the truth in general, or at any other time. To inſtruct him properly on this occaſion, therefore, you ſhould not undeceive him ſo ſoon. Let Emilius and his tutor ſerve for your example.

In the firſt place, I ſuppoſe that a child educated in the ordinary manner, on being aſked if the ſtick be broken, will readily anſwer in the affirmative. I very much doubt, however, if Emilius will be ſo ready to determine it. As he ſees no neceſſity either to be or to appear knowing, he is in no haſte to judge of the matter: his judgment of things is founded on evidence; and he who ſo well knows how liable we are to deception in the objects of ſight, is very far from thinking the evidence in the preſent caſe ſufficient. Add to this, that knowing from experience that the moſt frivolous queſtions I put to him have always ſome material object, though not immediately perceived, he is not uſed to reply

reply careleſsly and without thinking. On the contrary, he is ſuſpicious and attentive, examining ſuch queſtions very carefully before he ventures to anſwer them. Hence he never makes me a reply that he is not well ſatisfied with himſelf, and it is no eaſy matter to ſatisfy him in this particular. In a word, neither he nor I pique ourſelves on knowing the truth of this, but only in not falling into error. We ſhould be much more aſhamed of ſitting down ſatisfied with an inſufficient reaſon for a thing, than of our incapacity to find any reaſon for it all. *I do not know*, is an anſwer ſo ſatisfactory to both, and which we repeat ſo often, that it now coſts us nothing. But, whether ſuch an abſurd affirmative ſhould eſcape, or he ſhould avoid it by our convenient negative, *I do not know*, my reply to him would ſtill the ſame: our way ſhould be to look and examine.

The ſtick, half immerſed in water, ſtands, we will ſuppoſe, in a vertical poſition: to know whether it be really broken as it appears, we have many things to do before we take it out of the water, or even touch it with the hand.

In the firſt place, we ſhould move round the ſtick, and in ſo doing we ſhould ſee the apparent fracture turn with us; the eye appearing to occaſion the change; but it is well known our looks cannot alter the form of the ſtick.

Secondly, We ſhould look down it from end to end, in which caſe we ſhould not ſee it broken or crooked. But can our eye have reunited or ſtraitened it.

Thirdly, I would give the water an undulating motion, when we ſhould ſee the apparent frac-

ture take different ſides, the ſtick appearing to bend backwards and forwards with the motion of the water. Now, can we think the motion given to the water ſufficient to break, ſoften, or bend the ſtick?

Fourthly, we take and pour out the water; by doing which we ſee the ſtick become gradually whole and ſtreight in proportion as the water decreaſes. Can any thing farther be required to explain the nature of this fact, and lead us to the diſcovery of the refraction? It is not true, therefore, that the ſight deceives us, ſince we have no need to uſe any other ſenſe to rectify thoſe errors we attribute to it.

But ſuppoſe a child ſo great a blockhead, as not to perceive the reſult of theſe experiments; in ſuch a caſe it will be proper to call in the touch to the aſſiſtance of the ſight. Inſtead, however, of taking the ſtick out of the water, let it remain ſome time in the ſame ſituation, and let the child carry his hand down it from the top to the bottom, by doing which he will find there is no angle, the ſtick is not bent or broken.

You will tell me, perhaps, this is not ſimply forming a judgment of things, but reaſoning on them in form. It is very true; but do not you ſee plainly, that as ſoon as we arrive at ideas, to form a judgment of any thing is to reaſon upon it?

The conſciouſneſs of a ſenſation is a propoſition, an opinion; and as ſoon as we compare one ſenſation with another, we reaſon. The arts of judging and reaſoning are one and the ſame.

Emilius can never learn dioptrics, if I cannot teach it him by means of this ſtick. He ſhall not, to this end, diſſect inſects, or count the ſpots

ſpots in the ſun; he ſhall not even know the uſe of microſcopes and teleſcopes. More polite and learned pupils may poſſibly laugh at his ignorance; for before he knows how to make uſe of theſe things, I purpoſe that he ſhall invent them; and this you doubt if he will compaſs ſo ſoon.

You ſee here the ſpirit that governs my ſyſtem. If a child holding a little ball between the fingers croſswiſe, imagines he holds two, I would not permit him to look, before he had otherwiſe convinced himſelf that he held but one.

Theſe explanations, I imagine, will ſuffice to denote preciſely the progreſs of my pupil's underſtanding, and the route he hath taken. But you are alarmed, perhaps, at the multitude of objects which have been preſented him. You are afraid his underſtanding ſhould be depreſſed or bewildered by ſuch a variety of knowledge. On the contrary, however, I have taught him to be ignorant of many more things than he knows. I have opened for him a way to ſcience, ſmooth and eaſy indeed, but long, extenſive, and tedious. I have inſtructed him at his firſt ſetting out, that he might know the entrance; but I ſhall never permit him to go very far.

Obliged to learn of himſelf, he makes uſe of his own reaſon, and not of that of others; for to give no influence to prepoſſeſſion, no weight ſhould be given to authority: and it is certain that our errors ariſe leſs from ourſelves than from others. From this continual exerciſe of the underſtanding will reſult a vigour of mind, like to that which is acquired by the body from conſtant labour and fatigue. Another advantage is, that we advance in knowledge only in proportion to

our capacity of digeſting it. The mind may be overloaded as well as the body. But when the underſtanding makes every thing perfectly clear and familiar before it commits it to the memory, whatever it deduces thence afterwards, is properly its own: whereas in overcharging the mind with the remembrance of a heap of confuſed ideas, we expoſe ourſelves to the inconvenience of never recollecting any thing that can properly be called our own.

Emilius has but little knowledge; but what he has, is truly his own; he knows nothing by halves. Among the few things he knows, and with which he is well acquainted, the moſt important is, that there are many things he is now ignorant of, which he may one day know; that there are many more which others know, and he will never be acquainted with; and that there is an infinity of others which neither he nor any body elſe will ever know. He poſſeſſes an univerſal capacity, not in point of actual knowledge, but in the faculties of acquiring it; an open, intelligent genius, adapted to every thing, and, as Montaigne ſays, if not inſtructed, capable of receiving inſtruction. It is ſufficient for me that he knows how to diſcover the utility of his actions, and the reaſon for his opinions. Once again, I ſay, my object is not to furniſh his mind with ſcience, but to teach him the method of acquiring it when he has occaſion for it; to inſtruct him how to hold it in eſtimation; and to inſpire him, above all, with a love for truth. By this method, indeed, we make no great advances; but then we never take an uſeleſs ſtep, nor are we obliged to turn back again.

Emilius

Emilius is acquainted with no other ſcience than that which is merely phyſical. He knows not even the name of hiſtory, nor what is meant by metaphyſics and morality. He hath ſtudied the eſſential relations between men and things, but no moral relations between man and man. He is ill qualified to generaliſe his ideas, or form abſtract notions of things; contenting himſelf with obſerving the general qualities of certain bodies, without reaſoning on thoſe qualities themſelves. He has a notion of abſtract ſpace, by the help of geometrical figures; and of abſtract quantity, by means of the ſigns in algebra. Thoſe figures and ſigns, however, are the ſupport of thoſe abſtractions, on which he reſts without ſeeking any further. He does not endeavour to find out the eſſence of things, or what they are in their own nature; but only their relations, and particularly thoſe in which he is intereſted. He holds nothing external in eſtimation, but from its relation to himſelf; but then the degree of this eſtimation is very juſt and exact. The caprice of cuſtom, or general agreement, ſtamp no value on any thing with him. He holds that in the higheſt eſtimation which is the moſt uſeful; and, never departing from this method of eſtimating the value of things, pays no regard to fancy or prepoſſeſſion. Emilius is laborious, temperate, patient, reſolute, and bold. His imagination never exaggerates danger; he is ſuſceptible of few evils; and knows how to ſuffer with patience, becauſe he has never learned to contend againſt deſtiny. With reſpect to death, he is hardly ſenſible what it is; but, accuſtomed to yield without

reſiſtance

reſiſtance to neceſſity, when it is his lot to die, he will ſubmit to his fate without murmur or complaint.

This is the utmoſt that our nature will permit in that dreadful moment. To live independent and unattached to life by human connections, is the beſt way to learn to die.

In a word, Emilius is virtuous in every thing relating to himſelf. To poſſeſs the ſocial virtues alſo, he only requires to be made acquainted with thoſe relations that give riſe to them; he only wants that information, which his mind is already formed to receive.

At preſent he conſiders himſelf as entirely unconnected with others. He requires nothing of any one, and thinks no one hath a right to require any thing of him. He ſtands alone, and independent, in the midſt of ſociety. Indeed his pretenſions to independency are better founded than thoſe of any other; as he is in himſelf very thing man is capable of being, at his age. He lies under no errors but thoſe which are inevitable: he has no vices but ſuch as no mortal was ever free from. He hath an healthy conſtitution, agility of body, perſpicuity of mind, and a diſpaſſionate heart. Self-love, the firſt and moſt natural of all the paſſions, as yet hardly exerts itſelf. Without diſturbing the repoſe of others, he has hitherto lived as content, happy, and free, as was poſſible for his nature. Do you think a youth thus arrived at his fifteenth year, hath miſemployed the term of his infancy?

END *of the* FIRST VOLUME.